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THE GROWTH OF NAPOLEON



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THE EARLIEST PORTRAIT OF NAPOLEON, AGED 16.

Frontispiece.

THE GROWTH OF NAPOLEON

A STUDY IN ENVIRONMENT

BY NORWOOD YOUNG

WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

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"I hold the immortality of the soul to be the remembrance which we leave behind in the minds of men. This thought is an inspiring one; it were better not to have lived at all than to leave no trace of one's existence behind."—NAPOLEON, FIRST CONSUL.

"My opinion is that the future good or bad conduct of a child depends entirely upon the mother."—NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA.



PREFACE

THE chief authorities for the youth of Napoleon are "Napoléon Inconnu," by Masson and Biagi; "La Jeunesse de Napoléon," by A. Chuquet; "La Genèse de Napoléon," by J. B. Marcaggi; "Les Bonapartes et leurs Alliances," by L. Brotonne; "Le Nid de l'Aigle," by Colonna de Cesare Rocca. To these writers I desire to express the fullest acknowledgment. Without their assistance it would have been impossible to complete this work, which is the first original study in English of the influence of his environment upon the growth of Napoleon. The subject has not been more than touched upon in any language.

The most important of these sources is Masson's great pioneer work. With it was incorporated in the first edition a transcript from the manuscripts of Napoleon, which have been placed in the Laurentinian Library at Florence by the Italian Government, who bought them from Lord Ashburnham. Commendatore Biagi, the eminent librarian, has undertaken the task of deciphering Napoleon's handwriting, a labour of no ordinary character. He has done it so well that there is small probability that any second version will ever be attempted. I have to thank him for his kindness to me, and for the facilities given me to examine the precious originals. Most of these youthful writings of Napoleon, together with a number of his early letters, which are also to be found in "Napoléon Inconnu," have not hitherto been translated into English.

The Laurentinian Library contains many priceless manuscripts, and among them a fifth-century Virgil, which has, on the back of the French binding of dark morocco, the crown of Napoleon impressed upon it, with two stars and "N."; and the pages are stamped in two places "Bibliothèque Nationale" (Paris). The story is that when Napoleon was in Florence on July 1, 1796 (for one day only), he found time for a visit to the Laurentinian Library, wrote his name "Bonaparte" in the visitors' book (where it is still to be seen), saw this Virgil in one of the cases, and examined it. It was an unusual occupation for a republican—or, indeed, any—General in that day. That Napoleon had been genuinely interested in his discovery is proved by the fact that one of his first acts as First Consul was to order this Virgil, the only book in Florence that he thought worth seizing, to be sent to Paris. The Congress of Vienna ordered the spoil to be returned, and thus in 1816 the Virgil returned to the Florence Library.

Fatalists may regard the presence in the library of the youthful writings of Napoleon as a retribution for the rape of the Virgil.

N. Y.

October, 1910.

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THE GROWTH OF NAPOLEON

CHAPTER I

ANCESTORS

SEVERAL different genealogies of Napoleon have been laboriously worked out. His descent was traced at various times by the sycophants about the Imperial Court to the Roman Emperors, the Greek Emperors, the French Kings, and to some of the great Italian families. To one of the most egregious of these efforts, which proved that Napoleon was the legitimate heir to the French Crown through the Man in the Iron Mask and the daughter of his gaoler, one Bompert (Bonaparte), the Emperor replied in the *Moniteur* of July 15, 1805:

“A genealogy of the Bonaparte house, as ridiculous as it is stupid, has appeared in the papers. These researches are most puerile. To those who ask from what period dates the Bonaparte house the answer is very simple: it dates from the 18th Brumaire. Soldier, magistrate, sovereign, the Emperor owes all to his sword and his love of the people. How is it possible in the present century that any person should be so silly as to amuse the public with such absurdities?”

A successful man is naturally averse to the idea that his triumphs can be due to his ancestors, and not to

himself. When Sir Francis Galton circularized the Fellows of the Royal Society, he found that they preferred to ascribe their eminent position to individual capacity rather than to inheritance. Pleasant as it may be to feel that one comes of superior stock, vanity is not completely satisfied without an acknowledgment of the personal factor.

An Emperor by inheritance, unable to prove personal qualities entitling him to his position, may have to rely upon the prestige of his blood. The Austrian Emperor, "whose head was crammed with ideas of high birth . . . who thought more of the lustre to be obtained from parchments than of victories,"* had a genealogy made out showing that his son-in-law was descended from a family which had reigned at Treviso, and then proudly declared that he would never have given his daughter to Napoleon if he had not felt sure that his family was as noble as the Emperor's own. The man of genius smiled, and quietly remarked that his desire was to be the Rudolph of Habsburg of his family.

The courtiers who thought to please Napoleon with their genealogies earned merely his contempt. It is strange that none of these industrious toadies, who were ready to make all the great men in history contribute to the production of their hero, should have thought of the most apposite and obvious name of all—the name invoked by Napoleon himself in 1809 in Vienna, when he quoted the example of "Charlemagne, my august predecessor." One wonders that no attempt was ever made to prove Napoleon's physical descent from his political ancestor, for, though he would have repudiated it, he might have been pleased to have it published.

A modern writer of ability and learning† has under-

* Napoleon to O'Meara, at St. Helena.

† "Le Nid de l'Aigle," by Colonna de Cesare Rocca.

taken the task, and found a connection through the Malaspina family, as follows :

Charlemagne, 768-814	Gabriele, 1275-1289
Louis, 814-840	Isnardo, 1291-1322
Lothaire, Emp., 840-857	Nicolo, 1348-1416
Lothaire, King, 855-869	Appolonia, m. Cesare
Bertha, m. Adalberto, Mar-	<i>Bonaparte</i> , 1440-1470
quis of Tuscany, 890	Giovanni Bonaparte, 1483-
Guido, 917	1486
Adalberto, 940	<i>Francesco</i> (went to Cor-
Oberto, 940-967	sica), 1490-1540
Oberto Obizzo, 986-1015	Gabriele, 1520-1582
Alberto, 1017	Geronimo, 1560-1584
Oberto Obizzo, 1090.	Francesco, 1596-1603
Alberto <i>Malaspina</i> , 1124	Sebastiano, 1603-1643
Obizzo <i>Malaspina</i> , 1145-	Carlo, 1637-1692
1185	Giuseppe, 1663-1700
Morello, 1165-1197	Sebastiano, 1684-1760
Guglielmo, 1193-1220	Giuseppe, 1713-1763
Obizzo, 1220-1249	Carlo Maria, 1746-1785
Iznardo, 1265-1275	Napoleon, 1765-1821

The dates give the extreme mention of each person.

There need be no hesitation in accepting this pedigree on such good authority. Its production 100 years ago might have earned a substantial reward. Now we are able to look upon it with indifference, for, as our genealogist points out, we are all, or nearly all, descended from Charlemagne.


With two parents, four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, and so on, doubling for each generation, it has been calculated by the author of this same pedigree that the ancestors living in the time of Charlemagne of any man living now must have been altogether 17,000,000,000, which is quite ten times the present population of the world, and many times the total in Charlemagne's day.

These swollen figures must be due to the appearance in every pedigree of the same persons over and over

again. A near ancestor appearing twice would cut out a very large number of repetitions. If two great-great-grandparents were the same person, that would eliminate 1,000,000,000 names. So near a duplicate may be unusual, but a little further back there must be many.

The blood of Charlemagne, or of any other man living 1,100 years ago, must by this time have spread to practically the entire populations reasonably near to the region in which such ancestor lived. The only causes which would prevent the spreading of so comparatively recent a strain would be a geographical obstacle, or a social custom. In Corsica it may not as yet have penetrated deeply, kept out by the barriers of sea and mountain which have sanctioned the custom of the marriage of near relations. The Corsican will have many duplicates even amongst his near ancestors, when compared with the inhabitants of countries where the movements of population are freer and the choice of mates is greater. But all those who, like Napoleon, lived on the coast, or were of Italian stock, must have had Charlemagne as one of their ancestors.

Napoleon, our genealogist tells us, was far more Ligurian than Corsican. Of his eight great-grandparents, six were mainly of Ligurian stock, two mainly of Corsican. Here is the succession :



The four great-grandfathers were Ligurian; two great-grandmothers were Ligurian, two (Tusoli and Peri) were Corsican. Thus Napoleon (not to go further back) was three-fourths Ligurian, one-fourth Corsican.

The Bonaparte line—of no greater intrinsic importance than the Malerba, or any other—has been explored back by diligent searchers to Francesco Bonaparte, who migrated from Sarzana in the sixteenth century, and died at Ajaccio in 1540. But Francesco Bonaparte was only one of Napoleon's 1,024 ancestors of the same degree, and his influence as bearer of "blood" is therefore negligible. The Sarzana strain in Napoleon may have been considerable, for Ajaccio was founded in 1486 by 100 families chiefly from Sarzana and the neighbouring parts of Lunegiana, in Liguria. These colonists disdained to intermarry with the Corsicans, the conquered natives, who were not permitted to live inside the town of Ajaccio. The Ligurians were the dominant, the civilized race, while the Corsicans were primitive peasants. The barriers were in course of time occasionally broken down and Corsican blood gradually introduced into the Ligurian stream; but there must have been some inbreeding among the colonists, especially those from Sarzana.

It is known that children tend to resemble their parents physically, and efforts have been made to show that there is also a visible mental approximation; but whether such doubtful phenomena as have been laboriously collected are the result of blood inheritance or of environmental influence, whether they existed before birth or were manufactured after it, has not been conclusively demonstrated. Though good work is being done in the study of this subject, it is still but little understood. We know practically nothing as to the connection that may exist between the reputed mental character of a man and the innate mental tendencies of his progeny; nor is it as yet possible to point to any adult whose character can be proved to be the result of inheritance from his father. To do that, a mental resemblance having been in the first

place shown to exist between father and adult son—in itself a very difficult matter to demonstrate beyond cavil—the coincidence of the maternal influence has to be proved, or its absence explained, and finally the infection from environment has to be eliminated.

No satisfactory evidence on these lines has as yet been produced. The most convincing proof would be furnished by a mental similarity being shown to exist between two adult brothers, twins, who had never been in the same environment, one of them having been permanently removed from the mother and her home on the day of his birth.

In the case of Napoleon it has to be said that we know little of his parents, less of his grandparents, and nothing at all as to their influence upon him as bearers of inheritable mental qualities.

His environment, on the other hand, can be observed, and an estimate made of its importance. We can examine the inherited environment, which existed at his birth, and had already affected his parents and the others about him; and the environment which was more personal to himself in the growing years of childhood, boyhood, and early manhood. Then we shall have considered the visible factors which, working upon an invisible heritage, made the ultimate product—the man.

CHAPTER II

INHERITED ENVIRONMENT

I. CORSICA.

CORSICA, a beautiful and romantic island, is situated in the Northern Mediterranean, 9 miles N. of Sardinia, 56 miles W. of Italy, 110 miles S.E. of Cap Martin, France. It is 114 miles in length, 52 miles in breadth, and 3,356 square miles in area—a little smaller than Cyprus, and larger than Crete. Its population in the second half of the eighteenth century was about 200,000, and is now 300,000. The island is covered with mountains, of which the highest are Monte d'Oro, 7,850 feet; Monte Rotondo, 8,775 feet; Monte Cinto, 8,890 feet—unusual heights to rise from so small a base. Though apparently heaped in confusion, a distinct range runs from N.E. to S.W., the areas on each side being known to the inhabitants as *Di qua* (N.E.) and *Di la* (S.W.)—This side and That side, counting from Bastia, the former capital, on the N.E. The higher mountains are snow-covered for the greater part of the year. From the central chain others branch off towards the sea, ending generally in headlands on the N., W., and S., with some magnificent gulfs, veritable fiords, on the W., and in terraces, leading to plains, on the E.

Numerous rivers, streams, and streamlets pour along the valleys, and the mountains being precipitous, the flow of water is swift or torrential. There are a number of picturesque small lakes. The island has

springs of valuable mineral waters, with bathing establishments, at Orezza, Guagno, Caldaniccio, etc.

The soil is fertile, some of the valleys where there is alluvial deposit giving remarkable results in wheat and other crops. Wine and oil are produced in quantity. The "Sposata" vineyard, belonging to the Bonapartes, produced wine which they all greatly appreciated, and Napoleon longed for when at St. Helena. Oranges and lemons are in profusion, and the citron is cultivated and preserved. Pines grow on the upper parts of the mountains, and the oak, ilex, and arbutus are common. The Spanish chestnut is the staple tree, the flour made from it forming the chief food of the inhabitants. The pastures are inferior, much of the hillsides being covered by a scrubby growth called "maquis." The cattle, goats, and sheep are small, and tend to be black in colour.

There is plenty of game. The wild-boar, the moufflon (a kind of deer now very rare), and hares; with woodcock, snipe, quail, partridge, wild-duck. The Corsican blackbird is large and fat, and considered a great delicacy. The fish have been famous since Roman days:

"Mullus erit domini quem misit Corsica."

(Juv., Sat., v. 92.)

Boswell, who visited the island in 1765, says in his "Account of Corsica": "Corsica is charmingly situated in the Mediterranean, from whence continual breezes fan and cool it in summer, and the surrounding body of water keeps it warm in winter, so that it is one of the most temperate countries in that quarter of Europe. Its air is fresh and healthful, except in one or two places, which are moist, and where the air, especially in summer, is suffocating and sickly; but in general the Corsicans breathe a pure atmosphere, which is also keen enough to brace their fibres more than one

would expect under so warm a sun." Boswell quotes from Theophrastus (Hist., v. 9.): "Corsica therefore, whether in respect of its temperate climate, or in respect of its soil, or of its air, greatly excels other countries." A modern medical authority, who has had personal acquaintance of many climates, says: "I regard Ajaccio as the most comfortable climate I have ever visited."* Except in the summer, when malaria is prevalent, the coast towns enjoy a delightfully salubrious climate, preferable to the French or the Italian Riviera, being warmer and free from the trying mistral. Fog and frost are almost unknown. Rain, falling heavily, is of short duration, and, owing to the porosity of the subsoil, disappears rapidly, leaving the roads dry after a very short interval.

In the summer all the inhabitants of the eastern coast, and many of those on the other coasts, move to higher ground, where the air, even on the hottest days, is delightfully fresh and genial. Thus in Corsica a considerable part of the population enjoys almost perfect climatic conditions—a winter that is sunny, genial, and tonic, and a summer with balmy and refreshing airs.

The coast is dotted with small towns, many of them still enclosed by their walls, with the vivid blue sea in their front, low hills covered with olive and vine in the environs, and snow-capped mountains in the clear distance. Ajaccio, though not the most picturesque town in the island, is in early spring a vision of beauty, radiant with light and colour, the trees on the boulevards bearing their oranges and mandarins; while in the gardens around the almond, peach, and cherry are in blossom, and the mimosa is a blaze of yellow.

Napoleon at St. Helena recalled the perfumes of

* Dr. Tucker Wise in "Mediterranean Winter Resorts," by F. A. Reynolds Ball, 1896.

Corsica, and declared that by them alone, with his eyes shut, he would recognize his birthplace. Boswell had already observed: "The prospect of the mountains, covered with vines and olives, was extremely agreeable; and the odour of the myrtle and other aromatic shrubs and flowers that grew all around me was very refreshing." A modern writer* speaks of "the glorious charm of the maquis, its hesitant, elusive perfume, which makes the air of Corsica something unique in the world." He says the maquis is "a mixture of eight plants—cistus, lentiscus, arbutus, myrtle, heath, rosemary, juniper, and wild olive—combining to give Corsica an enchanted atmosphere, to make it the Scented Isle."

The scenery inland is wild, stern, and romantic. Boswell says: "The interior parts of the island are in general mountainous, though interspersed with fruitful valleys, but have a peculiar grand appearance, and inspire one with the genius of the place, with that undaunted and inflexible spirit which will not bow to oppression." Modern connoisseurs speak of the Corsican scenery with enthusiasm. Here is what Mr. D. W. Freshfield, the well-known climber, and sometime President of the Alpine Club, says in the *Alpine Club Journal*: "I, at any rate, know of no such combination of sea and mountains; of the sylvan beauty of the North with the rich colours of the South; no region where within so small a space Nature takes so many sublime and exquisite aspects as she does in Corsica."

The Bonapartes lived for the greater part of the year at Ajaccio, making a *villeggiatura* to the hills in the summer. The Milelli vineyard, about five miles from Ajaccio, which some historians have designated as their summer residence, did not come into their possession until shortly before the death of Napoleon's

* "Romantic Corsica," by G. Renwick, 1909.



AJACCIO.

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father in 1785, when Napoleon was being educated in France. But the family possessed properties at Bastelica, distant twenty-five miles, and 2,500 feet above the sea, and at Bocognano, distant twenty-six miles, and 2,000 feet above the sea.

The childhood of Napoleon, up to the age of nine years, was spent at Ajaccio, on the seashore, in a delightful health-giving land of light and beauty, with summer excursions to the stern, rugged mountain scenery of Bastelica or Bocognano.

2. CORSICAN HISTORY.

The history of Corsica is written in sombre colours, for the island has been the prey of marauders and conquerors from time immemorial, and its annals are one long record of obstinate, but—except for one brief period—fruitless struggles for freedom. Napoleon, in his "*Lettres sur la Corse*," written in 1789, says: "The history of Corsica is nothing but that of a perpetual struggle between a small people which wishes to live in freedom and its neighbours who wish to oppress it."

The Phœnicians established trading centres on the coasts, and were followed in the customary succession by Etruscans, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Goths, Lombards, and Saracens, of whom only the last have left any considerable traces. The national shield still bears a Moor's head.

The classic name for the island was Cynus. The name Corsica is associated with the legend of a Ligurian woman named Corsa, who saw a bull swim over to the island, and return much fatter than he went. The story shows that the island had always a reputation for fertility and richness, and doubtless most of its inhabitants must originally have come from Liguria, the nearest part of the Continent. Corsica has been derived from *cor*, a heart, and *sica*,

a stiletto or steel; and certainly this people has a heart of steel.

Bonifacio of Lucca built the fortress of Bonifacio in 833, and established some sort of order within range of it. The island became divided among a number of foreign nobles, who were incessantly at war with the natives and with each other. Urban II., claiming to have received the suzerainty of the island from Charlemagne, in 1098 placed it under the authority of the Archbishop of Pisa, and Pisa remained mistress of Corsica for 200 years, until her defeat by Genoa at the naval battle of Meloria in 1284, which was followed by a treaty in 1300, giving Corsica to Genoa.

The Pisan rule had been benevolent, but the Genoese were to make their administration world-famous for harshness and oppression. "Genoa," as Boswell says, "drained the island of all she could possibly get, choosing rather even to have less advantage by tyranny than to have much greater advantage, and risque the consequences of permitting to the inhabitants the blessings of freedom." Boswell's remarks are of special interest because we know that Napoleon, as a young man, read a translation of his book.

The Corsicans, with their hearts of steel, were not to be easily suppressed. They elected as their leader Sambucuccio, the first of the famous Corsican patriots, whose career is, however, somewhat legendary. He freed a large part of the island from its oppressors, and is credited with a re-organization of the administration.

On the death of Sambucuccio the struggle was continued by Giudice della Rocca, Vincentello d' Istria, and other heroes whose names will never be forgotten in Corsica. After 150 years of incessant conflict a still greater leader appeared, the famous Sampiero di Bastelica, also known as Sampiero Corso. Like many

of the leading Corsicans, Sampiero was educated abroad, in Tuscany. Then he became chief of the Corsican regiment in France, in which capacity he distinguished himself greatly in the wars of the period. When France, in the course of the war with Charles V., drove the Genoese from the island, Sampiero led the Corsicans, who fought with great courage against the republic. Boswell remarks: "I hope a Livy or a Clarendon shall one day arise and display to succeeding ages the Corsican bravery with the lustre it deserves." But by the treaty of 1559 Genoa retained Corsica. The islanders now fought on alone, and with much success, under the intrepid Sampiero. He was at last done to death, as so many of the leading Corsicans have been, by a treacherous assassin, in 1567.

Napoleon, in his "*Lettres sur la Corse*," relates at some length—and twice over—the tragic story of Sampiero and Vanina d'Ornano, his wife. Outlawed by the Genoese, Sampiero was at Tunis, while Vanina and the children took refuge at Marseilles. There she entered into relations with a Genoese emissary. "Sampiero," writes Napoleon, "loves passionately his wife Vanina, whom he has left at Marseilles with his children, his papers, and some friends. The Genoese undertakes to seduce her with the hope that her great estates in Corsica will be returned to her, and a brilliant future insured for her children, with which her husband would be pleased. But she would have to go to Genoa to give the Corsicans the example of submission to their government." She agreed, but after starting was brought back by Corsican friends. Sampiero, on hearing this, was transported with rage, murdered the man who brought him the news, and rushed off to Marseilles.] Napoleon dwells on the details of his meeting with Vanina at considerable length. Finally: "She thinks she sees signs of emo-

tion on the physiognomy of her husband; she flings herself at his feet. She is repulsed with horror. 'Madame,' says Sampiero harshly, 'from crime and dishonour there is no escape save death.' She implores him to spare her. 'Sampiero, on the day of our marriage you swore to protect me in my weakness, and to guide my steps,'" and so on. But "the compassion and tenderness which ought to have been aroused found only a soul henceforth dead to all sentiment. . . . Vanina died . . . Vanina died at the hands of Sampiero."

After the death of Sampiero the Corsicans were held down by force for another 150 years. They had no civil or political rights, and were taxed so severely that all encouragement to labour in the fields was taken away. They preferred to be idle, living on chestnuts and chestnut flour, rather than work in order that their foreign tyrants should take the proceeds. The judgments of the tribunals were sold to the highest bidder, thus compelling the people to right their own wrongs, and forcing them to the practice of the *vendetta*. The *caporali* were too often traitors to their own people. Many Corsicans emigrated to France, Venice, Rome. The Pope formed his bodyguard of 800 Corsicans. The Genoese exactions were such that, when some of their officials returned, those who were to take their places asked with anxiety: "Have you left us anything to take?" Napoleon, who was himself descended from these vultures, but became, like his father, an ardent patriot, tells a story in his "*Lettres sur la Corse*" which shows what the Genoese themselves thought of the Corsican administration. A certain Genoese Senator, honest and pious, was in the habit of repeating a prayer whenever he heard the church bells announce the death of a noble; but he always before beginning made inquiry whether the deceased had been an official in Corsica; in that case

his prayer would be useless, for he was already in the hands of the Devil—*a casa del Diavolo*.

At last, in 1729, a general insurrection broke out. With the aid of Austrian soldiers, bought from the Emperor Charles VI., the revolt had been nearly suppressed, when, on March 12, 1736, there landed at Aleria, accompanied by a troupe of gorgeous servants, one Theodore, Baron Neuhof of La Mark, in Westphalia. He brought with him money which he had obtained from various persons by promises of rich rewards, and muskets and powder; also, so he said, all sorts of promises of help from people of great importance. Being a plausible man, bringing gifts of value, and a stranger against whom no local rivalries could be raised, within a month of his appearance he was actually proclaimed King of Corsica, a signal evidence of the pressing need of a strong central, unifying authority. Theodore showed conspicuous ability. He set about drilling an army, promulgated a liberal constitution, established factories of arms, encouraged industries in the towns and agriculture in the fields, and brought hope to the depressed people. He gained some successes over the Genoese, who thereupon, as a last resort, let loose criminals from their prisons as volunteers to serve in Corsica, a proceeding which proved hurtful to their interests, for the presence of these bad characters caused indiscipline in their own troops, and feelings of shame and disgust in their Swiss mercenaries. Theodore, however, was obliged to leave the island to collect arms and the succours which he had promised, and Genoa obtained the assistance of France. Louis XV. sent troops, the Corsicans were defeated, and the Marquis de Maillebois attempted to pacify the island. Then Theodore reappeared, but he was powerless against France, and the Corsicans would have none of him; he retired to London, where he died in poverty, in 1756.

Then the Corsicans elected as their Commander-in-Chief the famous Gaffori, one of the greatest of Corsican heroes. Gaffori laid siege to Corte. The Genoese, having obtained possession of the person of his eldest son, an infant, placed the child on the ramparts of the citadel at the spot where a breach was being attempted by the Corsican fire. But Gaffori ordered the attack to continue until the entrance was effected, and luckily the child was not hit. Boswell had this story from the young Gaffori. "He related to me himself, from the best authority, this story, which does so much honour to his father. I had it also vouched by such as had no particular interest in it." Other tales of heroism cling to the Gaffori name. During his temporary absence from Corte on one occasion the Genoese attacked his house, with the intention of seizing his wife as a hostage. Signora Faustina Gaffori barricaded the house, and with her friends sustained the attack for some days, when at last one of them proposed a surrender. Faustina Gaffori thereupon went down to the lower part of the house, where was a barrel of powder, and with a light in her hand threatened to blow the whole house down if there were any further talk of surrender. Gaffori himself arrived in time to drive off the assailants. The house still stands, its face deeply pitted with bullet marks. In front of it is a statue to Gaffori, on which is a relief representing his wife before the barrel of powder threatening to fire it.

Gaffori's task was to keep up the national spirit of resistance. Boswell records that "the Corsicans still talk with admiration of his harangues to them." On one occasion he said: "It is time to forget our miserable quarrels in the face of the peril that confronts us. We must give our blood and other sacrifices of all kinds in order to achieve the freedom of our country; but this enterprise is not beyond the courage and patriotism



STATUE OF GAFFORI, BEFORE HIS HOUSE, CORTE.

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of Corsicans. Liberty is a benefit so precious that one cannot pay too much for it. Remember the words of the ancient orator: 'Every people which has wished for liberty has obtained it.' You would not, I am sure, give me the sorrow of finding myself mistaken in judging that you are capable of subordinating every other interest to the most important of all—that of our deliverance, and of sacrificing every other feeling to the love of our country.'"

But his eloquence and his example were, in spite of some successes, insufficient to overcome the petty jealousies, the hostilities of families, which had always been the most serious of all the obstacles to independence. He could not get a united support, and was, like his great predecessor Sampiero, and many another patriotic Corsican, treacherously murdered on October 3, 1753. His own brother was among the assailants, and was in his turn assassinated; but the other perpetrators of the crime escaped to obtain their reward from Genoa. The house at Corte where the conspirators had made their plans was afterwards pulled down, and the place where it stood has been kept unoccupied and bare to this day.

The leaders met to elect a new chief, and were faced with the old difficulty of reconciling the various ambitions and rivalries. At length Clemente Paoli, bearing an honoured name, for his father, Giacinto Paoli, had already distinguished himself in the War of Independence, proposed his younger brother, Pasquale. It was at once seen that the suggestion was a good one. The name of Paoli was a symbol of patriotic ardour, and, most important of all, Pasquale was not personally known, and had therefore no enemies. Born in Corsica in 1726, he had been taken by his father to Naples at the age of fourteen, and was now, aged twenty-nine, an officer in the Neapolitan army. Theodore had been made King of

Corsica, and for a time obtained a united support owing to the fact that he was a stranger. Paoli also had the advantage of being, personally, a stranger; but he was besides a Corsican of a proved stock, and had in addition a valuable qualification for the post in his military education. Pasquale Paoli was accordingly invited to a conference. He eagerly responded to the call, though he had to abandon a promising career in Italy, and landed on his native soil, near Borgo, on April 25, 1755.

On July 15 the Supreme Council issued a manifesto, saying:

"The discords which have troubled the tranquillity of the country have revived ancient hostilities which do no good to the nation. They have obliged the principal chiefs to come together to concert measures for re-establishing a general unity of effort, and for assuring that the laws against those who agitate the country by their intrigues and quarrels shall be put into force."

They then announced that they had chosen as General Pasquale Paoli. At first it was proposed to limit the power of the new chief, but he made so good an impression that he was wisely permitted to act as Dictator. The only hope lay in a despotic power, and a Corsican Dictator was at least better than a German King.

Paoli found Corsica in a deplorable condition of anarchy and misery. His task was first to regenerate and purify society, and then to expel the invader. How he achieved what had never been done before by any of his predecessors in all the long centuries of foreign domination it would be too long to relate in detail; but he did gradually get control over his people. He made the law respected. Under his influence the judges refused bribes and punished wrongdoers. For homicide the death penalty was in

some cases exacted; even a relative of Paoli himself was executed. The effect was magical. The murders were reduced from 800 a year—an enormous number for so small a community—to almost nullity, a mere half-dozen or so. The world-famous vendetta of Corsica, which had come to be regarded as a microbe in the blood, was shown to be amenable to treatment.

Boswell describes the political system under Paoli as “a compleat and well-ordered democracy. From the Podestà and Padri del Commune, up to the Supreme Council, there is a gradual progression of power, flowing from the people, which they can resume, and dispose of at their pleasure, at the end of every year,” when “a general *consulta* or Parliament of the nation is held annually in the month of May, at the city of Corte.” Boswell considered the Constitution of Corsica to be “the best model that hath ever existed in the democratical form . . . while proper measures are taken for the continuation of the State, individuals have the full enjoyment of all the comforts of life. They are men as well as citizens.”

This gifted people, with their independent, self-confident spirit, and their free institutions, wanted, above all, a strong central, indigenous authority. This was furnished by their great man, Paoli, who drove out the foreign intruder, gave the country one of the best political systems that has ever been devised, established law and order, and respect for them both. He created a confidence in the central authority, a sense of national unity, a universal patriotic fervour, which was new in Corsican history. What Sampiero and Gaffori bled for in vain Paoli achieved.

The Genoese authority was forced to take shelter in a few of the coast towns, and was clearly not safe even there. The Genoese occupation was rapidly becoming a farce, for the island had never been regarded from any aspect except that of the tax-collector, and Genoa

was getting no tribute of any kind. She appealed once more to France, and 3,000 French troops were landed in November, 1756. There was always the fear in France that Paoli might come to terms with England, for possession of the island was of great importance to a maritime Power. Nelson thought Corsica worth more than Malta. But in 1759 the French troops were wanted for the war in Germany, and were withdrawn. The Genoese influence, confined to some of the seaports, and small even there, was now negligible. Paoli was the ruler of the island.

In this position he remained practically unmolested until, at the close of the Seven Years' War, the Duc de Choiseul, desirous, as he said, of "making good, by new acquisitions in time of peace, the cessions which the misfortunes of war have compelled us to make to our enemies," entered into a treaty with Genoa, signed at Compiègne on August 7, 1764. France was to garrison for four years the fortresses of Ajaccio, Calvi, Bastia, San Fiorenzo, and Algajola, and Genoa in return would abandon the £80,000 she had lent to Louis XV. during the Seven Years' War. Accordingly Comte de Marbeuf was sent to Corsica with six battalions, of which two went to Ajaccio, and the remainder to the other towns named. Paoli still retained control of the whole island outside those fortresses.

When the stipulated four years had nearly expired, and Genoa could not hope for any recovery of dominion over the island, she finally abandoned it to France. On May 15, 1768, a treaty was signed at Versailles by which Genoa gave up Corsica to France altogether for £80,000.

Paoli protested vehemently to all the Sovereigns of Europe. "We are treated," he wrote to Vienna, "like a flock of sheep sold in the market-place." He con-

vened a meeting at Corte of representatives from all parts of the island, at which resistance against the French was unanimously and enthusiastically voted, with cries of "Guerra, guerra! libertà ò morte!"

But, of course, the case was hopeless. Corsican bravery could merely delay for a time the French conquest. In July, 1768, Marbeuf, with troops newly landed, opened communications between the French garrisons of San Fiorenzo and Bastia. The war had begun before the expiration of the original term of four years from the Treaty of Compiègne, August, 1764. On August 15, 1768 (exactly a year before the birth of Napoleon), Louis XV. published an edict announcing the cession of Corsica to France, and ordering the islanders to accept and adopt the position of French citizens. This proclamation was published at Bastia by M. de Chauvelin, who had arrived with 10,000 troops, on August 28, 1768. The French, however, were worsted in several combats, and in October at Borgo they suffered a severe defeat, a force of 500 French being compelled to capitulate. De Chauvelin obtained an armistice from Paoli, and resigned his command. The French thereupon tried by bribes to get rid of Paoli in the Genoese manner. There were always Corsicans to be found for such work. A priest, Fabianni, volunteered to murder him, but his efforts ended in his own death. Then Paoli's secretary, Massesi, a man of good family and position, undertook to deliver Paoli to the French. The plot was discovered, and Massesi executed.

The war had already cost France £1,000,000. Large reinforcements were sent. In the spring of 1769 Comte de Vaux, the new Commander, had altogether in the island forty-five battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, with artillery and engineers. After deducting the troops in garrison, his field force was not large, considerably less than that of Paoli; but

the French were trained men, well armed, with cavalry and artillery, while the Corsicans were mere peasants, with no trained officers, inferior weapons, no artillery, and little discipline.

After some uncertain combats, a decisive battle was fought on May 8, 1769, at Ponte Nuovo. A Corsican body of 2,000 men crossed the River Golo by the bridge to attack a much superior French force. They were driven back to the bridge, where they were refused passage by their own friends, and, continuing to press back, were fired upon by their compatriots to compel them to turn and face the enemy. With Corsicans against them on one side and French on the other, they were nearly all killed on the bridge or drowned in the river. The rest of the Corsican army dispersed, crying out that they had been betrayed, and refused to fight more. Thus, owing to a mistaken order, given it is not known by whom, the heart had been taken out of the islanders, and Paoli's reign came to an end. The maritime towns, accustomed to foreign occupation, submitted at once, and on May 20 the French obtained possession of Corte, Paoli's capital. On June 13, 1769, Paoli, with some 350 devoted patriots, embarked on two English vessels at Portovecchio for Leghorn, where they arrived on June 16. Thence he found his way to London, for an exile of twenty years.

3. THE CORSICAN CHARACTER.

Paoli, one of the world's great men, is regarded by the Corsicans as their typical hero, who carried on and improved upon the work of Sampiero and Gaffori. The island is proud of having produced a Napoleon, but his reputation, like that of Christopher Columbus, who is also claimed as a Corsican, was made outside; and as he never referred to his Corsican birth if he could avoid it, the islanders in turn look upon him as something of a renegade. Paoli, having returned

to Corsica during the Revolution, did leave again, but the island was then in the hands of the English. His heart was always Corsican, and, far from being ashamed of his nationality, he would boast of it.

In person Paoli was tall and well made, with regular and manly features. Johnson, who made his acquaintance in London in company with Boswell, said that he had "the loftiest port of any man he had ever seen." Boswell says of his first interview with Paoli, who was then forty, while Boswell was only twenty-five :

"I have stood in the presence of many a prince, but I never had such a trial as in the presence of Paoli. For ten minutes we walked backwards and forwards through the room, hardly saying a word, while he looked at me, with a steadfast, keen, and penetrating eye, as if he searched my very heart. This interview was for a while very severe upon me." Elsewhere he says Paoli had a "manly and noble carriage." Although he had "often a placid smile upon his countenance, he hardly ever laughed."

On one occasion, when a traitor was brought before him, he pardoned the man, but said to him: "'I shall have a strict eye upon you, and if ever you make the least attempt to return to your traitorous practices, you know that I can be avenged of you.' He spoke this with the fierceness of a lion, and from the awful darkness of his brow one could see that his thoughts of vengeance were terrible. Yet, when it was over, he all at once resumed his usual appearance, called out, 'Andiamo' ('Come along'), went to dinner, and was as cheerful and gay as if nothing had happened."

Boswell also says: "Though calm and fully master of himself, Paoli is animated with an extraordinary degree of vivacity. Except when indisposed or greatly fatigued, he never sits down but at meals. He is perpetually in motion, walking briskly backwards and forwards. . . . Paoli told me that the vivacity of

his mind was such that he could not study above ten minutes at a time. 'La testa mi rompa' ('My head is like to break'), said he. 'I can never write my lively ideas with my own hand. In writing, they escape from my mind. I call the Abbé Guelfucci' (his secretary): "Allons presto, pigliate li pensieri" ("Come quickly, take my thoughts"), and he writes them."

Speaking of Paoli's remarkable memory, Boswell says: "He has the best part of the classics by heart, and he has a happy talent in applying them with propriety, which is rarely to be found." And: "He just lives in the times of antiquity. He said to me: 'A young man who would form his mind to glory must not read modern memoirs, ma Plutarcho, ma Tito Livio' ('but Plutarch and Titus Livius')." He told Boswell that he had "'an unspeakable pride' (*una superba indicibile*). 'The approbation of my own heart is enough.' . . . I asked him how he could bear to be confined to an island yet in a rude, uncivilized state. He replied in one line of Virgil:

"'Vincet amor patriæ laudumque immensa cupido.'

This, uttered with the fine open Italian pronunciation, and the graceful dignity of his manner, was very noble."

He told Boswell that "from his earliest years he had in view the important station which he then held"—that of ruler of Corsica—a position which had come to him, though an untried man, at the age of twenty-nine.

On such subjects as "fate and free-will, the materiality and immateriality of the soul," Paoli said that he had studied such "'metaphysical researches, but let us leave these disputes to the idle. I hold always firm one great object.'"

Yet he was superstitious. He had at times "extraordinary impressions of distant and future events,"

and told Boswell that "in general these visions have proved true." He believed in Providence. "It is impossible for me not to be persuaded that God interposes to give freedom to Corsica. A people oppressed like the Corsicans are certainly worthy of Divine assistance. When we were in the most desperate circumstances I never lost courage, trusting as I did in Providence."

These quotations from Boswell contain all that he says about Paoli. It is strange how closely they apply to Napoleon, then not yet born. Boswell has described not Paoli only, but an even greater man, the first Emperor of the French.

For Napoleon also was grave, serious, and impressive; he also had an imposing carriage and a disconcerting steadfastness and keenness of eye; like Paoli, he often smiled, but never laughed; his anger was as "awful" and "terrible" as that of Paoli, and he recovered from it as quickly; he also had the habit of "walking briskly backwards and forwards," and exhibited "extraordinary vivacity"; his thoughts being too quick for his pen, he always had his secretary at hand to write them down as quickly as possible, precisely in the manner of Paoli; he had Paoli's wonderful memory, though not his erudition—his references to classic examples were not from Latin authors, but from history ("In Italy and in Egypt," said one of his officers, "he was always talking to us of the Romans"); and if Paoli "just lived in the times of antiquity," and thought so much of Plutarch and Livy, did he not remark to the young Napoleon, "O Napoleon, thou art not of the present day, but of the time of Plutarch"? Not even Paoli had a more "unspeakable pride" than Napoleon, nor (in his youth) a greater love of his country, nor a more intense desire for glory; Paoli's contempt for the idle disputes of metaphysics was matched by Napoleon's scorn of

ideologues ; and Napoleon was quite as superstitious as his countryman, as great a believer in "destiny," the "Providence" of Paoli. Napoleon's precocious ambition becomes less remarkable when we learn that Paoli "from his earliest years" had looked forward to become the ruler of Corsica.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Napoleon, like Paoli, was the second son of his father, and, like Paoli, spent his childhood in Corsica, his schooldays outside the land of his birth, his early manhood as an officer in a Continental army. Napoleon, like Paoli, when given his first command, was a young and untried man ; like Paoli, his great opportunity came just at the time when unity of effort after a period of anarchy was a necessity obvious to all, thus insuring zeal and energy in his subordinates ; like Paoli, he found himself at the head of a growing movement ; and there was this further resemblance, that Paoli was accepted as leader because, though a Corsican, he was a stranger who had no enemies, while Napoleon was also assisted in his rise by a similar reason : he was a French citizen, but without French connections or entanglements. They were both led, by a very singular good fortune, along the same path to the position of Dictator.

To what extent were the characteristics common to Paoli and Napoleon seen also among Corsicans generally ? What was the Corsican character ? The power of the Napoleonic magnet has made it peculiarly difficult to discuss without prejudice the Corsican nature. There is a temptation, not always resisted even by the ablest writers, to deduce the Corsican character from what is known of Napoleon, and then to complete the circle by deriving Napoleon's qualities from his Corsican origin. The Corsican is shown to be Napoleonic, and then Napoleon is a typical Corsican. To avoid this difficulty we will turn to pre-Napoleonic authorities.

Here is a passage from the "Memoirs of Corsica, by Frederic, son of Theodore, late King of Corsica," dated 1758:

"The Corsicans are well made, but meagre and swarthy; they have a good mien, particularly under arms; are sober, and have hardly any wants. They content themselves with what is necessary to life, nor are the dangerous superfluities of luxury as yet looked upon as necessities.

"They are brave, intrepid, dextrous, tractable, spirited, and lively; but, on the other hand, they are proud, presumptuous, inconstant, choleric, cruel, indolent, foresworn, given to theft, more superstitious than devout. They have little probity, and are so distrustful of each other that they travel always armed, and ever go to work with a musket under their arm. For war they entertain a favourite passion. In fact, they have been productive of several distinguished warriors. Add to this that they are extremely susceptible of the slightest touches of ridicule or insult, and carry their vindictive spirit to such an excess that those who once conceive their honour injured suffer their beards to grow, nor will permit themselves to be shaved till they have revenged the affront received.

"The long beards they wear on these occasions they call *barbe de vendetta*: so true it is that they inculcate revenge as one of their first principles of education, and teach it their children from the cradle as the chief of moral duties. This hath given rise to that old saying: 'Il Corso non pardono mai ne vivo ne morto'; that is to say, A Corsican never forgives, neither alive nor dead."

Now, here we already have—Napoleon. He was "well made, meagre, swarthy, with a good mien, particularly under arms." For war he "entertained a favourite passion"; he was one of the "several distinguished warriors" that Corsica produced. He

was "sober, brave, intrepid, dextrous, spirited, lively," but "proud, presumptuous, inconstant, choleric, cruel, foresworn, more superstitious than devout, extremely susceptible of the slightest touch of ridicule or insult," and "carried his vindictive spirit to excess."

All this is a description of Napoleon. We have omitted only three expressions which are not very suitable: "tractable" (which refers to domestics), "indolent" (which again means the manual labourer), "given to theft" (also inapplicable to a gentleman). With these natural exceptions, every word in this extract is strikingly applicable to Napoleon, making it quite evident that, in spite of his Ligurian blood, he was a Corsican in character.

Our next authority must be Boswell, an observer of genius, whose remarks were greedily read by Napoleon in his youth and exercised a great influence upon him. Boswell quotes the apparently irreconcilable statements of two classic authors. Strabo says: "But Cynus is by the Romans called Corsica. It is ill inhabited, being rugged, and in most places difficult of access, so that those who dwell on the mountains, and live by robberies, are wilder than even wild beasts. Therefore, when the Roman generals make irruptions into their country, and falling upon their strongholds, carry off numbers of these people, and bring them to Rome, it is wonderful to see what wildness and brutality the creatures discover. For they either are impatient of life, and lay violent hands on themselves, or if they do live, it is in such a state of stupefaction and insensibility, that those who purchase them for slaves have a very bad bargain, though they pay very little money for them, and sorely regret their happening to fall into their hands."

Diodorus, on the other hand, says: "The Corsican slaves seem to differ from all others in their utility for the offices of life, for which they are fitted by a peculiar

gift of nature. . . . These islanders live amongst themselves with a humanity and justice beyond all other barbarians. . . . In every part of the economy of life they show a remarkable regard to equity."

To explain these divergent statements Boswell consulted several authorities. He applied to the Rev. Mr. Burnaby, chaplain to the British Factory at Leghorn, who made a tour to Corsica in 1766. Mr. Burnaby thought that these authors might be reconciled by "supposing them to speak of the Corsicans under different points of view—Strabo as of enemies, Diodorus as of friends; and they will not only be found reconcilable, but will exactly correspond with the character of the Corsicans at present. In war they are furious as lions. Death is esteemed nothing, nor is any power sufficient to make them yield against their inclination; they become irritated, and will not brook restraint. Whereas in peace and in civil life they are mild and just to the greatest degree, and have all those amiable qualities which Diodorus ascribes to them."

"My Lord Hailes" (Sir David Dalrymple, Judge of the Court of Session) "thinks that there is properly no contradiction between these illustrious authors, since Strabo has not thrown any abuse upon the Corsicans in general. He has only talked in strong terms of the barbarity of such of them as inhabit the mountains and live by robberies, just as if writing concerning Scotland in former lawless times he had said the Highlanders there are a wild set of men."

"My Lord Monboddo" (Burnet, Judge of the Court of Sessions) "thinks there is nothing more required to reconcile these different characters of the Corsican slaves but to suppose that those which Diodorus had occasion to observe were well treated, and those which Strabo had occasion to observe were ill treated. For good or bad treatment was sufficient to make the

Corsicans appear either of the one character or of the other, as we may see in many barbarous nations at this day."

"But I shall suppose," continues Boswell, "an universal ferociousness in the Corsicans, and I think it may well be justified, considering the treatment which that brave people have met with from their oppressors."

Boswell further says: "The Corsicans are naturally quick and lively, and have a particular turn for eloquence. Hieronymus de Marinis (*Græv. Thes. Ant.*, I., p. 1410) gives them this character: 'Their mountains abound in swarms of bees, and flow with milk and honey, like the genius of the Corsicans, who, while they have milk and honey under their tongues, have also a sting, and are therefore born for the forum.'" So, then, they are redoubtable in war and genial in peace, and have a persuasive eloquence which may cover a treacherous intention.

Boswell proceeds: "They are no doubt a people of strong passions, as well as of lively and vigorous minds. These are the materials of which men are to be formed, either good or bad in a superior degree. I always remember an observation M. Rousseau made to me one day in the Val de Travers, when we were talking of the characters of different nations; said he: '*J'aime ces caractères où il y a de l'étoffe.*' It was well said.

"These islanders have abilities for anything, but their fortune has been such that they have been conspicuous only for the hard and resolute qualities. . . . The authors of the *Encyclopedia* say: 'The Corsicans are tumultuous, vindictive, and warlike.' Their struggles against the tyrant could show them in no other light."

The Corsicans had a universal reputation for courage, which is well illustrated in the "*Sala di Costantino*" in

the Vatican. Above the great picture of Constantine defeating Maxentius at the Ponte Molle are some frescoes executed to the order of Sixtus V. One of them represents the figure of Corsica, a battle-axe in one hand and a sword in the other, with the inscription, "*Cyrniorum fortia bello pectora*" ("The strong hearts of the Corsicans in war").

Pommereul, a French officer who served in the Corsican campaign and wrote an account of it, observed that great men are born in the bed of civil discords, and that Corsica would become illustrious by the production of able generals and men of puissant genius. That the island would produce a great soldier at the first opportunity seems to have been quite a common expectation.

Amidst such natural fighters, who lived in a permanent state of war, it is natural that murder should have been more common than in more peaceful countries. But the terrible Corsican vendetta had other causes. In wild and remote communities the answer to a sneer is a blow. The provincial spirit is ready to exaggerate and even to imagine an insult, and to promptly reply in the crude manner of the savage.* In a secluded island, having high mountains and deep valleys, where each parish or collection of hamlets was practically independent, a feeling of violent hostility between parish and parish, family and family, would easily arise. Justice being unattainable from the corrupt Genoese judges, whose single aim was the extortion of bribes, and whose authority did not stretch far from the coast, each family or parish was tempted to take the law into its own hands. Geographical conditions have made Corsica the land where family ties are strongest. "The names of brother and sister still

* See the Autobiography of Sir H. M. Stanley, and his remarks on the homicides committed in the West of the United States of America in the early days.

remain the highest terms of endearment, and it is quite a common thing to hear a wife call her husband 'brother.'"* Family honour and family right were to be protected at all costs. Thus an imaginary personal slight might involve two entire parishes in a war of extermination.

Paoli said years afterwards: "It is not the fact that private vengeance comes always from a denial of justice or an incomplete reparation. Impatience to attack the enemy arms the avenger quite as often as the fear of a tardy or uncertain public judgment. Wounded pride will suffice to transform into a ferocious bandit the gentlest and most peaceful man." But Paoli was very proud of his achievements in suppressing the vendetta, gave much care and thought to the subject, and always attributed his success to his prompt and severe punishment of offenders. Wounded pride, no doubt, still urged the Corsican to revenge, but Paoli's moral influence, coupled with his severe justice, sufficed to prevent the crime. The Corsican is still sensitive and vindictive, and the spirit of vendetta survives, but it does not now so often lead to murder.

The Corsicans are, says Boswell, "extremely temperate. Their morals are strict and chaste to an uncommon degree." The "Corsicans, like the Germans of old, are extremely indolent. The women do the greatest part of the drudgery work, as is also the custom among the Scots Highlanders. Yet they are very active in war, like the same Germans, of whom Tacitus says that, 'By a wonderful variety of nature the same men are fond of indolence and impatient of rest.' Notwithstanding all that Paoli has done, the Corsicans are still averse to labour. Every year 800 or 1,000 Sardinians and Luccese are employed as artificers and day-labourers in the island.

* "Romantic Corsica," by G. Renwick, 1909.

"M. de Montesquieu observes that all indolent nations are also proud. This is indeed the case of the Corsicans, to which their success in war has contributed."

As an example of the women doing the hard work, Boswell says: "For some time I had very curious travelling, mostly on foot, and attended by a couple of stout women, who carried my baggage upon their heads. Every time that I prepared to set out from a village I could not help laughing to see the good people eager to have my equipage in order, and roaring out, 'Le donne, le donne!' ('The women, the women!')"

As to their indolence, Lady Elliot, wife of the British Governor, in 1795 wrote: "If the land were cultivated and the people civilized, it would be Elysium; but every peasant is armed with a knife, a gun, and a pistol." The Corsican was too proud for manual labour. Rough work in the fields was the woman's part, while the man braved it with his "knife, gun, and pistol." The name of the island has by some been attributed to the national habit of carrying a stiletto (*sica*) over the heart (*cor*). Boswell says: "The chief satisfaction of these islanders, when not engaged in war or in hunting, seemed to be that of lying at their ease in the open air, recounting tales of the bravery of their countrymen, and singing songs in honour of the Corsicans and against the Genoese."

Their idleness naturally ended in poverty. At the time when Boswell wrote, on the eve of the Revolution, poverty and liberty were supposed to be twin virtues, seen nowhere so pure as in Corsica. He admired Corsica because it was, "perhaps, the only country upon the face of the globe where luxury has never once been introduced." When he was at Bastelica, the home of the heroic Sampiero, where "there is a stately spirited race of people, I happened," says Boswell "to have an unusual flow of spirits, and as one who

finds himself amongst utter strangers in a distant country has no timidity, I harangued the men of Bastelica with great fluency. I expatiated on the bravery of the Corsicans, by which they had purchased liberty, the most valuable of all possessions, and rendered themselves glorious over all Europe. Their poverty, I told them, might be remedied by a proper cultivation of their island, and by engaging a little in commerce. But I bid them remember that they were much happier in their present state than in a state of refinement and vice, and that therefore they should beware of luxury." Here we have the crude revolutionary gospel, that "liberty" is the only good, to fight for it the only glory; that poverty is a happy state, luxury and refinement forms of vice. Corsica, where the men disdained to work in the field, preferring poverty, and loved to lie at their ease in the open air recounting tales of their bravery, was the ideal State, its people models of "virtue."

Napoleon never shook off the Corsican idea that a poor nation is more formidable in war than a rich one. He always expected England to collapse from the dislocation of her commerce in time of war.

Rousseau in the "Contrat social," book iv., chap. 10 (1762), says: "Il est encore en Europe un pays capable de législation; c'est l'isle de Corse. La valeur et la constance avec laquelle ce brave peuple a su recouvrer et défendre sa liberté mériterait bien que quelque homme sage lui apprit à la conserver. J'ai quelque pressentiment qu'un jour cette petite isle étonnera l'Europe." The concluding words, "I have a presentiment that some day this little island will astonish Europe," are evidence of a very general feeling that the Corsicans, with Paoli at their head, were leading the way, showing the world how "by courage and constancy a brave people can recover and preserve its liberty."

Rousseau was very far from standing alone in these views. Paoli and his band of patriots were much in men's minds. Boswell was attracted to Corsica—in spite of the danger that he “might be taken by some of the Barbary Corsairs, and have a trial of slavery among the Turks at Algiers”—by the renown of Paoli, for he says: “As long as I can remember anything, I have heard of the malcontents of Corsica, with Paoli at their head. It was a curious thought that I was just going to see them.” A certain Dr. Tissot, a physician of European reputation at the time, in his “*Traité de la santé des gens de lettres*” (1768), was giving expression to a widespread feeling when he observed: “Cæsar, Mahomet, Cromwell, M. Paoli, perhaps the greatest of all, doubtless received from nature superhuman powers.” This eulogy of his hero was much appreciated by the young Napoleon when he came across it in later years.

Frederick the Great sent Paoli a sword of honour, with the inscription, “*Patria Libertas*.” Alfieri dedicated to him his tragedy, “*Timoleone*”: “*Al nobile uomo il signor Pasquale Paoli propagnator magnanimo dei Corsi. Lo scrivere tragedie di libertà nella lingua di un popolo libero,*” etc.—“V. ALFIERI.”

The island was regarded as the natural breeding-ground of Republican heroes, with the great Paoli at their head—men of rustic, wild nature, who could not be corrupted by luxury.

The Corsicans, then, were a primitive people, extreme in hate and in love; fierce, untamable, revengeful to enemies; mild and affectionate to friends. Being active in mind as in body, they possessed the gift of oratory, were ready in speech, and had considerable address in advocacy, in a subtle and deceitful kind of eloquence. They were dishonest, “foresworn,” adepts at every form of fraud and ruse. They were excessively proud, could not withstand the smallest sus-

picion of contempt, and were ready on the instant to return a slight by a vindictive revenge which death alone could still; their pride also made them decline to do hard work, and they were consequently in an unnecessary state of poverty. War being the chronic condition of the island, men enjoyed an excessive prestige, and women were correspondingly depreciated; they did all the work, while the men spent their time boasting of their bravery. They were sober, temperate, and chaste; hardy, with few wants. They were absurdly superstitious.

The Corsican was not unlike the New Zealand aborigines, the Maori—a temperate, idle, vindictive, eloquent, hardy warrior, very clever at every kind of ruse in war and fraud in peace. The islands are not dissimilar: they are mountainous, and enjoy a delightful climate, and are well removed from the nearest continents. The Corsican, being nearer to the centres of the world, was an improved, semi-civilized, whitened New Zealander.

The climate of Great Britain, though temperate like Corsica and New Zealand, is much more damp and gloomy, and there are no mountains to compare with those in Corsica and New Zealand. Consequently the English are of a duller, more stolid nature, with less violent contrast from light to darkness, and a more sober disposition. But even in Boswell's day the points of resemblance had been noticed. He says: "A writer of the highest class thus characterizes them: 'The Corsicans are a handful of men, as brave and as determined as the English.'" This quality of self-confident persistence is an insular product. Wellington and Napoleon exhibited the two insular types—one from the dull, grey, cold island; the other from the bright, dazzling, and hot one.

Of modern writers, Lanfrey* says: "Resembling in

* "*Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}*," by P. Lanfrey.

this their climate, which is burning in the plains and icy on the heights, they have a violent heart and a cool head. They are made to excel both in war and in diplomacy." The image, though obviously post-Napoleonic, is tempting. Every Corsican does not experience both the coast and mountain life, but that is precisely what the better class of Ajaccian, the Bonapartes, did. It is true, Napoleon may have acquired an ardent spirit at Ajaccio, and a sober, serious intellect at Bocognano and Bastelica.

A recent writer, who seems to be free from Napoleonic obsession,* says: "Thrift, so feverishly practised in France, is practically unknown in the island. The Frenchman's whole ambition is to be 'Maître sur son fumier.' Not so the Corsican. With him ambition is made of other stuff. He does not aspire towards the possession of wealth or property, but of power and influence, towards the acquisition of one of those administrative posts which the French system of government so greatly multiplies, and which exactly suit the Corsican, with his love of power, his capacity for rule, and his desire to govern. . . . No other department of France sends so large a proportion of its children to school."

A Corsican writer says of his countrymen that they are "tormented by the desire to dominate."†

Reviewing all this testimony, it is clear that Napoleon had a remarkable resemblance to Paoli in many respects, and was unmistakably Corsican. War and politics and education, the Corsican passions, were his passions; he had the Corsican talent for guile and intrigue, the Corsican tenacity, courage, and desire for power; he was as vindictive, as superstitious, as excitable, and yet dignified and hospitable as the type.

Yet he and Paoli both left Corsica in childhood to

* "Romantic Corsica," by G. Renwick, pp. 59, 214, 292.

† "La Genèse de Napoléon," by J. B. Marcaggi, p. 401.

be educated on the Continent. And he was not of Corsican, but of Ligurian stock. The Corsican character must have been formed in him during the first nine years of his life. It was the Corsican environment in childhood, not the Ligurian inheritance, that made him what he was.

4. FAMILY TRADITIONS.

Carlo Maria Bonaparte, Napoleon's father, was born at Ajaccio, March 27, 1746, son of Giuseppe Bonaparte and Maria Saveria, *née* Paravicini. The Bonaparte ancestors have been carefully traced, but not the Paravicini. It is still the custom to ignore the female branch, and to treat of family character as if it passed only in the direct male line, by a kind of male parthenogenesis, from father to son, without any female assistance. The surname is derived from the father, and so Napoleon is for convenience called Bonaparte; but the Bonaparte ancestors, the direct male line, have no special potency in the transmission of character through the blood, while in other respects, in moral influence, they are less important than the women from other families, the wives, the mothers, who reared the Bonaparte children. They have, so far as is known, an equal capacity to that of their husbands in the passing on of qualities through the blood, and a superior power of moulding the moral characters of the children. This aspect of the matter, though the idea slowly gains ground, is not popular, and in Corsica in the eighteenth century it was wholly ignored. Napoleon was not regarded as a mixture of Bonaparte and Ramolino, reared and formed by Ramolino, but as Bonaparte pure and undiluted. Hence the necessity of considering the Bonaparte tradition.

It affected Napoleon in two ways: (1) by the direct impetus upon the imagination, and (2) by an unnoticed percolation of moral influence from father to son. As

illustration of the second point let us suppose that a Bonaparte has a leg amputated as the result of an accident. His son, begotten after the event, has two legs, the father's physical misfortune not being passed on in the blood. But the father's life and conduct are changed by the accident, and the moral effect of that change touches the son in his daily intercourse with the crippled man, and so is passed on from son to son, by environmental inheritance. It is quite possible that a great-grandson might thus inherit a gentleness towards physical misfortunes, though not through the blood.

If such an accident had happened to the mother its effects would have been much greater, but the child and its descendants are unaware of that fact, the female significance being still hidden from mankind ; and, moreover, the female lines of descent are not explored with zeal and industry, but left in obscurity.

The Bonaparte line carried with it a reputation of importance, and the Bonaparte tradition is thus the only one by which the descendants were consciously affected.

We need not go further back than :

Francesco Bonaparte,* of Sarzana, who went to Ajaccio, and died there in 1540. He had the Genoese appointment of "mounted mercenary," with a salary of 12 livres a month, and was known as "Il Moro di Sarzana." A petition exists, dated 1497, by "Gabriele di Sarzana, figliolo del Moro di Sarzana," asking for an appointment as mercenary, which he subsequently obtained. Some of the Genoese objected to these appointments running in one family, complaining that "the mercenaries intermarry or ally themselves with the Corsicans, to the detriment of their duty, which they execute with greater fidelity when they are new to the country."

Francesco married Caterina, daughter of Guido da

* "Le Nid de l'Aigle," by Colonna de Cesari Rocca.

Castelletto, who had come from Pietra Santa (near Sarzana) to take up the Genoese appointment of registrar and town clerk of Ajaccio. Francesco left a son, Gabriele (who follows), and a daughter, Antonia, who married and lived at Sarzana.

Gabriele Bonaparte lived at Ajaccio as a mounted mercenary. When Sampiero captured Ajaccio in 1553 Gabriele escaped, with other Genoese, to Calvi, the only town in Corsica which remained in the Genoese power, whence they went back to Lunegiana until the recovery of Ajaccio. Sampiero was assassinated in 1567. In that year Gabriele obtained permission to raise towers, a profitable business, as each tower was endowed with certain revenues; it was an investment of capital at very high interest. Gabriele died in 1569, leaving two sons, Geronimo (who follows) and Agostino (member of Council of Ancients).

Geronimo, born at Ajaccio. Advocate; in 1585 a notary. Member of the Council of Ancients, frequently re-elected; Chief of the Council, 1594. A prominent man, sent as deputy to Genoa to report on Corsican affairs in 1572 and 1577. Married Pelagrina, daughter of Quilico Calvari (of Chiavari, Lunegiana). Sons: Francesco (who follows), Gabriele, Lucciano.

Francesco: Notary; member of Council of Ancients in 1596, 1620, 1622, 1630, 1631. Married a widow, Camilla Cattaccioli. Children: Sebastiano (who follows); Maria, m. G. V. Costa; Geronimo, m. D. Bozzi; Francischetta, m. G. A. Loagalonchi; Giacometta, m. Tavera. Francesco, partly owing to the necessity of providing dowries for his daughters, was always in financial difficulties. He even had to pawn a gold *Agnus Dei* for 16 livres, which he left his son Sebastiano to redeem.

Sebastiano, b. 1603; d. about 1661; m. (1) Angela Felice, daughter of Troilo Lubera, who died without children; (2) in 1630, Maria Rustelli. Children:

Geronimo, m. April 24, 1650, Isabella Costa ; Camilla, m. April 24, 1650, G. V. Costa (brother of Isabella); Carlo Maria (who follows); Alessandro.

Carlo Maria, bap. at Ajaccio, December 1, 1637 ; d. at Ajaccio, August 26, 1692 ; member of Council of Ancients, 1681 ; m. June 10, 1657, Virginia Odone. Children : Fiordalice, m. D. Costa ; Giuseppe (who follows).

Giuseppe, b. Ajaccio, March 24, 1663 ; d. about 1713 ; member of Council of Ancients, 1702 ; m. December 20, 1682, Maria Bozzi, of the feudal signors of Bozzi. The Bozzi alliance introduced Corsican blood into the Bonaparte family, and also the name of Napoleone, which the Bozzi seem to have acquired from an alliance with the delle Vie family. A Napoleone delle Vie distinguished himself as Captain in the service of Henri II. Children of Giuseppe : Sebastiano Nicolo (who follows) ; Carlo Maria, d. without children ; Francesco Maria, d. young ; Maria Anna Virgilia, m. Federico Forcioli ; Paolo Girolamo, d. young ; Maria Saveria ; Tommaso Xavier, d. young.

Sebastiano Nicolo, b. Ajaccio, September 29, 1683 ; d. Ajaccio, November 24, 1760 ; member of Council of Ancients ; m. Maria Anna Tusoli, of Bocognano. Three sons : Giuseppe (who follows) ; Napoleone, b. Ajaccio, 1715 ; d. Corte, August 17, 1767 ; Chief of Council of Ancients, 1764 ; m. November 3, 1743, Rosa Bozzi, his cousin, and had one child, Isabella, who married Ludovico Ornano. Lucciano, b. Ajaccio, 1718 ; d. Ajaccio, October 16, 1891 ; Archdeacon.

Giuseppe, bap. Ajaccio, May 31, 1713 ; d. Ajaccio, December 15, 1763 ; member of Council of Ancients ; m. March 5, 1741, Maria Saveria Paravicini. Two children : Gertrude, bap. Ajaccio, November 25, 1741 ; m. June 25, 1763, Nicolo Paravicini, her first cousin ; d. about 1788 without issue ; and

Carlo Maria, father of Napoleon.

Many of these Bonapartes were lawyers. They were never rich, even for Ajaccio, but they had country estates, which produced wine, oil, and grain; and on the sale of this produce, with an occasional fee for notarial or other legal work, they lived comfortably.

Lawyers, townsmen, and also landed proprietors, they cultivated mind as well as body, were believers in education, admirers of mental acquirements, of culture. In this they were superior to their friends. Pozzo di Borgo said long afterwards: "The young Bonapartes" (Joseph and Napoleon) "and I were of about the same age. Our education had certainly been more thorough than that of many of our compatriots." Carlo was himself exceptionally educated and accomplished; he was ambitious, with a great desire to improve the family standing by favourable marriages, by qualifying for official positions, by cultivating influential friends and relations. His children had important people as sponsors at the baptismal font. He did his best to raise the standing of the clan, to create a family tradition that the Bonapartes were expected to leave their children in a better position than their parents.

It will be observed that nearly all these Bonapartes became members of the Council of Ancients. These *Magnifici Anziani* were six in number, elected each for one or two years, to direct the municipal administration. Their importance may be gauged from the fact that they shared with the Genoese Inspectors of Muskets, the Bishop, and the Captains of the town, the privilege of being given the first refusal of such fish and meat as came into the town, but they could not demand more than 6 pounds of meat each. The Council of Ancients continued its functions till 1768, when it was abolished by the French. At first Corsicans—that is, residents of Corsica before the

Genoese conquest, many of whom must have been of Ligurian origin—were not admitted into this body, nor even to the rights of ordinary citizens. In reply to an agitation on their part, which had been partly successful, Geronimo Bonaparte in 1577 headed an appeal to Genoa to prevent the natives (*paesani*) from obtaining the citizenship of Ajaccio, demanding that the two already admitted in the Council of Ancients should not be denominated Corsicans, which would damage the prestige of the colony; and that no Corsican should be allowed to carry arms, or to acquire property in Ajaccio, which belonged to Genoa by right of conquest. The Corsican interest was pleaded by a Pozzo di Borgo, with the result that in 1592 Corsicans were admitted to the rights of citizenship in Ajaccio. This is the first recorded victory of a Pozzo di Borgo over a Bonaparte. The last, according to the boast of Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, who had some influence with the Czar Alexander I., was the fall of the Emperor Napoleon.

As time went on the Ligurian families gradually began to sympathize with the Corsicans, a feeling which grew rapidly during the War of Independence (1729-1769). The Bonapartes, with many other Ligurian families, began to hope for the success of the "patriots." After the advent of Paoli they were open adherents of the national party. Carlo Maria Bonaparte grew up an ardent patriot and admirer of Paoli.

When his father died, in 1763, Carlo, aged seventeen, was attending a Jesuit college at Ajaccio, where he was regarded as a brilliant pupil. He was under the guardianship of his uncle, Lucciano Bonaparte, the Archdeacon.

At that time there lived at Ajaccio a young girl, Maria Letizia Ramolino, who was of good birth and an heiress. She was descended from a Gabriele Ramolino, who arrived in Corsica as a Genoese official towards

the end of the fifteenth century, just about the time that Francesco Bonaparte left Sarzana for Corsica. The Ramolino tradition touched Napoleon's mother, but it need not be taken far back. Letizia's grandfather was—

Giovanni Agostino Ramolino, b. April 25, 1697; m. Angela Maria Peri, daughter of Andrea Peri (Captain of Corsican Militia in the service of Genoa, of a well-known military family) and Maria Maddalena d' Istria, a family of feudal signors, Corsicans. Issue, a son—

Giovanni Girolamo, b. Ajaccio, April 13, 1723; d. Ajaccio, 1755; m. October 29, 1743, Angela Maria Pietra Santa, and had issue *Maria Letizia*, b. August 24, 1750.

After the death of her husband, Letizia's mother married again, in 1757, her second husband being Francesco Fesch, a Captain of the Genoese Marine, a Swiss by origin. To them was born, on January 3, 1763, a son, Giuseppe, half-brother of Letizia, known to history as Cardinal Fesch.

Letizia was the only surviving child of her father, and inherited the Ramolino property. Her father had been Inspector of Roads and Bridges, a Genoese appointment; and the Ramolino and Pietra Santa families were adherents of Genoa. This fact has led to the supposition that Paoli may have used his influence with Carlo and the Archdeacon to arrange a Bonaparte-Ramolino connection, and thus to bring the Ramolino and Pietra Santa families to his side. It is probable that it was a love-match besides, for Letizia was very pretty, and Carlo was a handsome youth. A comelier couple was not to be found in Corsica. They were married at the cathedral of Ajaccio on June 2, 1764.

Carlo was a fine man, tall, elegant, and manly. His features were regular, his expression agreeable and sympathetic, his manners engaging and correct. His

eyes, like those of his son Napoleon, were grey or grey-blue, not a very usual colour in Corsica.* He was above the average in intelligence, as in education. He wrote Italian poems, was fluent in French—a rare accomplishment in Corsica at that time—and continuing his education after marriage, took the degree of Doctor of Laws at the renowned University of Pisa. His character was ambitious and restless. He was a pertinacious solicitor for appointments and official rewards, besieging and wearing out the various functionaries with his importunate and audacious demands. In such matters he exhibited a subtle spirit of intrigue. He was careless of money when anxious to make a display. He spent a year's income on a single banquet, to commemorate his obtaining the Doctor's degree. An extravagant sum was laid out on his Court dress when he went to Versailles to be presented to Louis XVI.

Letizia was a famous beauty. She was rather below the middle height, and of spare habit. She had brown chestnut hair, brown-black eyes, nose straight and rather long, mouth refined and expressive, good teeth, small ears, hands, and feet. The complexion was lovely, white, with a delicate peach tint to the cheeks. The expression of the face was serious and reflective, with a touch of nobility, of refinement, and an aspect of steadfastness of character. Like other Corsican women of that time, she had no education beyond the ordinary reading, writing, and arithmetic.

She was proud and self-respecting, intrepid, not easily overcome by difficulties. She went with her husband almost on to the actual battlefield during the French war. She was a determined woman, who would not submit to any indignity from anybody. On one occa-

* A picture of Carlo, which is often reproduced, but has no portrait value, was made of him in 1806, twenty-one years after his death, by Girodet, who had never seen him.

sion when she was at Bastia at the confessional the priest, who was personally unknown to her, persisted in asking her questions of a kind to which she was not accustomed. She raised herself, and in a loud, ringing voice that could be heard throughout the church, indignantly exclaimed: "Sir, you are saying what is not proper!" The priest threatened to refuse absolution, to which Letizia replied: "As you please; but I shall denounce you before your superiors." The church being full of people, the priest hastily gave absolution.

Letizia's courage never failed her, even when bad times came and she had to perform prodigies of economy to keep the family in health and decency. Later, when fortune had changed, she was miserly, a virtue gone to extremes. She was an excellent mother, loving her children and doing her duty towards them. She did not spare corporal punishment when it seemed necessary.

Two months after the marriage of Carlo and Letizia the Treaty of Compiègne introduced French garrisons into the coast towns, two battalions taking up their quarters in the citadel of Ajaccio. Carlo thereupon went with his wife to Paoli's capital, Corte, in the interior of the island, and he took the courses of Ethics and Law at the new University founded at Corte, which was inaugurated on January 3, 1765. The young couple lodged in the house of Letizia's uncle, Thomas Arrighi de Casanova. They were subsequently joined at Corte by Nicolo Paravicini and his wife Gertrude, Carlo's sister, and by Carlo's uncle, Napoleone Bonaparte, and his family. All the ambitious, energetic men were at this time paying their homage to Paoli at Corte, the centre of the government of the island.

Paoli had a warm affection for his young protégé and a great admiration for Letizia. It was afterwards a tradition in the Bonaparte family that Paoli had named Carlo his successor—not an improbable choice.

In 1765 a son was born at Corte to Carlo and Letizia, for whom his uncle Napoleone stood sponsor ; but the child, who was named Napoleone, after his godfather, died. A daughter, born in 1767, also died at an early age. About this time Carlo made a journey to Rome—it is not known for what purpose. In order to return he had to borrow 50 écus from Saliceti, a Corsican, the Pope's medical attendant. We next hear of him at Corte composing Italian verses on the fête of St. George, patron saint of the University of Corte.

On January 7, 1768, Joseph, who lived to become King of Spain, was born at Corte. His godparents were Thomas Arrighi de Casanova and Maria his wife, with whom the Bonapartes had been living.

In the following May Carlo delivered a spirited harangue in favour of strenuous resistance to France, at the meeting convened by Paoli at Corte. It was issued as a proclamation, and distributed about the island. In after-years the Bonapartes were wont to refer to it with pride. Napoleon at St. Helena quoted a passage that he admired. He may have had the original before him. "If liberty," said Carlo, "was to be obtained by wishing for it, all would have it ; but a persistency of effort in spite of all difficulties, based upon realities and not appearances, is rarely found among men, wherefore those who possess that quality are regarded as divinities."

Carlo acted as Paoli's aide-de-camp at the Battle of Borgo, when the French were severely defeated. It seems probable that during the armistice that followed Carlo and Letizia returned to Ajaccio for the winter, with their son Joseph. After the decisive battle of Ponte Nuovo, May 8, 1769, at which Carlo may have been present, it is supposed that he took his wife to join a handful of patriots in a wild refuge on the slopes of Monte Rotondo. On hearing of the departure of Paoli from Corsica (June 13), deputations

from all parts of the island made their way to Corte to tender their submission. Carlo Bonaparte and his brother-in-law, Nicolo Paravicini, formed part of the deputation from the Monte Rotondo refugees. They swore fealty to Louis XV. before the French Commander, the Marquis de Vaux. Carlo bowed to the inevitable and joined the winning side. Napoleon, in the "Souper de Beaucaire," written at a great crisis in the fortunes of the French Revolution and of himself, has shown the necessity for such action at such times.

An incident is related of Letizia during these difficulties which merits mention. She accompanied her husband in his retreat to the mountains, and in the journey back to Corte, and ultimately to Ajaccio. She carried Joseph, aged over one year, in her arms, and was advanced in pregnancy. In order to pass over the Liamone River she had to mount a horse, which lost its footing in the torrent, and was carried out of its depth down the stream. Letizia, with great intrepidity, kept her seat, urged on the animal, and by her energetic direction brought it safely to the bank.

These dangers over, the Bonapartes returned to Ajaccio, where, on August 15, 1769, their son Napoleon was born.

CHAPTER III

BIRTHDAY (AUGUST 15, 1769)

THE controversy about the date of Napoleon's birth, which was started by Chateaubriand in 1814, and has not even yet quite come to an end, is one of the most strange in all biographical history. For there never was any excuse for it. It was always quite certain, and obvious, that Napoleon had been born on August 15, 1769. There was not even the difficulty that occurred with regard to the birthday of Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, who made his entry into the world a few months before Napoleon, in the night of April 30-May 1, 1769. In the parish register the birth is entered as having taken place on April 30, whereas it occurred in the early hours of May 1. But in Napoleon's case it is asserted—and there are still reputable authorities who think it arguable—that he was born in January of the previous year (1768), and therefore that he was a year and a half older than was generally supposed. That such an idea should ever have been promulgated is a remarkable example of the wrong thinking that passion may produce.

To begin with the documentary evidence. A copy from the register book of baptisms for the city of Corte, year 1768, was made on July 19, 1782, by the parish priest of Corte, F. A. Gaffori, and duly certified as correct on July 19, 1782, by Augustin Adriani, who styles himself "conseiller du Roi, juge royal civil,

criminel et de police des villes et juridiction de Corte." The copy is headed: "Copie de l'acte de naissance de Nabulione Buonaparte." Then follows the declaration, in Latin, by Franciscus Antonius Gaffori, the parish priest already mentioned, that on January 8, 1768, in the parish church he baptized an infant born on the 7th of the same month of January, to Carlo Bonaparte and Lætitia his wife, of the city of Ajaccio, to whom was given the name Nabulione, and for godparents, Joannes Thomas Arrighi de Casanova and Maria his wife.

The parish register of Ajaccio has an entry, in its proper place among the baptisms, apparently irreconcilable with the above. G. B. Diamante testifies that on July 21, 1771, the sacred and precious ceremonies were administered to Napoleone, son of Carlo Bonaparte and Letizia his wife, who had been given the water at home by the very reverend Luciano Bonaparte; born August 15, 1769, with godparents Lorenzo Giubega and Geltruda, wife of Nicolo Parivisino. Then follow the signatures: Gia Batta Diamante, Economo; Lorenzo Giubega; Geltruda Paravicini; Carlo Buonaparte. The book in which this entry occurs is exhibited with the page open in the museum of the Hotel de Ville, Ajaccio. A certified copy, now at the Ministry of War, Paris, was made at the request of Carlo on June 23, 1776, by Demetrio Stefanopoli, advocate performing the functions of a judge, whose signature was on June 25, 1776, certified correct by M. Ponte, "subdélégué" of the province and town of Ajaccio.

These authentic and undisputed documents show that Nabulione was born on January 7, 1768, at Corte, with godparents J. T. Arrighi and Maria his wife; while Napoleone was born on August 15, 1769, at Ajaccio, with godparents Lorenzo Giubega and Geltruda or Gertruda Paravicini.

anno mille sedecento settantuno a vent' uno luglio si sono adoprati le cerimonie e preci sopra di napoleone. E siccome nati del
 1. Carlo Felice Giuseppe Bonaparte, adella di prima letizia sua moglie al quale più si d'età d'acqua in lega d'incenso del m.
 2. Felice Bonaparte padre di quindici agio del m. 1800
 3. Carlo Bonaparte ed hanno amato alle sacre Cerimonie
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 5. per meo. La legge di Calvi, meglio del di più m. 1800
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ENTRY OF THE BAPTISM OF NAPOLEON.

Photographed from the Parish Register of 1771, at Ajaccio.

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Which of these children became Joseph, King of Spain, and which Napoleon, Emperor of the French?

In the archives at Ajaccio there exists a paper which answers that question. It is headed, in Italian, "Copy of the baptism of Signor Giuseppe, son of the most illustrious Signor Carlo de Buonaparte, royal assessor of the jurisdiction of Ajaccio, which took place in the city of Corte."

Then follows a copy of the Latin certificate already mentioned, referring to the Corte child, but the name is now inserted as Joseph Nabulion. Appended is the signature, with no date, of G. B. Levie, Archpriest of Ajaccio. Levie belonged to one of the most respected families in Ajaccio, and was a well-known priest, who baptized many children in the cathedral.

The meaning of this document is clear. It is intended to set at rest any confusion in official entries as to Nabulione of Corte and Napoleone of Ajaccio. It states that the child born at Corte should be called Joseph Nabulion, and is now known as "Signor Giuseppe." There is no reason to doubt the statement. It was made after Carlo had become Royal Assessor in June, 1772; and the use of "Signor" for Joseph shows that he was no longer an infant, and suggests that this paper was written later—perhaps in July, 1782—when Carlo had a certified copy of the original Corte register made. The two documents would then explain each other. Carlo and Letizia went to Autun, where Joseph was at school, in 1782. Probably Carlo had these certificates prepared to take with him.

That Nabulione was known as Giuseppe soon after the birth of Napoleone we know from a Corsican directory, "*L'État de la Corse*," published in 1770, which says Giuseppe is two years of age and Napoleone one year. The eldest child—that is, Nabulione of

Corte—was already Joseph. There is nothing surprising in the use of a name other than that given on baptism. The same thing occurred in this family with all the daughters. Maria Anna was known as Elise, Paola Maria as Pauline, Maria Nunziata as Caroline. Amongst Italians at the present day baptismal names are not regarded with much reverence. A child may be given one name before the civil registrar, another name by the priest, and be generally addressed by a third. The inconvenience of this Italian-Corsican habit was realized when Carlo wanted to get his sons into public institutions in France, and the French officials demanded certificates of birth. Then he got Levie, the responsible official, to copy Nabulione's birth certificate, and preface it with a statement showing that it referred to Giuseppe, or Joseph.

When Carlo's first child, a boy, was born in 1765, Carlo's two uncles were living, Napoleone and Lucciano. He asked the elder of the two to stand as godfather to the child, and gave him the name of his godparent, Napoleone. That was only natural. He did not care for his own name, Carlo, which he gave to none of his children, and the obvious godfather was Napoleone. This child died before the end of the year. Then came a daughter, named Maria Anna, who died in infancy; and then, in January, 1768, a son. Uncle Napoleone having died in the previous year, the parents, who were living at Corte, in the house of their relations, the Arrighi, asked them to act as godparents. The child was baptized the day after its birth, and given the name Napoleone (spelt Nabulione), in memory of the son they had already lost. In August, 1769, came another son. It was then decided to call the eldest Giuseppe, and this, the second surviving son, Napoleone. At St. Helena the Emperor said he had been called Napoleon "because that had been for centuries the name given to the

second sons of the family." There was a tradition in the family to that effect.

Carlo's grandfather had named his three sons Giuseppe, Napoleone, Lucciano, in order of birth. It is not a mere coincidence that Carlo did the same with his three eldest surviving sons.

It is, however, not necessary to be furnished with any explanation for the baptism of two children by the same name. The documents already cited show that the elder was known as Giuseppe, or Joseph; the younger as Napoleone, or Napoleon.

It has been argued that the Levie document connecting Nabulione with Signor Giuseppe was a fraud intended to assist Carlo in passing off the younger boy as the elder; for when Napoleon entered Brienne in May, 1778, the Corte child was over eleven years of age and inadmissible, the limit being ten, but the Ajaccio child was only nine and a half and admissible. That uninteresting fact has inspired the assumption that Carlo must have put forward Nabulione of Corte as Napoleone of Ajaccio. But the regulation of which Carlo was taking advantage for the free education of one of his sons at a military college, if he could prove his nobility and also his poverty, was not issued till March 28, 1776. This explains why the copy of the Ajaccio child's birth entry was made, at the request of Carlo, on June 23, 1776, soon after he heard of the new decree, and why, on June 25, 1776, he obtained from the same Demetrio Stefanopoli who copied the birth register a certificate of poverty. When Carlo did this the elder (Corte) child was still one and a half years under the limit age of ten. There was, therefore, no motive for the fraud suggested. Both children were eligible. Carlo could not already have determined to scrape in the elder child after deliberately waiting till he was too old. He had the younger child's certificate prepared because it was the younger

child he was intending for the French Military School. One is lost in wonder at the hardihood of this invention as to Carlo's and Levie's supposed fraud.

For we have to assume that Carlo, having determined that the elder child should enter the Military College, and prepared his own certificate of poverty to meet with the French regulations, proceeded at the same time to obtain a copy of the certificate of the younger child's birth from sheer inadvertence; and then intentionally waited until the elder child had passed the ten-year limit, having decided that he would use the younger son's certificate, and thus get the elder into the school.

Apart from the inherent improbability of any such proceeding on the part of any man, it was not likely that the eldest son would be put into the army or navy, such a career being generally assigned to the second son. That the eldest should be prepared for the Church, the second for the navy, as was the case with these boys, is what we should expect. Moreover, Joseph was, in character, an eldest son; Napoleon a typical second. If we change their birthdays, we must change their natures, for it is the place in the family that forms the character. It is, therefore, more than improbable that any occasion could have arisen for the very eccentric conduct attributed to the father of these boys.

And then we have to assume that knowledge of the fraud committed on the French authorities was kept from all Corsican friends and relations. But many of them knew that the limit of age for admission was ten, and that the elder of Carlo's children was above that age when one of them entered the Military College. They would inevitably have inquired of Carlo how he managed to get a child admitted who was over the limit of age. The trick played would soon have been known amongst Carlo's numerous friends and

relations in Ajaccio. No hint of it ever escaped to any French official either in Corsica or in France. The idea was not current at all until Napoleon had become the central figure of Europe, and had many powerful enemies. Napoleon was always spoken of by his parents, by his brothers and sisters, by himself, by all his Corsican relations and friends, as the second son ; and Joseph was always—by Napoleon ; by Carlo on his death-bed ; by his uncle, the Archdeacon Luciano, on his death-bed ; by his mother, brothers, sisters, and relations ; by every single person who knew the family—accepted as the eldest, a position of great importance in Corsica, especially after the death of the father, involving rights of guardianship and of inheritance, which were often discussed in the family even during the Consulate. Lucien excused his refusal to divorce his wife at the order of Napoleon by observing that it was Joseph, the eldest, who had the right to issue such commands.

If Napoleon was really the eldest, how is it possible that the fact should not have been known, not even to the nurses nor to the boys themselves ? or, being known, how is it conceivable that the entire Ajaccio society could have kept up the fraud without ever dropping an unguarded hint ? Not a single person who knew the family gave any support to the fantastic invention even after the death of the Emperor in 1821, of his mother in 1836, or of the last of his brothers, Jerome, who survived till 1860.

It is indeed astonishing that the inherent impossibility of the feat attributed to the Bonapartes and their friends should not have occurred to such able writers as, amongst the English—Hon. D. A. Bingham, "The Marriages of the Bonapartes" (1881) ; Sir John Seeley, "A Short Life of Napoleon I." (1885) ; Colonel Phipps, "Bourrienne's Memoirs" (1885) ; Rev. S. Baring Gould, "Life of Napoleon" (1897) ; Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon,

the Last Phase" (1900): the French—Colonel T. Yung, "Bonaparte et son Temps" (1880); G. de Grandmaison, "Napoléon et ses Historiens" (1896): the German—Fournier, "Napoleon I."; Yorck von Wartenburg, "Napoleon als Feldherr" (1901): the American—R. M. Johnston, "Napoleon" (1904). All these writers coquet with the idea. Fournier, in a later edition, says he is convinced of his error by a recently published private note from Carlo's diaries, apparently under the impression that evidence of that kind is necessary. Indeed, it is strange that even Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoleon" (1897), and Colonna de Cesare Rocca, "Le Nid de l'Aigle," should have missed the correct answer. Both these eminent writers seem to regard the authenticity of the register in which Napoleon's birth is entered as conclusive; but for Carlo's purpose of sending one boy to school with the birth certificate of his brother, a genuine document was as good as a false one. It was a properly certified copy of the genuine entry of the birth of Napoleon at Ajaccio on August 15, 1769, which Carlo is supposed to have given to the eldest son. The existence of the birth register, and the undoubted genuineness of the entry concerning Napoleone, do not invalidate the possibility of the feat attributed to him. Neither Masson himself, nor any other writer on the subject, has adverted to the absurdity of imagining so universal and eternal a deception. The fraud could not have been kept secret. That alone is conclusive without any further proof.

It is true that the Bonapartes, like many of their contemporaries, were indifferent as to dates. Lucien, on his marriage in 1794, at St. Maximin in France, aged nineteen, wished to appear older than he was, and asserted that he was close on twenty-six. Joseph, on his marriage at Marseilles in 1794, got some Ajaccio friends to swear that he was over twenty-five years of

age, and that he was born at Ajaccio ; whereas the eldest son was over twenty-five years of age, born at Corte, and the second son was under twenty-five years of age, born at Ajaccio. Evidently they knew nothing of the matter, and were merely supporting Joseph's statement to them. He asked them to swear he was born at Ajaccio, where he spent his childhood, because they were all from Ajaccio themselves. There were probably no witnesses from Corte at hand, and if Joseph had insisted on his Corte birth, these witnesses from Ajaccio would not have been accepted. Napoleon, on his marriage in 1796, wished to appear older than he was—partly to lessen the seniority of Josephine, partly in view of his appointment to command the army of Italy. He added a year and a half to his age, asserting that he was born on February 5, 1768, and deducted four years from Josephine's age, making her birth June 23, 1767.

In the Imperial almanacs for 1805 and 1806 there are a number of incorrect statements as to the birthdays of the Emperor's family, but the orthodox dates are given in 1807 and subsequent numbers, with one exception. Josephine is throughout stated to have been born on June 24, 1768, although her son Eugène is given September 3, 1780, when the mother would have been only twelve years old. This was a little transparent flattery of Josephine, whose enemies said she was too old to give a child to the Imperial Dynasty.

In these almanacs August 15 is marked as the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin, of St. Napoléon, and of the Concordat, whereas the Concordat was signed on July 15 (1801). Napoleon wished to connect his name with the Concordat, and brought the Concordat, whose date was notorious, to his birthday, when it would have been easier to shift his birthday to the Concordat. The extraordinary statement has seriously

been made that he put his birthday to August 15 because it was the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin, as unsuitable a connection for a great soldier as could possibly have been imagined. Napoleon could not have been pleased at the "adulatory rodomontades of the most absurd description"* which the coincidence of the Virgin and St. Napoléon produced at each anniversary, as, for instance, "Heaven ordained that the hero should spring from the sepulchre of the Virgin." This kind of thing exposed him to the deadliest ridicule. He would have been tempted to move his birthday celebration away from this particular fête rather than towards it.

Another reason has been given for the alleged falsification of Napoleon's birthday. It has been propounded that Carlo having given the eldest son the second son's birth certificate, Napoleon afterwards supported the fraud because the Corte (eldest) child was born before Corsica became French; the Ajaccio (second) child after the conquest. The Corte child was not born a Frenchman, the Ajaccio child was. After Napoleon's abdication in 1814 the Senate passed a decree stating that he was not born a Frenchman. Lord Rosebery thinks that this point was "capital for Napoleon and his dynasty," and relates the story of a French Mayor who, at a fête, praised Napoleon for being able to do such wonders, although not born a Frenchman—a tactless speech which is said to have annoyed the Emperor. The Mayor meant nothing more than that Napoleon was a Corsican—a fact which the Emperor would not wish to be emphasized. Whether he was born just before or just after the conquest was too trivial a detail to be thought of or mentioned. That his dynasty had nothing to fear from a Genoese-Corsican origin is shown by the readiness with which the name of

* Bourrienne, "Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte," edited by Colonel Phipps, vol. ii., p. 475.

Joseph was discussed as his successor. It was never suggested that Joseph was barred by his birthday. The conquest of Corsica made all Corsicans, of whatever age, French citizens, with every privilege attached to that position. No Corsican candidate for an official position in France was ever asked whether he was born before or after the conquest. In any case, it would have been quite impossible for Napoleon to palm himself off as junior to Joseph if he was really senior.

We may conclude with a quotation from the Memoirs of the Duchesse d'Abrantes (Mme. Junot), who knew the Bonaparte family intimately. She relates that she and her mother (Mme. Permon, an old friend of the Bonapartes, in whose house Carlo died at Montpellier) were spending the evening of Brumaire (November 10, 1799) with Letizia. On this momentous occasion, when her son was grasping at the supreme power in France, it was natural that the mother's thoughts should turn to the day when she gave him birth. Speaking in privacy to these old and intimate friends of her own sex, Letizia said that "being at Mass on the day of the fête of Notre Dame of August, she was overtaken by the pains of childbirth, and she had hardly reached home when she was delivered of Napoleon. During her pregnancy she had experienced many misfortunes; for when the French entered Corsica many of the principal families, and among them that of Bonaparte, were constrained to fly. They assembled at the foot of Monte Rotondo, the highest mountain in Corsica. In their flight, and during their sojourn among the mountains, they underwent many hardships. It has been reported that Paoli was Napoleon's godfather. It is not true. Laurent Jjubega was his godfather. He held him over the baptismal font along with another of our relations, Geltruda Bonaparte."

Here we have the date fixed. It was shortly after

the conquest of Corsica and the flight to Monte Rotondo—that is, after May, 1769; it was on the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin—that is, August 15. The godparents were, as the baptismal register states, Lorenzo Giubega and Gertruda Bonaparte. It is not possible to suppose that Letizia in all this was keeping up the fraud; that the child who she said was born August 15, 1769, was in fact born January 7, 1768; that while talking about August, 1769, at Ajaccio, she was thinking of January, 1768, at Corte; that while pretending to speak of Napoleon she knew that it was Joseph Napolion who was the hero of the day. Nor can we imagine why Mme. Junot should invent the tale.

This evidence, conclusive and final by itself alone, was published eighty years ago; and yet the ridiculous fiction that Napoleon was Joseph and Joseph was Napoleon has been allowed to live into the twentieth century.

Thus does the great magician continue to disturb men's minds, so that when contemplating any event with which he was connected, they are unable to steady themselves for the normal exercise of the ordinary mental processes.

CHAPTER IV

PERSONAL ENVIRONMENT

I. CHILDHOOD (AUGUST 15, 1769, TO DECEMBER 12, 1778).

(1) *The Bonaparte House.*

THE house in which Napoleon was born was burst into by the adherents of Paoli in 1793, after the family had fled. Some authorities think that it was burned on that occasion, and that the existing structure is the result of so much restoration and rebuilding after fire that it must be regarded as a new edifice, to which no memories of Napoleon's childhood could be attached.

There exists in the archives at Ajaccio a document, dated 13 Prairial, year vi. (June 1, 1798), which rebuts this theory and supports the statement of Joseph, who says in his Memoirs that in 1793 the house was *saccagée* and *dévastée* (not burned). It is headed, "Statement of indemnity due to the refugees and detained persons of the town of Ajaccio on account of losses sustained at the time of the invasion of the English, in conformity with the law of 6 Pluviôse, year vi." (January 25, 1798).* The Paolists are here spoken of as the English, who, on the invitation of Paoli, took possession of Corsica, but had to evacuate it again after Napoleon's victories in Italy. That the damage was not done by the English, who were admitted into Ajaccio without contest, but by the irrup-

* "Notes et Documents sur la Ville d'Ajaccio," by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Campi, p. 183.

tion of the Paolists in 1793, when the Bonapartes and the French party were driven out of Corsica, is evident from the names of the persons to whom indemnity was paid. The chief recipients were Letizia Bonaparte, 124,800 francs; Nicolas Paravicini (Carlo's brother-in-law), 41,438 francs; André Ramolino (Letizia's cousin), 38,896 francs—all members of the Bonaparte party who, in 1793, were obnoxious to the Paolists.

From the detailed items, which include an extravagant number of beasts and books, as well as nearly 20,000 francs for loss of enjoyment of her property, it is evident that the mother of the conqueror of Italy was encouraged to make very exorbitant demands. The damage to real property is thus described :*

	Francs.
A house situated in the Rue Bonaparte, completely furnished, of four stories, with the ground-floor (the Bonaparte house in the Rue St. Charles, formerly Via Malerba, sometimes called Rue Bonaparte), <i>dévastée</i>	16,000
The Badina house in the Rue Malerba, <i>dévastée</i>	2,000
A bakehouse in the Rue Malerba, <i>dévastée</i>	1,000
The Pietra Santa house in the Rue Malerba, <i>dévastée</i>	4,000
A house in the Salline Garden, <i>brûlée</i> , with 300 quintals of fodder	1,800
A house of two stories in the Milelli Garden, with an oil-press, <i>brûlée</i>	1,900

The distinction between devastation and burning is clearly made, proving that the Bonaparte house was not burned. Nasica, a Corsican who collected materials for his "Mémoires sur l'Enfance et la Jeunesse de Napoléon I^{er}," at Ajaccio in 1821-29, says : "The house was given up to pillage. Even the doors and windows were torn from their hinges. The house would have been burned but for the fear of damaging the neighbouring houses, which belonged to the so-called Patriots" (the Paolists).

When, after Napoleon's conquest of Italy, Joseph returned to Ajaccio, Napoleon wrote to him : "Put in

* Marcaggi, J. B., "La Genèse de Napoléon," p. 433.



THE BONAPARTE HOUSE, AJACCIO.

To face page 62.

order the house we lived in, which I wish in any event to see in a proper condition and fit for habitation ; it should be made again just what it was, joining to it Ignazio's apartment."

When Joseph arrived in 1796 the house had been for three years and a half unoccupied, with no windows or doors and bare of furniture ; but it was so far from having been structurally damaged by burning that he was able to live in it in a few weeks. Joseph obtained possession, by an exchange, of the top floor, which had never belonged to the Bonapartes. A branch of the Pozzo di Borgo family had lived there—a further reason why the Paolists should not have burned the house, for Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo was Paoli's right-hand man.

The Emperor gave the Bonaparte house to his wet-nurse, Camilla Ilari. Letizia's cousin, Andrea Ramolino, was living there at the time, and declined to move, a fact which Camilla Ilari was unable for several years to bring to the notice of Napoleon. When at last her petition penetrated to the Imperial ear, Napoleon was indignant that his wishes in such a matter should have been ignored ; but he had against him his mother and Cardinal Fesch, who objected that the historic house ought not to go out of the family to a peasant woman. In the end he allowed Ramolino to retain the Bonaparte house on condition that he gave up his own house to Camilla Ilari, together with 20,000 francs, and that he pulled down the Pietra Santa house and part of the Gentile house, which stood opposite, so that an open space might be made in front of the Bonaparte house. This was done, and the Place Letizia made, affording a good view of the front of the house. Andrea Ramolino died in 1831, and left the house to his nephew, Levie Ramolino, who was offered and refused large sums for it : as much as £20,000 was offered in 1833 by the famous C. A. Pozzo di Borgo, and later £8,000 by

the Duc d'Orléans. Levie Ramolino gave the house to Joseph in 1843, after having removed the furniture. Princesse Zénaïde, sole heiress of Joseph, sold the house to Napoleon III. for £2,000, and the furniture for £600, £2,600 in all. It now belongs to the Empress Eugénie.

The entrance stairs, the woodwork, flooring, fire-places, wall and ceiling decorations, are all subsequent to 1793, and most of these changes must date from the Second Empire. There is no reason to suppose that otherwise, in plan and elevation, the house is different from what it was in the days of Napoleon.

The furniture now in the house consists of what Levie Ramolino handed over to Napoleon III., with a few other reputedly authentic pieces. It is very unlikely that any of the original furniture can have survived the Paolist irruption. The house was cleared of its furniture in 1793, and again in 1843. It is possible, though not probable, that Napoleon III. may have got from Levie Ramolino some pieces which were in the house when Napoleon visited it for a few days on his return from Egypt in 1799. It is inconceivable that any of it can have been in the house before 1793. Nearly fifty years have already elapsed since the present furniture was placed in the house, and 110 since Napoleon saw it for the last time.

Ajaccio at the time of Napoleon's birth contained about 3,000 inhabitants. It consisted of a citadel, and touching it the town proper, all enclosed by walls and bastions. That town is still in the direction, breadth, and number of its streets the same as it was in Napoleon's time, though many of the houses have been heightened by the addition of one or more stories. Outside the walls there are great changes, with new residential and business quarters, but the town proper of to-day is the Ajaccio of 1769.

The three main streets were the Strada Dritta (now



the Rue Napoléon), the Strada della Fontanaccia (now the Rue du Roi de Rome), and the Strada delle Monache (now the Rue des Écoles). These thoroughfares were connected by three streets—the Strada Centurione (now Rue Notre Dame), with its prolongation, the Strada Lazaro Rossi; the Via Malerba (Rue St. Charles), with its prolongation, the Via Seminario Vecchio (Rue St. Charles); and the Via Troilo Lubera (Rue du Centre), with its prolongation, the Via Baldovino Frasso (Rue du Centre). The Via del Pevero (Rue Letizia) connected the Strada Centurione with the Via Malerba. The Bonaparte house stands at the corner of the Rue St. Charles and the Rue Letizia, which are narrow lanes, some 10 to 12 feet broad. This part of the Rue St. Charles was (before the rise of Napoleon) sometimes called the Rue Bonaparte.*

The house was built in the early part of the seventeenth century, ground-floor and two stories above. The third story, of later date, belonged to a branch of the Pozzo di Borgo family.

The roadway in these Ajaccio streets falls from both sides to a small open drain in the centre, which, even in the present day, is often full of unsanitary matter. In the time of Napoleon it was the custom to empty superfluities into the street, the law merely demanding that this should not be done until a warning had been shouted three times, and then only between eleven at night and sunrise. But these legislative refinements were derided in Corsican practice. Carlo was one day taking the air in his doorway, dressed in his most expensive costume, when slops were emptied upon him from the top story, inhabited by Giustina Pozzo di Borgo, *née* Bozzi, a somewhat distant cousin of his. Being a lawyer, he took the matter before the tribunal, and obtained a judgment in his favour, which, after citing the complaint of "the magnificent

* Campi, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

de Bonaparte," and "having heard the expert evidence and the attestations of the witnesses on both sides," decreed that "the dame Giustina Bozzi is condemned to pay for the coat according to the valuation of experts."

The annexed plan of the first floor is the work of the author from measurements made by him on the spot. Without professing the accuracy that would be found in an architect's plan, its substantial correctness may be relied upon. The second floor consists only of four rooms exactly similar to the four rooms below in the front part of the house.

On the right of the stairs was the dining-room, above the ground-floor kitchen. On the other side of the stairs was Letizia's *salotto*, or reception-room, probably seldom used. In the Italian fashion it would be unoccupied except when visitors were ushered in. Beyond it was Carlo's study, which contained, according to Letizia's claims, as many as 1,000 books. Though Joseph and Napoleon and the Archdeacon added their quota before 1793, the estimate was doubtless excessive. Adjoining was Letizia's bedroom, where all the children, except Joseph and Napoleon, were born.


The study and bedroom have windows on to a terrace, or balcony, which is connected with a long hall, or gallery, by six glass doors. According to Carlo's book of accounts, he spent 600 francs in 1774 in the construction of the terrace and the purchase of the land upon which it stands, and in 1780 he spent 896 francs in repairs to his bedroom.* Probably what is now the gallery was at one time the space below the roof of the house in the Via del Pevero. This space would have been used as a *guardaroba*, where enormous cupboards stand to hold the family linen, glass, etc. That is quite a usual feature in Italian villas. The cost of raising the walls, lifting the great

* Marcaggi, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

Measurements are in feet.

W = Window

D = Door



V I A D E L P E V E R O

V I A M A L E R B A

Drawn by NORWOOD YOUNG.

PLAN OF THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE BONAPARTE HOUSE, AJACCIO.

wooden beams, and re-laying the roof, would not have been great, and would have produced this fine apartment.

The terrace, though looked down upon from the windows of the neighbouring houses, was doubtless much patronized. Here the babies would take their day-sleeps. In hot weather some meals would be taken here, in spite of its distance from the kitchen. Chairs would often be brought out on the terrace from the large room, especially on hot evenings. It was here that Napoleon read Montesquieu and other writers with Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo; here he had a rough shelter made of planks of wood, forming a sort of summer-house, to which he retired for work.

The three small rooms beyond the gallery belong, by right, to a house in the Rue Notre Dame. They are the rooms referred to by Napoleon in his letter to Joseph as "the apartment of Ignazio," his foster-brother. The Ilari family may have lived there.

On the floor above, the two front rooms were probably those of the Archdeacon Lucciano and the grandmother, Maria Saveria Bonaparte. Of the two back rooms looking down on to the terrace, one was occupied by Napoleon when a young man. Madame Walewska, in a conversation she reports, makes Napoleon say he "went upstairs" to dress. At one time he used one of these rooms to work in. He said to Antommarchi at St. Helena: "I had established my study in the quietest room in the house—had placed myself in the attic," which would refer to one of these rooms.

When the Governor of Corsica, Comte Marbeuf, visited Ajaccio, he lodged with the Bonapartes. The gallery would then be used as a palatial dining-room, and during the Governor's stay many of the notabilities of the town would be invited to meet him there at table. It would be an excellent occasion for strengthening

Carlo's political position, by exhibiting the terms of close intimacy between himself and the all-powerful representative of France.

Marbeuf would have the ordinary dining-room as his bedroom, for the chief guest would naturally have the room with a private entrance of its own. The Bonaparte house, like other Italian houses, had no passages. Having entered from the stairs, you had to pass through one room to get to another. If possible, an important guest would be placed nearest to the stairs, so that he would not require to pass through any rooms in order to go out, nor would the other residents have to pass through his room for the purpose. It would have been a natural and good arrangement to use the gallery as a grand dining-hall, and give the Governor the usual dining-room, just off the stairs, to sleep in.

During the stormy times of the revolution in Corsica, after the death of their father and of the Archdeacon, it is very probable that Joseph and Napoleon made good use of their fine gallery for the entertainment of influential guests at political feasts. Much of the money left by the Archdeacon was used to buy political support.

Napoleon was not born in the room which has always been, and still is, pointed out as his birthplace. The true facts were published by Antommarchi in 1823, who had them from Napoleon, and by H. Lee in 1834, who had them from Letizia herself; but they have been forgotten. Letizia had gone to Mass in the morning of August 15, the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin, at the cathedral, within five minutes' walk of the Bonaparte house. There she was suddenly attacked by the pains of childbirth. "Hastening home, she was met by a gentleman, who, observing an uncommon glow in her countenance and lustre in her eyes, with a gallantry more natural than seasonable,



THE ROOM IN WHICH NAPOLEON WAS BORN.

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made these effects of pain and agitation subjects of compliment and praise. She was just able to reach her house and throw herself on a sofa in the parlour. When discovered by her domestics, the child was born."*

This account is supported by Napoleon, who told Antommarchi at St. Helena that his mother, hurrying home from the cathedral, had barely time to reach her "salon."

The "parlour," or "salon," was, of course, Letizia's *salotto*, or reception-room, the first she would reach after mounting the stairs. In her distress she would make for the first sofa that met her gaze in the first room she entered. Pilgrimages are now made to her bedroom, where a sofa has been placed, which serves the purpose of a shrine, on which offerings of flowers are laid. But it was in the *salotto*—the parlour—that Napoleon was born, a fact which has been known on the authority of both mother and son for three-fourths of a century.

The point is certainly unimportant. The room in which a great man was born, but not reared, can have no particular interest; the room where he spent his first days, where he learned to suck, to cry, to see, to hear, to move, deserves all the careful scrutiny that can be given to it. In the case of Napoleon this was not his mother's bedroom, for he had a wet-nurse, and while he was in her care Joseph would sleep in his mother's room. When Napoleon was two years old there was another baby, Maria Anna, who was nursed by her mother; so we may conclude that Napoleon spent most of his early days with Camilla Ilari either in one of the small rooms beyond the gallery, or in one of the upstairs rooms. Assuming that the two front rooms were occupied by the Archdeacon and the grandmother, Napoleon and Camilla may have slept in

* "The Life of Napoleon," by H. Lee, 1834.

the room over Carlo's library, which, to modern and Northern ideas inappropriate for sanitary reasons, may have been deliberately selected; or the room chosen may have been that over Letizia's bedroom, a good-sized apartment, lighted from two sides, having a window on the Via del Pevero and another on the terrace.

For the rearing of a large family the house was above the average of Ajaccio. It was well aerated and lighted; it had good-sized rooms, and the terrace made a fair substitute for a garden. Most other children, even of the better class, had to go into the streets for their outdoor life.

(2) *The Family.*

If the moulding of the character in childhood by the influence of environment, so that it sets into a permanent form, only then to be gradually altered by the slow process of disintegration and decay, were more generally appreciated, we should not have to deplore the absence of ascertained facts as to the growing years of all great men. Very little has come down to us of the childhood of Napoleon from those persons who were witnesses of it.

His mother at the age of eighty-four dictated some remarks, which have been preserved, to her companion, Rosa Mellini. Letizia said that she had been obliged to take the furniture out of a large room in the Bonaparte house, and to give it to her children to play in, so turbulent and troublesome were they. Napoleon covered the walls with pictures of soldiers on the battlefield; she presented him with a drum and a wooden sword. He had a particular liking for the study of numbers, and had a sort of a summer-house made with planks of wood on the further part of the terrace, where he could retire from the racket made by the other children for quiet calculations. One day, visit-

ing a certain mill, he calculated the amount of corn it would grind, from the volume of the water which moved it. Though very fond of good things, when attending the Jesuit College he would exchange the white bread that had been given him for his lunch for a soldier's coarse bread. Being scolded by his mother for this, he said, as he was going to be a soldier, he wished to accustom himself to hardships; and, besides, he liked the soldier's bread best.

Letizia, unfortunately, was confusing dates. Napoleon was with his mother at Ajaccio up to the age of nine, but not again till he was seventeen. The mathematical calculation she attributed to him was too difficult for a child of nine, who had not had any special preparation, and must be relegated to the period of his return from France with a mathematical reputation. And it was not till then that the family had grown to need a large play-room. When Napoleon went to France there were only two small boys and two infants. When he returned to Corsica there were four boys, aged eighteen and a half, seventeen, eight, and two; and two girls, aged six and four and a half. This would be a much more noisy gathering.

Letizia's reminiscences are unreliable. It is not unusual for a mother to attribute to the favourite or most interesting child all the striking nursery incidents of the whole family. The fact that she is regarded as an oracle, no other adult being in a position to correct her statements, does not make for a rigid, conscientious, punctilious memory. When asked questions about her children, she does not like to admit that she has forgotten, however natural that may be.

In accordance with Corsican custom, Letizia nursed her children herself; but in the case of Napoleon she was obliged to employ a wet-nurse, Camilla Ilari, the wife of a sailor. This woman, with her children, Santo, Ignazio, and Giovanna, had an important influence

upon the development of Napoleon, and he showed his appreciation of her on many occasions. He stood godfather to Giovanna's daughter Faustina in 1787. When he landed at Ajaccio on his way back to France after the Egyptian campaign, one of the admiring crowd who met him on the shore was Camilla Ilari, who called out to him, "Caro figlio," to which he replied, "Madre." Camilla then presented him with a bottle of milk, with the remark: "My son, I have already given you the milk of my heart, and have nothing now to offer but the milk of my goat."*

At St. Helena Napoleon, speaking to Antommarchi about his wet-nurse, said: "She wished to be present at my coronation, and came to Paris for the purpose. She amused me much with her stories, her lively, animated manner, and the Genoese gesticulations with which she emphasized her remarks. She pleased Josephine and the family, and the Pope was enchanted with her; he gave her many blessings, and did not conceal from me his surprise at her good sense and her sallies." Napoleon gave her large sums of money, and vineyards, and wanted to give her the ancestral Bonaparte house, as already related. He referred to her in his will, saying: "I suppose she is rich; but if by any chance all that I have done for her has turned out unfortunately, my executors will not leave her in misery."

Her children, Santo, Giovanna, and Ignazio, were playmates of Joseph and Napoleon, and are mentioned by Napoleon in his letters from Brienne. When Joseph and Napoleon went out together, they would hurry down the narrow, filthy Via Malerba, into the broader Strada Dritta, and thence would make sometimes for the citadel to watch the soldiers; but as a rule went straight down to the shore, where a number

* "Figlio vi ho dato il latte del mio cuore, ora non ne ho più; accettate il latte della mia capra" (Campi, *op. cit.*).

of boats were lying, and were doubtless taken for many a sail by the relatives of the wet-nurse. The foster-brothers Santo and Ignazio often went with them. Ignazio was destined to follow the sea, as his father had done, and he chose the English Navy, in which he ultimately fought against France. We are justified in assuming that the English Navy and the English nation were subjects of admiration amongst these boys; for was it not an Englishman, Boswell, who had visited Corsica to meet Paoli, and spread the Corsican renown? Was not Paoli welcomed and pensioned in England at that very time? Was not England an island like Corsica, and equally hostile to all the Continent, particularly to the hated French tyrants? The English Navy was to be the deliverer of Corsica. Ignazio would himself join it, and though Napoleon might be obliged to accept the charity of Louis XVI. for his education, he also would be a sailor, and his heart would be with Ignazio and the English, the hereditary enemies of the French oppressors. Napoleon always retained a marked respect for England, and an equal contempt for France and the rest of Europe. The pertinacity of the Consul and Emperor's opposition to England was partly due to his admiration for stern fighters, partly to desire for a respected enemy's appreciation. These feelings were so much a part of the adult man's character, so interwoven into the very fibre of his being, that he was unconscious of their presence, and quite incapable of controlling or extricating them. Tendencies of this immutable nature would most easily be acquired in childhood. His wet-nurse and her family did much to fix them.

The women who lived in the Bonaparte house during the childhood of Napoleon were, besides his mother and his wet-nurse, his grandmother, Saveria Bonaparte, nurse or governess Caterina, and two

domestics, Francesca and Maria Antonia. Frequent visitors were Grandmother Fesch and her sisters, Signora Antonietta Benielli and Signorina Pietra Santa, and Aunt Gertrude Paravicini, Carlo's sister. Napoleon referred to some of these persons in his letters from Brienne.

Writing to his father in 1784 (at the age of fourteen and three-quarter years), he says: "*Présentez mes respects à Minana Saveria*" (Grandmother Bonaparte, sometimes confounded with Saveria, the domestic who subsequently came into the household); "*Zia Gertrude*" (Aunt Paravicini); "*Zio Nicolino*" (her husband); "*Zia Touta*" (perhaps Antonietta Benielli), etc. "*Présentez mes compliments à Mariana Francesca*" (servants), "*Santo, Giovanna, Ignazio*" (the foster-children). "*Je vous prie d'avoir soin d'eux. Donnez-moi de leurs nouvelles, et dites-moi s'ils sont à leur aise. Je finis en vous souhaitant une aussi bonne santé que la mienne.*" The "respects" are for grandmother and aunts, the "compliments" for people of the servant class, on behalf of whom he pleads as a patron for his protégés. In the following year, writing to his mother after the death of his father, he says: "*Ma santé est parfaite, et je prie tous les jours que le ciel vous gratifie d'une semblable. Présentez mes respects à Zia Gertrude, Minana Saveria, Minana Fesch, etc.*"

Of these persons, Zia Gertrude made a great impression upon the children. Joseph, in his *Memoirs*, says that she was a second mother to the children, and Lucien records some very complimentary remarks made by Letizia of her sister-in-law, who evidently was a person of strong and spirited character, for whom the family had much respect.

Grandmother Saveria Bonaparte showed her devotion and concern for the family by hearing one Mass a day for each grandchild as soon as it appeared. As

Letizia had eight children who survived, this would mean eight Masses a day.

Of Nurse Caterina Napoleon talked to Antommarchi, who, like Caterina, was reared in the extreme north of Corsica. Napoleon was complaining that Antommarchi's views on medical subjects were unorthodox, and remarked: "You think I am accusing you of presumption: not at all. But you come from the Cape" (of Corsica), "and you have the marks of your origin. Oh, I know you well, you North Cape men!" (*capocorsini*). "You are always dissatisfied, and see no good in anything but your own work. I was ushered into the world in the arms of the old Mammuccia Caterina.* So you may guess if I know what I am talking about. She was obstinate, captious, and fault-finding, continually at war with all around her. She was always quarrelling, especially with my grandmother, though they were very fond of each other. They were continually nagging; their disputes were interminable, and amused us very much. You are looking serious, doctor; the portrait displeases you. Never mind: if your compatriot was a shrew, she was good and affectionate; she took us for walks, cared for us, made us laugh, with a solicitude whose memory remains to this day. I still remember what tears she shed when I left Corsica for France, though it was forty years ago."

Of Grandmother Fesch a characteristic anecdote—which also throws valuable light on Letizia, Pauline, and Napoleon himself—was told by Napoleon at Elba to Madame Walewska: "My grandmother was very old and bent, leaning on a stick, and appeared to Pauline and myself like an old witch. Her kindness for us was shown by her invariably bringing us sweets, which, however, did not prevent Pauline and me from following behind her, imitating her gait. Unluckily,

* This is not to be taken strictly.

she noticed us, and complained to my mother, telling her that she brought us up without proper respect for our grandparents. My mother, though she loved us greatly, would stand no nonsense, and I saw in her eyes that I was in a bad case. Pauline soon received her fate, a petticoat being easier to raise than trousers to unbutton. That evening my mother tried to get hold of me, but without success, and I began to think I had escaped altogether. Next morning she pushed me away when I approached to kiss her. However, I thought no more of it, when later in the day she said to me: 'Napoleon, thou art invited to dine with the Governor; go and dress.' I went upstairs, very pleased to dine with the officers, but my mother was playing with me as a cat with a mouse. She entered my room suddenly and shut the door; I then saw the trap into which I had fallen, but it was too late, and I had to submit to a whipping." Napoleon was then an Artillery Lieutenant, over seventeen years of age. That the operation to which he had to submit was not a mere form is evident from the remarks which led to this anecdote, which was introduced by the Emperor's observing a naughty child and saying: "You do not fear the rod; well, you would if you had my experience. I only received it once, and I have never forgotten it."

There was another occasion, however, as he told Antommarchi: "My mother was severe against disobedience—would never tolerate it. I remember a misfortune that happened to me and the punishment I received." The children were strictly forbidden to touch a certain fig-tree. Napoleon one day gorged himself with the fruit, and filled his pockets with what he could not consume. This coming to the knowledge of his mother, "the wrongdoer had to expiate his fault."

Of their mother the children always spoke in the warmest terms. For her they had, and retained to the

end, the greatest respect and veneration—and there could be no better proof of her mothering excellence. Joseph in his *Memoirs* exclaims: “Strong, good woman, model of all virtues, how much we still owe you for the example you gave us!”

Napoleon frequently spoke of his mother at St. Helena. He said to Antommarchi: “She was all her life an excellent woman, and as a mother was without equal.” On another occasion, says Antommarchi, “His thoughts were with his mother. He was recalling her affection, her tenderness, the love she lavished upon him, and, with a sudden stop, he said: ‘You are attached to me, doctor; you think nothing of annoyances, trouble, fatigue, when it is a question of giving me any relief: but all that is very different from the solicitude of a mother. Oh, Mamma Letizia!’” Again, speaking of the period just before his birth, he said: “Losses, privations, fatigues, she sustained and faced them all; she had the head of a man on the body of a woman.” Again, observing the “tenacity” of little Bertrand, he said to Antommarchi: “I was as stubborn as he at his age; nothing stopped or disconcerted me. I was a quarreller, a fighter; I feared nobody, beating one, scratching another, making myself redoubtable to all. It was my brother Joseph who most often had to suffer. He was slapped, bitten, scolded, and I had already complained against him before he had had time to recover himself. But my quickness was of no avail with Mamma Letizia, who soon repressed my bellicose humour; she would not tolerate my tantrums. She was both tender and severe; she punished wrongdoing and rewarded good conduct; she recognized impartially our good and bad actions. My father, a man of intellect and culture, but too fond of pleasure to occupy his time with us children, would sometimes attempt to extenuate our faults. ‘Let them be,’ said my mother: ‘that is not your business; it is for me to look after

the children.' She did watch over us, in truth, with a solicitude without equal. Low sentiments, ungenerous feelings, were checked, banished ; she allowed nothing to reach our young spirits that was not fine and elevated."

To O'Meara he said : " My excellent mother is a woman of courage and of great talent, more of a masculine than a feminine nature, proud and high-minded. To the manner in which she formed me at an early age I principally owe my subsequent elevation. My opinion is that the future good or bad conduct of a child entirely depends upon the mother." In our own day Theodore Roosevelt, ex-President of the United States, has said : " The mother is the one supreme asset of national life. She is more important by far than the successful statesman, or business man, or artist, or scientist."

Unfortunately this opinion is not yet common, and consequently biographers tell us very little—practically nothing but a few vague generalities—of the mothering that makes the great man. If Letizia was really " tender and severe," one who " recognized impartially good and bad actions," who " watched over her children with a solicitude without equal," who " allowed nothing to reach the young spirits that was not fine and elevated"—if this tremendous panegyric is to be accepted in full, the mother of Napoleon must have been a very rare woman, approaching perfection. Doubtless there is a little, very natural, exaggeration, but it is also quite clear, from the sufficient testimony of her children, that Letizia was a mother far above the average. But mothering is still an unexplored science ; a consensus of opinion may establish the general result, but the details of accomplishment are hidden from all, even from the mothers themselves, and what little is known or ascertainable is never put on record.



LETIZIA BONAPARTE.

After the portrait by Ch. Devritz.

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We have to be content with the general statement that Letizia was a woman of character and determination, who did not spare correction, or shrink from any motherly duties and attentions. She gave herself freely and fully to the mothering of the family, and was, as Napoleon justly observed, like every mother, the direct factor for good or ill in the development of her children.

Of the father's influence very little has been recorded. Letizia in her old age told an English visitor at Rome that when Carlo wanted to correct Napoleon he had to have recourse to the threat that he would tell his mother. Doubtless this would apply equally to Joseph. To English readers it would seem that the normal positions of the parents were reversed in this family. With us it is usually the father who is called upon when severity is required. But Italian parents are generally over-indulgent, and the father especially so; he expects the children to be bright and happy, charming to play with, and has no idea of ever making himself disagreeable to them if he can avoid it. Sometimes he may be called upon to exercise discipline, but the children have a good deal of their own way, the mother's appeals being about all that they ever have to struggle against.

Carlo would, from his own nursery environment, grow up a self-indulgent man. He was the youngest of two, with a long interval—five years—between the eldest, Gertrude, and himself. It is probable that he was a spoilt child. He was also the last of the Bonapartes descended from the Carlo Maria Bonaparte who married Virginia Odone in 1657. The only other descendants of Francesco Bonaparte, the introducer into Corsica of the Bonaparte line, were the issue of Girolamo (uncle of Carlo's great-great-grandfather), who married Isabella Costa in 1650; or, still


further back, the issue of Agostino, born early in the sixteenth century, grandson of the Sarzana ancestor.

Carlo Maria was thus not merely the only son of his parents : he was the only male descendant, and the heir, of Carlo Maria, his great-great-grandfather, after whom he was named. No wonder his devout mother said a Mass every day for each of her grandchildren ; she trembled for the lives of the children who were to continue this Bonaparte line.

One is inclined to imagine that Carlo's mother was conscientious and affectionate to her children. Her daughter Gertrude grew under her guidance to be universally respected. Her son Carlo suffered from his intrinsic importance, which was further emphasized and exaggerated by the presence of an elder child to whom he was, from no personal merit, constantly preferred. His life was precious ; on him many hopes rested ; his education had to be of the best. The situation in which he was reared explains what we know of his character. Being important, he was conceited, ambitious, desirous of making a show in his world ; being spoilt, he was self-indulgent and reckless of money.

Letizia's mother, of the ancient family of Pietra Santa, was the most influential of the four grandparents, for she formed the character of Letizia, who formed the character of Napoleon. She was a determined woman ; she made her second husband change his religion from Swiss Protestant to Roman Catholic before she would accept him ; she was a disciplinarian, who blamed Letizia for allowing her children to grow up without sufficient reverence for their seniors. It may legitimately be inferred that Letizia's strong character was produced by her mother's training and example, just as Carlo's self-indulgence was the result of his mother's spoiling.

Letizia was reared in a very different atmosphere





from that of Carlo. She lost her father at the age of five ; at seven a stepfather distracted her mother's attention from her, and brought a stranger's influence to bear upon her ; at twelve and a half a half-brother still further intervened between her and her mother. Her childhood was not all sunshine, with a strict mother, a strange stepfather, a rival half-brother. She was probably glad to leave her home, even at the early age of thirteen and three-quarters, especially as her husband was a fine, handsome youth, whom she found it easy to love. It was important that a son should be born to represent this branch of the Bonaparte family, threatened with extinction in the male line ; and when a son came, his early death must have been a great sorrow.

The death of the next child, a girl, also shortly after birth, made the mother, not yet eighteen when her third child was born, extremely anxious to preserve the boy's life. Happily, this was a healthy child (Joseph), who grew and thrived ; and then another son came, a small, delicate baby, who needed more attention than Joseph, being both younger and less robust. It may have been Napoleon's early delicacy that caused the postponement of his baptism in church, which was not performed till another child, the third of the Maria Annas, had appeared, when they were taken to the cathedral together, Napoleon being nearly two years of age. The church ceremony was still later in the case of Lucien and Elisa, who were baptized together when Lucien was four and a half and Elisa nearly three.

Napoleon's near relations will be found on the annexed genealogical table. Most of them lived at Ajaccio.

It is on his companionship with Joseph that the whole growth of Napoleon hangs. If we had no other proof, we should know that Joseph was the elder and Napoleon the younger, from the adult characters of

the two men. There never was a more obvious eldest son than Joseph, or a more certain second son than Napoleon.

Position in age and sex, relatively to the other nursery inmates, is, after the mother's or nurse's personality, the chief factor in the development of a human being. Consider a case.

Three brothers, aged six, four, and two, are playing together. Six performs a certain gymnastic performance on the sofa; Four at once imitates it, with fair success; Two then tries his immature powers, sometimes achieving an exact copy, sometimes only getting near it, sometimes failing entirely and hurting himself. The story of the growth of the three children is here exhibited.

The eldest, having nobody to imitate (at an age when the father's prowess is merely miraculous), had to originate, to invent for himself. Though Four would sometimes be a successful rival, Six would, on the whole, maintain a superiority, and would probably retain through life a consciousness of ability which the long and exciting years of child-growth would have fixed as a permanent characteristic. This quality might easily degenerate into self-satisfied indolence, in spite of his early training as originator and inventor. The steady approach of Four, who would be treading on his heels all the time, and would be visibly reaching his standard, might be valuable to Six, keep him going; but it might also tend to drive him into his tent, to disdain such competition, and lose its benefit. All sorts of factors may intervene to divert progress from these broad lines. Normally Six would grow into an indolent, self-satisfied, mild, and capable man.

Four has a triple position: he is the younger of two, the elder of two, and the middle of three. He has the ambition of the younger, the contentment of the elder,

and the compromise and good fellowship of the middle. His attendants prefer him to Six (who always seems to be quite old, and when naughty a horror of senile depravity). Four can never be neglected, left to himself, to work out his own problems. He is always in the swim, but for that very reason he misses the occasional solitude in which such great strides in growth are often made. He is always either hurrying to catch Six or slowing to accompany Two; never very decidedly and entirely going his own way because it is his own way. Yet his personality must grow, and it may tend to be a popular one; he will have wider sympathies and be less self-centred than either Six or Two.

Two is the youngest of the family. His attendants spoil him. He is, therefore, self-willed and self-indulgent. He is also constantly stimulated to attain the performances of his elder brothers. He experiences at two the same sensations and adventures that his brothers only reach at twice and thrice his age. He misses none of the teaching excitements of childhood, because he gets all that both Six and Four can gather, and some of his own. While Six may or may not be precocious in originality, according to the strength of the reflex stimulus he gets from Four, and to the influence of his father and female attendants, Two is sure to be precocious in sensational enjoyments. He will grow up an epicure in the pleasures of life.

This example may serve to illustrate the position of Napoleon. When Joseph was six, Napoleon was four and a half, Maria Anna two and a half. The situation is similar in broad outline, though with important modifications, to that which we have been considering. Napoleon is much nearer to Six than Four was, and he is further from Maria Anna than Four was from two. He is more the second of two than the elder of two; his position relatively to his senior is more

important to him than his position relatively to his junior.

There is another and greater variation from the previous case. Napoleon's junior is not of the same sex as himself. By the time Napoleon is four and a half and Maria Anna two and a half, sex has already come into play. It is customary amongst all peoples, and especially among the Corsicans, for the nursery attendants to emphasize and exaggerate the normal divergence due to sex. Maria Anna would naturally be a delightful companion for Napoleon, a sweet and charming influence, an ally sometimes against Joseph's maturer powers, a companion and inspirer of manliness and chivalry. Such an idyll may have developed. On the other hand, Napoleon may have been taught to despise Maria Anna, and Maria Anna may have learned to regard herself as inferior, no equal companion for Napoleon. In that case Napoleon, from the age of two to seven, during the five years of Maria Anna's short life, would have forced upon him a prestige of sex which a child would accept as a tribute to personal worth.

While his egotism was being fomented by the persistent preference given him, as of right, over Maria Anna, the comparatively small distance between him and Joseph would be always stimulating him to match Joseph's achievements. Joseph, being in the extremely privileged position of a Corsican eldest son, the successor to his father, the direct heir to the great-great-grandfather of the family, would not need to show his superiority, and would submit to be continually defeated or bettered, thereby fanning the younger son's eagerness. "Nature," he once said, "has made me without ambition." Broadly, that is not quite correct. He had the vanity and conceit which desire public recognition, but he had not an active desire to rise, nor an intolerance of obscurity. He has related that on one occasion when the two

boys were at school together at Ajaccio, one half of the class were made to act the part of the Romans, while the other half were Carthaginians. Joseph was placed by the master among the victorious Romans, Napoleon among the defeated Carthaginians. Napoleon begged Joseph to change places with him, to let him be on the winning side, which Joseph willingly did, wondering no doubt that Napoleon had not a tougher skin. Joseph was too conceited, in his position of eldest son, heir to the Bonapartes, to be affected by a masquerading farce; while Napoleon was conscious of an uncertain prestige, which he was most unwilling to have still lowered. Unsatisfied vanity is a potent influence in the growth of an aggressive, ambitious nature.

Time alone steadily lessens the proportional age advantage of the elder brother. From being many times the age of Napoleon, Joseph is gradually losing his position: now he is only twenty times Napoleon's age, soon only ten times, and then merely twice. The younger one is always approaching, and both know that the progress will continue until the original distance of one and a half years has, though still existing, become negligible. Its influence will never die; the cleavage in differentiated character it has produced is permanent and portentous; but when Napoleon has reached thirty and Joseph thirty-one and a half, the original one and a half is now only a symbol of what has been. Its significance is that during the larva stage the younger was approaching the elder, not merely in arithmetical proportion of age reckoned by time, but at a faster rate (sometimes at a dangerous speed), owing to the stimulus of a forced pace to the younger and the sedative of a shortened stride to the elder.

So were laid, firm and immutable, the foundations of their adult characters: the elder one easy-going, indolent, courteous; the younger active, aggressive,

and rude. If Maria Anna had been a boy, treading on the heels of Napoleon and treating him as he treated Joseph—if Lucien and Maria Anna had exchanged birthdays—it is reasonable to suppose that Napoleon's character would have developed upon different lines. The desire to dominate, for instance, would not have been his principal feature; for though he would still have been the younger of two relatively to Joseph, he would then also have been the elder of two relatively to the third, and would inevitably have been touched to some extent with the generous, easy indolence of an elder child.

By the time Napoleon had reached the age of five his mother had come to the conclusion that his frequent attacks upon the superior, contemptuous Joseph, with the bursts of temper, needed to be cut into by a drastic change. He was sent to a girls' school, to learn manners. He told the story at St. Helena to Antommarchi. Little Arthur Bertrand had been exhibiting a nasty temper. "That little pickle," said he, "is as headstrong as I was at his age; but my transports often had more excuse. You shall judge if I am not right. I was five to six years of age. I had been placed in a *pension* for little girls, whose mistress was known to my family. I was a pretty child, the only boy at the school, and the girls liked me. But I always had my stockings down at heel, and when we went for walks I held tight to the hand of a certain little girl, which caused many quarrels. My boy comrades, jealous of my Giacominetta, joined these two facts and put them to rhyme. I could not appear in the street but they followed me, shouting :

" Napoleone di mezza calzetta,
Fa l' amore a Giacominetta."

(Napoleon, with his stockings half down, makes love to
Giacominetta.)

"I could not stand being made sport of. Sticks or stones, I seized whatever was at hand; I rushed blindly amongst them all. Happily there was always somebody there to prevent things going too far, but I would never stop to reckon the number of my tormentors."

Thus Letizia's efforts to cure Napoleon of his temper by sending him to a school for girls, where it was hoped he might be restrained by the sex of his companions from tempestuous outbursts, merely led to his fighting in the street.

In the meantime, while the character of his second son was growing in a direction which would ultimately shake Europe, though the process was unnoticed by all about him, Carlo was himself becoming a man of importance on his small stage.

On November 30, 1769, he obtained the degree of Doctor of Law from the University of Pisa, having sustained the thesis required. He was following the example of the Bonapartes of San Miniato, of whom one, Giovanni Battista Bonaparte, was at that time Professor of Medicine at Pisa; while in the previous 100 years, from 1672 onwards, fifteen Bonapartes of San Miniato had received the degree of doctor at Pisa—thirteen of them in law, two in philosophy and medicine. Joseph took his degree in 1788.

Giuseppe, Carlo's father, had obtained from the Tuscan Bonapartes a formal recognition of consanguinity, dated June 25, 1759. By means of this document Carlo obtained from the Archbishop of Pisa letters patent authorizing him to use the title of Noble and Patrician. Carlo was thereupon described in the "Libro di Dottorati" of Pisa as *Il Sig. Carlo del Qm Giuseppe Bonaparte, Nob. Patrizio Fiorentino, Saminiantense, e di Ajaccio*.

This statement that Carlo belonged to the San Miniato branch of the noble and patrician Florentine

family has never been substantiated, though it was honestly credited both by the Ajaccio and the San Miniato Bonapartes. Giuseppe Bonaparte, of San Miniato, by his will dated February 6, 1780, made Carlo his heir. He had nothing to leave save some family papers, to which he thought the Ajaccio Bonapartes were entitled.

Joseph in 1789 made great efforts to prove the Tuscan connection, set the genealogists of Sarzana to work, went to Pisa himself to make inquiries, and finally made application to the Grand Duke of Tuscany with such proofs as he could obtain of his nobility, soliciting the honour of a cross of Saint Étienne. The reply he received was: "His Highness orders that the applicant be invited to furnish the proofs of his Tuscan origin" (September 10, 1789), which meant that the proofs that Joseph had counted upon were valueless. There the matter ended. Later, Napoleon during his Italian campaign made the personal acquaintance of a certain Filippo Bonaparte of San Miniato, and treated him as a relative, but without documentary justification.

With the exception of the feudal signors, whose privileges had been taken away by Paoli long since, there was no titular nobility in Corsica, nor any aristocratic sentiment. The social intercourse was of the most democratic nature. All the well-to-do were owners of farms or vineyards, and it was not unusual for them to sit down at table with their workpeople, and allow themselves to be addressed by their baptismal names. It was for this reason that Rousseau and the Jacobins so loudly praised the institutions of the country.

But with the French conquest came the *ancien régime*, and the division of society into the three classes—nobility, clergy, and third estate. In Corsica, as in every island or other small isolated community,

family rivalry was exceptionally strong; on it, indeed, rested the evil vendetta, and much of the blame of the Continental oppression, which a united people would have been able to throw off. There was now much discussion in every household concerning the new formal lines of precedence, much routing out of old papers and constructing of genealogies. It was not very clear what it was that constituted nobility. Every family of Continental origin had enjoyed immunity from taxation, and Ajaccio consisted almost entirely of these Ligurian descendants. Some other distinction would be necessary. Practically this resolved itself into the desire to stand well with the French. So when, in April, 1770, an edict of Louis XV. was published, admitting into the French nobility all Corsicans who could prove their possession of the condition for 200 years, the French adherents alone took the necessary steps, and the application was itself the best qualification. Of the eight families from whom, in the line of great-grandparents, Napoleon was descended, only two—the Bonaparte and the Pietra Santa—took the trouble to prove their nobility. Carlo and his uncle Lucciano had joined the French party. The Archdeacon and his pupil had been among the first to abandon the fallen Genoese and follow the rising star of Paoli, and were now equally ready to range themselves on the side of the victorious French.

Here we see the origin of some of the prominent features of Napoleon's early career. He was not an aristocrat in the Continental sense—no Corsicans were—but he had an intensely insular pride in his titles of Bonaparte and Corsican. In France he found that these insignia were treated with contempt, and he came in contact with persons who by law were entitled to precedence over himself, and flaunted their superiority over him. Like every Corsican subjected

to such insolence, he became a leveller, an opponent of privilege; thus during the most dangerous part of his career he ranged himself willingly on what happened to be the winning side. In the crucial period, when it was a question which of the Republic's Generals would be the usurper, it was not the man of obstinate convictions, the Hoche or the Moreau, who emerged, but the time-server, the son of Carlo and great-nephew of Lucciano—the Bonaparte who was following the example of the family teachers in preferring self-advancement to abstract opinion; hence his belief that mankind is guided by nothing but material interest. He owed his rise above the sticklers for principle to his readiness in abandoning lost causes, which was a family characteristic.

With the aid of a certificate dated April 19, 1771, signed by certain notabilities of Ajaccio (Ornano, Ramolino, Benielli, Pontano, Bacciocchi), declaring that the Bonaparte family, at that time represented by *Signore* Lucciano and Carlo, had always been regarded amongst the ancient and noble families in the district, Lucciano and Carlo obtained from the Conseil Supérieur, on September 13, 1771, the desired declaration that the Bonaparte family had been proved to be noble, with a nobility extending over more than 200 years.

On May 1, 1772, the States-General of Corsica met at Bastia; on the 18th they proceeded to elect the Twelve Nobles, the chief Corsican functionaries in the island. Carlo was present, having taken his place among the nobles, and was a candidate for the Twelve. Marbeuf, at Bastia, was the French Commander-in-Chief; Narbonne, at Ajaccio, was his second in command; Lorenzo Giubega, Carlo's intimate friend and godfather of Napoleon, was the registrar or chief clerk of the States. Marbeuf and Narbonne were open enemies, Narbonne making every effort to get his

chief recalled, and to obtain his place. Marbeuf, however, was in the saddle, and it appeared to Carlo, who was supported in this by Lorenzo Giubega, the best policy to stand in with the actual chief. The election went in favour of the Marbeuf party, and Carlo found himself in the honourable position of one of the Twelve, with a salary of 300 livres a year. He also obtained the appointment of Assessor to the Court of Ajaccio, with a salary of 900 livres a year. He occasionally got a fee for legal work, which seems to have been permitted to the Assessor, though difficulties would inevitably arise. A rival lawyer complained that Carlo had acted for a client in a case which he decided as Assessor. However, his affairs were progressing, though he spent more than he could afford, in keeping up appearances, in his official sojourns as one of the Twelve at Bastia, and in entertaining his supporters. It was the characteristic life of Corsican intrigue, of buying and selling support, of applications for public positions and benefits, in which Lucciano and Carlo, the priest and the lawyer, would naturally excel.

On May 10, 1774, Louis XV. died. Marbeuf thereupon went to Paris to explain to Louis XVI. the cause of the unrest that still disturbed the island. The French officials were most unpopular; there had been revolts, which had been suppressed with a severity that had produced further insubordination. During the somewhat prolonged absence of Marbeuf, Narbonne acted as Commander-in-Chief, and the States elected three Narbonnists to make the annual report in person to Louis XVI. on the condition of Corsica. On their arrival at Versailles they formulated serious accusations against Marbeuf, denouncing him as a tyrant, a bloodsucker, the cause of the discontent in the island. But Marbeuf had been at headquarters for some time, making interest with the responsible persons; while the Narbonnists were

strangers—Corsicans, moreover, with no friends at Court. The French officials declared themselves unconvinced of the justice of their complaints, and the King ordered an inquiry into the condition of Corsica. When this news arrived in the island Narbonne at once left for Paris.

During this difficult time Carlo steered his way with much adroitness. Without abandoning Marbeuf, he managed to keep on good terms with the Narbonnists, who were for the time being in power at Ajaccio.

Later, when Marbeuf's star was in the ascendant in Corsica, Carlo did not forget that Narbonne was at Paris, and he supposed that it was in the capital that their local disputes would be decided. Carlo, therefore, on January 1, 1776, wrote to Narbonne a very polite New Year's letter. "Permit me to do myself the honour," he said, "of expressing my sincere wish that the year 1776 may be as favourable to you as you could desire; that would be a service to Corsica which loves you, with reason, and to the magistrates who have had the fortune to serve the King under your orders. I trust that you may be disposed to continue your goodness towards me."

Soon afterwards, on February 1, 1776, the Military College at Paris was closed (afterwards reopened). The King now sent his pupils, to whom he gave free education, to certain selected schools, where paying pupils were also received. On March 28 the King offered this free education in certain schools, now to be called military colleges, in the seminary of Aix, and in the girls' school at St. Cyr, to the children of poor but noble parents, Corsicans being included. On hearing this Carlo decided to take advantage of the offer on behalf of Napoleon. Having already his proofs of nobility, he obtained from two responsible citizens of Ajaccio, Folacci and Ornano, supported by Demetrio Stephanopoli, acting as judge, and Ponte, the sub-

delegate, a declaration that, though a gentleman, he was poor and unable to give his children an education suitable to their birth. The statement was a mere form, for Carlo was not really poor.

It had now become apparent that Narbonne was not making much progress in Paris, and that the final struggle between the two factions would take place on the meeting of the Estates of Corsica on May 11, 1777. Carlo then exerted himself, with the true intriguer's electioneering devices, on behalf of the man on the spot, Marbeuf; and when that party finally triumphed, he obtained his reward. Marbeuf seconded Carlo's application for the King's bounty on behalf of Napoleon, unobtainable without such influential support; and Carlo was himself chosen by the Estates to form part of a deputation to the King.

Carlo represented the nobility, Monseigneur Santini the clergy, and Casabianca the third estate. Carlo spoke and wrote French with ease, and was a better-educated man and more intelligent than either of his colleagues. On their arrival at Versailles he was the leader and the spokesman of the deputation. He was able in this position to deal the final blows to Narbonne—whose patronage he had formerly solicited—and to hasten his dismissal. For the expenses of the journey Carlo obtained 2,000 livres, Santini 2,500, and Casabianca 1,500. Carlo also got a concession of one of the three *pépinières* (plantations of mulberries) which the King had decided to establish in Corsica, to be paid for when the planting had been done.

On his return a close friendship with the all-powerful Marbeuf was established. Marbeuf wrote to the Minister of War about Carlo's two eldest sons, and received on July 19, 1778, the reply that: "It is noted that the younger of the children of M. Bonaparte whose names have been inscribed is preferred for the military school, the other appearing to be destined for

the ecclesiastical condition." Evidently the names of both the boys had been sent in.

Marbeuf now, when on his visits to Ajaccio, lodged with the Bonapartes. On September 24, 1778, when Carlo's fourth son, born on the 2nd, was baptized, he was given the royal name of Louis, and his godparents were Marbeuf, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, and Madame Boucheporn, wife of the Royal Commissioner. Honoured by these important people, the baptismal ceremony made quite a local sensation. From rival families came unkind, and unfounded, accusations as to the paternity of the baby. If there had been any truth in them, perhaps the Second Empire would not have been accepted as an emblem of Bonapartism. Marbeuf's name was also Louis. He lodged in the Bonaparte house, and conferred benefits on his host. That was enough for envious tongues in Ajaccio.

Having again to go to Paris as deputy of the nobility, Carlo this time took with him Joseph, Napoleon, and Fesch. Joseph and Napoleon were to go to school at Autun, where Marbeuf's brother was the Bishop. Fesch had obtained through Marbeuf the free education at Aix which Carlo may have hoped for on behalf of Joseph, whose education at Autun he had to pay for. Marbeuf, however, assured Carlo he would be able to make Joseph a Corsican Bishop. Napoleon was to qualify for admission in a military college by acquiring a little French, and some other necessary elementary knowledge.

On December 12, 1778, the party put to sea. Napoleon was then nine and a quarter years of age. His Corsican childhood had come to an end.

At the age of nine the character is already in broad outline permanently fixed. The framework is finished; the layers which are to be added will be comparatively

thin, liable to be chipped or worn off, and covering an established shape. Over these layers a final superficial varnish will ultimately be applied. Owing to our feeble powers of sight, we are not able to obtain a general view of the whole structure; we cannot get beyond the mere surface polish, from which alone we are in the habit of judging of the whole building. The soldier, the lawyer, the actor, each has his distinct outward mask, put on after adolescence has been reached; but the man beneath still has the habits of thought, the moral tendencies, the emotional inclinations of his childhood. These things, the real foundations, are very early formed.

Up to the age of two the personal influences upon Napoleon were:

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| 1. Wet-nurse. | 5. Caterina. |
| 2. Mother. | 6. Other domestics. |
| 3. Joseph. | 7. Grandmothers, aunts. |
| 4. Santo, Ignazio, Giovanna (children of the wet-nurse). | 8. Father. |
| | 9. Half-uncle Fesch. |
| | 10. Uncles, cousins. |

When he was two, Maria Anna appeared, and disturbed Napoleon's position with regard to his mother.

At five to these personal factors have to be added the experiences at the girls' school, separated from Joseph, and therefore the first of an independent nature; and the fighting with street-boys. And now gradually there came a sense of the magnificence of the father, who visited the King in Paris; of the importance of the Bonaparte family, on intimate terms with the King's representative, Marbeuf; of the splendour and heroism of the great Paoli, the friend of the father; of the cruel tyranny of the French usurpers.

Over it all was the climate and scenery of smiling Ajaccio in the winter, the stern ruggedness of the mountains in the summer.

2. BOYHOOD.

(1) *Autun—Brienne* (January 1, 1779, to October 30, 1784).

After leaving Fesch in the seminary at Aix-en-Provence, Carlo and his sons reached Autun on December 30, 1778. On January 1, 1779, Joseph and Napoleon entered the school at Autun, and their father went on to Paris, where he was presented to Louis XVI. a second time as deputy of the Corsican nobility; and his proofs of nobility having been approved after some inquiries had been answered, he was informed that Napoleon would be received at Brienne. Accordingly, on April 20, 1779, Napoleon went to Brienne, leaving Joseph at Autun.

He and Joseph had been there nearly four months. It was their first experience of France and of French boys. They could not speak French, and doubtless kept close together. Joseph says in his Memoirs that when the time came for Napoleon to leave Autun for Brienne he himself wept copiously, while Napoleon shed only one tear, which he strove in vain to conceal. Abbé Simon, who was present, told Joseph afterwards that Napoleon's single tear showed as much feeling as all his own. It is much harder to be left behind, amid surroundings which are known to be unpleasant and depressing, than to go forward to new experiences. If they had exchanged places—if Napoleon had stayed at the small Autun school, while Joseph went on as King's pupil to the great college—probably the chief display of emotion would this time have come from Napoleon. The same influences that braced Napoleon to a manly self-control on leaving his brother at Autun continued to act upon him after the separation. His position—not by his own initiative, but by the fact that he was the second son—was that of the

spirited adventurer, going to the great French college to face the proud scions of the French nobility, there to be taught all manly exercises, and be trained for the hardy career of the naval officer. Moreover, it was precisely in war, in physical courage, that Corsicans had a great reputation, not in the devotional exercises that Joseph had to undergo in his petty school; and Napoleon was to be received as a pupil of the King, a proved member of the nobility amongst his peers. Joseph's education was costing 600 francs a year, a heavy tax upon his parents, while Napoleon was no charge upon them. All the glory was with Napoleon, all the small depressing trials with Joseph, so that we are not surprised when Joseph, later on, longing to get away from Autun to a livelier, more spirited life, clamoured for a military career. It should also be remembered that the parting at Autun is known to us precisely because it accords with Napoleon's subsequent history; occurrences—of which there may have been many—which conflict with after-events have not been recorded. The most difficult part of the task of the biographer, when relating the childhood of a great man, is to try and forget what happened afterwards. He is in the position of the juryman who has heard an interesting piece of evidence which the Judge then tells him is inadmissible, and instructs him to dismiss from his mind. Anecdotes with less convincing credentials than this one of the Autun parting have to be received with a caution which increases with their inherent plausibility. The more characteristic they are, the more closely should we examine their authority. There are many legends as to Napoleon's life at Brienne, but very little well authenticated fact has reached us, most of what once was current having been shown to be unreliable.

The schools to which the King's pupils were sent had the words "École Militaire" marked over the

entrance, because they superseded the Military College at Paris, which had been closed for the time; but there was nothing military about them. Even of the royal pupils, not all were destined for the army or navy, some preparing for an ecclesiastical career; and the royal pupils, the *boursiers*, were only one-half of the total number in each school, it being a condition insisted upon by Saint-Germain, who invented the scheme, that there should always be as many *pensionnaires*, boys whose education was paid for by their parents, as King's pupils. If the teachers could not attract parents in the ordinary way, they should not have the royal patronage.

The twelve schools were conducted by Benedictines, by Oratorians, by regulars; in the case of Brienne by Minims. The quality of the education given varied to a remarkable extent. Pont-à-Mousson was a good school, one of the best in France. Few could have been worse than Beaumont, where the inspector found a youth of eighteen who could scarcely write and had no conception of spelling; or Tiron, where the boys ran wild. Rebais was less a college than a bad academy of music, drawing, and fencing. La Flèche was entirely religious; the inspector commented on the absurdity of calling it a military college, and suggested the title "royal and ecclesiastical." Tournon and Brienne were hotbeds of schoolboy vice. Napoleon escaped this contamination owing to the superiority of his home-rearing. He retained throughout life the constant use of soap and water, the bathing, and the attention to minor details of personal self-respect, which his mother had taught him. This attitude of personal dignity stood him in good stead at Brienne.

One of the strictest rules at the "military" schools was that, except in rare cases of extreme urgency, no boy was ever to leave the school during the six years for which he was entered. In September there was a

relaxation, only one lesson a day, and freedom for long walks, but there were no holidays. Parents, at long intervals, might be permitted to enter the school to see their boy, but he could not leave it to see them. It was a monastic life. The boys heard Mass every day, but it was an indecorous performance, the sub-principal himself gabbling through it in less than ten minutes.

No Greek was taught at Brienne. Latin was the chief study. The other subjects were French, elementary mathematics, German, geography, history, writing, and music, for which, during Napoleon's last two years, English was substituted. There were also teachers of dancing and fencing.

Father Patrauld was a capable teacher of mathematics; he was assisted by Pichegru, afterwards so famous, who probably gave Napoleon his first lessons. The medium, the French language, being strange to him, Napoleon had no chance of attaining prominence except in the subject which substitutes symbols for language. He distinguished himself in mathematics, which can only have been elementary, as he left Brienne when only just over fifteen. He was on good terms with Father Dupuy, the teacher of French, and sent him years afterwards his "*Lettres sur la Corse*" for criticism, which the good father found time to give at considerable length.

The other subjects were indifferently taught at Brienne. Napoleon disliked the Latin and the German; it was enough to have French to struggle with. His early difficulties with French coloured the whole of his bearing towards language and literature.

He was interested in geography, as was natural in a boy born in Corsica, of Italian origin, and a French citizen, who had already made a considerable voyage; the son of a father who had been to Rome, to Pisa, to Paris, on different occasions; of a family which looked

to the Continent for its ancestors, often speaking among themselves of their Florentine relations; of a nation which had been forced, at the point of the sword, to scan the map to see where their conquerors came from. The Corsican had to know where France was, while the Frenchman would rather parade his ignorance of Corsica, and, indeed, of all non-French territory. At the autumn show-days in 1780, and again in 1782, Napoleon was chosen to exhibit his geographical knowledge. Geography is a potent stimulus to the imagination. But for the hours spent by Napoleon over the atlas as a boy, would he have embarked upon his Eastern schemes; would he have been "bored by this aged Europe"; would the French eagles have travelled such great distances; would he, indeed, have ever risen to fame? His first successes in Italy were the result of long previous study of the map, fortified by personal exploration. Throughout his campaigns his mind was always on the map, and he would express sovereign contempt for his Continental opponents, who were so ignorant and so disdainful of geography. They were doomed to be defeated by the careful student, who declared that war is an affair of positions, that is, of map-making and map-reading.

Napoleon at Brienne was also much interested in history and biography, devouring in particular "Plutarch's Lives," which doubtless inspired him with a vague desire to do something great. He was always coming to the library for books of history or biography, and would have made a better librarian than the boy entrusted with that work, who wearied of Napoleon's incessant demands.

Those who wished to enter the Navy, the Engineers, or the Artillery, had to pass examinations, and had to work; while those who were destined for infantry or cavalry, or for the Guards, or for non-military careers,

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*Quand je serai un homme, je serai comme toi
je serai comme toi, je serai comme toi*

THE EARLIEST CARICATURE OF NAPOLEON, AGED 15.

By a comrade at the Military College, Paris, 1784-5.

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paid small attention to the halting efforts of the Minims. Napoleon was thus from the first, by the necessity of his position—a royal pupil aiming at a commission in a superior service—in the small society of those similarly placed, the élite of the 110 boys who were at the school.

When he got back to Corsica he told Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo of the sufferings of his legitimate pride on being received at Brienne (and subsequently at the Military College, Paris) almost as a stranger both by comrades and superiors. "Let them treat us," he exclaimed, "if they like, with disdain in their palaces if we importune them there, but let them not come to sneer at and humiliate us in our mountains."

A caricature of Napoleon has fortunately been preserved, drawn by a comrade at the Military College, Paris, which no doubt is appropriate to the Brienne period also.

He is represented standing, a severe and determined look upon his face, with both hands on the top of a musket, resting the butt on the ground. A smaller figure behind him, an old man whose nose nearly reaches his chin, is pulling him back by his wig. Napoleon's feet face in two directions—one forward, the other backward. Underneath is written: "*Bonaparte cours vole au secours de Paoli pour le tirer des mains de ses ennemis.*" These words have been struck through with a pen, which has also been drawn across the face of Napoleon.

It is a significant piece of evidence, confirming the statements of Bourrienne and another (anonymous) Brienne schoolfellow. Napoleon at Brienne, as subsequently at the Military College, Paris, was to his schoolfellows the Corsican who was perpetually referring to his hero, Paoli. No doubt this attitude was forced upon him by the jeers of his companions, who crowed over him, treating him as one of a conquered race, whom the King generously patronized,

and France, out of sheer magnanimity, admitted to French privileges, but who could not claim to be a real Frenchman. Any boy of spirit—his brothers Joseph and Lucien, both educated in France, doubtless did the same—would retaliate by observing that France was much larger than Corsica, and the fight was not a fair one. Napoleon is reported to have said: "If you had been only four to one, it would not have mattered, but you were ten to one"—a natural schoolboy retort. While subjected to insult, Napoleon was upheld by a justifiable pride, for he knew that the Corsican reputation in war was superior even to the French, and that the Corsican Paoli was admitted to be one of the world's great men. Despised by the French boys for belonging to an obscure, semi-civilized, and conquered island, he despised them in turn for being, man for man, inferior to Corsicans, and for giving themselves airs of importance without justification.

Moreover, the Bonapartes had been accustomed to regard themselves as belonging to a superior race. In their own little island they were the conquerors, they were the civilized men from the Continent among a set of barbarians. It was no consolation that the French had created a class of nobles and placed the Bonapartes among them; rather was it an additional offence that the Bonapartes should derive a local prestige from the oppressors of their country. The intense, inextinguishable pride of the Corsican of Ligurian descent, in his island and his family, can hardly be realized except through personal knowledge of such a situation. These feelings constitute the foundation upon which the insular character is based. They are rampant in all islands, and the map alone would tell us that in Corsica, too small and too near the Continent to be independent, too far away to feel the breath of the larger Continental spirit, insularity and provincialism would be abnormally profound and

ineradicable. Napoleon himself was always insular, in spite of his wide and extraordinary experiences; he never appreciated the Continent, and he was ruined by insular pride and stubbornness and contempt for his opponents.

Napoleon's adoration of Paoli was shared by Joseph and Lucien, though in a lesser degree. They had all heard their parents speaking of the great man, whose labours they had shared and friendship they had enjoyed, and it was believed that Paoli had named Carlo as his successor. Joseph, destined for the Church, was interested, but not enthusiastic, for the career of a man of action was outside his point of view. Lucien, during the absence of Joseph and Napoleon, was, for five or six years, the eldest boy at home, with no near rival (Louis was three and a half years younger), and grew up a very conceited youth, absorbed in the contemplation of his own genius. He and Joseph were too self-satisfied to be very ardent hero-worshippers. To Napoleon, on the other hand, destined for a Continental career in an active service, the character and fame of Paoli made a special appeal.

Abbé Chardon said (forty years later) that already at Autun he had remarked to Napoleon: "How did it come about that you Corsicans were defeated, seeing that you had Paoli? Was not Paoli a capable General?" To this unkind and cruel sneer, coming from an adult to a child, Napoleon replied sturdily: "Yes, he was; and it is my ambition to resemble him." The example of Paoli, the great position he had occupied on the world's stage, were most encouraging to all young Corsicans, making them feel that they, too, might make a name outside their own little island. As Pozzo di Borgo said, years afterwards: "Paoli was the man who took us all by the hand to place us upon the scene of the world." One man by his own successes may carry a whole society with him, inspiring each member

of it with the confidence which is far more than half the battle. Paoli, an administrative genius, was not a great General; but Napoleon in his boyhood revered him for his supposed military abilities, and being the first Corsican to be educated at a French military college, it was natural that he should not only hope, but actually expect, to be able to follow his model. The history of Paoli had an immense influence in inspiring the self-confidence and the ambition of Napoleon.

In the meantime he was incessantly at war with his French companions, who mocked at the conquered savage, and he detested and despised them in return. They called him "Paille-au-nez," or "Straw-in-the-nose," a witticism derived from his name, pronounced Napollioné; and they would amuse themselves by introducing one of their number as a Genoese, whom Napoleon would attack with furious words, much to their delight.

The Bonaparte children suffered from home-sickness during their French education. The change from Corsica was so great. For the glorious blue sea, the grand snow-clad mountains, the clear and warm air of Ajaccio, Napoleon had at Brienne dull skies and a damp, cold climate, amidst gloomy surroundings—very trying conditions for a son of the South. There was no large, free life, roaming over the hills or boating in the bay, but a claustral interment in a monastery, where no visitors were allowed, and no news came from the outer world. This burial alive amongst his nation's enemies, whose very language he was forced to learn, was to be endured without change for six years. Later on he wrote with sympathy of the nostalgia that a wild Greenlander feels when he is brought to a town like Copenhagen; so that, in spite of all its luxuries and delights, he is affected by such a longing for his native land and for his family that he falls into a

melancholy which leads to death. He experienced this, even after all his varied experiences, at St. Helena. How very severe must have been the child's ordeal! No wonder he became morose and gloomy, and, being laughed at whenever he tried to express himself in the strange tongue, was forced into habits of solitude. In Corsica, though quarrelsome and domineering, he had been lively and gregarious. At Brienne circumstances made him silent and solitary; he was driven into his shell, and grew there in his own way. It was a hard lesson, but it was to prove of immense value. He thus acquired self-knowledge, self-reliance, a self-sufficient confidence in his own way of doing things. He could not develop into mere imitation of others, a following of the general trend which is the ordinary habit of mankind. He had to work out his own way. Being a Corsican, he had, in Rousseau's phrase to Boswell, "the stuff in him." Hostile to all about him, he had to invent his own methods; and in a solitude which, though it makes for a strong character, is a hard experience for a child, he had only one pleasant image—his beautiful Corsican home—and one ennobling ideal—the grand figure of the illustrious patriot, Pasquale Paoli.

The first gleam of light that came to Napoleon from the outer world was the visit of his parents in 1782, after three and a half years of separation. In June, 1782, Carlo and Letizia left Ajaccio for Bourbonne-les-Bains, in Champagne, as we know from an entry in Carlo's account-book. Going on to Brienné, not far off, Letizia is reported to have found Napoleon sleeping in a hammock, as preparation for his naval career, and to have been shocked at the thinness of the child. The Bonapartes also visited Joseph at Autun, and have thus been described by a school friend whom Joseph introduced to them: "M. de Bonaparte senior was tall, ascetic, thin, rather blotchy in face. His wig

was in the horseshoe shape, with a pouch and a double black silk ribbon ; his coat was of silk, and he carried a sword. His wife, Mme. Letizia, still young, with an imposing Roman carriage, had hair of a brown chestnut in a chignon, and wore a head-dress of lace, a white silk dress cut *en panier*, with green flowering. I can still feel her caressing hand in my hair, and hear her sonorous and incisive tones as she called me ' her little friend, the friend of her son Joseph.' "

Evidently Carlo already had an unhealthy appearance. The next visit he paid to Brienne, this time without Letizia, was on June 21, 1784, when he brought with him Marianne and Lucien. He was taking Marianne (Elisa) to St. Cyr, where, thanks to Marbeuf, she was to be a royal pupil, with free education; and he had brought Lucien, after a year at Autun, to enter Brienne as *pensionnaire*, until he could be admitted as *boursier* after Napoleon had left, two brothers not being accepted as royal pupils at the same time.

After the evil fashion of some parents, Carlo complained to one son of the other. He blamed Joseph to Napoleon, and the causes of his dissatisfaction are revealed in the inspired letter Napoleon at once wrote to one of his uncles. It is the earliest of his extant.

MY DEAR UNCLE,

I am writing to you to tell you of the passage of my dear father by Brienne for Paris to take Mariana to Saint-Cyr and to try and restore his health. He arrived here on the 21st with Lucciano and the two young ladies whom you have seen.* He left here the latter youth, who is nine years old, and his height is 3 feet 6 inches and 6 lines. He is in the sixth class in Latin, and is going through the whole course. He shows plenty of ability and willingness. Let us hope he will turn out well. His health is good ; he is big, quick, and lively, and so far he is approved. He knows French

* Corsicans, who were being escorted by Carlo to St. Cyr.

very well and has forgotten Italian entirely. He will write to you at the back of my letter. I shall not coach him at all so that you may see how well he can do it. I hope that now he will write to you oftener than when he was at Autun. I feel certain that Joseph, my brother, has not written to you. How could you expect it? Even to my dear father he only occasionally sends a couple of lines. Really he has changed. However, he writes very often to me. He is in the class of rhetoric, and would be the best of them all if he would work, for the principal told my father that of all the pupils in the college none had in physics, rhetoric, or philosophy, his talents or his facility in exposition. As for the career he desires, the ecclesiastic, as you know, was the first that he chose. In that he has persisted until now, when he wants to serve the King, in which he is quite wrong, for several reasons :

1st. As my dear father observes, he has not the hardihood required to face the perils of an action. His weak health would not permit him to sustain the fatigues of a campaign and my brother thinks only of the army from the garrison aspect. Yes, my dear brother would be a very good garrison officer, well made, a light nature suitable for frivolous compliments, and with his talents, he would always behave well in society, but in a battle? That is what my dear father doubts. (Here Napoleon quotes some lines, which we translate literally.)

What is the value to soldiers of such a frivolous accomplishment?

What are all these advantages without courage?

For this prize, had you the beauty of Adonis, the god-like eloquence of Pindar, what are all such gifts without bravery?

2nd. He has been educated for an ecclesiastic career. It is very late now to turn back. Monseigneur the Bishop of Autun would have given him a fat appointment and he was certain to become a Bishop. What an advantage for the family! Monseigneur d'Autun has done his best to induce him to persevere, promising that he would never have cause to repent it. No good, he persists. I should praise him for it if it arose from a decided taste for this career, the finest of all, and if the great Controller

of human things in making him had given to him, as to me, a decided inclination for a military career.

3rd. He wishes to be a soldier,* very well, but in which corps? The marine? He knows no mathematics. He would want two years to learn enough. Secondly, his health is not fitted for the sea. The engineers? He would want four or five years to learn what is necessary, and at the end of that time he would still be only a pupil of engineers, all the more surely, in my opinion, because the levity of his character makes it impossible for him to work all day long. It would be the same in the case of the artillery, except that he would have only eighteen months to work as pupil, and as much again to become an officer. Oh! that is not yet to his taste. Let us see then: he doubtless wishes to enter the infantry. Good! I understand it. He wants to have nothing to do all day, he wants to strut up and down the pavement all day; and besides, what is a petty infantry officer? A *mauvais sujet* for three-fourths of the time and that is what neither my dear father, nor you, nor my mother, nor my dear uncle the archdeacon desire, as he has already shown some lapses into frivolity and prodigality. So a last effort is to be made to induce him to accept the ecclesiastical career, and if that fails my dear father will take him to Corsica where he will have him under his eyes. He will be entered for the bar.

I conclude praying for the continuance of your good graces towards me. To make myself worthy of them will be my most essential and most sought duty.

I am with the most profound respect your very humble and very obedient servant and nephew,

NAPOLÉONE DI BUONAPARTE.

P.S.—My dear uncle, destroy this letter, but it is to be hoped that Joseph with his talents and the sentiments that his education should have instilled into him will do what is right and will be the support of the family. Point out to him these advantages.

Evidently his father had expressed himself in severe terms to Napoleon about Joseph. He was doing very

* "Military" and "soldier" include the marine.

well at Autun ; he was, like Napoleon, a great reader during play hours, but with better results so far as school-work was concerned, as he carried off the prize for French composition, besides several other prizes, and was selected to take the chief part in the annual recitations. Yet his father declared he was idle, and would not be able to pass the examinations for the army or navy. He was tall and well made, but his father told Napoleon his elder brother had neither the physique nor the courage required of a soldier, and that he was not fitted for a life on the sea. There was no justification for these statements. As is often the case, the father rather disliked his eldest son, from motives in which there was a touch of jealousy. Joseph was on Carlo's model—handsome, dignified, courtly, accomplished. He was to be the father's successor, the future head of the family, and was in person a challenger and a domestic rival. Napoleon had none of these annoying attributes, and was for that reason the father's favourite. So Carlo appealed to Napoleon against Joseph, and suggested that Napoleon should write to his uncle denouncing his elder brother as a feeble, sickly, indolent coward. Napoleon succumbed to the temptation. It had always been assumed that the glorious career of arms was to be his because he was naturally fitted for it in courage and energy ; and the idea that Joseph, the obvious priest, could also wear a uniform was humiliating. All the prestige was to have been with Napoleon, and his natural resentment that Joseph should take it from him was easily fanned by his father. But the boy was rather ashamed of what he had written, and in a postscript (which may possibly have been added after his masters had read and corrected the rest of the composition) he asked that the letter should be destroyed, adding merely that it is to be hoped that Joseph "will do what is right," "will be the support of the family," will adhere to "the

sentiments which his education should have instilled into him," and not give way to any personal inclinations of his own.

When the family is large and means are small, the eldest son is in danger of being expected to sacrifice himself for the sake of the younger children. Joseph probably hated Autun as much as Napoleon disliked Brienne, and longed for a change. And if Napoleon, and now Lucien also, were to have Continental careers, why should he be relegated to Corsica for the rest of his life? It was precisely the feeling of the family, as we see it in Napoleon's letter, that was so unpalatable. It was assumed that he had not the spirit to make his own way, was unsuited for a career in the large world, had no inclinations of his own; that for the sake of a Corsican bishopric, and impelled by devotion to family interests, he would accept the condition of permanent celibacy, and consent to vegetate for the rest of his life in the little island, struggling to find dots for his sisters, while his younger brothers were flaunting their uniforms on the Continent. Naturally enough, he rebelled.

Carlo could not ignore his eldest son's wishes. While he was in Paris he wrote, on July 18, 1784, to the Minister of War, asking him to place Joseph, who had finished his education at Autun with distinction, in the Engineers or Artillery. The letter was in terms which seem abject in the present day, referring to his poverty, his large family, to which an addition was expected, etc. The reply was that Joseph would have to go to the Artillery School at Metz, and pass an examination in mathematics. Carlo thereupon decided to take Joseph back to Corsica to see his mother before embarking upon a new career.

Carlo also said in his letter: "Following the advice of M. le Comte de Marbeuf, Napoleon has directed his studies in the direction of the Marine. He succeeded

so well that he was destined by M. de Keralio for the school at Paris, and after that for the department at Toulon. The resignation of the former inspector, monseigneur, has changed the destiny of my son, who has no longer any classes at his college except mathematics, and who is now at the head of a batch, with the approval of his professors."

Keralio appears to have led Carlo to expect that Napoleon would leave Brienne after the inspection of the autumn of 1783, although he would then have been there only four and a half years, instead of the regulation six. But Keralio resigned, and on June 1, 1783, Reynaud took his place.

In the autumn of 1783 the new inspector chose only two pupils from Brienne for the Military College at Paris, both of them a year and a half older than Napoleon. This appears to have entailed upon Napoleon the abandonment of the navy for the army, of which corps he thereupon inevitably chose the artillery. It was a *corps d'élite*, in which promotion was not entirely by favour, as was the case in the infantry and cavalry; and yet it did not require the protracted education that would have been necessary for the corps of Engineers. Very probably this destination of Napoleon for the artillery had some effect in turning Joseph's thoughts in that direction.

While at Paris Carlo was suffering from the disease—cancer—which ultimately killed him. He consulted with benefit to his health De la Sonde, the physician to Marie Antoinette, who advised the waters of Orezza, in Corsica. He returned hastily to Corsica, picking up Joseph, but not again stopping at Brienne. To this Napoleon refers in the opening sentence of his letter of September, 1784.

MY DEAR FATHER,

Your letter as you can well understand was not very pleasant for me; but reason and considera-

tions of your health and of the welfare of the family, which are very dear to me, have made me appreciate your prompt return to Corsica, and have quite satisfied me.

Besides, being sure of the continuance of your kindness and affection towards me and your concern to get me on and to help me in whatever might please me, how could I fail to be satisfied and content? I hasten to ask for news of the effects the waters have had upon your health, and to assure you of my respectful affection and my eternal recognition.

I am glad Joseph has gone to Corsica with you, provided he is here on November 1 or about that time. Joseph can come here, as Father Patrault, my mathematics master, whom you know, is not leaving. Consequently Monsieur the Principal has charged me to assure you that he would be very well received and may come with perfect confidence. Father Patrault is an excellent teacher of mathematics and he has especially assured me that he would be delighted to take him in hand, and if my brother is disposed to work, we may enter together for the artillery examination. You will have no trouble on my account as I am an accepted pupil. Something would have to be done for Joseph, but as you have a letter of recommendation, that is arranged. Also, my dear father, I hope that you will prefer to place him at Brienne rather than at Metz for several reasons:

1st. Because that would be a consolation to Joseph, Lucien, and myself.

2nd. Because you would have to write to the Principal at Metz, which would cause further delay as you would have to wait for his answer.

3rd. It is unusual to learn at Metz what Joseph would have to know for the examination in six months; consequently, as my brother knows nothing of mathematics, he would be placed amongst children. These reasons and many others should decide you to send him here, especially as he will be more comfortable here. So I hope to embrace Joseph before the end of October. In any case he could easily get here by November 12 or 13 next, even if he did not start till October 26 or 27.

I beg you to send me Boswell (*Histoire de*

Corse), with other histories or memoirs concerning that kingdom. You need not fear; I will take care of them, and will bring them back to Corsica when I return there, should it be even six years from now.

Adieu, my dear father. The chevalier* embraces you with all his heart. He works very well, and did very well in the public exercise. The inspector will be here on the 15th or the 16th at latest of this month, that is in three days. As soon as his visit is terminated, I will tell you what he has said.†

This letter is in a very different tone from that which Carlo had inspired against Joseph. Napoleon now accepts the fact that Joseph, who is in the superior, authoritative position of the Corsican elder brother, has a right to go into the army if he wishes.

Lucien says in his Memoirs that he disliked Napoleon from their first meeting at Brienne. He was nine and a quarter, and Napoleon nearly fifteen, and having parted when they were respectively three and a half and nine and a quarter, he had no recollection of Napoleon, who in turn can hardly have recognized him. The difference of years was just enough to make the elder assume airs of patronage, yet not so great as to preclude occasional gleams of direct rivalry on the part of the younger.

The relations existing between these four persons—Carlo, Joseph, Napoleon, Lucien—were just what might have been expected. When the age intervals between the children are as in their case, the same situation has often been produced, and will be again. The birth-dates are the controlling factors. There is nothing to show the presence of an extraordinary man, or to indicate an exceptional family.

At the autumn inspection of 1784 Reynaud selected

* Lucien.

† Then follow the respects and compliments already referred to, p. 74.

Napoleon with four others to go to the Military College, Paris, as final preparation for the artillery. One of these boys was within five days of Napoleon's age; the other three were younger by twelve months, fifteen months, and twenty months, which shows that Napoleon was far from being a brilliant pupil at Brienne.

The five schoolfellows set out together in the charge of a Minim on October 30, 1784.

(2) *The Military College, Paris (October 30, 1784, to October 28, 1785).*

While Napoleon was at the Military College, his father, suffering intensely from his terrible disease, embarked at Ajaccio to consult again De la Sonde at Paris. Joseph went with him, on his way to Metz, to begin cramming for the artillery. A violent storm compelled them to put in at Calvi, and further injured the invalid's health, and they had another severe buffeting before they reached the French coast. They went to Aix-en-Provence, where they saw Fesch, and thence to Montpellier, where several doctors were called in. Nothing could be done. Carlo died of cancer in the stomach at Montpellier, in the presence of his son Joseph and of his wife's half-brother, Fesch, on February 24, 1785, aged nearly thirty-nine. Joseph was seventeen, Fesch twenty-one. Joseph says in his *Memoirs* (written nearly fifty years later) that his father spoke of Napoleon, observing that he was sure his soldier son would get on; and, as the end came near, during paroxysms of agony producing delirium, his father called out that nothing could help him, that Napoleon, whose sword would some day triumph over Europe, might try in vain to deliver him from the dragon of death. Napoleon at St. Helena said to Antommarchi merely that, "He asked for me, called

for me, invoked the assistance of my great sword in his delirium."

From the nature of his disease Carlo may well have imagined, when in a semi-conscious condition, that a dragon was eating him; and the idea of a sword, the sword of his soldier son, to cut away the trouble may well have arisen. But that in a time of peace, with no war on the horizon, no revolution in prospect, he should have prophesied that this quite undistinguished youth would ultimately conquer Europe is incredible in itself, and disproved by the fact that Napoleon himself made no mention of so startling a prognostication when reporting what his father said.

An autopsy was performed upon the body, and the presence of cancer in the stomach was certified. The burial was at Montpellier. Louis Bonaparte afterwards had the body transferred to St. Leu.

In 1802 the Municipality of Montpellier desired to erect a monument to the father of the First Consul. The town of Montpellier, accompanied by Religion and Science, was to be represented opening a grave, above which were to be the words:

Come forth from the grave!

Thy son Napoleon raises thee to Immortality.

The First Consul observed: "Twenty years have passed since this event occurred; it can be of no interest to the public; we will not talk of it any further."

In September, 1780, Carlo began a register of expenses (in Italian): "Register to serve as memorandum in domestic matters, commenced in the month of September, 1780, in Ajaccio.

"1780, Tuesday, 19 September: I, Carlo Buonaparte,* of the late Giuseppe, have commenced this register to note all that happens in the day in domestic

* Carlo adopted the " in order to mark the supposed affiliation to the San Miniato family. Previously he and his ancestors had signed "Bonaparte," to which Napoleon returned.

affairs, and I beg my children and the descendants of my house to follow the same plan, as it is a matter of great value both for the present time and that to come."

This introduces a copy of a sonnet composed by Carlo on the occasion of Marbeuf's marriage :

Vincitor dell' invidia e della morte,
Fortunata di Cirno alma felice,
Se i fausti aventi prevenir mi lice,
Vivi contento di sì bella sorte.

E giusto e ben che goda e si conforte
Tua stirpe illustre, a cui 'l destin predice
Di figli e di nepoti un stuol felice,
Sempre uguale allo sposo e alla consorte.

Si, si vedrà ben presto un gentil figlio,
Che, mostrando di te l' imagia vera,
Farà bagnar per allegressa il ciglio.

E seguendo de' suoi l' alta carriera,
Sarà di lustro al triplicato giglio,
A voi di onore, o nobil coppia altera.

The register contains lists of properties, of kitchen utensils, of linen, clothing, etc. There are dates of voyages to France, of visits paid to Marbeuf at Cargese, of births of children. On one page we find : "The night of October 20, 1780, at half-past ten, Signora Letizia, my wife, gave birth to a child, whom we have named Paoletta—that is, Paola-Maria. The godfather was my uncle the Archdeacon. . . . My son Joseph, who is at the College of Autun, was born at Corte on January 7, 1768. My son Napoleon, who is in France at the Military College, was born at Ajaccio on August 15, 1769." On another page he speaks of "Joseph, my eldest."*

In the same year, 1780, Carlo began, also in Italian : "Memoirs of the Buonaparte Family."

"I, Carlo di Buonaparte, have determined, in the

* There would still be doubters of Joseph's seniority though one rose from the dead.

year 1780, to write these memoirs of our family, because experience has taught me how useful it may be—and another inheritor has just appeared" (Pauline)—"to have the information necessary to preserve the prestige and prosperity of the house; and I recommend that one of my children who may be in the best position for the purpose, to finish and continue this little history, and to charge his descendants to add all the necessary explanations, and to avenge the troubles and difficulties experienced in past times, as I shall be able to show in the sequel."*

These Memoirs, unfortunately for us, after giving an incorrect genealogy of the Bonapartes, come to an end. The troubles to which Carlo referred were his inability to prove his right to property left by a Bonaparte ancestor—who had acquired it from his wife, Virginia Odone—to the Jesuits. The French conquest entailed the expulsion of the Jesuits and the confiscation of their property. Carlo spent time and money in persistent claims to this property, the estate at Milelli and the Maison Badine, which were finally given to the Bonapartes shortly after his death, though their right to it remained doubtful. Carlo had acquired a great belief in the value of a proved genealogy from the labour he had to undertake to obtain recognition of his nobility, of his right to the San Miniato inheritance (which consisted of family documents, and nothing more), and of his right to the Odone property.

* If only Carlo had himself kept up his register of expenses and his Memoirs, what gropings in the dark, what laborious researches, we should have been spared, and how much better we should be able to judge of the character and career of Napoleon! If he had set the example himself, and trained his children to follow it, we should have the necessary facts, and should be able to watch the growth of Napoleon from day to day. Indeed, if a minute and accurate account of the growth of *any* man from childhood upwards was available, it would be the starting-point for a new science, and would lead to a systematic study of mankind, with tremendous results.

During the coronation ceremony in the Church of Notre Dame, Napoleon turned to his elder brother and said, "Joseph, if our father could see us now!" The remark reveals the detachment of the Emperor from his surroundings, which was one of his most valuable mental safeguards; it shows how persistently conscious he was of his position as a Corsican adventurer; and it recalls Carlo's anxieties, his sanguine, ambitious nature, his pride and confidence in the Bonapartes. He seems to have inspired them all with the belief that they were of rare stock, and, now that careers in France were to be had by the favour of the French Governor, that they might well expect to rise in the world. Carlo had his share in forming the confident, ambitious character of Napoleon.

Napoleon's comrades at the Military College were of two classes. The majority were *boursiers*, or royal pupils, the sons of poor nobles, most of them without powerful family influence, who had to work for admission into the higher branches of the services, where promotion might be hoped for according to merit; the minority were sons of great families whose future in the King's bodyguard, or in the infantry or cavalry, was assured, irrespective of qualifications.

The Government declared that the chief aim of the education at the Military College should be to turn out men of the world with *savoir-vivre* and agreeable manners, and "that polite tone so rare and so difficult to acquire," with "the habit of replying without hesitation and with firmness," pupils "whose judgment should be formed rather than memory be charged."

The establishment was on an extravagant scale, and the food was sumptuous. Napoleon said to Las Cases at St. Helena: "At the Military College we were served and fed in a magnificent manner, treated

throughout like young officers accustomed to great luxuries, far exceeding those of most of our families." For instance, at dinner they had soup, meat, two entrées, two helpings of dessert; for supper, roast, two entremets, salad, three helpings of dessert; always with a mixture of half wine, half water.

The attendants of all sorts—professors, controllers, inspectors of buildings, secretaries, managers, accountants, hall-keepers, dormitory men, porters, cooks, grooms—totalled 111; and there was also a whole company of Invalides.* It was calculated that the total cost amounted to as much as £170 per annum for each pupil. It must have been the most extravagantly managed school in the world, and was suppressed for that reason in 1787, two years after Napoleon had left.

The professors were—for mathematics, five; history and geography, three; French grammar, two; German, three; English, one; fortifications, three; drawing, three; writing, one. The masters of equitation, with sixty horses in the riding-school, and of fencing were men of considerable public reputation; and there were two teachers of dancing.

Napoleon's social relations at first were confined to his four fellows from Brienne, and to Desmazis, who was officially assigned to him as mentor during his early days, and became his best friend. His chief enemy was De Phélippeaux. The boys were (as at the Woolwich Academy) described as gentlemen cadets, and had their under-officers, sergeants, and corporals. Picot de Peccaduc was the sergeant-major. He attempted to stop the fighting that went on between Phélippeaux and Napoleon even in class-time, by sitting between them; but then he got the kicks from them both. Phélippeaux was two years older than Napoleon—a great advantage. He was the son of an

* Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

officer, a Vendéean, and a monarchist. Napoleon, coming from a country which had no King and no birth privileges, was inevitably a democrat. The only Corsican at the Military College, he disliked all aristocrats, and especially the French; was hostile to royalty in general, and to the King of France in particular. Phélippeaux's rearing gave him sentiments the exact opposite of Napoleon's; being next to him in class and aggressive in character, he tried to "sit on" Napoleon, who retaliated with Corsican spirit.

It is certainly strange that the two permanent personal enemies whom Napoleon had made before his appearance in the public eye, Phélippeaux and Pozzo di Borgo, should both have been able to stand in his way at an important crisis later on. Phélippeaux helped to beat back Napoleon's assault at Acre, and Pozzo di Borgo stiffened the Czar's refusal to make peace with Napoleon at Moscow.

Napoleon was placed in the class for artillery, consisting of twenty-five pupils. Their chief study was mathematics, though they also took history and geography, French and German. Napoleon in later years said to a former fellow-pupil: "Do you remember that German booby who would never put me on to construe because I was so stupid?" This referred to the German master, Baur, who one day, missing Napoleon from his class, was told that he was undergoing the examination for the artillery. "Does he really know anything?" said Baur; and on being told that Napoleon was one of the best mathematicians in the college, Baur remarked—as, indeed, Johnson or Goldsmith would have done—"Just so; I always thought it was only the fools who could do mathematics."

Bezout's "*Cours de Mathématiques*," in four volumes was the text-book. Originally designed for the use of candidates for the marine, Bezout had altered it for the artillery students.

Early in 1785 Napoleon wrote the following doggerel lines on his Bezout :

Grand Bezout, achève ton cours,
Mais avant permets-moi de dire
Qu'aux aspirants tu donnes secours.
Cela est parfaitement vrai,
Mais je ne cesserai pas de rire
Lorsque je l'aurai achevé
Pour le plus tard au mois de mai
Je ferais alors le conseiller.

Napoleon went up for examination in September, 1785. The candidates of the Military College were examined in the precincts of the college, but all other candidates had to go to Metz, the chief artillery school of France, which furnished the bulk of the successful candidates. A large number—58 as against 32 in 1784 and 33 in 1783—obtained commissions. Of those from the Military College, Picot de Peccaduc was only 39th, Phélippeaux 41st, Bonaparte 42nd, Desmazis 56th.

If Napoleon had been as low in the list in either of the two previous years he would have been rejected, but all his comrades at the Military College would have undergone the same fate, even the head, Picot de Peccaduc, who was only three places above him. Napoleon had done well, for he had been only one year at the Military College, while his three comrades had been there longer and were older than he.

It was a creditable, though not a startling, performance, for among the successful candidates from Metz and other schools there were several younger than Napoleon, or of the same age. The death of his father, the great pecuniary as well as moral support that the family had lost, inspired him to work much harder than he had done at Brienne; and he had arrived at the age—just sixteen—when changes in the character often occur, frivolity giving way to serious effort. But the chief cause of the stride forward he was now able

to make was that the important subject for the examination was mathematics, in which he had always excelled.

The three eldest Bonapartes were all good at their books. Joseph at Autun, Lucien at Brienne, were brilliant pupils, and Napoleon was, for his age, one of the best mathematicians among the candidates for the artillery in his year.

3. EARLY MANHOOD.

(1) *Valence (November, 1785, to September, 1786).*

Having passed their examinations, and obtained their commissions of Second Lieutenant, dating as from September 1, 1785, the four successful candidates from the Military College went to their regiments: Picot de Peccaduc to the regiment of Metz, Phélippeaux to the regiment of Besançon, Napoleon and Desmazis to the regiment of La Fère, in garrison at Valence. Desmazis selected that regiment because he had a brother in it as Captain; Napoleon, partly to be with his friend Desmazis, but chiefly because Valence was the nearest artillery centre to Corsica, and the regiment in garrison there provided the two companies for Corsica.

Napoleon and Desmazis, with a schoolfellow of the Military College, Dalmas, who was going to Valence to work there for the next year's artillery examination, left the college together, accompanied by a non-commissioned officer from the company of the Invalides, whose duty it was to see them safely into the diligence, pay their fare, and give them money for the journey. On reaching Châlon-sur-Saône they took the water diligence, descending the Saône as far as Lyons, where they exchanged for another boat, which carried them on the Rhone to Valence.

Napoleon's commission described him as "Napoleone de Buonaparte, lieutenant en second de la compagnie de bombardiers de d'Autume du régiment

de La Fère de mon corps royal de l'artillerie." The Royal Corps of Artillery was composed of seven regiments, with two battalions to a regiment, and each battalion contained fourteen companies of gunners, four companies of bombardiers, and two companies of sappers. Napoleon was in the bombardier company captained by d'Autume. He got on very well with his Captain. When the regiment went afterwards to Auxonne, d'Autume several times invited Napoleon to stay with him at his château of Autume, not far away. Indeed, all the officers of this excellent regiment were on the best of terms.

In accordance with regulations, Napoleon had still to go through some practical training before he was received as an officer. He had to serve in the ranks, and to rise gradually from private through the non-commissioned stages of corporal and sergeant, mounting guard three times in each grade. He had to acquit himself in these duties to the satisfaction of his Colonel. The training occupied three months; he took his place as Second Lieutenant in the regiment on January 18, 1786.

His education as officer was only now to begin. He had to mount guard as officer, to help in the construction of batteries, and to perform the necessary drill and firing exercises; and he had to attend the regimental classes in mathematics, fortifications, chemistry and physics, drawing, etc.

La Fère artillerie was a hard-working, early-rising regiment, which the inspectors always spoke of in the highest terms—not only for the artillery exercises, its proper business, but even for the infantry evolutions, which it carried out almost as well as could be done by the line. It was one of the best of the French artillery regiments. How good that artillery was Europe had yet to learn. Napoleon wrote in the "Souper de Beaucaire" that "the French artillery

was in its art the master of Europe." At St. Helena he said that it was "the best corps of the best material in Europe. It was like a family: the chiefs were quite paternal, and they were the bravest and most worthy men in the world, as pure as gold, only too old because the peace had been so prolonged. The young officers laughed at them, because sarcasm and irony was the fashion of the time; but they adored them at the same time and admitted their merits."

His pay was, everything included, about £50 a year. He lodged at the house of M. Bou, an old man whose middle-aged daughter, Mlle. Bou, kept house. He soon established very friendly relations with his landlord and his daughter. When he left M. Bou said: "We shall never see each other again, and you will forget us"; to which Napoleon replied, placing his hand on his heart: "You and Mlle. Bou are lodged here, and memories once placed there do not change garrison." Two francs a week has been estimated at about the rent he may have paid for his room. His breakfast, taken after the morning's work was over, consisted of two rolls and a glass of water, which he obtained for two sous at the shop of a pastrycook named Couriol. His dinner he took with other Lieutenants at the *Trois Pigeons*, paying for it *en pension* as a regular subscriber, no doubt at a very cheap rate, probably not more than a franc a day.

He saw little society. He had an introduction from Monseigneur de Marbeuf to Monseigneur de Tardivon, Abbé of St. Ruf, who was polite and kind to him. Through him he made the acquaintance of a Mme. Colombier and her daughter Caroline, of whom he became very fond. He recalled long afterwards how happy he had been in her society, eating cherries together. He took lessons in dancing and deportment, being conscious of a rough brusqueness in conversation and demeanour. At Brienne and Paris he had been

the typical wild Corsican, jeered at by the young sprigs of French nobility for his uncivilized manners. The taunts were repelled by blows, and by an instant exaggeration of the offence. He had been like an ill-bred youth, who, on being told that he is attracting unfavourable notice by his loud tone, immediately, almost instinctively, with a fierce impulse that overflows, raises his voice to a shout, until every eye is turned upon him. Having now the social prestige of an officer, Napoleon wisely endeavoured—though with only partial success—to acquire the manner suitable to his position. Perhaps if he could have been satisfied as to his social accomplishments, he would have been less restless on the throne of France, and more certain of the allegiance of the polite French nation. He knew only too well that he was a rough soldier, not a gracious monarch.

Very poor, with few friends, uncomfortable in society, his youthful energy found an outlet in work. He managed to save a little out of his pay for a library subscription, and even for the purchase of books. M. Bou had at one time been proprietor of a café much frequented by the literary lights of Valence, amongst others by M. Aurel, who had a library; to this Napoleon subscribed. He also wrote to Geneva for books, as the following letter shows :

VALENCE,

The 29 July, 1786.

TO MONSIEUR PAUL BORDE, LIBRARIAN AT GENEVA.

I write directly to you, sir, to ask you to send me the "Mémoires de Mme. de Valens," and "Claude Anet," to serve as sequel to the "Confessions" of J. J. Rousseau.

Please also send me the two last volumes of "L'Histoire des Révolutions de Corse," by Abbé Germanes. I should be obliged if you would mention what books you have about the island of Corsica, and which you could get

for me promptly. I await your answer to send the money.

You can address your letter: To Monsieur Buonaparte, officer of artillery in the regiment of La Fère, in garrison at Valence, Dauphiné.

I am, sir, with the most perfect consideration,

Your very humble and very obedient

BUONAPARTE (Officer of Artillery).

Napoleon had a Corsican friend, Pontornini, who lived at Tournon, near Valence, to whom he paid a visit. Pontornini drew his portrait, and the drawing has been fortunately preserved. It is the earliest portrait of Napoleon. On it is written:

Mio Caro Amico

BUONAPARTE

Pontornini del 1785

Tournone.

It is a striking picture. The artist has exaggerated the nose, and the line of the profile from forehead to chin is too straight; but we have already the sensitive mouth, the large eye, the long, thin face, with its grave look. There is a decided resemblance, in flatness of visage, in the serious air, to the caricature already noticed.

Napoleon left for long leave in Corsica on September 1. The usual date for the commencement of leave was October 1, but he was allowed to start a month earlier because he had a long journey. He passed by Aix, where he saw Fesch, and also Lucien, who had changed his mind about the army, and had left Brienne to prepare at Aix for an ecclesiastical career. Joseph having given up the Church, Lucien may have thought of stepping into his shoes and obtaining the Corsican bishopric which the Marbeufs had promised. Then the young officer embarked for his native land, his home, which he had not seen since he left it in childhood.

Having spare time from regimental duties, he

began at Valence the valuable habit of writing in notebooks, most of them still in existence in the Laurentinian Library at Florence. Their contents have been published by the eminent author and librarian, Commendatore Biagi. On April 26, 1786, at the age of sixteen and a half, Napoleon wrote about Paoli and Corsica; on May 3 on suicide and patriotism; on May 9 on Rousseau and religion. We append translations.*

The 26 April, 1786.

To-day Paoli enters upon his sixty-first year. Could his father, Hiacinto Paoli, ever have believed when his son came into the world that he would be counted one day among the greatest men modern Italy has produced? The Corsicans were in those unhappy times (in 1725) crushed more than ever by the Genoese tyranny. Degraded below animals, they dragged on in continual troubles an existence miserable and degrading to humanity. Already in 1715 some parishes had taken up arms against the tyrants, but it was not till 1729 that the revolution began in which occurred so many acts of signal intrepidity and of a patriotism comparable to that of the Romans. Well now! Let us see, let us consider a moment. Had the Corsicans the right to shake off the Genoese yoke? Listen to the cry of prejudice: the people are always wrong in revolting against their Sovereign. Divine laws forbid it. What have Divine laws to do with purely human affairs? But do you perceive the absurdity of this general rule which Divine laws make that you must never shake off the yoke even of a usurper? So an assassin, clever enough to seize the throne after having assassinated the legitimate Prince, is at once protected by Divine laws, and all the time if he had failed he would have been condemned to lose his criminal head on the scaffold. Do not tell me that he will be punished in another world, for I should say the same of all perpetrators of civil crimes. It would

* The translations are as literal as possible. No attempt is made to remedy defects of punctuation, or to improve the style, or to clarify obscure passages.

follow that they ought not to be punished in this. It is, besides, plain that a law has nothing to do with the success of the crime it condemns.

As for human laws, there cannot be any when a Prince violates them.

Either the people have established these laws by submitting to the Prince, or it was the Prince who established them. In the former case the Prince is inviolably bound to execute the conventions by the very nature of his Principedom. In the second, these laws should assist the aim of the Government, which is the tranquillity and happiness of the people. If not, it is clear that the people return to the primitive condition, and that the Government, by failing to provide for the social pact, dissolves itself; more, the pact by which a people establishes sovereign authority in any body politic is not a contract—that is to say, the people can at will take back the sovereignty which it has given. Men in a state of nature do not form a Government. To establish that it is necessary that each individual should consent to the change. The act constituting this convention is necessarily a reciprocal contract. All the men who have made this engagement have made the laws. They were therefore Sovereigns. Whether from the difficulty of arranging frequent meetings, or from quite other cause, the people transferred its authority to some particular corporation or individual. But no man is bound by engagements he has made against his will. There are no precedent laws which the people (which, in whatever form of government, must be regarded as essentially sovereign) cannot abrogate. It is not the same with the relations that may be held with neighbouring peoples.

Open the annals of Corsica, read the memoirs of these brave islanders, those of Michele Merello, etc.; but, more, read the peace proposals made by the Republic itself, and by the remedies which they propose you may judge of the abuses which must have existed. You will see that the encroachments of the Republic in the island were begun by treason, and by violation by surprise of the rights of hospitality from Bonifacio to Capo Corso. You will see that they supported by the strength of their marine certain inhabitants of the parishes of Istria who were dis-

contented with the Republic of Pisa, which owned a part of them. Finally, if, by dint of ruse, perfidy, and luck, they managed to make the Orders of the State consent to declare the Republic of Genoa as the Prince, there you will find the pact so insistently claimed by the Corsicans, and what were the conditions which should constitute their sovereign principality.

But of whatever nation you may be, were you even an ex-eunuch of the Seraglio, keep your indignation for the details of the cruelties they made use of for their assistance. Paoli, Colombano, Sampietro, Pompiliani, Gafforio, illustrious avengers of humanity, heroes who delivered your compatriots from the furies of despotism, what were the rewards of your virtues? Daggers—yes, daggers.

Effeminate moderns, who nearly all are languishing in a soft slavery, these heroes are too far above your cowardly souls; but consider the picture of the young Leonardo, youthful martyr of his country and of paternal love. What was the death which ended thy heroic career in the springtime of thy youth? A rope.

Mountaineers, who is it that has troubled your happiness? Peaceful and virtuous men who were spending happy days in the bosom of your country, what barbarous tyrant has destroyed your habitations? Four thousand families were obliged to leave in a short time. You have nothing but your country; by what unexpected event do I see you transported to foreign climes? Fire burned your rustic abodes, and you have no longer the hope of living with your domestic gods. May the avenging furies make thee expiate in the most fearful torments the murder of the Zucci, the Rafaelli, and the other illustrious patriots whom thou didst cause to be massacred in defiance of the laws of hospitality by which they were called into thy palace, thou villain Spinola! What kind of death would the Republic be slow to employ against the supporters of Corsican liberty?

If by the nature of the social contract it is proved that even without any reason the nation in a body can depose a Prince, how should it fare with a private person who, by violating all natural laws, by committing crimes and atrocities, acts contrary to the institution of Government? Does not this reasoning come to the

help especially of the Corsicans, since the Sovereignty or rather the Princedom of the Genoese was only conventional? Thus, the Corsicans have been able, while following all just laws, to shake off the Genoese yoke and may be able to do the same to the French. Amen.

3 May.

Always alone in the midst of men, I return to my room to give myself to dreaming and to deliver myself to all the vivacity of my melancholy. In which direction is it turned to-day? In the direction of death. In the dawn of my days I may still hope to live a long time. I have been absent from my country for from six to seven years. What pleasures shall I not taste when I see again in four months' time both my compatriots and my relations? From the tender emotions which the remembrance of the pleasures of my childhood makes me feel, may I not conclude that my happiness will then be complete? What madness then leads me to wish for my destruction? Certainly, what is there to do in this world? Since I must die, would it not be as well to kill myself? If I had already passed sixty years, I should respect the prejudices of my contemporaries, and I should wait patiently till nature had run its course; but since I am beginning to experience misfortunes, and nothing pleases me, why should I support a life which prospers in no way? How far removed are men from nature! What vile, grovelling cowards they are! What spectacle shall I see in my country? My compatriots carrying chains and kissing in fear the hand which oppresses them! They are no longer those brave Corsicans whom a hero* inspired with his virtues, the enemies of tyrants, of luxury, of vile courtiers. Proud, filled with a noble feeling of his individual importance, a Corsican was happy if he had employed his day over public affairs. The night passed away in the tender arms of a dear wife. Understanding and enthusiasm effaced all the trials of the day. Tenderness, nature made those nights comparable to those of the gods. But, with liberty, they have vanished like dreams, those happy days! Frenchmen, not content with

* Paoli.

[illegible]

FACSIMILE OF NAPOLEON'S HANDWRITING, AGED 16.

Thoughts on Suicide.

having torn from us all that we cherished, you have even corrupted our morals. The present picture of my country, and the impossibility of changing it is therefore a new reason for flying from a world where I am obliged by duty to praise the men whom virtue should make me hate. When I arrive in my fatherland, what figure shall I make? what language shall I hold? When the fatherland is no more, a good patriot should die. If I had only one man to kill in order to deliver my compatriots, I should go this instant and plunge in the breast of the tyrant the avenging sword of my country and its violated laws. Life is a burden to me because I cannot taste any pleasure and it is all pain for me. It is a burden to me because the men with whom I live, and shall probably always live, have morals as distant from mine as the light of the moon differs from that of the sun. I cannot therefore follow the only manner of life which would enable me to support my life, whence follows disgust for everything.

9 May,
4 in the afternoon.

Rousseau! one of thy compatriots,* one of thy friends, a man of virtue who considers himself above the prejudices of men, would destroy those he says thou hast with regard to religion considered from its political aspect. He is not influenced by passion, so often the secret motive of the actions of human beings. Neither the pride of hate nor jealousy inspires him, but august truth. He bows before her and, sure of thy respect for his sacred torch, he publishes his reflections on the eighth chapter of thy "Contrat Social." But yet, of a certainty, it is not enough to be virtuous and to love the truth to be able to wrestle with Rousseau. He was a man, so I can easily believe that he did not see everything correctly. But the matter at issue is not one of his detached ideas, but one of the principal chapters of the "Contrat Social," and a conception which must be probed to the bottom to under-

* Roustan, a Swiss priest, had written "A Defence of Christianity considered from its Political Aspect, with a Reply in Particular to the Eighth Chapter of the Fourth Volume of the 'Contrat Social,'" 1764 (Masson, *op. cit.*).

stand in some degree the difference between modern and ancient systems of government.

Is the Christian religion good for the political condition of a State? Rousseau has so little doubt on the subject that he says: "The third" (the Roman Catholic religion) "is so evidently bad that it is waste of time to amuse one's self in demonstrating it." Whatever breaks up the social unity is bad. All institutions which place man in contradiction with himself are bad. As these principles are incontrovertible, M. Roustan cannot shrink from them, but he denies that the catholic reformed religions are in that position.

In the case of the Roman religion it is abundantly evident that the unity of the State is broken.

Let us investigate thoroughly the reasons he gives against Rousseau. It is true that Christianity and the Governments have for their common goal the happiness of man, but does it follow from that that the unity of the State is not prejudiced? Certainly not. They arrive at the same goal, but by opposite paths. Christianity gives happiness by the disdain it inspires for the evils which afflict us in this world. "What is this life compared with eternity? I am unfortunate, and you, wicked man, are prosperous; but I shall await you at the tribunal of the Supreme Being. Then the balance will change once for all."

The Government watches over the safety of the citizens. "Thou hast committed treason against me, thou hast violated the laws that affect me; come and account for it before the ministers of justice, the avengers of crime and the supporters of the laws." So you see that the motives which inspire Christianity and Government are contrary, although they reach the same goal; but if, in one of those moments of crisis which every State experiences, it becomes necessary to make the people unhappy for a moment in order to save the country, Christianity will resist you and counteract the aims of the Government. So the point is decided.

Christianity forbids men to obey every command opposed to its own laws, every unjust command, were it to emanate even from the people. It is therefore against the first article of the social part, the basis of all government, for it substitutes its own particular

approval for the general will which constitutes sovereignty. As we are discussing politics, the practical inconvenience has to be considered. The inconvenience of this resistance made by the Gospel is so severe in a Christian State that it destroys completely the unity of the State, for the ministers of law and the ministers of religion are not the same persons. The spirit characteristic of the latter body working in accordance with the strictest rule would lead to an indirect opposition to the orders of the Sovereign. What, indeed, is the tribunal which will have the decision whether such and such an order is unjust? Conscience, you say. Who is it that controls the conscience? So you see that the State is no longer one. If you follow out this reasoning you will see that the reply of Vicomte d'Orthe is very different in a Christian State. You perceive then yourself the influence that the ministers of religion may exert against the laws, since, to prevent the abuses of elections, you have ecclesiastics enlightened and virtuous. You feel then that they have greater influence in the State than even the ministers of the law; and as the corps of ministers of religion are never or hardly ever citizens, and always ministers, there is a conflict of influences.

I shall pass over a great number of real contradictions or inconsequences into which M. Roustan falls. I have pointed out enough of them. It is then undoubted that Christianity, even reformed, destroys the unity of the State: first, because it diminishes the confidence men ought to have in the ministers of the law, second, because by its constitution it has a special corps, which not only shares the heart of the citizen, but may also often counteract the intentions of the Government. And, moreover, is not this corps independent of the State? That is so, since it is not subjected to the same maxims. Do we see it defending the country, the laws, liberty? No. Its empire is not of this world. Thus it is never a citizen.

Since Christianity breaks the unity of the State, may one conclude that it has been the cause of the numerous troubles which have agitated the Christian States? Rousseau thinks so and that is what we must get to the bottom of. It is in the nature of mankind, as

experience shows us every day, that in following the tortuous mazes of metaphysics the mind strays off to a supposition, a principle, a superficial aspect. But that J. J., the author of "Émile," of the "Contrat Social," that profound and penetrating man who spent his life in studying mankind, that Rousseau who has so well revealed to us the petty springs of great actions, should have drawn a false conclusion; that he should have misunderstood the principles which have delivered Christian States to all the fury of civic dissensions, that is what M. Roustan will have difficulty in convincing me. However, let us not be too enthusiastic. Who can understand the vicissitudes of the human mind? Many a good diver who has plumbed the depth of the superb ocean, who has seen without trembling the precipices which threatened his life, has ended miserably in a still pond. We must distinguish the spirit that Christianity has given to the clergy in its constitution from the precise meaning of the law. "Thou art more powerful than the Sovereign himself," says the one; "thou hast need of wealth to support thy rank and sustain it among the other classes of the State." This voice which makes itself heard incessantly is not slow to carry the day. Previously the Gospel had enjoined: "Remain poor"; they soon evade that counsel. Now, Rousseau attacks only that spirit of the Constitution which, by breaking the unity of the State, by making the ministers of religion powerful, rich, zealous for the dogmas of intolerance, has been the cause of all the wars which have estranged the Christian States.

The reproaches you bring against Christian Emperors should rather be brought against Christianity, since they are its natural sequel. Of two opinions concerning a dogma there cannot be more than one that is good, and that is of Jesus Christ. Each party sustains its opinion with the same obstinacy. They get to exchanging insults, for it is a question of gaining the people. Each party is horrified, believing he sees his adversary in the tortures of hell. What man would yield? Not only do shame and vanity prevent an admission of defeat, but hope of reputation, of wealth, of the favour of the people. So they become more obstinate. The man who is not

in the same path as the Master ought not to have the advantages enjoyed by His other creatures. At the very least he ought to be despoiled of his temporal goods. What will the ministers of the law have to do with all this? Will they present their judgment to the two parties? What temerity! "What are you troubling about? This is not in your jurisdiction. It is a question of the other world." Thus the laws are despised. Presumptuous mortals, you must breathe and yet you think you are not subject to laws! Your empire is of the other world, and you trouble this one! That is how Christianity has broken the unity of the State, that is how it has fathered the wars which have torn the hearts of nearly all the Kingdoms of Europe.

Politics, you say, has had a good deal to do with it. I agree. What follows? Is it not dangerous for a State that ambitious men should be able to find pretexts for disturbance? Thus the spirit of the Christian constitution, far from solidifying the State, has done nothing but disturb it by breaking the unity of the Government, and furnishing powerful pretexts with the multitude to colour the plans of the ambitious. But the reason you give in support of your opinion is ludicrous.

With a triumphant air you ask why Protestant Switzerland and the French and Piedmontese Catholics have not been disturbed by civil dissensions? Why? Because they had a common enemy, the Papist. So long as the Christians were persecuted and restrained by the Pagans, they were humble and good. The spirit of the constitution, which showed itself afterwards, was shrouded in impotence. The political wars; the vigilance which the nation required to prevent the Prince from invading the remains of their liberties; the old Papists, who were still numerous; the need of the German Protestants for help against the Roman leagues, were the causes that saved the Swedes from wars of religion. But without opening the annals of Europe, we perceive other evils that the reformed sects have created.

Before attempting to expose the errors into which Jean Jacques has fallen, you should read him. You construe literally the sense of his words when he says that the idea of a kingdom of the other world could

never have entered into the heads of the Pagans ; that is to say, they could never have imagined that men assembled together could have formed society simply for purposes of religion. They understood too well the human heart not to see clearly that that would lead to the destruction both of their religion and their government, and that these Christians would one day be despots in this world, whatever they might say.

The ineptness of what you say on page 26 is such that the best way to make you recant would be to send you back to the reading of your own plan. Does one wait until the city is all in flames before stopping the incendiaries ? Besides, do you not know that it is impossible to prove the influence of the Christian constitution, seeing that by its nature it is not developed until it is at its greatest power ? They were weak no doubt because they were scattered, because they had not unity or energy, since the constitution was not completed. The energy which is required to prepare to repel with all your strength the Sovereign who attacks you and whom you are accustomed to obey, is very different from the frenzy which is inspired by the enthusiasm to accept martyrdom. The one shows greatness of soul, the other fanaticism.

If no Emperor was earlier a Christian, if prosperity did not shine upon Christianity until all the springs of the State were broken, it is clear that this religion could in no way help the Government, and that, on the contrary, by its rapid corruption it could only bring infinite harm to society.

Do you find that in the case of the ancient religions ? Certainly not. The religion follows more or less the degree of corruption of the Government. If you reflect upon the Christian constitution, you will find there the origin of wars, and, I venture to say, of the small amount of respect we have for religion.

You admit, then, that you do not understand how the clergy can be master and legislator of the nation. Do you think in that way to make us suspect that Rousseau had no object in saying that ? No, no ! You rather make us think it would have been much better for you not to have written. The clergy, wherever it is a body touching several States, is master in that its decisions are independent of all the

other bodies of the State. It is a legislator, in that it rules over consciences. In short, whatever it does, it does despotically.

We have now investigated the reasons which M. de Roustan gives to prove that Christianity does not break the unity of the State, and has not been the cause of the wars which have troubled Christian States.

Does Christianity detach the citizens from the nation? That is the second question we must investigate. Rousseau argues in the affirmative. M. de Roustan begins by leaning upon the authority of Montesquieu, which not only is not decisive, but is even against him. All that he says from pages 42 to 44 is absolutely in favour of the opinion of Jean Jacques, or rather is absolutely inappropriate. He wishes to justify Christianity. Who attacks it on the point which he defends? For it is not a question whether Jesus Christ did well or ill, but simply whether Christianity detaches the citizens from the State.

"Liberty being lost, all that remained was to prevent the slaves from further degeneration; not being able any longer to respect themselves as compatriots, to teach them to respect themselves as men." If the object of the Gospel was to teach slaves discipline, that would be so. If they learned that it was "as meritorious to die for moral liberty, as immortal example had shown in days gone by it was to die for political liberty," it is clear that in their hearts one desire had been substituted for the other, and so farewell to patriotism. "If they learned of those superb tyrants who placed no limit to their power but that of their own caprice, that their glory was but a flash and power but weakness, that a God before whom they were but worms closely watched all their conduct, that death was at His command and would bring them soon to His tribunal where they would receive the punishment or reward that their actions had earned," they concluded that a tyrant had been given them by God, they learned that the right of correction belonged to those who had placed Him in power. Farewell the pride in its existence so necessary in a Government. After that who would expect that

M. de Roustan would say that "the Christian religion prepared the peoples to recover their political liberty if they found the opportunity? A nation which has morals and is united has only to wish to throw off the yoke to succeed." But you told us that the object of the Gospel was to discipline slaves. With this policy it would have been very foolish to give them the energy and inspire them with the desire to shake off the yoke of their Sovereign. What astonishing contradictions! But let us investigate your maxim: "A nation," you say, "which has morals and is united has only to wish to throw off the yoke to succeed." Do not speak of the Christians being united. They might easily have never been divided. Tranquillity is the element of religion, but political unity on the other hand is a warm feeling which is very unlike the coldness and pyrrhonism of Christianity. But, admitting your maxim, the will would always be wanting, for as soon as the will . . . Not only does the unity of the State depend on there being no body, and no individuals who could thwart the means employed to attain the ends of Government, but also it is essential that the feelings animating the different institutions should tend towards the same goal. Now, does not Christianity produce a marked indifference towards the merely human actions?

Christianity, it is true, tends to make us happy. The aim of the Government is to make us happy. It may be doubted whether it follows that Christianity does not destroy the unity of the State. They may arrive at the same goal, but by methods entirely opposite and contrary. Christianity makes us happy by making us regard the evils which come to us as a punishment from God, and of a kind that will be recompensed in the other life. It says: this life is made happy by its hope of a future life. The aim of the Government, on the other hand, is to assist with a strong hand the weak against the strong, and in this way enable each one to enjoy the sweet tranquillity which is the source of happiness. But, besides, the ministers of the law not being at the same time ministers of religion, this latter body acquires a separate spirit, and this spirit is very strong because its empire is purely metaphysical. The heart of the

citizen is thus divided between the ministers of the law and those of religion.

Now, it is natural to man to wish to dominate. Consider whether a body which is all-powerful without power would not desire real power. And that is what has happened. So I say that Christianity destroys the unity of the State because it has produced a company which has a spirit separated from and independent of the State: the Jesuits.

But you yourself declare that Jesus tells men that God is the chief King and that unjust orders should not be obeyed. So you make the subject judge the acts of the Sovereign. Conscience, you say, will be his tribunal. But who regulates the conscience? The ministers of religion. So you see here is the unity of the State destroyed.

You say that it would have been well for the monarchies of Paganism if this maxim had been accepted. I can well believe it. Christianity may have sweetened manners, but that has nothing to do with our question.

But do you not see that what you are saying for the Vicomte d'Orthe is of quite a different nature in Paganism from what it would be in another religion? Unity would have existed all the same, because there was only one body which could consider that its affair, whereas here the ministers of religion consider themselves authorized to protect it, or at least to approve it. Whether that is good or bad is not the question. But you are now admitting what you wish to deny, for you are tacitly saying that the priest should be prepared to make the people rebellious against unjust orders when you tell us that the Prince could avoid this inconvenience by choosing virtuous priests. That is not the question. However, I will show you that you are contradicting yourself. Thus, you have told us that Jesus had exhorted us not to obey an unjust order. The more virtuous a minister of religion, the more he will follow the maxims of Jesus Christ. Now, I understand as rebellious the man who does not obey the order of his Sovereign.

You tell us that the Emperors made a great mistake when they enriched the priests; you do not then see that it was a natural result first of the power they

had over the conscience of the Prince, and then of the good or the ill they could do in the State. What! You desire that a man, a body, more powerful than any other, should not be rich. Explore the human heart a little! Then you will see that the wealth of the clergy was a natural result of its determination not to be dependent on the Government, and consequently should be put to the account of Christianity, like the abuses and the wars it had fathered. I propose: Independence of the Government. That is clear. Especially because, being spiritually independent, it would necessarily have a temporal influence.

It is useless for the Gospels to say: "Obey your Sovereign." What are these words to me? I am not looking to them, but to the principles and the constitution which say the contrary. So it is useless to say: "Remain poor and wise," when the principles of their institutions say: "Be rich." But even if we follow the strict spirit of Christianity the unity of the State is broken. That is proved both by this reasoning and by the spirit of the constitution. Rousseau had ground for saying that the doctrine of Jesus produced intestine divisions which have never ceased to agitate the Christian world. Those suspicions of heresy, are they not a result of the intolerance and the particularity of Christianity? Consider whether Paganism produced anything of the kind. It is immaterial to me whether the Churches have or have not been conducted in the Christian spirit so long simply as these wars are a result of the constitution of Christianity. That is enough for my purpose. That is just what Rousseau says: that the unity broken, civil wars have followed because they are sanctioned by the ministers of religion. But it seems that you have not understood Rousseau! He does not say that it is the Gospel itself which occasions these abuses, but that they are the result of the abuses of the political constitution of Christianity. But suppose that Rousseau had really said that the Gospel inspires discord. The answer you give is ridiculous. Despotism always grows into tyranny: does it follow from that that some good Princes cannot render their subjects happy? Switzerland has not been agitated by intestine wars because the Swiss had the Romans to fight,

and, besides, because the smallness of each canton is the result of the Helvetic constitution.

The Protestants of Sweden, Denmark, France, have not been at war with each other because they had Roman Catholics to fight. But why, I beg, do you defend the Protestants of Augsburg more than the Roman Christians? Neither the one nor the other would accept you.

In spite of your giving Rousseau the title of a friend, you are not capable of appreciating his works. To prove that the Pagans could have the idea of a kingdom of the other world you tell us that many . . . by that I can well see that you do not understand what Rousseau is saying. The politicians and the Cæsars of Paganism could never believe that the Christians were sincere, and could never have been satisfied with a metaphysical Empire. That shows that the profound politician conceals his art. Ought the Pagans to have waited until the Christians had exposed their intentions? Suppose that an army were to approach your town in order to enter it, but has not given evidence of any evil intention. . . .

There is youthful eagerness, and sometimes dramatic fervour, in these writings, but the style is involved, and the argument often obscure.

In the first essay Napoleon is the ardent Corsican patriot and hater of the French oppressors. His feelings are very natural, and have often been experienced by lads in his position; there are islands off the coast of Great Britain where similar emotions are common in youth. His home-sickness and loathing of the Continental conquerors impel him, in the second essay, to consider escape by suicide. It is intolerable to be educated in France, at French expense, receiving the charity of the French tyrants—the first Corsican to suffer that indignity—and to have to appear in Corsica with the French uniform, the badge of servitude upon him. The prospect of spending his life amongst these hated Frenchmen, whose morals, moreover, are revolting, is loathsome, and makes him wonder whether

death itself would not be preferable. He had hoped to enter the navy, which would have brought him nearer to Corsica, and, so he thought, would have lessened the sense of degradation. He intended to spend as little time with his regiment as he could possibly arrange; and, as the sequel shows, contrived to be absent for long periods. The hatred, and the intense desire of revenge for insults, which his position of charity boy and hostage in the enemy's country had created in Napoleon, are sure breeders of personal ambition.

As the work of the future First Consul and Emperor, the third essay, on religion, is interesting because it exhibits in their original form the opinions as to Church and State which guided the policy of the ruler of France. The Church was to be spiritually strong, but without temporal power. The State was to be supreme. As Masson observes, the Emperor had intended (according to the Memorial of St. Helena) to instal the Papacy at Paris, where it would have been an influence for good under Imperial control. He did not succeed in doing that; perhaps he never could have succeeded. Here, at any rate, we have the basis of his opinions on the subject.

(2) *Corsica* (September 15, 1786, to September 12, 1787).

Napoleon arrived at Ajaccio on September 15, 1786, after an absence of seven years and nine months, from the age of nine years and four months to seventeen years and one month. Joseph had not been away so long: five and a half years, from the age of eleven to sixteen and a half. Lucien was absent at Autun, Brienne, and Aix, about five years, from the age of eight to thirteen. Napoleon's absence from his home was two to three years longer than those of his brothers. It was an immense pleasure to return.

Napoleon was the first Corsican to obtain a commission in the army from the Military College, and there was only one other Corsican in the renowned Royal Corps of Artillery. His arrival at Ajaccio was a considerable local event; he was at once identified by strangers, friends, and relatives, by his military dress. The party at the Bonaparte house now consisted of his mother, Letizia; the Archdeacon, confined to bed by gout; Joseph, the head of the family, aged nearly nineteen; Louis, aged eight, whom he had left a baby of three months; and three new-comers—Pauline, aged six; Caroline, aged four and a half; Jerome, aged two. Elisa and Lucien were still in France.

It was indeed a happy time, his only regrets being, as he told Duroc long afterwards, that he could not have with him his father and his father's great friend, the protector of the family, Marbeuf, who died at Bastia on September 20, a few days after Napoleon's arrival at Ajaccio.

He went about in ecstasy, drinking in the genial airs, the aromatic odours, of his native land; wandering among the olives and vineyards, or on the beach, gazing with delight on the blue sea and the mountains in the background. In one of his essays he writes with eloquent appreciation of the beauties of Nature. Under the influence of Rousseau, he speaks of the "sentiment" of Nature; he is sorry for the man who is not "touched" by the "electricity of Nature"; he describes "the star of day at its close precipitate itself with majesty in the bosom of the infinite"; he experiences "the sweetness, the melancholy, the emotion, that usually arises in such conditions." Youthful emotions of this kind sometimes contain a touch of self-consciousness, of pose; but one is inclined to think that Napoleon's feelings were not forced, but were a spontaneous growth due to the intense pleasure

his long absence now inevitably gave him in the beauty of the land of his birth.

He was also delighted with the Corsican peasants, whose demeanour towards him, though respectful, was manly and self-respecting, so different from the unpleasant cringing of the lower class in France. He was more than ever convinced, with Rousseau, that these "men of nature," who had not been made vicious and effeminate by luxury, who were hardy, though uncultured, and who retained still intact the sentiment of human equality which is innate in all men, were the ideal men, and their country, his beautiful Corsica, was the model for all the world. And what a pleasure it was to be once more among people who gave themselves no supercilious, contemptuous airs! With them his French was not uncouth, but a wonderful accomplishment; his Corsican origin was no longer a disgrace, but a glory.

It was no doubt of this time that Letizia was thinking when, at Rome in 1834, she spoke of the wonderful mathematical calculations made by Napoleon, and of his making a retreat on the balcony for quiet study. He worked at Italian, which he had forgotten; kept up his mathematics, and was as studious as at Valence. Joseph says in his *Memoirs*: "My brother Napoleon at last obtained leave. His arrival was a great happiness for my mother and myself. Some years had passed since we had met, but we had corresponded regularly. The country delighted him. His habits were those of an industrious and studious young man; but he was quite different from what he has been represented by the authors of memoirs, who all repeat the same mistake when once it has gone forth. He was at that time a passionate admirer of Rousseau, was what we used to call 'an inhabitant of an ideal world'; connoisseur of the masterpieces of Corneille, Racine, Voltaire, which we used to declaim every day.

He had collected French translations of Plutarch, Plato, Cicero, Cornelius Nepos, Livy, Tacitus, as well as Montaigne, Montesquieu, Raynal. These books filled a trunk larger than that which contained his clothes. I do not deny that he had also the works of Ossian, but I do deny that he preferred them to Homer."

He does not appear to have been interested in military studies. Above all it was necessary to learn Italian in order to be able to converse with his relations and friends, of whom Joseph alone was able to speak French; and also to read Italian histories of Corsica in preparation for the work on Corsica which he had in contemplation.

Joseph was now, as in childhood, his chief companion. He one day told Bourrienne that he had never loved anybody, except Joseph perhaps a little. Probably it was during this first Corsican visit that the brothers were most closely drawn together. "Ah," said Joseph, when the Empire was at its height, "the glorious Emperor will never indemnify me for the loss of that Napoleon whom I loved so dearly, whom I should like to see again as I knew him in 1786, if one can meet again in the Elysian fields." The affection between the two young men does credit to them both, and especially to the elder, who appears to have been entirely free from any trace of jealousy. The head of the family, living quietly at home with his mother and the children, would not always welcome so eagerly a younger brother with his fine uniform and his Continental prestige. He was glad to have a companion nearly his own age, and derived enjoyment from the opportunity of displaying his French, acquired by him also on the Continent. Sitting on the terrace together, outside the long gallery, the two young men would declaim passages from Racine or Corneille.

Napoleon's patriotism and Paoli-worship impelled

him to write to a Swiss doctor, Tissot, who had compared Paoli to Cæsar, Mahomet, and Cromwell. The letter begins:

“AJACCIO IN CORSICA,

“1st April, 1787.

“SIR,

“You have occupied your days in instructing mankind, and your reputation has penetrated even into the mountains of Corsica, where little is known of medicine. It is true that the short but glorious terms of praise that you have employed in speaking of the beloved General of the Corsicans, suffices to fill them with acknowledgments which I am delighted to find myself in the position to testify to you in the name of my fellow-countrymen.

“With no other introduction but the esteem I have conceived for your writings, I venture to trouble you to ask your advice for an uncle of mine who suffers from the gout. . . .” Then follows a description of the Archdeacon’s symptoms. He had already been confined to bed for nearly two years (he never again left it). Napoleon adds: “I myself have been for a month past tormented by a tertian fever, which makes me doubt whether you will be able to read this scrawl.”

Tissot received this letter, but did not reply. On the back he wrote: “Letter not answered; of little interest.”

In August, 1787, on the expectation of war with Prussia, all officers on leave were recalled to their regiments. Accordingly, on September 12, 1787, Napoleon, after a year’s leave in Corsica, left for France. On arrival at Marseilles, the war-clouds having disappeared, he received notice of the cancellation of the recall, but he went on to Paris. He may have intended to join his regiment, then at Douai; he

also had to solicit the payment of moneys claimed by his mother from the French Government for a mulberry plantation in the neighbourhood of Ajaccio. These were sufficient reasons for visiting Paris, besides the natural desire of a young man to see the centre of the civilized world, which he had not been permitted to explore while at the Military College.

(3) *Paris (September, 1787, to December, 1787).*

When Napoleon arrived in Paris he was only just eighteen, an age which is still that of the schoolboy in the present day, while he was already a Lieutenant of two years' standing. He went at once to Versailles, and obtained an interview with the Prime Minister, Monseigneur de Brienne, on the subject of the mulberry plantation. Napoleon put his petition into writing. His claim on behalf of "widow de Buonaparte" was that "by the contract made by her late husband with the King for the establishment of a plantation of mulberries, in 1782," sums amounting to 5,800 livres only had been received, leaving 3,800 still due. This was a sum well worth struggling for. He also applied for a free nomination for Lucien to the Seminary at Aix, where his education was being paid for by his mother. His efforts in these directions came to nothing; but the application for an extension of his own leave, "in order to assist at the deliberations of the Estates of Corsica," was successful. He started for Corsica in December, 1787.

Some of his writings while in Paris are still in existence at Florence. He discussed love of country, as distinguished from love of glory.

I have scarcely attained the age of the dawn of passion; my heart is still agitated by the revolution which that first knowledge of man produces in our ideas, and yet you expect me, mademoiselle, to discuss

a question which demands a profound knowledge of the human heart. But is it not by obedience to you that I must earn the right to remain a worthy member of this intimate society? Consider then this discourse not so much a product of intellect and knowledge as a faithful picture of the feelings which agitate my heart, into which the whole perversity of man has not yet perhaps penetrated.

If I had to compare the times of Sparta and Rome with our modern period, I should say: Here rules love, there love of country. The opposite effects of these passions would certainly make us suppose that they are incompatible. What, at least, is certain is that a people given up to gallantry has lost even the degree of energy that is necessary to be able to imagine the existence of patriotism. That is the point at which we have arrived to-day. Few people believe in the love of country. What quantities of works have not been written to show how chimerical it is! Were, then, the feelings which produced the sublime act of Brutus chimerical? . . .

Could desire for the esteem of men or wish for glory have produced that host of acts which posterity has extolled under the name of love of country, as our modern sophists assert? If, then, we are able to show their inadequacy, what must it have been? What, then, was the motive of the celebrated patriots who hold so distinguished a place in the annals of the universe? what must be the primitive passions which constitute patriotism?

That, mademoiselle, shall be the subject of the ideas which I am about to develop under your patronage. May they be worthy of it, and happy in having procured me the pleasure of receiving the attention of this intimate society. Let us open the annals of monarchical countries. Certainly we become enthusiastic at the recital of the exploits of Philip, Alexander, Charlemagne, Turenne, Condé, Machiavelli, and many other illustrious men, who throughout their heroic careers worked for the esteem of mankind; but what is the emotion which masters us when we think of Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans? They do not go to a battle, they run to meet death to save their country from the fate which threatens it; they face the united

forces of the Orient, accepting their doom, the first upholders of liberty. But thou who to-day dost chain to thy chariot the hearts of men, sex whose whole merit consists in its brilliant exterior, consider here your triumph, and blush at what you are not. It is in your annals that I shall find the greatest proof of the insufficient power of glory.

Who are the heroines who triumph in Sparta? I see them, at the head of the other citizens, celebrate by cries of joy the good fortune of their country. "O Thermopyleans, you hold the tomb of my husband: may you do the same for my son if tyrants ever threaten my country." What! you whom I see crowned with myrtle, you represent the sublime efforts of the grandest heroism? What! It is nothing then but the vile love of glory. But is not the love of glory the desire to have one's name renowned? Have they any hopes of that kind, the Spartan women? . . . Those, says Plutarch, triumphed in temples and public places, while the mothers and wives of those who had escaped alive did not dare show themselves. Yes, these are customs worthy of a nation. So you can see clearly that the love of glory could not have been the motive of the Spartans.

But if love of glory had been the principle of action of both republicans and monarchists, whence comes the astonishing difference in the sentiments we feel at the mere recital of their acts, whence the difference even in the acts themselves? Aristides, the wisest of the Athenians, Themistocles, the most ambitious, still the terror of the Great King, both of them saviours and restorers of their country, are rewarded by ignominious exile. "O God, may you forget the injustice of my countrymen as readily as I forgive them," says Aristides, while gazing for the last time upon his ungrateful and cherished land. . . . "Tell my son," said Cimon while suffering ignominious arrest, "that, being no longer a citizen, I am nothing more to him and that Athens is always his mother and his home."

Themistocles prefers rather to swallow the fatal poison than to see himself at the head of the soldiers of the Orient, and to be in a position to avenge his own personal wrong. He could have hoped no doubt to subjugate Greece. What glory in future ages and

what a satisfaction of his ambition ! But no, he lived amidst the pomps of Persia, ever regretting his country. "O my son, we should have perished if we had not perished !" Energetic phrase which should be permanently inscribed in the heart of a true patriot.

Compare to these traits of heroism the actions of Robert d'Artois, Gaston d'Orléans, the great Condé, and that crowd of Frenchmen who did not blush to devastate the land that gave them birth. Those had been reared in the precepts of patriotism, these in love of glory. You will not venture to say that patriotism is nothing. Does anything ever come from nothing ?

Inflamed by the burning fire of patriotism, the pupil of the great Plato, severe Dion abandons the blissful scenes of Attica. Farewell the pleasures which charmed the philosopher. He abandons his ease. A tyrant rules his country. Fly, Denys,* fly from these shores hitherto the theatre of thy cruelties. Dion has already raised at Syracuse the standard of Liberty, but the surprising effect of jealousy, that terrible monster spawned from hell with all its furies glides into the hearts of the Syracusans. The madmen ! They dare to take up arms against their saviour ; they attack on all sides the legion which has just delivered them and which remains faithful to the hero who leads them. What, then, are the motives by which they are animated ? "Strangers, who are taking up the defence of my life," exclaims Dion, "do not spill, I conjure you, the blood of my countrymen !" Was it love of glory that prompted that sublime harangue ? What would the great Condé have done ? . . . Say, sirs, what do you think the great Condé would have done in such circumstances ? Syracuse ! Syracuse, thou shouldst long have suffered the punishment for thy ingratitude. Bound to his chariot thou wouldst for ever have served as monument to his glory, and posterity, doubtless, would only have applauded his bravery. But such sentiments do not agitate the heart which contains no love of country. Whilst these barbarous fellow-citizens are using the arms which he himself has provided, to take away his life : "Strangers," cried Dion, "who are here defending my life, I conjure you not to spill the blood of my fellow-citizens." The

* Dionysius.

protector of liberty is no longer in the city. Already the satellites of tyrants have made blood flow in torrents. Liberty totters in its last fortress. Dion enjoys his triumph, sees at his knees the ungrateful and perjured men who wanted his life. But what! Thou weepest: tears stream from thy stoic eyes! What! These tigers who on thy first defeat thirsted for thy blood, these tigers draw out thy tears! Love of country, how powerful thou art over the human heart! Just as the sun disperses the densest fog, so, O great Dion, thy appearance dispersed the dense cohorts of the tyrant. With what joy thou sawest thy blood flow! It sealed for long the liberty of Syracuse. You contend that the love of glory produced these sublime tears! You contend that it produced that short harangue which is governed by a sentiment that Jesus Christ alone has since renewed! No! No! The desire for immortality is a personal feeling which has always given way to wounded self-love. Turenne, the hero of France, yields to a personal interest and rushes against his own country; but what am I saying, yields?—gives new strength to the effects of the vengeance of self-love. It is a feeling which may be allied to the most opposite passions. Condé at the Dunes was moved by love of glory just as much as at Rocroy and Nordlingen.

Must we search further for proofs of the inadequacy of love of glory? Let us open the annals of that little island too little known for the honour of modern times: a Corsican is condemned to perish on the scaffold. The laws of the Republic have decreed it. Besides the ties of blood, those of gratitude and of the most tender friendship closely concerned his nephew as to his fate. In the fervour of his feelings he casts himself at the feet of the chief magistrate, the great Paoli. "May I plead for my uncle? Are the laws made for our unhappiness? He is only too guilty, no doubt, but we offer 2,000 sequins to buy him off. He will never return to the island. We will give 400 so long as the siege of Furiani shall last." "Young man," answers Paoli, "you are a Corsican. If you think it would be an honour to our country the judgment you desire will be pronounced, and I will give you the pardon." The good young man rises. The working of his features

sufficiently betrays his distracted condition. "No! No! I will not buy the honour of our country for 2,000 sequins. O my uncle, I would rather perish in thy arms." From whatever aspect I regard this heroic reply, I cannot find in it any trace of love of glory.

If I were to continue, mademoiselle, to follow the annals of this illustrious nation, what traits of patriotism would I not find? Gaffori, who joined the soul of Brutus to the eloquence of Cicero, thou didst offer to patriotism the sacrifice of thy paternal love. Neither ambition, nor attachment to his estates, nor even the imprisonment of his sons, could tempt Rivorella. "As for my sons, they should certainly be returned to me. All the rest I consider unworthy, being personal to myself and incomparably inferior to the engagements I have made with my compatriots; I die content since I die for my country. Paoli, to my arms! I shall be by the side of Gaffori and the other illustrious patriots..." Some Amphipolitans informed Argileonis of the death of her son Brasidas whom they had seen perish. "Certainly not, Sparta has not another his equal." "Do not say that, my friends; my son was a worthy citizen, I like to think it, but Sparta still counts in her walls above seventy even more worthy of her."

It is in private remarks of this kind that the true sentiment is exhibited. Every trait, every word of a Spartan shows a heart full of the most sublime patriotism. You who aspire to the title of good patriots, who hope to acquire such feelings, here is your baptism. Doubtless it is possible only to those privileged virtuous souls, to those men who by the force of their organism are able to master all their passions, and by their breadth of view govern states, to march in the path of a Cincinnatus, a Fabricius, a Cato, a Thrasybulus; but you who aspire merely to the title of good citizens, consider Pedaretus. A vain title is refused to Bouillon and Turenne, the hero of France, Turenne, the invincible bulwark of the nation, Turenne, whom she has loaded with favours, well! Turenne reduces to cinders the cottages which he had defended so long. Honours being refused to Condé, his love of glory is hurt, and he unfurls the standard of revolution. That is what the thirst of ambition produced in the two greatest men of France. How much higher is Pedaretus,

simple citizen of a celebrated Republic, than these illustrious Monarchists. He strenuously demands before the tribunal of the people to be elected one of the Three Hundred, the chief magistrates of the Republic. He is rejected. "Sparta, my dear country, thou containest, then, three hundred citizens more worthy than myself. Gods, be witness of my joy! Ah! Should I be the last, how willingly would I consent at this price to be merely a citizen." Remain, then, confounded, preachers of glory. Do homage to the truth. For did the Spartans affect all these sublime emotions for the sake of glory? It was, then, a simulated emotion, and simulated by a whole town? But little as you may understand the spirit of men, you must see that such an imposture could not have lasted any time. The absurdity of the boredom of affecting sentiments that one has not would soon have made the people at least shake off so useless a yoke. . . .

Napoleon, aged eighteen, is still unable to express himself clearly—a defect that he never cured. It has been said of Wellington that "there is hardly an ambiguous sentence in the whole series of his despatches."* It was quite the contrary with Napoleon, whose meaning was sometimes as hard to unravel as his handwriting was difficult to decipher. From his first command in 1796 he had Berthier at hand to explain it, but even Berthier sometimes misunderstood.

As for the argument, a modern writer would merely observe that love of glory is more personal, and therefore more selfish, than love of country; whether there was more love of country in classic than there is in modern times can only be matter of conjecture. Perhaps so cold a treatment of the subject was not to be expected from a young Corsican of the eighteenth century.

When, five years and a half after writing with such warmth, Napoleon was driven out of Corsica and

* "The Life of Wellington," by Sir Herbert Maxwell, vol. i., p. 66.

became an exile amongst the people he had always hated, love of country could no longer be the main-spring of his actions ; he had to abandon for the rest of his life what he here calls "the burning fire of patriotism," which had been with him so strong a passion, and had to adopt in its place love of glory—that is, personal ambition.

Napoleon also composed the following imaginary correspondence between Theodore, ex-King of Corsica, then in prison for debt in London, and Horace Walpole, who raised a subscription on his behalf.

Theodore to my Lord Walpole.

FROM A LONDON PRISON.

MY LORD,

Why have you dragged me from the obscurity in which I lived ? I was groaning in a dungeon, but I groaned unobserved. My name and rank known to few persons, not guessed by my guards nor by my fellow-slaves, left me still the sad consolation of being respected by the criminals or the unfortunates who surrounded me.

If oppressed by the horror of the prison they formed projects of escape, I was the first to be informed. There was not one who did not say : We shall break our fetters, and then you will be our head.

But from that day, my Lord, when you informed them who I am, I have fallen to the lowest point in their esteem, and I am the object of their mockery. . . . Unjust men ! I tried to contribute to the happiness of a nation. I succeeded for a time, and you admired me. Fortune has changed. I am in a dungeon, and you despise me.

My Lord to Theodore.

You suffer and are unhappy. These are two reasons for claiming the sympathy of an Englishman. Emerge then from your prison and accept a pension of £3,000 a year.

Napoleon here reveals his admiration for England, where Paoli was being hospitably received, and

enjoying at that time a pension of £2,000 a year. When the fallen Emperor, to escape a worse fate, went on board the *Bellerophon* at Rochefort, he may have had some wild hope of being welcomed in the same spirit. He was capable of believing that England would forget that, unlike Theodore and Paoli, he had been an enemy, and would receive him with open arms; and that the Powers, who did not like having him at Elba, would have raised no objection to his being stationed even nearer to France.

(4) *Corsica (January 1, 1788, to June 1, 1788).*

When Napoleon returned to Ajaccio at the beginning of the year 1788, he found his mother in sore straits for money. She had to pay for the education of Lucien at Aix, and for Joseph's expenses at Pisa, as well as keeping the household. Mamuccia Caterina was her only assistant. She wrote to Joseph (in Italian):

"VERY DEAR SON,

"From your uncle's letter you will see what you ought to do. He wishes that you should pass for your degree of doctor" (of laws). "You know the state of the family, and therefore it is unnecessary for me to tell you to spend as little as possible. We are without a servant, so do what is possible to bring one back with you. I would like a woman of a certain age, not too young, a woman of forty years, for the house, not the country, only she should do our washing, but if she will not it does not matter; but she must do our little cooking and be able to sew and iron, and be faithful. That is what I want, because since my finger trouble I am not in a condition to do one single thing further. Try and do your best. You will ask what salary you may promise and I answer: as little as you can arrange for; but to give you an idea I will say

three or four francs a month. It suffices that the woman is satisfactory, and then twenty sous more or less is of no importance, as my need is great.

"Abbot Colonna says you will be sure to remember these commissions, and in particular that of the servant.

"Your sisters and brothers embrace you, and wish you to bring them a straw hat for the summer. Grand-mama, Mammuccia Caterina, and your uncles and aunts, salute you. I embrace you, and hope for your safe return. Do not forget what I am writing about.

"Your most affectionate Mother."

To this Joseph replied (in Italian):

"MOST LOVED UNCLE AND DEAREST MOTHER AND BROTHERS,

"I have received your letters, together with the 80 scudi you have sent me for obtaining my degree, which will follow in a few days, conferred by Van-nucchi. On the 1st May I shall part for Bastia if occasion serves.

"I am in doubt whether I shall see Napoleon again when I arrive in Ajaccio. . . . Although my body is in Tuscany, my spirit has followed the family events and has been in Pisa and Ajaccio at the same time. But the bell calls me to the lecture of Lampredi. It would be a crime to miss a lecture from that eloquent man, as I have only a few more days to listen to him. I hope to enjoy conversation with you at a more opportune moment. I will send you news of me from Bastia.

"I am your most affectionate nephew, son, and brother."*

"PISA,

"18 April, 1788."

* "Uncle" comes before "mother," and "nephew" before "son." Sisters are ignored.

Joseph brought with him a servant, the faithful Saveria, who remained with Letizia through all vicissitudes, and died in Rome after the fall of the Empire.

Napoleon passed some part of this Corsican holiday at Bastia, and he visited his artillery comrades who were in garrison there. One of them, De Roman, an ardent Royalist, has left an account of him. "In 1788," he says,* "M. Buonaparte, who had recently been nominated a lieutenant of artillery, arrived in Corsica on leave. He was a comrade of ours; he came to visit us as such, and according to custom we invited him to dinner one after the other. He was a little younger than I; was my junior in the corps by two years. I do not remember his appearance, still less his character, and his manner was so dry and sententious for a young man of his age, a French officer, that I never had any inclination to make a friend of him. My knowledge of the forms of government, ancient and modern, was too limited to enable me to discuss with him this the favourite subject of his remarks. So when I invited him to dinner in my turn, which happened three or four times, I departed after the coffee, leaving him at issue with one of our captains, better able than myself to enter the lists with so redoubtable a champion. My comrades, like myself, thought his ideas absurd and pedantic. We even thought this professional tone meant nothing, until one day he argued so strongly upon the rights of nations in general, and *Stupete gentes* included even his own, that we were lost in astonishment, especially when he said, when speaking of the Corsican Estates, that it was not certain they would be convoked, that M. de Barrin desired to postpone their meeting, following in that the mistake of his predecessor, that 'it was very surprising M. de Barrin should wish to prevent them from deliberating about their

* "Souvenirs d'un Officier Royaliste," quoted by Masson.

interests,' adding, in a threatening tone : ' M. de Barrin does not know the Corsicans ; he will learn of what they are capable.' This remark revealed his character. One of my comrades replied : ' Would you draw your sword against the representative of the King ?' to which he made no reply.

" We separated coldly, and that was the last time that this former comrade honoured me by dining with me."

This letter exhibits the contemptuous attitude of the French officers towards the little conquered island. Napoleon's resentment, his hatred of them as aristocrats and as Frenchmen, was inevitable, what every Corsican in his place would have felt, and all but the few feeble spirits would have expressed. And he was naturally full of political ideas, questions as to the best form of government, which France had begun to discuss with eagerness and formed the dominant issue of the time. It was already a year since the Notables had met and been dispersed. His Royalist comrades were as naturally indifferent, or hostile to the consideration of these political matters.

Napoleon enjoyed for a short time the society of Joseph, arrived from Pisa with his degree, and then left on June 1, 1788, to rejoin his regiment.

(5) *Auxonne (June, 1788, to middle of September, 1789).*

The regiment of La Fère had been at Auxonne for six months when Napoleon joined it. He had been absent for no less a period than one year and nine months, and had as yet served only ten months with the colours. Although leave for long periods was easily obtained, the custom must have been somewhat stretched in the case of Napoleon. His home was across the seas in Corsica ; and he produced a medical certificate showing that he had been in poor health.

The commander of the Artillery School at Auxonne was Baron J. P. du Teil, a former Colonel of the regiment of La Fère, a man of ability, a capable disciplinarian, and not hostile to the new ideas. Under him the Artillery School at Auxonne became, in the words of Napoleon, "certainly one of the best, if not the very best, of its kind." He wrote afterwards that Du Teil was "an excellent artillery officer. . . . His school was the only one in which the officers tried to learn."

J. P. du Teil did not survive the winter of 1793-4, fatal to so many of France's best men. He was guillotined on February 22, 1794.

Writing from Auxonne to Fesch on August 22, 1788, Napoleon says: "I am indisposed; the great works which I have been directing these last days are the cause. You should know, my dear uncle, that the General here has taken me into such great consideration that he charged me to make at the polygon some constructions which required great calculation, and for ten days, morning and evening, at the head of 200 men, I have been busy. This unheard-of mark of favour has rather irritated the Captains, who declare that it is a slur upon them to entrust a Lieutenant with so essential a duty, and that when there are more than thirty men at work one of them ought to be there. My comrades also show a little jealousy, but that passes. What troubles me is my health, which is not too good."

He exaggerated his importance. Du Teil had nominated a commission of officers to report as to the feasibility of using cannon for the discharge of bombs. Experience in war had shown the inconvenience of having to wait before a fortress for the arrival of siege artillery, and several commissions of inquiry had already been held at Auxonne and elsewhere to report whether ordinary cannon could be employed with

effect in emergency. The commission to which Napoleon was nominated as the only Second Lieutenant included the Brigade-Major, the Professor of Mathematics, three Captains (one of them a bombardier), and three First Lieutenants (two bombardiers). Napoleon, being the junior, had to do most of the hard work and to draw up the report, which they all signed. A bombardier Second Lieutenant would naturally be chosen for this work. There were only four of them all told, and of these probably some were absent on leave. Napoleon may have been chosen because his First Lieutenant, Hennet de Vigneux, was on the list.

On January 12, 1789, he wrote to his mother: "My health, which is at last re-established, enables me to write you a long letter. This neighbourhood is very unhealthy by reason of the adjoining marshes, and the frequent inundations from the river, which fill all the ditches with water that exhales pestilential vapours. I have had for certain periods of time a continuous fever, which left me four days of repose and then returned. It has weakened me, has given me long periods of delirium, and has required a long convalescence. Now that the weather has improved, and the snow has disappeared with the ice, winds, and fogs, I am making visible progress. . . . I have had no news from Corsica since October." When Joseph did not write he got no letters from his island home.

Napoleon renewed his friendship with Desmazis, and found another congenial spirit in Gassendi, a Captain, a man of studious and literary tastes. The Napoleon of history exhibited plenty of military camaraderie, and it may be presumed that he was now on good terms with his brother officers; they were not, as at Bastia, in garrison on the conquered soil of his native land. It is believed that he saw a good deal of Lombard, the Professor of Mathematics. He may have been introduced to Mme. Lombard and to Mme. du

Teil, but there was little social distraction at Auxonne. One of his brother Lieutenants, De Cachard, afterwards spoke of "that miserable residence at Auxonne, where we did not know what to be at or how to pass our time." The surrounding country is flat and uninteresting.

When Napoleon had been nearly a year at Auxonne he had there his first actual experience of the Revolution. The mob at Seurre, a small town near Auxonne, murdered two merchants suspected of cornering grain. On April 2, 1789, Napoleon went there with a force from the regiment of La Fère; but the riots had nearly ceased by the time they arrived, and they had nothing of any importance to do, and went back to Auxonne after a few weeks. Then came the great historic events. On May 5 the States-General met at Versailles, the Session being opened by Louis XVI. in person. On June 17 the Third Estate called itself the National Assembly, passing over, without the sanction of the Crown, the two other Estates, which in law were each equal to the Third—a violently revolutionary proceeding. Three days later, finding their hall closed to prepare for a Royal Session, they made for the tennis-court, and swore together to establish a new Constitution. Then on July 11 Louis dismissed Necker; on the 12th the mob rose, broke open prisons, looted gun-shops; on the 14th the Bastille was attacked, the prisoners liberated, and the garrison murdered; on the next day Louis took back Necker, and agreed to remove his troops from Versailles, with the result that many Princes and nobles fled from France, in fear for their lives; on the 17th Louis publicly wore the revolutionary tricolour cockade.

These exciting occurrences in Paris assisted the disorder already reigning throughout France. On July 19 there was a riot at Auxonne; the mob sacked the offices of the receivers of taxes, and the regiment

of La Fère looked on with approval. Next day the keepers of the salt store were forced to sell salt at six sous the pound. On the 21st the officers of the regiment at last managed to get their men in hand, and quelled the tumult. Then on August 4 the National Assembly, at the instance of some excited and enthusiastic nobles and clergy, in a fit of hysterical enthusiasm, abolished, at one stroke, nearly all their privileges, destroying the remnants of the feudal system, and ruining both the nobility and clergy.

Four days later Napoleon asked for the usual winter leave for Corsica; and the request was forwarded by the inspector La Mortière to the Minister of War, La Tour du Pin, with the remark that Napoleon's leave was due, and that he ought to start in September, a favourable time for the voyage. The leave was granted as from September 15; but before that date serious events had occurred at Auxonne in his regiment. The soldiers marched in a body to the house of the Colonel, and demanded the money kept in the regimental cash-box for entertainments and similar expenses, which the Colonel thought it best to give them. They got drunk, tried to lynch an officer who opposed them, who was lucky to escape with his life; and forced all officers they met to drink with them and dance the farandole. When their excitement had subsided, the regiment was dispersed to various neighbouring points; but before that Napoleon and his brother officers, on August 23, had taken the oath required of all. It was as follows: "We swear to remain faithful to the nation, the King, and the law, and never to employ those under our orders against the citizens unless we are required to do so by the civil or municipal officers." Napoleon has left it on record that if he had received the order to fire on the mob he would not have hesitated to do so, in spite of this oath. Soon afterwards he left for Corsica.

Napoleon spent a consecutive fifteen months with his regiment at Auxonne, from June, 1788, to September, 1789. In a letter of his, July 8, 1789, he said: "I have no resource here but work. I change my dress only once a week. I sleep very little since my illness. It is incredible how little. I go to bed at ten, and rise at four in the morning. I have only one meal a day, which is very good for my health."

Nearly the whole of what he wrote at Auxonne has, fortunately, been preserved.

The total comes to 375 pages of Commendatore Biagi's reproduction. Most of this consists of notes of the books he was reading. As Napoleon was sixty-five weeks at Auxonne, what he wrote amounts to less than one page of print per diem. Even if some pages on artillery have been lost, it is not probable that he would spend as much as two hours a day to produce this total. It was not strenuous work.* Beyond what was required by his military duties, Napoleon had time to spare, and spent some of it taking notes in a leisurely manner. Many a young man, poor, well educated, with no possible distractions, has done precisely the same thing.

It has been contended that his preference for non-military subjects was due to a deliberate intention of qualifying himself to succeed Paoli as ruler of Corsica; or to his perception of the fact that knowledge of civil government is often of service to the commander of an army. In the same spirit, if he had read novels it would be said that he was qualifying to administer social laws and customs. He said afterwards that "he

* Masson, *op. cit.*, speaks of his "furious labour." Marcaggi, *op. cit.*, says that he was ruining his health by "overdriving the brain." Chuquet, *op. cit.*, says he was indulging in "assiduous, unnatural labour, destructive of the constitution." Colin, "L'Éducation Militaire de Napoléon," calls it "prodigious labour." It is hard to withstand the mesmeric lustre of the Imperial Diadem.

had a vague feeling that he had no time to lose." Many young men have an eager curiosity about everything and everybody, which there seems no prospect of ever satisfying, a desire to "take all knowledge for their province." Those who regard a thirst for knowledge without any definite, specific aim as so extraordinary, must have forgotten their own youth. Certainly it is not every young man who works at books in his spare time; but there always have been, and always will be, some examples in every society. It is by no means unique and wonderful. Much harder work is far from rare, at Napoleon's age.

Napoleon wrote in cahiers of folio size, and also on separate sheets. The orthography is bad. He was one of those persons who could not spell—a fatal disqualification in our day for entrance upon the career of an officer and gentleman. It has been conjectured that he wrote indistinctly in order to hide defects of spelling; but that can hardly be admitted. The writing is at its worst in the notes which are intended for his own eyes alone, and it is improbable he would intentionally make himself illegible to a correspondent. The writing is rather small; the pen touches but lightly and goes forward with a flowing sweep. There is an appearance of swift movement, of scorn for pedantic niceties of manner, and of indifference to rigid accuracy, in keeping with the character of the writer. When he was composing his own ideas he made frequent corrections and interlineations, but the note-taking is clean and unrevised. He did not go over his notes a second time.

Most of the books of which he took notes at Auxonne were borrowed from the local library, and had to be returned. He possessed a copy of Rollin, but the trunk full of books which Joseph tells us he took to Corsica contained for the most part French poets or

belles-lettres, not the history and geography that he was reading at Auxonne.

Comparison of Napoleon's notes with the text of his author reveals his manner of work. He read first an indefinite number of pages; then he turned back and began taking notes, with the text still before him. Sometimes, while writing the notes, he came across a passage which his first reading reminded him was elucidated or enlarged further on; when this occurred he would turn over a few pages, collate the two references in one note, and then go back again. That the addition was not made from memory, but while holding both pages open between his fingers, is shown by his copying the exact words from both passages.

His writings at Auxonne are arranged below in their chronological order, so far as it is now ascertainable. Here and there the date is in his own handwriting in the margin.

1. *Plato* : Republic. Translated by Grou. Pp. 3, in Biagi's reproduction.
2. *Rollin* (*Charles*) : Histoire ancienne. Pp. 48.
3. *Raynal* : Histoire des deux Indes. Pp. 5.
4. *Barrow* (*John*) : History of England from Julius Cæsar to 1763. Translated. Pp. 74.
5. Le Comte d'Essex (a story from Barrow). Pp. 4.
6. Projet de Constitution de la Calotte du Regiment de la Fère. Original. Pp. 12.
7. Dissertation sur l'Autorité Royale. Original. Less than half a page.
8. Histoire du Roi Frédéric II. Pp. 5½.
9. *Terray* (*Abbé*) : Mémoires. Pp. 3.
10. *De Tott* (*Baron François*) : Mémoires sur les Turcs et les Tartares. Pp. 7.
11. *Mirabeau* : Lettres de cachet. Pp. 6½.
12. *De Vallière* : Upon Artillery; from the Mémoires de l'Académie, Année 1772. Pp. 7½.

13. *Robins (Benjamin)*: New Principles of Gunnery, 1742. Translated. Pp. 12.
14. *Suvirez de Saint Rémy*: Mémoires d'Artillerie. Pp. 9.
15. L'espion Anglais, ou correspondance secrète entre milord All Eye et milord All Ear, 1784. Pp. 23.
16. *Buffon*: Histoire naturelle. Pp. 35.
17. Mémoire sur la manière de disposer les canons par le jet des bombes. Pp. 6.
18. *Marigny*: Histoire des Arabes sous le Gouvernement des Califes, 1750. Vols. 4. Pp. 15.
19. Le masque prophète (a story from Marigny). Pp. 2.
20. *Amelot de la Houssaie*: Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise. Pp. 11.
21. *Necker*: Rapport, May 5, 1789. Pp. 5½.
22. Notes about Slavery and Wilberforce. Pp. 3.
23. Lettres sur la Corse. Original. Pp. 48 (in their revised form).
24. *Mably*: Observations sur l'Histoire de France. Pp. 11½.
25. *Lacroix*: Géographie moderne. Pp. 8.
26. *Nouvelle Corse*: Original. Pp. 8.
27. Letter to Giubega about Corsica. Pp. 2½.

He gave to English History (Barrow, Wilberforce, a story) 81 pages; to Ancient History (Rollin, Raynal, De Tott, Marigny, a story) 72 pages; to France and French History (Terray, Mirabeau, Espion Anglais, Necker, Mably) 49½ pages; to Natural History and Geography (Buffon, Lacroix) 43 pages; to Venice (Amelot de la Houssaie) 11 pages; to Frederick the Great 5½ pages; to Plato 3 pages. He also wrote 58½ pages on Corsica, 34½ on Artillery, 12 on La Calotte. How far this division of his time was intentional we cannot tell, as we do not know what were the resources of the library to which he had access; but it is interesting to observe that

England and the East were the chief subjects, then Corsica.

Let us turn to the originals of some of these pieces and follow his analysis. His notes on Plato begin :

"Cephale est un sage vieillard et riche. Il définit la justice ; dire la vérité, ne tromper personne et rendre à chacun ce que l'on en a reçu. Il avance que le principale avantage des richesses est de mettre dans le cas de ne rien devoir et de ne tromper personne."

"Polémarque, son fils, soutient le sentiment de son père. Socrate lui observe que si un homme confiait ses armes à un ami, ce serait un mauvais service de les lui rendre s'il devenait furieux. L'on ne peut donc définir la justice rendre à chacun ce que l'on en a reçu."

The first sentence is Napoleon's summary of the first ten pages of Grou's translation. The remainder is based upon p. 11. It is full of inaccuracies.

It was not Cephalus who defined justice ; he spoke only of the advantage of wealth. He did not speak of returning to each what one has received, but of not being compelled to cheat. Socrates did not address Polemarchus when speaking of the loan of arms ; he was still speaking to Cephalus. Polemarchus did not support his father, who had not advanced the proposition ; he contradicted Socrates. Only a careless reader would have so mistaken the character of Cephalus, and confused his remarks about the advantage of wealth with what Socrates said concerning a definition of justice.

Napoleon did not get further than the 29th page out of the 480 pages of Grou's translation. His last notes are as follows :

"Socrate. Les arts commandent à leurs sujets. Aucun art n'a donc pour but l'intérêt du plus fort, mais au contraire de leur sujet, ou du plus faible. Le médecin, en tant que médecin, ne se propose ni-

n'ordonne ce qui est à son avantage, mais ce qui est à l'avantage du malade. Le vrai pilote n'est pas matelot, mais chef, et n'ordonnera donc que l'avantage de ses sujets, les matelots. Tout homme qui gouverne ne se propose pas, en ce qu'il ordonne, son intérêt, mais celui des sujets."

The whole of this passage is in the exact words of the text; a sentence is copied as it stands, then some unnecessary dialogue matter is omitted, another substantive sentence taken, and so on.

Napoleon's notes on Plato are disappointing. At first inaccurate, then a mere copyist, he soon tires of his subject.

This unexpected and unfavourable impression is confirmed by his other notes. With every appearance of precision, they are careless and inaccurate.

His figures, for which he has an obsession, are too often incorrect. He writes that at the Battle of Timbrun Cyrus had 180,000 men, whereas his author Rollin says 196,000. When Rollin speaks of "environ cent trente ans après Lycurgue," Napoleon writes "cent cinquante." His account of the numbers of Xerxes' host contains several errors. He says that the fleet consisted of 1,200 warships, carrying each 200 men, making 277,600 men, whereas the number would be 240,000. Rollin says 1,207 ships carried 230 each, making 277,600. Napoleon says the European ships were 100; but Rollin's figure is 120.

He says that Cyrus the younger "partit de Sarde avec 100,000 hommes d'infanterie barbares et 10,000 grecs et quelques cavaliers." But Rollin says in two places that the Greeks were 13,000; and that their numbers were reduced by the long, perilous journey, and the great battle against enormous odds, to 10,000 when they began their famous retreat. Napoleon wilfully insists that they were only 10,000 when they marched forth with Cyrus, and that their numbers

were undiminished by all their fatigues and battles until they started back.

Raynal says the Portuguese discovered Madeira in 1419; Napoleon writes 1418. Raynal says the Portuguese obtained in precious metals from Japan "pour quatorze à quinze millions de livres"; Napoleon writes "14 ou 16 millions."

He says the Armada was composed of "cent cinquante vaisseaux," whereas the text says 130. When his author says that the Scotch lost "about 12,000" men at Falkirk, Napoleon wilfully writes 13,000. There are many other examples of inaccuracy in figures.

He notes some puerile matters simply because they have figures attached to them. "Alcibiade avait un chien qui lui coûtait 3,500 livres. . . ." "Les pierres qui brillaient sur la personne du Roi dans une guerre, montaient à 36 millions. . . ." "Milon mangea un bœuf de quatre ans après l'avoir porté la longueur du stade. Vingt livres de viande, autant de pain, quinze pintes de vin étaient sa nourriture."

From Marigny: "L'on dit que Soliman mangeait 100 livres de viande par jour. . . ." "Hescham avait 10,000 chemises, 2,000 ceintures, 4,000 chevaux, 700 terres dont deux rapportaient 10,000 dragmes. . . ." "L'on prétend que Motassem avait dans ses écuries 130,000 chevaux."

He enjoys writing down obvious impossibilities in figures. "Athénée dit que le trésor de Sardanapale consistait en mille myriades de talents d'or, ce qui fait 300,000,000,000 livres, et en 300,000,000,000 de livres en argent."

His notes on the "Espion Anglais" begin: "Louis XIV. se releva jusqu'à trois fois la nuit qui précéda la disgrâce du duc de Choiseul." The *trois* is the magnet. If the original had said that Louis had passed a restless night, no note would have been

taken. Further, a characteristic note : " Sur le chemin de Paris à Versailles, il y a eu continuellement vingt mille chevaux en course."

On one page there are forty different figures, relating to all sorts of subjects—ships, sailors, pawn-broking, playwrights, theatre boxes, actors, Voltaire, America, a law-suit. The nature of these notes forces one to the conclusion that they were selected solely because of the opportunity they afforded of copying down figures, and not for any inherent interest. If the information had been imparted without figures, Napoleon would have ignored it.

He has also a passion for names. When he comes to the description in Rollin of the geography of Greece, Napoleon writes down several whole pages consisting of nothing but names, thus : "*La Macédonie*. Épidame, Apollonie, Pella capitale, Égée, Édesse, Pallène, Olynthe, Torone, Acanthe, Thessalonique; Stagire, patrie d'Aristote, Amphipolis, Philippes," and so on.

From de Tott's "Turks and Tartars" his first page has : "Cette zone contient le Yetitchékoulé, le Dziam-boylouk, le Yedesan, et la Bessarabie. . . ." "Chirine, Mansour, Sedjond, Arguin et Baroum sont les cinq familles. Celle de Kondalak est la sixième." The next page contains the following : Mirza Capikouly, Kam Mingli - Gueray, Noguais, Séraskiers, Calga, Acmet-Chid, Bactché-seraï, Cafā, Nouradin, Alabey, Ouloukani.

His notes on the "History of England" contain a double page covered with the names of the Heptarchy Kings. Beginning with Wessex, we have : "Cerdic, Cynric, Ceawlin, Ceobric, Ceolwulf, Cinegils, Cenwold, Sexburga, femme, Escwine, Centwine, Coeadwalla," and so on.

An average page of Biagi's reproduction contains, not counting familiar terms such as "les Arabes, Syrie, Mecque," the following exotics : Déhac, Moavias,

Mervan, Déhac, Abdallah, Couffah, Mervan, Mervan, Mokthar, Soliman, Abdallah, Abdalmelek, Obeidallah, Mossab, Abdallah, Couffah, Amrou-ebn-Said, Damas, Abdalmelek, Abdallah, Mossab, Hégiage, Abdallah, Abdallah, Aboubekre, Saleh, Schebid, Mésopotamie, Schébid, Couffah, Hégiage, Tigre, Abdarrahan, Hégiage, Couffah. Here are nineteen different names, which, with their repetitions, amount to thirty-five transcriptions. Every seventh word that he writes on this page is a queer-looking name.

It cannot have been mere boyish amusement at these eccentric spellings that caused them to be copied in such numbers. Napoleon must have imagined that it helped him to get on terms with his subject, that when he had written down Amrou-ben-Al-As he had somehow become intimate with Arab life.

There is also this to be said—the insatiable hunger and the bounding vitality of youth produce a feeling that the whole of every subject may be acquired, and therefore that all knowledge, even of names only, should be picked up. The desire to understand everything completely and entirely may go so far as to cause the writing down of incomprehensible, senseless matter, from a confident feeling that it may be absorbed in some way. At least, it is quite inconceivable that a mature man could have copied down so many figures and names.

With all his show of accuracy, Napoleon is—incredible as it may seem—indifferent to facts and contemptuous of truth. Marigny relates that Hadi sent his mother a poisoned egg, which she abstained from tasting; that soon afterwards he died suddenly “after drinking a glass of water”; and that “most historians agree that his mother had some part in his death.” Napoleon writes that it was his mother who sent Hadi the poisoned egg. If he was bent upon writing down something about a poisoned egg, he could have done

so while following the text. This example provides a most important and interesting commentary on the character of the writer. He will have things in the way that he prefers. He is a misogynist, and makes the mother send her son the poisoned egg because he preferred the story that way—against the woman.

His notes on the "History of England" contain the following :

"1424. Bataille de Verneuil, 5,000 Écossais ou Français restèrent sur le champ de bataille.

"1428. Siège d'Orléans.

"1432. Mort du duc de Bedford."

Napoleon hated the French and was antagonistic to women. Therefore, out of all the numerous pages given by his author to one of the most important periods of Anglo-French history, and to one of the most dramatic episodes and characters in all history, he notes only the number of Scots and French killed in a battle, and the fact that there was a siege of the town of Orleans, omitting all mention of the marvellous and immortal woman, Jeanne d'Arc; and he concludes with an incorrect date—1432 for 1435.

His English notes show him anti-feminine, anti-French (he gloats over the figures of French dead at Crécy, Poitiers, Agincourt), anti-clerical (he always puts the clergy in the wrong, and searches for individual cases of profligacy), and anti-monarchical.

To read history in the light of these opinions is one thing; wilfully to pervert the facts related is a totally different matter. He asserts, for instance, in spite of what Barrow says, that the Royalists were defeated at Edgehill. He says, "Tandis que l'on vint à pourparler d'un accommodement, le Roi surprit plusieurs places, ce qui rompit entièrement toute négociation;" whereas Barrow distinctly states that the King did not countenance, nor take advantage of, the overtures which emanated from the other side. He writes; "Le

celèbre Blood avait servi dans l'armée de Cromwell. Il avait assassiné le duc d'Ormond et procuré de voler les bijoux de la couronne. Par adresse il se fit pardonner et devint confident du Roi." He has invented the killing of Ormond, who was kidnapped only, in order to throw greater odium upon the King, who took Blood as his favourite. His notes on history are warped by prejudice, and cannot be regarded as the work of an honest seeker after truth.

His notes are very young sometimes. He writes down that Abdalmelek "had a breath so pestilential that the flies which rested on his lips fell off dead. . . ." "Yésid, while amusing himself in throwing grapes into the mouth of the beautiful Hababah, suffocated her," and then "watched over her body for eight days, and finally died of sorrow."

He is attracted by cruelties and murders. He writes down the details of the tortures practised by the Persians, and dwells on the murders perpetrated by Cambyzes and Darius; he copies out the tortures inflicted on Sogdien, what horrors Parysatis committed, the cruelties of Statira, and the clever way in which she was ultimately poisoned. From Marigny he notes that Abdallah, after crowning his nephew Aboul-Abbas-Saffah (an enticing name to copy out), attacked and killed the Ommiades, and "covered their bodies with planks, on which he had his dinner."

He devotes the greater part of his notes on Buffon's "Natural History" to the male and female factors in generation. He also constructs from Buffon a table of the expectation of life. His notes on Buffon and on Lacroix's Geography are impartial, and therefore intelligent and interesting—very different from the history notes. One entry from Lacroix, the very last of them all, catches the eye. It is as follows: "Ste. Hélène, petite île." Strange coincidence that he should have stopped there.

One subject he is always interested in. He takes every opportunity to note down the political Governments of the various countries. The great question for him is the hereditary element. He begins a number of notes headed "Gouvernement de l'empire de Perse" by asking whether the Government was despotic, and proceeds to explain its constitution, noting that the judges were hereditary, but the people had prescribed privileges, and so on. He has several pages of observations and notes under the heading "Athènes. Notions sur son Gouvernement," beginning with "Le premier roi est toujours le premier homme de son peuple. La cause qui l'éleva au-dessus de ses semblables doit l'y maintenir, et son autorité a toujours été plus absolue que celle de ses successeurs, jusqu'à ce que la corruption introduisant dans le Gouvernement la religion prêchée par des hommes rendus, ait enfin fait oublier aux hommes leur dignité et les causes premières de l'institution de tout gouvernement. Alors le despotisme élève sa tête hideuse et l'homme dégradé, perdant sa liberté et son énergie, ne sent plus en lui que des goûts dépravés." Derived from Rousseau, this is his political creed, and he searches his authorities for confirmation of it.

Under the heading "Lacédémone, Gouvernement" he notes: "Il y avait des magistrats, mais le peuple ne les croyait pas despots et ne regardait pas leur personne comme sacrée. Tantôt, dit l'historien, le gouvernement devenait despotique par l'empire que l'habileté des rois savait se donner, tantôt le peuple s'emparait de toute l'autorité et la démocratie régnait." He is always preoccupied with the problems of democracy and despotism. He praises Lycurgus for having divided the land equally among all, observing, "Point d'égalité, point de démocratie."

Of Carthage he observes: "Leurs guerres, les

differentes branches de leur commerce sont connues et les détails de leur administration, c'est à dire la partie la plus interessante et la plus instructive, est presque ignorée. Y avait il des patriciens ou une noblesse héréditaire? Composaient-ils le Sénat par loi du sang? Par le choix seul du peuple rendu sénat même? Voilà ce qu'il nous est impossible de pénétrer." He then proceeds to write out what was the Governmental system from the pages of Rollin; but he thinks very little of importance is known so long as it is not stated whether there was an hereditary nobility. Rollin says that the Senate was selected from among those who by their age, experience, birth, wealth, and, above all, merit, were respected. This Napoleon thinks superficial and unsatisfactory.

It would have been strange if he had not been interested in political Constitutions, the dominant subject of thought at that time. Violent hostility to the prerogatives of the King, nobles, and clergy was being shown on every side. No man could avoid giving some attention to the subject.

Many of the remarks which have been supposed to be original are copied from the text. When Napoleon says: "Féroces et lâches, les Français joignirent aux vices des Germains ceux des Gaulois," he is copying the words of his author, Mably. His note with regard to the enforced labour on the Great Pyramid, "Quel cas doit on faire d'un peuple qui souffrait une tyrannie pareille," is not, as has been supposed, an original exclamation of indignation, but is copied verbatim out of Rollin. His remark, "La seule raison qui fit succomber Annibal et mit fin à ses brillants succès en Italie fut le défaut de recrues," has, strangely, been regarded as a proof of extraordinary perception. It is to be found, word for word, in Rollin. When he notes that "Herodotus says," etc., he has not, as has lightly been assumed,

gone to Herodotus, but is copying the words from his author.

Napoleon's own contributions are confined to political discussions, except the following instance, which occurs in his notes on Rollin, apropos of the struggle between Sparta and Athens. He says: "There are two ways in which a nation may attain to great power: a great equality, frugality, wisdom, courage, permanent institutions, principles supported with vigour, and, above all, a great contempt for riches. Rome, Sparta, Croton, Persia, have arrived by this way.

"A flourishing commerce, sustained with intelligence, and encouraged by great liberty, encourages shipping, increases population, enriches the citizens, fills the public treasury, and furnishes inexhaustible resources. In this case the principal aim should be to encourage a great activity of circulation. Arts, sciences, monuments, appear to be particularly the resort of these Governments, although they have not been able to reach the summits even there. Tyre, Carthage, Athens, Sybaris, Syracuse, etc.

"Experience has often enough shown that when peoples of this second class have had a quarrel with the first, they have nearly always been conquered, because war ruins their commerce, consumes them unperceived, while the others become inured to war, are strengthened by it, and are so to speak in their element, provided the war is not upon their own territory, because they have no other source of supply."

In the "Souper de Beaucaire," written nearly five years later, he has still the same idea. He is speaking to a citizen of Marseilles, at the time when the city was in revolt against the Convention.* "Leave it to the poor countries to fight to their last gasp; the inhabitant of the Vivarais, the Cevennes, Corsica, has

* See the complete passage, *infra*, p. 299.

no fear for the issue of a fight : if he wins he has accomplished his aim ; if he loses, he has the same position for making peace as before.

“ But you ! Lose a battle, and the fruit of a thousand years of toil, struggles, economies, good fortune, become the prey of the soldier.”

He thought that Carthage was defeated by Rome, and Athens by Sparta, and that Marseilles would not be able to withstand *sans-culotte* soldiers, because wealth and maritime commerce are a disadvantage in war. For the same reason he thought that France had a permanent advantage in her contest with the Nation of Shopkeepers, and was quite content that it should continue indefinitely, confident that the conditions were against the commercial nation.

These remarks also explain how he was so slow to realize the extent of the blows that France received at Moscow and Vittoria. He thought that, so long as the war was on enemy's soil, defeats could not be serious, nor could the drain of war be felt. War on enemy's territory could be made to sustain itself, without causing any serious loss to France even when defeats came.

These ideas he had already acquired at the age of nineteen from his reading of history. They contain a solid basis of truth ; but he was led by them to persistence in war, and to distant adventures, which brought down the Empire.

It is evident, from the character of the items that Napoleon copied into his notebooks, that he did not aim at an abstract of all the important matter. His conscience was satisfied when he had copied out a quantity of figures and names. At the same time, there is a significance in his omissions which cannot be ignored.

His notes about Cyrus omit the whole of the thirty pages which Rollin gives to the siege and capture of

Babylon, and also the twenty-eight pages of Rollin describing the "celebrated Edict of Cyrus," and the career and prophecies of Daniel.

Of the conquests of Cambyses Napoleon says nothing; he copies out at unnecessary length the details of some of his murders, and says no more about him.

His notes of Darius are of the same kind, confined to trivialities and cruelties. He omits all mention of the expedition against Greece, and all Rollin's description of Athens, of the characters of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides, of the Persian defeat at Marathon. But when Rollin makes what he calls a digression concerning the Scythians, Napoleon copies out a long page of notes about the cannibalism and other savage customs of these barbarians.

He cannot really have supposed that it was more important to note that the Scythians drank out of the skulls of their slain enemies than to learn about the Marathon campaign; but the fact remains that he notes barbaric orgies, and leaves out one of the greatest events in history, to which Rollin gives ample notice.

Xerxes he treats in the same way. He details a cruel act of Xerxes, makes a long and inaccurate note concerning the numbers that were collected for the Grecian expedition, and that is all. Of Rollin's 114 pages describing the movement of the Persian forces, the Grecian preparations to meet it, the fight at Thermopylæ and death of Leonidas, the naval fight of Artemisium, the abandonment of Athens and its burning by Xerxes, of the historic combats at Salamis, Plataea, Mycale—of all this not a word. Instead, he describes the mutilations which the wife of Xerxes caused to be perpetrated upon her sister-in-law.

Rollin devotes 173 pages to the period covered by the reign of Artaxerxes. Napoleon details the physical performances of Milon the athlete, and describes the

tortures by which a son of Artaxerxes was put to death, and the cruelties perpetrated by the wife of Artaxerxes; he gives the figures as to the wealth of Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and the geographical names of the various divisions that supported Sparta or Athens; he says that Pericles built the Parthenon. He omits all other mention of Artaxerxes and Pericles; does not notice Themistocles and Cimon, and the important events with which their names are connected; ignores all the early years of the Peloponnesian war, which come under the reign of Artaxerxes.

Of Socrates, to whom Rollin gives seventy-three pages, Napoleon takes no notice whatever.

He treats Marigny's "History of the Arabs" in similar fashion. He notes that the poet Caab presented Mahomet with some verses which the latter covered over with his cloak; that the Califs 600 years later clothed themselves with the cloak in days of ceremony; that a Calif paid 20,000 drachmas for it after the death of Caab. This unimportant anecdote attracted Napoleon's eye, because it was in a note, in italics, and contained some figures—for him three magnets. But he leaves out all that his author tells about Mahomet founding a new religion; about his joining Pagans, Jews, and the various sects of Christians under his banner; about his establishing a central Government as well as a single religion. Of the pages Marigny gives to the religion itself, and to the meaning of Mahometanism, Napoleon takes no notice whatever. He has not even observed the militant aspect of Mahomet's creed. Marigny says that Mahomet, after a serious defeat, when it seemed that his cause was hopelessly lost, gathered followers to his flag by insisting upon the doctrine of predestination. He asserted that no man could prolong his days beyond the hour that Heaven had decreed; conse-

quently, if he was killed in battle, it was ordained beforehand that he should die at that time, so he might as well die a martyr to the faith, and if he killed an enemy, he would be worthy of Paradise. It was this comforting doctrine which enabled Mahomet to suppress all opposition, and which has been the chief factor in all the conquests of his followers in various parts of the world. The Mahometan religion is a battle factor of great value. In passing it by without a single word Napoleon is leaving out the Prince of Denmark.

Of the Koran he says no more than of the Caabah. Having noted that Caabah means "square house," he observes that Koran means "*the* book." That is enough for him. He omits all Marigny's description of the Bible of the Mahometans, of its tenets, its importance, and the manner in which it was produced. He has got a translation of the word, the title; he is indifferent to the significance and importance of the subject.

His other historical notes are in the same manner, omitting many important matters, and stuffing the sheets with figures, names, and criminalities.

The man who is supposed to have been ruining his health by the feverish assiduity of his application, and with the discerning power of genius extracting the very pith and marrow of each book in turn, was, in fact, behaving in a very different manner.

He wrote at the leisurely rate of less than a page a day. He seldom went far with any book, usually throwing it down long before the end. His method of note-taking was to copy down :

1. Political details, particularly as to the prerogatives of Kings and nobles and the hereditary principle.

2. Figures, however palpably absurd and unimportant; they conferred an aspect of precision even when copied incorrectly.

3. Names—perhaps because they gave an appearance of familiar knowledge, especially when the spellings were exceptionally uncouth.

4. Murders, cruelties, tortures, with full details.

5. Puerile stories.

6. Words in italics.

For the sake of much trumpery and childish, or merely spectacular, matter, he omitted events of the greatest importance in the history of the world.

A modern youth of Napoleon's age would not regard his method of note-taking as serious work at all, except his natural history and geography notes and his political observations. This general conclusion may be unpalatable, but it must not be shirked. An able writer on Napoleon's military education,* after quoting half a page of figures from Napoleon's notes on Frederick the Great, furnishes the following comment and explanation: "At first sight, if we suppose that these notes represent the most interesting part of the book for the man who wrote them, it might be alleged that he felt the most absolute indifference with regard to military operations; but then we should also have to consider him a puerile statistician. The man who, in a book dealing in an intelligent manner with political and military operations, is interested only in such figures as those we have cited, could certainly not be regarded as possessed of a superior intelligence. We are thus warned, by this simple observation, that the figures copied by Buonaparte *could not have been*" (the italics are Colin's) "for him the most interesting part of the book, but merely that part of it that it was impossible to store in the memory, and which had to be written down. . . . It does not follow that because Napoleon took notes in the 'Life of Frederick II.' only of figures and names that he was not interested in anything else."

* Colin, "L'Éducation Militaire de Napoléon," 1901, p. 156.

With much respect, this is unsound. The idea that whenever Napoleon is not visibly and obviously inspired, he must be assumed to have been in regions of thought far removed from ordinary mortals, which it would be impious and foolish to attempt to understand, is most deplorable, and cannot be too strongly deprecated. The tendency to regard Napoleon as one of the gods is a superstition unworthy of the present age. He was a man, and therefore liable to man's stupidities, frivolities, and other failings. What would be puerile statistics in another are still puerile statistics in Napoleon.

If we are to suppose that he noted only those things which he could not store in the memory, it would follow that he could remember most of the figures with regard to the expedition of Darius, but not those concerning the invasion of Xerxes; the details of Marathon, Thermopylæ, Salamis, but not those of Crécy, Poitiers, Agincourt. And it would follow that he noted tortures, tyrannical acts, trivial occurrences, because he found it impossible to carry these things accurately in the mind.

We see the Emperor in these notes. He was nineteen and twenty when he was writing them, and there is no substantial change in mental habits after that period. Here he is, counting up the numbers of the opposing armies, and noting their relative positions. His rivals and opponents imagined they were doing the same, but allowed themselves finally to be distracted by other things. But his exaggerated display of figures and his frequent inaccuracy prepare us for the Emperor's excessive reliance upon arithmetical estimates, a show of exactness which covered sometimes a neglect of the vital facts of the situation.

He is not master of his passions: he writes that a man's mother killed him by means of a poisoned egg because he is anti-feminine, and prefers the story

against the woman ; he makes his hero win a battle which the text tells him he lost. This wilfulness grew with power, and was in the end fatal to him.

He seldom had the patience to get to the end of a subject. Just as at Auxonne he would begin one book long before he had finished the previous one, so he began a Russian campaign before the Spanish was nearly over, unable to resist the novelty.

His tendency to show off his acquaintance with a remote subject by glibly citing an appropriate name was a dangerous one, which ended in his imagining he knew more than he did.

He gaily ignored whatever failed to attract him at the moment, regardless of its importance.

These writings furnish a new light on some aspects of his character. That relentless, brutal pursuer of facts, for instance, does he stand where he did ? Is it not plain that he selected for record only those statements which agreed with his opinions ? His notes on natural history and geography are of a different nature ; he is a student of these subjects, he is informing himself in the ordinary manner concerning matters of which he is ignorant.

But of his history notes, the greater part of his work, it has to be said that, where he was not childish, or sensational, he was either indifferent and contemptuous, or prejudiced. There is throughout a singular detachment ; the young Corsican is observing the world from without, as an islander who has no part or lot with it. Except when he is reading about the other island, England, or is observing the defects of monarchical government, or is exposing the vices of the clergy, he never seems to be interested. His notes remind one of the Emperor's habit of asking interminable personal questions of those who were presented to him. He paid very little attention to the answers he received, condescension had gone far enough in

making the inquiries. This was his attitude towards the human race. It was that of a self-centred, insular egotist. He was so entirely absorbed in his own personality that his history notes are, in the main, colourless, indifferent, trivial, even puerile, except occasionally when his prejudices are aroused; then he turns the facts to suit his desire.

At Auxonne Napoleon wrote out a Constitution for the Calotte of his regiment.

The Calotte was a society, existing in every regiment of the French Army, composed of the Lieutenants only. It met from time to time to authorize the senior Lieutenant to protest against some infraction of their privileges, some tyrannical act on the part of a superior officer; or to rebuke and punish one of themselves for conduct unworthy of an officer, generally on a point of honour, or of politeness to a brother officer or to a lady. Abuses gradually crept in, until the institution became little more than a sanction to the senior Lieutenant to bully an unpopular fellow Lieutenant. Intended as a means of withstanding oppression and of teaching good manners, it had become an instrument of tyranny.

Soon after Napoleon's arrival at Auxonne the first important events of the Revolution took place. The Estates of Dauphiné met, decided that their Third Estate should be equal to the Nobility and Clergy combined, and declared they would not consent to any taxes but those levied by the States-General of France, and a meeting of those States was convened for May 1, 1789. These events were the one topic of discussion in France, and must have been a common subject of conversation even among the King's officers. Constitution-building and the suggestion of laws to prevent tyranny were not unusual mental exercises for active-minded men. It was doubtless Napoleon who proposed that a written constitution should be made out for the

Calotte, the only democratic institution in the army, so that its original purpose should be the better secured. The energetic young Corsican offered to undertake the task, and he was given, for the sake of appearance, two uninterested coadjutors, who merely approved whatever he chose to write. The paper was read before the Calotte, convoked for the purpose by the senior Lieutenant. Napoleon absented himself. De Cachard says: "We discussed the report in the gay manner customary to young men of our age. I noticed that our pleasantries annoyed Chevalier Desmazis, the intimate friend of the author, who suddenly seized the manuscript and threw it in the fire, saying it was only a joke which had lasted long enough." The original draft, and a copy made at the time, both survived the fire. The young officers were quite unable to regard Napoleon's constitution, with its Infalibles and Grand Master of Ceremonies, as a matter to be discussed with seriousness, and thought Napoleon eccentric for taking so much trouble for nothing. They had no intention of making themselves ridiculous by adopting any of Napoleon's suggestions; whereas he was in earnest, and would actually have established his constitution and its officials.

PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CALOTTE OF THE REGIMENT OF LA FÈRE.

GENTLEMEN,

You have charged us to draw up the principal points of the Constitution of the Calotte. We are anxious to prove ourselves worthy of your confidence and we now submit to your profound wisdom the ideas which our desire for public order have inspired in us.

Gentlemen, there are some constitutive laws which cannot be ignored. They rest directly upon the nature of the primitive pact. To develop them must be our first object.

There are laws which are not fundamental. They are capable of being destroyed by a unanimity of suffrages. These, Gentlemen, will expose to us the nature of the authority of the most ancient (*plus ancien**) lieutenant.

Then as we enter upon the details of the form to be given to the administration we shall denote what authority you should devolve upon the Chief and upon the Infallibles, to avoid both the inconvenience of anarchy and the abuse of arbitrary power.

The police of your assemblies, and the forms of procedure to be adopted, will bring us to speak of and discuss with you the institution of a Grand Master of the Ceremonies, and thus terminate the glorious but difficult task which you have imposed upon us.

Happy shall we be if our work succeeds in deserving your approval, if it proves to be of some public utility.

ARTICLE I.

Primitive Nature of the Calotte and its Constitutive Laws.

Gentlemen, our ordinances prescribe a blind obedience to our superior officers. That has given birth to the friendly tribunal of the Calotte. The necessity for common defence was the first cause of the creation of the tribunal, and the first good it did was to make the chiefs respect the young men, young no doubt, but imbued with the precepts of honour and not yet degraded by the fury of ambition, and yielding to none in any corps in feelings of loyalty.

To be respected it was necessary to be redoubtable, and thus it soon began to be felt necessary to submit to the general decision those individual cases of rebellious refusals which were injurious to the general welfare. By what strange fatality has so advantageous a constitution become the instrument of the fantasies of individuals? By what fatality has that which was imagined only for the advantage of all become, in many corps, the source of the most unpardonable vexations? Behold, Gentlemen, how man corrupts all

* The translation is literal in order to distinguish *plus ancien* from *ancien* further on.

things ! This is how the world languishes to-day in slavery !

Gentlemen, you will see when reflecting upon this exposition that the Calotte should be made up of all those who have the rank of lieutenant. It would be a mistake to attempt to reduce the prerogatives of some of the members : all are equal, all are animated by concern for the corps, all should have a voice in the deliberations. The date of a commission, seniority in rank, should be regarded as puerile distinctions. All those who share equally the danger should share equally the honours. At the same time this general principle may be susceptible of some minor exceptions.

ARTICLE 2.

Fundamental Laws.

The Laws which are based upon the nature of the pact are constitutive laws. No legislator, no authority, can derogate from them. We admit only one such—that is the law of Equality amongst the members who compose the Calotte.

The Laws which arise from the relations of the various bodies to each other are what we call fundamental Laws. Of such is the institution which confers on the most ancient lieutenant the dignity of the Chief of the Calotte. Always all persons, however foreign to your Assembly, have been accustomed to regard the most ancient lieutenant as your Chief. That has become consecrated through a long sequence of years. You could not then deprive him of it without doing him the greatest wrong. For that reason it would first be necessary to prove he was utterly incompetent, which could only be done by a unanimous vote.

Gentlemen, we distinguish two kinds of Chiefs of the Calotte ; the first lieutenant chief of the Calotte, and the most ancient lieutenant chief of the Calotte. The first lieutenant chief of the Calotte cannot be deposed except by the grand assemblies in which all the Calottins are present. The most ancient lieutenant chief of the Calotte may be deposed by the particular Calotte over which he presides.

ARTICLE 3.

Of the Authority of the Chief of the Calotte and of the Infallibles.

Every government must have a chief, and we have just shown that the most ancient lieutenant is ex-officio the chief of the Calotte. All the authority given to the executive powers is derived from him. The right of convoking the Assembly, of presiding over it, of representing it on all occasions, the duty of upholding our interests and the respect which is our due: the right of taking steps in relation thereto, of speaking in our name without being specially authorized, and in unforeseen contingencies, cannot be denied him. He is for each separate individual the spokesman of public opinion. Night has for him no darkness; he must not be ignorant of anything which might compromise your rank and uniform.

The piercing cry of the eagle, the hundred heads of Argus,* would scarcely suffice him for a satisfactory discharge of all his obligations, or the duties imposed upon him. If ever, Gentlemen, he were to sleep as did the Argus, it would be necessary to subject him to the same fate, and to be armed with the sword of the law. His elevated post makes him only the more accountable for his conduct. The Law recognizes no human honours. Gentlemen, you doubtless recommend your members to show him always the greatest respect; you will repress the passion and straining of your eloquent and often worthy orators. But we are not slow to appreciate their vehement complaints. They represent Liberty about to succumb under the weight of the colossal authority of the Chief.

His rights, and his authority, can hardly be extended too far so long as he is faithful to the spirit of the law; but if ever he attempted to go beyond it, if ever, Gentlemen, contrary to the spirit of the society, the Chief mixed himself in matters contrary to the public interest; if ever by that spirit of partiality which so often characterizes men in office, he annoyed one in order to oblige another; if ever, forgetting the constitutive Laws, he refused to convoke the Assembly in spite of

* Argus had a hundred eyes, not heads.

the requisition of one or more members, we ought to have the power of controlling him without falling into the chaos of anarchy. Establish two Infallibles. Give them the power when they are in agreement, to object, with the formula: "We oppose in the name of the Chamber the project which you entertain as being useless or inadvisable." Give them the power of convoking the Assembly if the first lieutenant absolutely refuses. Give to each Infallible the power of proposing a vote of censure upon the Chief without running any risk, and you may rest assured that, by means of their action, your constitution is for ever secure.

Who will you appoint to fill the important posts of the Infallibles? Will you name the two lieutenants next below the first? We need not reopen the wounds which are still bleeding. Too near to the throne they would share its desire for the establishment of a despotism. Bound together by their long acquaintance, separated by their age from the bulk of the Assembly, they would be all the less suited to act as its defenders. These reasons will doubtless decide us to call to fill these positions the ancient first lieutenant and the most ancient second lieutenant. By this means the two orders which compose the Republic will be joined together, will have more reasons to be accommodating, and will each have its spokesman to express its opinion. You will not then have any more reason, Gentlemen, to fear that an interest contrary to your own may unite them. Besides, it is indispensable to give a certain preponderance to the ancient lieutenant, that he may early begin to acquire the difficult art of governing with equity. You feel that it is indispensable to give a certain dignity to the first second lieutenant who, being a member of the deputation engaged in discussions with other bodies, participating in dangers should participate in honours.

ARTICLE 4.

Police of the Assemblies.

The Chief of the Calotte who alone can convoke the Assembly will announce the hour and the place. He

will endeavour, if possible, to choose the hour most convenient for the Calottins. If he frequently ignored this convenience, or if he convoked the Assembly for a futile object, the Chamber would give him one of the Infallibles for an adviser. The summons would be made through the junior, who would be accompanied on the first occasion by his predecessor. Six minutes of grace would be given beyond the time designated, and every member arriving later would have to sit on the stool of repentance and be judged. If the Chief had overstepped the six minutes the two Infallibles would occupy their ordinary places, and place upon the throne the most ancient lieutenant present. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies would make a short speech, and announce the subject to be placed before the Assembly, and all would go as usual. If the first lieutenant arrived in these circumstances he would sit in the middle of the hall, without the right of speech. If no vote had yet been taken, he would be re-established with the customary ceremonies, and from that moment would have his casting vote.

The Chief would be between the two Infallibles. The two most ancient lieutenants would sit one on one side, the other on the other. If at that time the Chamber contained more than four new voters who had not been present at the Assemblies of the summer, the two first among them would come next, then by order of rank. The seats would be as nearly as possible in a ring, leaving only the space of four places to denote the bar, and beyond the stool. The junior of the last promotion, assisted by the junior of all, and under the inspection of the Grand Master, would be charged with the arrangement. The junior of all would have the duty of calling for silence when the Chief makes the sign. The junior of the last promotion would be placed at the side of the Grand Master.

This would be the place, Gentlemen, to enter into the details of the different ceremonies, whether for receiving the Chief, or for deposing him, or for rehabilitating him, or for the punishments, or to restore a member who has been at the bar, etc. All these details are too minute, and would fatigue your attention. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies, who would have the supervision of all these matters, would

be charged by you with this work, so that in the end all would be done incontestably in accordance with the different formulas of the oaths taken, or other customary pronouncements.

ARTICLE 5.

Of the Procedure and of the Grand Master of the Ceremonies.

The chamber may assemble for so many different objects, the subjects that might be discussed are so numerous that if we were to attempt to decide upon the different procedures to be followed for the different subjects of discussion, we should never succeed in providing for everything: that is the chief reason for proposing the institution of a Grand Master of the Ceremonies.

The older men always know the law well enough. They forget only when it is for their advantage to do so. For that reason the Grand Master of the Ceremonies should not be too old nor too close to the persons of power. He should be elected by a majority of the votes taken by ballot, and should have been in the corps before the last two promotions. The Law will be in his keeping. He must know it and be seized with its spirit. The supervision of all the ceremonies will be one of his occupations. It will fall upon him to sustain the text of the Law whenever it has been violated. In thorny discussions he will be consulted as to the method of procedure to be adopted for the discussion, so that the chamber may be instructed and its opinion elicited. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies would have no authority. He would have merely the right to speak without ever being liable to be called to account for what he may have said, especially if it was a case of representing to the Assembly the annoyances experienced by some newly arrived member at the hands of older members.

He will be at once Grand Master of the Ceremonies, orator and adviser, of the Calotte.

Intelligence, activity, zeal and strong lungs are the qualities required to obtain this post. You all feel, Gentlemen, how much the absence of such an official

has lessened the value of your former legislation. At every moment there were interruptions, and two hours went in preliminaries before opening the exhausting discussion of the chief object of the meeting, and there were no regular rules of procedure.

Only by good selection will an official useful to the Republic be found.

He would be liable to be deposed if three-fourths of the votes were against him ; and every voter who should propose to depose him and did not obtain the support of half the votes would be expelled, with the exception of the first lieutenant and the Infallibles. Doubtless, Gentlemen, you will see to it that the speakers are courteous towards him, and that the younger members show some respect for his person.

The first lieutenant would not be allowed ever to convoke the Assembly without informing him of the subjects for discussion.

He would be given a place in the hall where he would be seen by all.

The winter season should never be chosen in preference to the summer, if it can be avoided.

Any member who might wish to consult the Law would go to the Grand Master's room and read it there, without the right of taking it away.

The Grand Master would have the power of giving orders to the juniors, who would be obliged to obey.

The Grand Master of the Ceremonies is the only official chosen by the Chamber. This alone may make his office very useful in certain circumstances. You will not hesitate then, Gentlemen, to adopt this institution without which your Assemblies will always be disordered.

Gentlemen, any individual denounced by the Chief before your tribunal will first be visited by the Infallibles. If he admits a knowledge of the matter he will be placed at the bar. The Chief will at once choose an advocate who will be one of those who have complete knowledge of the facts. No member would have the right to refuse to act as advocate for the Chamber. The accused would also nominate his advocate. If he consents to act he would be allowed five minutes for private conference with the accused, or longer if the nature of the case made it advisable.

Then the affair would be debated. Only the advocates would be allowed to speak. The accused, after these pleadings, might also make his remarks ; then the voting would take place in the following manner : The Grand Master of the Ceremonies would always have with him the list of voters and a pencil. The first Infallible will express his opinion, and, according as it is favourable or not to the accused, the Grand Master of the Ceremonies will write against his name the initial letter of the advocate for that view. If a member should propose a third opinion, the names of those who follow him will be noted in the margin by the initial letter of the member who originated the opinion. Then he will count the votes and present the result to the criminal.

There is another way of voting—by ballot. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies will have as many little voting-papers as there are members. The junior* will distribute them and then each will write his opinion. The junior will pass along with a hat and each member will throw in his paper. The Master of the Ceremonies alone will verify them, and announce the result.

This method of expression by ballot will be employed for the election or the deposition of the dignitaries and for all other matters touching personal respect.

ARTICLE 6.

Various Observations.

All the members are equal. Certainly that law could not be attacked without destroying the Constitution. At the same time, Gentlemen, you will agree that if the number of the new arrivals is very considerable they would have a preponderant voice, and by their union and their inexperience might cast the ship of the public weal upon some disastrous rock.

For that reason you will order that if the Chief and the Infallibles are in agreement and their opinion is opposed to that of the new voters the latter, even if there were ten of them, would not be allowed more

* Three juniors have been mentioned—the junior Infallible, the junior of the last promotion, and the junior of all.

than three contrary votes. Gentlemen, by new voter we mean every member who has not been present at the assemblies of the summer, those majestic and sublime Assemblies in which the entire Calotte is seen.

This law may seem hard but consider, Gentlemen, that it is unusual for more than five or six officers to come in one promotion, and that they could not be forced to unite except by a corrupt inducement. Consider that for the first three months they have no votes, not being received as officers, so that their period of being juniors is only three or four months.

A unanimous vote is required, Gentlemen, for deposing the Chief. It must be understood however that relatives are not included, and as the bonds of friendship are not less sacred, near relatives, and also two friends, will not be included. Consequently, before proceeding to the deposition of the Chief, the Assembly will exclude two voters as known friends of the Chief of the Calottins. What unlucky man is there who has not two intimate acquaintances among his comrades?

Occasionally, though not often, there may be persons whose conduct is a continual offence to the dignity of your uniform. In such cases the first lieutenant must be given a more decided authority. You will decree therefore that by using this formula : *The Chamber charges you, illustrious chief, to take the most expeditious means for recalling to the usual standard of behaviour Mr. So-and-so,*"—by using this formula, I say, the first lieutenant will acquire over the Calottin whose name is inserted, all the authority of the Chamber, and he will be obliged to obey as if all were speaking.

You will be able, Gentlemen, to depose the Infallibles if there are three-fourths of the votes against them.

When the Calotte is discontented with the first lieutenant it should be shown him by an injunction demanding better conduct. The second Infallible would be the organ of the Assembly to enjoin upon him to be more faithful to the spirit of the Law. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies will be charged with the duty of speaking to him.* The discontent of the Chamber might be manifested by ordering the two

* Then, what is the precise function of the second Infallible in the matter?

Infallibles to watch over his conduct, giving him an adviser as to his duties, finally by expelling him. The last punishment would require three-fourths of the votes to be against him.

Any member who should propose to depose or expel the Chief would, if he failed, receive the uttermost sentence, except however the two Infalibles and the Grand Master of the Ceremonies.

We must now propose to you a law not required at the present moment but which might become so at any moment. That is, Gentlemen, that no lieutenant with less than two years of service should be permitted to fight a duel unless his second is of three promotions before his own. You perceive the value of this law. If it is a case of a misunderstanding the older man will manage to appease matters. If the duel is with a stranger what an advantage for a young man to have one older as his adviser. If this law were ever to be transgressed the punishment would have to be exemplary, but no, that would never happen. The activity of the first lieutenant will be able to restrain so ardent a youth. The strictness of the Chamber will assist him, and with these precautions we shall have no more of those ridiculous and barbarous scenes.

These are, Gentlemen, the laws you should adopt. If they are not the best that could be given to an unprejudiced association they are in our opinion the best for you. May they never become mere cobwebs! May they be respected by the weak, feared by the strong, and secure for ever the happiness, prosperity, felicity of our very dear Republic!

These are the sentiments which have animated us, and still do so at this moment. Your perception, your experience will add what my feeble powers have perhaps but imperfectly accomplished. Remember, however, Gentlemen, that these Laws thought over in profound solitude have obtained on all points the suffrages of the three commissioners whom you named.

To facilitate your discussion, we give a summary of the contents of the articles which have just been read.

After having had read out in a loud and clear voice the said laws before the Calotte assembled under the Presidency of its Chief, we all declare that the said

laws should be accepted and made operative as tending to the good of the Association, being copied from the original, and conceived for the prosperity of the Calotte.

The Assembly of the Calotte, composed of all who have the rank of lieutenant, is the legislative body which has the right to act in any way without any other law but its own interest.

Only those members are equal who are in their places. The new voters are not allowed altogether more than three votes to oppose to the Chief and the Infallibles, when the latter are united.

The first lieutenant is the Chief of the Calotte and has plenary executive power.

Napoleon is clearly shown to us, at the age of nineteen, as a courageous and open advocate of democratic institutions, an enthusiastic believer in the virtues of laws and constitutions; and, above all, a man who was itching for work, ready at any moment to enter upon the labour of solving on paper political problems which had small interest for the majority of his brother officers, even when their own regimental institutions were being discussed.

Any member who impeached the Chief and failed to carry the Calotte with him was to be expelled—a characteristic conception, which exhibits Napoleon's insistence upon respect for established authority. At the same time the power of the Chief was tempered by the two Infallibles, and as they were in some degree controlled by a new official, the Grand Master of the Ceremonies, who was to be elected by ballot, the democratic principle was introduced. In this way Napoleon thought he had secured equality for all, and a strong central authority which could not become tyrannical.

Looking into the details, we find that he uses the words *premier* and *plus ancien* indiscriminately for the officer whom we should call the senior Lieutenant. He

further confuses matters by saying they should "distinguish two kinds of Chiefs of the Calotte: the first" (*premier*) "Lieutenant Chief of the Calotte, and the most ancient" (*plus ancien*) "Lieutenant Chief of the Calotte." He is now referring to different individuals: the first Lieutenant presides over the "grand assemblies," and the most ancient Lieutenant over a "particular Calotte." The meaning is revealed in a later passage, where he says that if the first Lieutenant is six minutes late in arriving at a meeting, his place will be taken by the most ancient Lieutenant present. The senior Lieutenant of the regiment is *ex-officio* Chief of the Calotte, and presides at its meetings; in his absence the senior Lieutenant present will take his place. That simple statement, with the adherence throughout to the term *premier* for the senior, would have obviated much obscurity and confusion.

He designates *l'ancien lieutenant en premier et le plus ancien lieutenant en second* as the persons to take the post of Infallibles. Although he says the Lieutenant next to the Chief ought not to become an Infallible, as being too near the Chief in position, he also says further on that this *ancien lieutenant en premier* is an officer who expects to be promoted to "govern with equity," and should therefore be trained early in official duties. That would mean the Lieutenant next to the senior, who, on the latter's promotion, would become the Chief; but Napoleon has already disapproved of that appointment on account of the Chief's intimacy with the nearest to him in seniority, and is thus contradicting himself. In another passage, after placing the Infallibles on each side of the Chief, he says: "Les deux *plus anciens* les suivent l'un d'un côté et l'autre de l'autre." These two are presumably the next in seniority after the *premier* or *plus ancien*, who is the Chief, and the *ancien lieutenant en premier*, who is the first Infallible. But he has not made it clear.

He begins his essay by saying that there are constitutive laws derived from the primitive pact, and to develop them must be the first object; there are laws which are not fundamental, which refer to the authority of the most ancient Lieutenant, and are capable of being abrogated by a unanimous vote. Later on he dismisses the constitutive laws, which were to have been developed, with the remark that they cannot be abrogated, and consist only of the law of Equality. Then he mentions that one of the fundamental laws makes the most ancient Lieutenant Chief of the Calotte, and irremovable except by unanimous vote. But in the earlier passage he had described this as a not fundamental law. He is trying to say that Equality is the essence of the Calotte, and cannot be abrogated without destroying the Society; and that the senior Lieutenant is the ex-officio Chief of the Calotte, who cannot be deposed except by a unanimous vote. In endeavouring to make this simple announcement he falls into these inconsistencies and obscurities.

Again, after saying that the Grand Master of the Ceremonies has no authority, "merely the right to speak," he says that he has "the power of giving orders to the juniors, who would be obliged to obey"—more carelessness and contradiction.

Napoleon says in one place that the Chief alone can convoke the Assembly, in another that the Infallibles may convoke it if the first Lieutenant absolutely refuses. It follows that the Chief has merely nominal superiority in this respect over the Infallibles, who can procure a convocation of the Calotte whenever they desire, either with the Chief or without him. The serving of the summons on each member is to be carried out by the "junior," assisted by an officer who has done it himself on a previous occasion; but who these two officers may be is not indicated.

Having said that the law of equality is the one

essential law, he proceeds to demolish it by decreeing that those who have not been present at the Assembly of the summer should not be allowed more than three votes altogether, if they are opposed by the Chief and the Infallibles. This derogation from the sacred law which is derived from "the primitive pact," Napoleon excuses by observing that the new voters could not be in agreement except for corrupt motives. He assumes, therefore, that whenever all the members of a class join in a certain proposal they must all be inspired by the same evil spirit. No such opinion could be held by a real believer in democratic institutions. This remark of his already shows us the man who distrusted all popular opinions and movements, who never had any confidence in the integrity of the motives either of an individual, a class, or a people. His democratic leanings must have been based not upon confidence in the mass, but upon hostility towards the individual placed above himself. As is very often, perhaps usually, the case, it was personal pique and vanity that made him opposed to Kings and nobles and privileges, not concern for the oppressed; hatred, not love, was at the root. His democratic lucubrations were merely a form of self-assertion, and it could have been foreseen that as soon as he had become a ruler, no longer under superiors, the origin and cause of his levelling principles—desire for personal power and importance—which had made him restive under oppression, would make him an oppressor in his turn.

Napoleon's notes on Barrow's "History of England" conclude with the following story:

THE EARL OF ESSEX.

The arbitrary government of Charles II., the vexatious measures of his brother the Duke of York who was imbued with Catholic principles and persecuted excessively the Presbyterians and the leaders of the Oppo-

sition, brought to birth on all sides conspiracies and associations to maintain the national Constitution. The Duke of Monmouth, bastard son of Charles, encouraged a discontent which he hoped would put the crown upon his head.

The Earl of Essex, Lords Russell and Sidney, animated by a common love for their country, conspired against Charles II. and his brother the Duke of York. For four years this Prince had been governing without a Parliament, and the nation was groaning under the yoke of an illegal administration.

The national Constitution, and the dominant religion, were in danger, the royal authority had swallowed everything. There was no longer any hope for liberty except through the death of the usurper, and it was resolved to inflict it upon him. Everything was already arranged. The day was chosen, and the measures to be taken agreed upon, and the single event would have avenged and saved oppressed England.

However, it all failed, and the Lords who were the leaders of the conspiracy were arrested and sent to the Tower. When this news spread among the public it was felt that one of those moments of crisis had arrived which alarm and discourage honest men. The Earl of Essex was known for the severity of his morals, the austerity of his life and his strict justice. He might have said, like Cato, that having never pardoned himself for anything he did not pardon any man. Lord Russell was the idol of the people, who adored him. His dulcet eloquence, his kindly nature, the fairness which governed all his acts, had added to a reputation which his mere firmness in opposing the royal authority had caused to be cherished by every good Englishman. It was said of him: If justice were to come to earth it would behave like Lord Russell.

Sidney was one of those inflexible patriots who are animated by the spirit of Brutus, or of Thræseas. He had been one of the first to unfold the standard of independence under Charles I. He was alone in opposing Cromwell. He alone still hoped for the establishment of a Republic. The enemy of monarchies, of princes, and the great personages, Sidney had by profound study penetrated to the original contract which is the basis of all Constitutions.

Such were the three men whom the tyrant had in his power. Russell would never conceal the truth and his trial was not obstructed in any way. In vain he was urged to fly; no good. . . . He died as he had lived.

Lord Sidney let his blood flow for the good cause and regretted only that he left his country delivered over to the fury of the two tyrants.

Essex still remained. The people, who had shed tears at the death of the two lords, demanded with fury the pardon of the Earl. The judges, appalled at all these crimes, did not dare condemn him. In vain the King commanded and the Duke petitioned; they tremble at the thought, and conscious of the abyss which was opening beneath them, resolved to spare the Earl. Who could depict the mad rage by which the Duke of York was transported? He saw his prey escaping. The blood of Russell and Sidney did not satisfy his fury, and unable to destroy a nation that he hated, he wished at least to take vengeance upon those it idolized, those who had caused the bill of exclusion to pass. Religion, politics, antipathy, hatred, desire for revenge, all united in the heart of the Duke to make him desire the death of the Earl.

Everything failed however, and the Earl was about to be declared innocent when a terrible accident relieved him of his embarrassment.

This very interesting story deserves to be told with such details as it has been possible to collect.

The weather was very cold on Monday the 13th of September. A fog common enough in the climate of London enveloped the town. The Countess of Essex was going to see her husband. The carriage collided with another, and after several hours of delay, at last she arrived. She found her husband preparing for departure, as the intention to release him was already known.

Having spent part of the day together they arranged for a meeting on the next day, Tuesday.

It was not yet ten o'clock when the King accompanied by the Duke of York went to the Tower, contrary to their custom; for they had not been there for two years; and they left at half-past eleven.

Meanwhile the Countess, who tenderly loved her

husband, was burning with impatience to see him again and having spent a part of the night in preparing the house, allowed herself some sleep. She was still in the first sleep when she was awaked with a start by a noise which she seemed to hear in the room. It was only a dream. However, she waked up three times, always disturbed by a mournful sound which she thought she heard and which stopped when she woke. Exasperated, she called her people, but sleep came upon her again, and the domestics did not come. The noise increased. Then the Countess, courageous by nature, arose, opened the curtains, traversed the darkness of her chamber, and came to the door. Imagine a woman troubled by sinister dreams, warned by terrifying noises, in the middle of the night, bewildered in the darkness of a vast apartment. She reaches the door and searches for the lock. Her whole body trembles as she touches the edge of a knife. The blood which flows from it does not frighten her. "Whoever thou art, withdraw, recognize the unfortunate wife of the Earl of Essex," she exclaimed, and, far from losing her wits, she tries her hand again, finds the key and opens the door. She thinks she sees in the distance of the antechamber something which moved, but accuses herself of fancy, and having closed the door goes again to bed. It was eleven o'clock in the morning and the Countess, agitated, pale, oppressed, was fighting against a dream which troubled her. "Jeane Betzie, Jeane Betzie, dear Jeane." She raised her eyes, awakened by the noise, and saw, oh God! she saw a phantom which approached her bed, drew the four curtains, took her hand and said: "Jeane, thou hast forgotten me, thou sleepest, but touch me." He raised her hand to his neck. Oh horror! The fingers of the Countess are buried in great wounds, her fingers are covered with blood, she gives a cry, hides under the clothes, but on looking out again sees nothing. Terrified, trembling, in consternation, heart-broken by her fearful presentiments, the Countess enters her carriage, arrives at the Tower. As she was passing through Pall Mall she heard a common man say: "The Earl of Essex is dead." At last she arrives, a door is opened, oh, horrible sight! She sees the Earl swimming in gore, stretched upon the earth. Three large

razor cuts had taken the life of the Earl. His hand was on his heart. His eyes raised to heaven he seemed to call down an eternal vengeance.

Do you think, perhaps, that distracted, fainting, Jeane dishonoured by cowardly tears the memory of the most estimable of men? No. She had the body washed, and exposed to the public gaze.

The uproar that this spectacle aroused in London is difficult to imagine. The people wanted at once to deal the same fate upon the cowardly assassins. They accused the King and his brother.

Doctor Burnet was charged to make inquiries to discover the authors of this murder. Two children deposed that they had seen a bloody razor thrown out of a window. The domestics of the unfortunate Earl said that they passed the whole morning in tranquillity, that at eleven o'clock they had been sent away by the Governor of the Tower. There was no longer any doubt as to the authors.

Meanwhile, in her mortal sorrow, the Countess had her apartment hung with black. She closed the windows and passed the days bewailing the terrible fate of her husband. It was not till three years later when, after the death of the King, the Duke of York had been dethroned, that satisfied with the vengeance that Heaven had taken, she reappeared in the world.

Algernon Sidney, Lord Russell, and Lord Essex were unjustly accused of complicity in the Rye House plot against the life of Charles II. Sidney and Russell having been executed, Essex was found in his prison in the Tower with his throat cut, and two children declared they had seen a razor covered with blood thrown out of a window.

When, during the days of tragedy which ushered in the Empire, Napoleon caused the Duc d'Enghien to be shot and Moreau to be banished—both of them unjustly charged with being concerned in a plot against his life—when Pichegru was found dead in his prison, did not Napoleon remember this story, in which he had written that “the people accused the King”?

The following story comes after Napoleon's notes on Marigny's "History of the Arabs :

THE MASKED PROPHET.

In the year 160 of the Hegira Mahadi reigned at Bagdad ; this prince, great, generous, enlightened, magnanimous, saw the Arab Empire prospering in the haven of peace. Feared and respected by his neighbours, he occupied himself in assisting the sciences to flourish and in accelerating their progress, when peace was disturbed by Hakem, who from the interior of Korassan began to obtain followers in all parts of the Empire. Hakem, tall in stature, of virile and fiery eloquence, proclaimed himself the Envoy of God ; he preached a pure morality which pleased the multitude ; equality in rank and in fortune was the usual text of his sermons. The people flocked to his standards and Hakem soon had an army.

The Caliph and the chief officials realized the necessity of stifling at its birth so dangerous an insurrection, but their troops were several times defeated and the power of Hakem grew every day.

However, a cruel disease, brought on by the fatigues of war, began to disfigure the face of the prophet. He was no longer the handsomest of Arabs, his noble and proud lineaments, his great and fiery eyes, were disfigured. Hakem became blind. This change might lessen the enthusiasm of his partisans. He conceived the idea of wearing a silver mask.

He appeared before his followers. Hakem had lost nothing of his eloquence. His speech had its old force. He spoke, and convinced them that he wore the mask solely to prevent them from being blinded by the light that emanated from his countenance.

He was more than ever confident of the rapture of the people, when the loss of a battle came to ruin his position, reduce his followers and weaken their belief in him. He was besieged, and the garrison was few in numbers. Hakem, death is necessary if thou wouldst prevent thy enemies from becoming possessed of thy person ! He assembles his followers and says to them : " Ye faithful, whom God and Mahomet have chosen for the restoration of the Empire and the re-

generation of the nation, why are you discouraged by the numbers of your enemies? Listen: Last night, while you were all plunged in sleep, I prostrated myself and said to God: 'My father, thou hast protected me these many years. Have I or mine offended thee that thou dost abandon us?' An instant later I heard a voice which said: 'Hakem! only those who have not abandoned thee are thy true friends and they alone are the elect. They will share with thee the wealth of thy proud enemies. Wait for the new moon, then have large trenches dug and thy enemies will come and precipitate themselves therein like flies stupefied by smoke.'"

The trenches are soon dug, and filled with lime. Tubs full of spirituous wine are placed on the edges.

That being finished a general repast is served, with the same wine, and all die, with the same symptoms.

Hakem drags their bodies into the lime which consumes them, sets fire to the liquors and jumps in. Next day the troops of the Caliph approach, but stop on seeing the gates open. They enter with precaution and find only one woman, the mistress of Hakem, who has survived him.

That was the end of Hakem surnamed Burkai whom his followers believe to have been raised up to heaven together with the faithful elect.

This example is incredible. How far can the mad desire for celebrity go?

This story recalls the lines in Moore's "Lalla Rookh" concerning "The veiled prophet of Khorassan":

"O'er his features hung
The Veil, the Silver Veil, which he had flung
In mercy there, to hide from mortal sight
His dazzling brow, till man could bear its light."

Napoleon at St. Helena was as determined as Hakem to suffer no loss of his personal prestige. He insisted on the fullest forms of respect being accorded to him as Emperor, and would intentionally keep his attendants standing as long as five full hours while he was playing chess. Indeed, he even went so far in imitation of the

veiled prophet as to discuss with his few followers a common suicide for them all, by sitting together and inhaling the fumes of charcoal. And when all was over, Cardinal Fesch declared that the violent storm which occurred at St. Helena shortly before the death of Napoleon, proved beyond doubt that he had been carried up to heaven.

(6) *Corsica (end of September, 1789, to June, 1791).*

On his way to Corsica Napoleon visited at Marseilles Abbé Raynal, then at the height of his popularity. A champion of the Revolution, he advocated insurrection as a "salutary movement," the "legitimate exercise of a natural right." Napoleon was one of his most devoted disciples. He consulted Raynal about his projected "History of Corsica," and received sympathy and encouragement. He subsequently sent him the "Lettres sur la Corse."

Napoleon arrived at Ajaccio at the end of September, 1789. In the house in the Rue St. Charles he found his mother, his great-uncle Lucciano, and all the children except Elisa, still at St. Cyr.

Joseph, a graduate in law at Pisa, aged twenty-one and a half, was in practice as an advocate. He had pleaded, and gained, one cause; his client being accused of murder, Joseph was able to convince the court that he had acted in self-defence. Except for two visits to Pisa, Joseph had been at Ajaccio, as the head of the Bonapartes, ever since the death of his father in March, 1785, now four and a half years past.

Lucien, aged fourteen and a half, was doing nothing. He had originally wished to be a soldier, had then changed his mind, and had left Brienne in the autumn of 1786 for the seminary at Aix, with the intention of becoming a priest. But he would not work; his mother could hardly scrape together sufficient to pay

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Joseph _____
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



DIAGRAM OF THE TRAVELS OF THE BONAPARTES TILL THEY LEFT CORSICA, JUNE 11, 1793.

The lines indicate residence in Corsica, the dots residence elsewhere. The distances separating the children in age are shown according to scale.



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1784

Jerome

To face page 206.

for his education, and so it terminated, and he came to live at home in idleness before he had reached his fourteenth year. The large gap (five and a half years) between Napoleon and Lucien caused a cleavage, the two eldest forming a separate society of their own. When Joseph and Napoleon went to France, Letizia was left with Lucien, aged nearly four, and Elisa, two, and the new arrival, Louis, three months. Lucien was now, until his departure for France four and a half years later, in the proud position of the eldest boy. Elisa, his junior by nearly two years, was a girl, and Louis, three and a half years younger, was too far off to be a rival. Even at the end of this period of grandeur Lucien was nearly double the age of Louis, who had not yet got within striking distance. He was in the position of acting eldest, and carried with him through life the marks of his temporary elevation. He was supercilious and self-sufficient, and yet, his seniority having been spurious, he had also the rebellious self-assertion of the younger.

As it was, what with his temporary position of acting eldest, his permanent position of third, the absence of a younger boy rival in the home, and the petting of his mother, he became intensely conceited and at the same time intractably rebellious. A typical spoilt child, he could not endure any continuous application, and would not work, except in brilliant short displays. His education ending before he was fourteen left him at a great disadvantage compared with Joseph and Napoleon.

Coming between two boys—Lucien and Louis—Elisa, who was the least good-looking of the family, became awkward and masculine in manner, ambitious and aggressive in character.

Louis also was formed by his position. He was too far from Lucien, three and a half years, for any hope of rivalry. He was between two girls, and inevitably

grew up a mild, gentle youth. When Louis was four and a half Lucien left for France, leaving Louis, with no masculine influence, alone, with his sisters on either side. Then Elisa left, Louis being nearly six, Pauline three and a half, Caroline two, but his position of eldest of this party conferred no prestige, and merely kept him backward and girlish. Pauline and Caroline formed a society of their own, leaving him out, and when Jerome appeared he was too young for Louis, six years his senior. Far removed from both eldest and youngest, unable to compete with his elder brothers or to make a companion of the youngest, with only Pauline and Caroline, both younger than himself, to play with, Louis was much in need of a boy chum. He remained in this enervating feminine atmosphere till he was twelve and a half, while his elder brothers had experienced the bracing, toughening change to the Continent at eleven, nine, and eight; and while they had lived respectively five and a half, nearly eight, and five years in France, each one alone, and obliged to fight his own way, Louis, already coddled, was little more than half a year there, and then under the sheltering wing of Napoleon. Then he returned to his mother and sisters. In these circumstances it would have been strange if he had grown up masterful and energetic.

Caroline, the younger of two of the same sex, was stimulated by her position. She was often an effective rival to Pauline, and tended to become aggressive, while Pauline, from the same causes, was less combative. It was a feminine version, low down in the family, of the Joseph-Napoleon situation. Pauline was the "ornament of society," and Caroline the ambitious rival. When Napoleon with his grand French uniform came upon the scene, he made a pet of the amiable and pretty Pauline, thus increasing her vanity and self-satisfaction, and fomenting the jealous rivalry

of Caroline, who, though the youngest girl, was not the youngest of the family.

That position was held by Jerome, two and a half years younger than Caroline, an age distance which, with his favoured sex, gave him all those privileges of the youngest which the youngest girl might otherwise have shared. Every member of the family, except Caroline, made a fuss of Jerome—an additional cause of Caroline's jealousy. Jerome left Corsica at the age of eight and a half, and was already, owing to Napoleon's victories, a person of importance before he was twelve. The Bonaparte custom of spoiling Jerome had long passed into a kind of instinctive action when Napoleon found himself in the position of having gifts to bestow. Inevitably he showered them most on Jerome. It would have required a very sudden and violent break with old habits to refrain from doing so. Very seldom can such a thing happen. As a rule the members of a family behave to each other throughout life as they learned to do in nursery days, in spite of all subsequent changes. Napoleon never quite forgot that Joseph was the eldest son. His new rôle of fairy godmother gave an additional impetus to a habit long since formed towards the youngest of the family.

Napoleon on his arrival at Ajaccio had much to tell his Corsican relations concerning the Revolution. His own leave had not been obtained without a protest from Du Teil, who had proposed to stop all leave owing to the prevailing unrest, but was over-ruled by the Minister of War, who objected that at such a time innovations were peculiarly dangerous and liable to misconstruction; that it was better to be ostentatiously weak than timidly strong. Here we have one of the chief stimulants of the Revolution, the pretence of the nobility, as blow after blow was showered upon them

that it was of no consequence; the touching belief that an attitude of confidence would disarm opposition.

Napoleon told his family that he had stopped at Valence on his journey, to visit Abbé Tardivon, who remarked to him: "From the way things are going, it seems likely that each one of us will be King in turn; when your turn comes, take care to be on good terms with the Church; you will find it pay." To this Napoleon replied pleasantly: "I would make you a Cardinal." Pozzo di Borgo records a conversation he had with Napoleon at this time: "Talking of Italy and of the feebleness of the various governments that reigned there, he suddenly interrupted me with, 'From what you say, if I had 10,000 men under my orders, I should make myself a King in that country.'" These remarks exhibit the colossal fissures that had already opened out in the body politic, and the wild dreams which were already prevalent. In such an atmosphere ambition would all unconsciously grow in a man's heart; he would be for ever imagining himself in a position of power, at first in an abstract, unreal way, but the habit would continue, and increase as the Revolution proceeded and his own position gradually rose; until he would, at last, be quite prepared for the highest summits, and would indeed begin to imagine that they belonged to him as of right. Every man who was poor, and below the rank of noble, felt that his situation was daily improving, and that at any moment he might find himself in a position of authority. Those who were young felt the full force of this tremendous stimulant. One has only to remember how dull and hopeless is normally the prospect before even the sanguine and confident young man to realize the enormous leverage exercised by these extraordinary events upon every man of Napoleon's age, in his position.

Fortunately for Napoleon, there was a steady

influence at work in his case. As a Corsican, citizen of a land which knew no privileged nobility or wealthy clergy, he was in favour of a revolution in France, but was far more intimately concerned at the presence of foreign officials on his native soil. What every Corsican desired was the establishment of a Corsican administration. He would gladly accept a Paoli, as a tyrannical dictator, to be free from French domination. Napoleon was thus able to escape the full force of the Jacobin whirlwind; and retained some self-control, some coherence, when the French world was indulging in orgies of wild hysteria. He did not care very much whether the French were slaves or not, so long as Corsica was not a conquered country, saddled with an aristocratic French bureaucracy. This attitude was common in the island. He and Joseph and Lucien were especially ardent patriots from their having been, in tender years, hostages in the enemy's camp.

As there was no opening for a war of classes in Corsica, the Revolution had scarcely touched the island. The French officials, against whom the attack would have to be made, took care that as little as possible should be known of what was occurring in France. The decrees of the National Assembly were not published in Corsica, and the French newspapers were not circulated, nor would they have been understood. Corsica had sent deputies to the States-General—Buttafoco for Nobility, Peretti for Clergy, Saliceti and Colonna Cesari for Third Estate. There was much vague unrest in the island. Vicomte de Barrin, Commander-in-Chief, asked for more troops, and received the typical reply from Paris that to reinforce the French garrison would merely make the Corsicans imagine that the French were afraid of them. It is to be remembered that throughout the whole of Napoleon's life there had been a regiment of French troops in the citadel at Ajaccio, within a few yards of his father's

house—a sight that could only inflame the youthful patriotism of every Corsican.

Joseph had been at Pisa in the early part of the year, where he met Clemente Paoli, elder brother of the great Pasquale, and other Corsican exiles. There he wrote the "*Lettres de Paoli à ses Compatriotes*," and sent them to Lorenzo Giubega, to whom also Napoleon addressed a letter. Joseph, on his return, had much to do with the formation of a committee of thirty-six at Ajaccio, and was chosen its secretary. The president of the committee told his fellow-members that Joseph, though conciliatory in manner, had more need of bridle than spur. He was too young for the position he wished to take in the Corsican world. Napoleon was still younger, and was also hampered by his uniform. Both, however, succeeded in making their mark on Corsican history.

The Corsican deputies to the Assembly took opposite sides. Buttafoco and Peretti were reactionary, while Saliceti and Cesari were for the Revolution. The latter sent to Corsica proposals for the formation of a Central Committee and a national militia. The Twelve (of whom Carlo had been so proud to be one) replied that the country was tranquil, that the elections to the new committee would arouse tumults, and that a national militia would cost an enormous sum and take the men from the cultivation of the land. A number of Ajaccio citizens commissioned Napoleon—a recent arrival from France, and conversant with the language—to draw up a French reply to the Twelve, which he did. It was more vehement than convincing. For instance, his answer to the complaint that men would be taken away from the tilling of the soil was: "*Non, jamais la liberté n'empêchera la culture; la tyrannie, le despotisme seuls dépeuplent les campagnes.*" He signed the address, "*Buonaparte, officier d'artillerie*," and other signatures followed of friends



SALICETI.

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and people of position, amongst them C. A. Pozzo di Borgo, Archdeacon Lucciano, Fesch, etc.

Bastia was the capital, and the headquarters of French oppression, and to Bastia accordingly Napoleon went. He paid the necessary visits, more ceremonial than cordial, to his comrades of the regiment of La Fère. He could not openly espouse the anti-French cause, wearing the King's uniform, but he was behind the scenes. On October 20 Saliceti wrote to Galeazzini, of Bastia, a friend of Napoleon's, that the municipality of every town in France was in command of its affairs, and had control of the military forces in the shape of national militia, and urging the adoption of similar measures in Corsica. Accordingly, on November 5 the municipal officials of Bastia presented to Barrin an address asking for the formation of a town guard. Before he could give them a definite reply the town was in an uproar, and he was compelled, on pain of instant death, to give an order that arms were to be distributed among the populace. A national guard was formed at Bastia on the French model, and three of its captains, Galeazzini, Murati, and Guasco, were sent to Paris to give the Corsican account of what had occurred, in opposition to that of Barrin and the French party. They arrived in the capital on November 24.

On the 30th a remarkable scene occurred in the National Assembly. Saliceti produced "*Une lettre aux députés corses*," signed by the three Corsican delegates, which was read out. It complained of the uncertainty as to the future of Corsica, whether it was to be a military possession, or, as some said, handed back to Genoa; and urged that the island should be made a part of France. In the speeches that followed the Assembly seemed determined to make amends to Corsica for the oppression to which she had been subjected. Mirabeau regretted that he had soiled his youth by taking part as a volunteer in the conquest of

1769. Barère said that Choiseul was a usurper, that Corsica had been subdued by a tortuous policy and a violent soldiery. On every side Corsica was praised. The prophecy of Rousseau was recalled. Roland described Corsica as the patrimony of liberty. The island was acclaimed as the home of liberty, the natural asylum of heroes, patriots, true republicans, etc. The Assembly then proclaimed Corsica an integral part of French territory; and decided, on the proposal of Mirabeau, that those Corsicans who had expatriated themselves after having fought for liberty should be permitted to return to the island and enjoy their rights as French citizens. Some "aristocrats" protested that the presence of these exiles would be a danger to public tranquillity, and demanded the omission of the words "after having fought for liberty," as an insult to France and to Louis XV. Mirabeau replied that the word "liberty" seemed to have upon certain persons the effect of water upon those afflicted with hydrophobia.

When the decree reached Corsica there was general rejoicing. The crowd at Ajaccio, whither Napoleon had now returned, lighted a huge bonfire, crying, "Evviva la Francia, evviva il re!" From the house in the Rue St. Charles a flag waved with the words, "Vive la nation, vive Paoli, vive Mirabeau!" Corsica was no longer a colony kept down by a military despotism, but exactly similar in all respects to any other part of France.

From this time Napoleon was less aggressively Corsican. He decided not to publish his "Lettres sur la Corse." But there were still the French officials and the French soldiers. On December 26 La Ferandière, the commander of the citadel of Ajaccio, wrote to the Minister of War concerning Napoleon: "This young officer was educated at the Military School, his sister at St. Cyr, and his mother showered with benefits

by the Government ; he would be much better with his regiment, for he ferments unceasingly." This is the first authentic contemporary description of the young Lieutenant that has come down to us.

Corsica had still to establish its own Government. At the municipal elections of March, 1790, J. J. Levie, a relation of the Bonapartes, was elected Mayor of Ajaccio, and Joseph a municipal officer. Joseph, being only twenty-two, was under the requisite age (twenty-five). His opponents got from Corte a copy of his baptismal certificate to prove him ineligible, but many others of the officials were under the required age, and Levie, knowing no French, was in need of Joseph, and succeeded in retaining him in his position.

On March 2, 1790, a Comité Supérieur met at Bastia, with Clemente Paoli as president, and requested the municipality *di la* to send representatives to a complete Comité for the whole island, which would meet at Orezza on April 12. On April 9 a meeting was held at Ajaccio (Peraldi, president ; C. A. Pozzo di Borgo, secretary), which decided not to send delegates to Orezza. The local jealousies of Ajaccio and Bastia had carried the day, in spite of the efforts of Joseph, who urged that these petty disputes should not be allowed to interfere with the future of the island. In the evening there was a long discussion on the matter in the Bonaparte house—in the long gallery, no doubt. Napoleon, not entitled to speak before, now joined Joseph in protesting against the provincial spirit of the decision. Their Continental education enabled the young Bonapartes to take broader views. They knew, from the great world they had seen, that both Bastia and Ajaccio were small places, that it was of no consequence whatever which of them led the way, but that it would be most unfortunate if, just when France was showing confidence in Corsica, the old petty jealousies should be exhibited. These arguments told,

and it was finally decided to send delegates to Orezza, Joseph and Pozzo di Borgo among them. Napoleon went with them.

The Comité Supérieur at Orezza proved by no means a happy family. The members began by disputing as to their rights, each district claiming more than its fair share of representation. A sub-committee was formed to propose means of accommodation, to which Joseph and Pozzo di Borgo were elected. Joseph made an eloquent speech. "Let us swear," he said, "before the Creator, the mover, preserver, and destroyer of nations, to sacrifice all private resentment for our country; let us stifle the spirit of faction; may this day see the end of our discords!" It was the old cry of Gaffori, of Sampiero, of every Corsican leader in turn: "Let us only be united, and all will be well." But there was only one man whose influence could overcome these ancient Corsican rivalries. Paoli, it was known, had already reached Paris on his way to Corsica. Delegates were sent by the Orezza Comité to meet him. On April 8 he was received at Court by the King, Queen, and Princes. On the 22nd he was invited with the Orezza delegates to appear before the National Assembly, where he was acclaimed by Bonnay, the President, as the hero and martyr of liberty. When Lafayette held a great review in the Champ de Mars, Paoli at his side was the hero of the day. The Société des Amis de la Constitution organized a reception to the Corsican, presided over by Robespierre. When, finally, it was known that he had started from Paris, the municipal council of Ajaccio sent four representatives, Joseph and Pozzo di Borgo among them, to meet him in France, and urge him to land at Ajaccio. They met him at Lyons. Paoli gave Joseph a playing-card with his portrait drawn upon the back of it by Carlo when at Corte. Paoli, however, declined to go to Ajaccio. When the

party arrived at Marseilles, he sailed for Bastia, where he arrived on July 17, while Joseph and his friends returned to Ajaccio.

In the meantime there had been a serious disturbance at Ajaccio. Several French officials who were obnoxious to the municipality were forcibly seized and imprisoned, and La Ferandière found that his soldiers declined to interfere ; finally, the prisoners were either released or deported. Napoleon wrote an address in support of the municipality, which was placarded about the town. He was called upon for such work, and thus came to the front, owing to his knowledge of French. No doubt also he "fermented unceasingly."

Soon after Joseph's return the two brothers narrowly escaped being murdered. A procession of monks suddenly broke up to attack them, with cries of "Death to the Jacobins!" One of them, an ex-bandit, saved their lives by drawing a pistol in their defence.

Joseph was amongst those elected by Ajaccio to the Congress, superseding the Comité Supérieur, that was to meet at Orezza under the presidency of Paoli. Napoleon went with his brother again to Orezza ; on their way they met Paoli. Passing the fatal bridge at Ponte Nuovo, Paoli explained the disposition of the troops at the battle. Joseph, in his Memoirs, says that Napoleon made some criticisms which Paoli did not relish. It was at this time that Paoli said to Napoleon : "You are on the ancient model. You are one of Plutarch's characters."

The Congress made Paoli practically a Dictator. Joseph distinguished himself by several effective speeches, some of which the Congress ordered to be printed.

The peasant in whose house Napoleon lodged declared that the young officer had scribbled upon, torn up, and burned so much paper that there was

hardly any to be found in the village ; he was evidently a man of talent and science, but such persons were usually imbecile ! Anecdotes of this kind have a tendency to distort the scene. A glare of sharp light is thrown across the stage on to a particular figure, making it difficult to see what is going on. It is improbable that Napoleon used up all the writing-paper in Orezza ; it is, on the other hand, very probable that the demands of the members of the Congress exceeded the local supply. Many of them may have been writing and tearing up. We shall never get a properly rounded view of Napoleon in his early years until the light is evenly distributed over the whole stage, until the labour that burrows out a matter of this kind is turned with equal zeal upon his contemporaries, and especially upon Joseph. It is too easily assumed that when Joseph made a speech containing sentiments that we know Napoleon to have held, and mentioning the names of Sampiero and Gaffori and other Corsican historical personages, whose lives we know that Napoleon had studied, he must have been prompted by Napoleon. Joseph was a man of ability, who at a very early age was making a name for himself. It is likely that Napoleon learned at least as much from him as he did from Napoleon. Napoleon came hot from the conflagration in France, but Joseph was the better informed on local politics. The younger brother would naturally be, and was, the more combative, but the eldest son was not devoid of ambition. He desired to be regarded as a person of importance in the world, as in his family, while the second wanted power for its own sake. Joseph wished for position and recognition, Napoleon for dominance. One wanted the world to appreciate him, the other to domineer over the world. A *succès d'estime* might have pleased Joseph ; to Napoleon it would have been an exasperating failure.

In October the elections took place for the Ajaccio Council. Joseph was elected president, and J. B. Pozzo di Borgo secretary. The tortuous manipulations that preceded the election may be imagined, for when the Council met exception was taken—not without cause—to the fairness of the election of Joseph and Pozzo di Borgo. Doubtless there had been secret meetings, and application of “influence,” in the long gallery of the Bonaparte house. The president and secretary were roundly charged with obtaining their positions by fraud. Napoleon retaliated by accusing the chief antagonist, Ponte, of making his house the centre of opposition to the new order of things, and he went so far as to advocate illegal violence, quoting the oft-invoked saying of Montesquieu that “laws are like the statues of certain divinities which we cover over in certain circumstances.” In the end Joseph and Pozzo were confirmed in their positions.

The Orezza Congress passed votes of censure against Buttafoco and Peretti, the Corsican representatives for nobility and clergy in the National Assembly, and sent Gentili and Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo to Paris to present them to the National Assembly. On their appearance an animated debate ensued. Mirabeau was so hot against the clergy that Peretti, after the Corsican manner, threatened him with a knife. In the end the Orezza representatives were, by a large majority, welcomed into the bosom of the National Assembly. Napoleon, on hearing what had occurred, suggested the presentation to Mirabeau of a complete Corsican costume, with its weapons.

It was time he returned to his regiment. He had already obtained an extension of leave for four months by the excuse, accompanied by a medical certificate, that he had been attacked by a malignant fever from walking in the marshy valley of Salines, on the outskirts of Ajaccio. Joseph and Lucien also suffered

from the same cause. That prolongation of leave came to an end on October 15, 1790. It was not till October 12 that Joseph's election as president of the Ajaccio Council was confirmed. Then when Napoleon did start he was beaten back twice by unfavourable winds.

The complete change that had come over the spirit of the citizens towards their Government, even that of officers toward their superiors, is visible in Napoleon's conduct at this time. To make up for his neglect to return to his regiment, he obtained from the Directory of the district of Ajaccio a certificate that he was a pure patriot who had not feared to expose himself to the resentment of the partisans of the aristocracy. The municipality of Ajaccio also gave him a certificate, declaring that he was a brave patriot who had supported the Constitution. These documents were of great value in those dangerous times. Emanating from Corsica, the model land of liberty, they were passports it would have been hazardous to question. With them in his possession, Napoleon need have no anxiety about contrary winds, so he stayed on a little longer.

On January 6, 1791, he was present at the opening of the *Globo Patriottico*, a revolutionary club at Ajaccio. Masseria was president; Lucien, not sixteen, was a member, and occasionally acted as secretary. The club decided that Buttafoco should always be called "l'infâme," and authorized Napoleon to write an address to express their sentiments. He was always ready with his pen, especially for denunciations, and entered with zest upon the congenial task. On January 23 he read his "Lettre à Buttafoco" to the members of the *Globo Patriottico*, who voted it should be printed. It was a splenetic diatribe, in the wildest Jacobin style, containing some passages of passionate invective, but mostly tedious, sometimes obscure, and

of a fatiguing length. Occasionally it became vulgar to the verge of indecency.

Buttafoco had been from the age of eight—from 1739—in the French service, in the Royal Italian Regiment, and had been present at the Battle of Fontenoy. He did not believe that Corsica, surrounded by enemies, could maintain her independence. He thought that Paoli “seduced the Corsicans by the phantom of liberty while leading them to servitude by an imperceptible and gentle violence.” He predicted that, unless France took the island, England would do so; and, having been educated in France, and having fought in the French Army, he naturally preferred France to England.

Buttafoco was right, and Napoleon was wrong. Paoli did aim at personal government, dictatorship, under the name of liberty. Corsica never has been, and is not now, an independent country. Buttafoco was no supporter of Genoese tyranny, but he saw that it was undoubtedly best that the island should be under French control, if only to save it from other nations. He was in favour of a Constitutional Monarchy in France. Wearing the King’s uniform, he supported the King. It was not open to Napoleon, who also wore the King’s uniform, and had been educated from childhood at the King’s expense, to accuse Buttafoco of dishonourable conduct. Buttafoco replied to Napoleon that he had used towards certain of his opponents, brave and estimable men, “epithets that put you in the wrong.” Napoleon had said that a young Corsican, Murati, by a certain small exploit in the War of Independence, had shown that he required only a larger theatre to prove himself a Turenne. (Was he already thinking that he also only wanted a large stage?) To this Buttafoco replied: “You recognize the courage of Murati, and with reason, but do not attenuate the military talents and the virtues of the

great Turenne by too extravagant comparisons; you are a mathematician, and yet have no sense of proportion." And then, writing years later, when the Empire had been established, Buttafoco, referring to Napoleon's youthful tirades on behalf of Corsica, observed: "Our common country has no cause to reproach me. What motives it has for saying to you: 'What, my son, is your heart insensible to the island where you saw the day?' When you had come to the age of reason, I hoped well of you. When I saw you on a great stage, my heart was full of joy; I hoped then that your country, your fellow-countrymen, would be dear to you. It is shocking that one of themselves should neglect them to such an extent." As Emperor of the French, Napoleon avoided laying any emphasis on his Corsican origin.

Napoleon was doubtless thinking of his not very creditable attack on Buttafoco when, at St. Helena, he remarked to Antommarchi that he was inexperienced at that time, and judged impertinently the managers of affairs.

At the end of January, 1791, he left Ajaccio to join his regiment, taking Louis, aged twelve and a half, with him.

(7) *Auxonne* (February 12, 1791, to June 14, 1791).
Valence (June 16, 1791, to end of August, 1791).

On his way to Auxonne Napoleon stopped to see friends at Valence, and wrote to Fesch on February 8, 1791:

"I am in the cottage of a poor man, where I like to write to you after having talked long with these fine fellows. I have everywhere found the peasants very firm in their stirrups. Especially in Dauphiné they are all ready to perish for the Constitution. I saw at Valence a people resolute, soldiers patriotic and officers

aristocratic. . . . The women are everywhere royalist. That is not surprising. Liberty is a woman more beautiful than they, and quite eclipses them. All the priests of Dauphiné have taken the civic oath ; they laugh at the protests of the bishops."

When he reached Auxonne Napoleon had been absent from his regiment seventeen months. His total record was two years with the colours, to over three years away. His last extension of leave had expired four months. At any other time the consequences would have been serious, but now it would have been risky to say a word to a certified pure patriot from the land of liberty. His Colonel was glad to see him, and even obtained for him pay for the period when he was absent without leave.

He spent his spare time, as before, in reading and writing ; and he also now had the care of Louis's education, acting as his tutor. Louis slept on a mattress in the small servant's room outside his own. Napoleon was poorer than ever, as he now had Louis to keep as well as himself on his Lieutenant's pay. Of Louis, he wrote to Fesch, April 24, 1791 :

"Louis works hard, is learning to write French ; I teach him mathematics and geography.* He reads history. He will become an excellent person. All the women here are in love with him. He has acquired a little French tone, light, and correct : he knows how to take his part in society ; to bow with grace, to make the usual enquiries with the serious and dignified air of a man of thirty. It is evident to me that he will be the most presentable of us four. None of us will have had so polite an education. He is a charming person. A worker by inclination as much as from self-respect : and full of sentiment. . . . If he should have to return to Corsica his education would be altogether wanting." (This is what happened.)

* Note how Napoleon continues to dwell on figures and names.

Napoleon having got his "Lettre à Buttafoco" printed, sent it to Paoli, together with a request for certain documents that he wanted, to enable him to finish his "History of Corsica." The answer he received was of a chilling kind. "Do not give yourself the trouble of exposing the impostures of Buttafoco. . . . I cannot now spare time to open my boxes to find the writings you refer to. For the rest, history is not written in tender years (*la storia non si scrive nelli anni teneri*). Allow me to recommend you to form an outline of the work according to a plan that Abbé Raynal will make for you, and then you can from time to time jot down anecdotes and the most important facts." This is rather contemptuous; it might have been written to a schoolboy, though Napoleon had reached the age when his father had been the trusted friend of Paoli. Napoleon then got Joseph to write to the great man. The reply was of a similar kind. "I have received your brother's pamphlet; it would have made a better impression if it had been more reticent, and had shown less partisan spirit. I have other things to do now than to search for documents and get them copied." This was a heavy blow to Napoleon's Paoli-worship. It may be doubted whether henceforward Napoleon's adherence to Paoli was anything more than an expectation of favours, which never came; for the Bonapartes were Jacobins, and the younger was headstrong and unmeasured. These were not malleable elements for a Dictator. He preferred Pozzo di Borgo, who had tact as well as ability, and did not bring discredit upon him by outrageous language.

A description of Napoleon at this time, though written after the Empire, is of interest. The writer was dining with a publisher when Napoleon was announced, and he saw enter "a young artillery officer, extremely thin, very brown, with piercing eyes, a serious expression, and a slight Italian accent."

He was invited to join in the dinner; but he would accept only a glass of wine and water, remained silent throughout the meal, and then went into the study with the publisher. If the writer of the above had been in the habit of keeping a diary, and, for want of other matter, had, on the actual day of this occurrence, jotted down some notes about the young artillery officer, he would have omitted the superlatives and the piercing eyes. He would have said that Napoleon was thin, dark or sallow, with a serious expression; that he had a slight Italian accent, and was abstemious, and silent among strangers.

While at Auxonne Napoleon received from Joseph a speech delivered by the latter to the *Globo Patriottico* at Ajaccio, which had been printed as an "Adresse à toutes les Sociétés des Amis de la Constitution." It was again printed in 1793 in the *Journal des Amis de la Constitution*. Writing to Joseph in acknowledgment, Napoleon said: "Your pamphlet has been received better than I expected. It has had a very good reception." Joseph was an able, energetic, and zealous propagator of the extreme revolutionary ideas of the time. It is probable that his opinions and his example had their effect upon Napoleon.

Napoleon made an excursion to Nuits to see his friends Gassendi, Captain, and Le Lieure de Ville-sur-Arce, Second Lieutenant, who were stationed there with a company of the regiment. At a dinner-party Napoleon gave expression to his views in opposition to Gassendi and to the whole company. The discussion was becoming hot when the local Mayor arrived. Napoleon thought he would be an ally, but found he was even more rigidly aristocratic than the rest, and an unpleasant scene was developing when the lady of the house intervened to put an end to the discussion.

Napoleon's second visit to Auxonne was short.

New regulations had been issued with the object of democratizing the artillery. They had the effect of retiring a number of officers, and Napoleon was transferred as First Lieutenant to the regiment of Grenoble, now to be called the 4th Regiment, which was in garrison at Valence. There he again lodged with his old landlady, Mlle. Bou, who received him and Louis with friendly warmth.

He found Mme. Colombier and Caroline still at Valence, and presented Louis to them. He made two new friends, Sucy and Montalivet, both commissaries for the army, whom he raised subsequently to important posts. Montalivet became Minister of the Interior. In 1814 he spoke to Napoleon of the dangers he feared from the Royalists. "Merely to speak of them," replied the Emperor, "is an act of cowardice." Montalivet, much hurt, resigned his portfolio on the spot, and left the room. Some hours later a chamberlain presented himself. "The Emperor," he said, "has charged me to bring you a message in the exact words he used: 'I beg my friend Montalivet to come and see me.'" Montalivet at once repaired to the Tuileries, and was immediately received by Napoleon with the remark: "I think, my dear Montalivet, we will forget, will we not, what has just passed?" It was a feature common to the Bonapartes to remember and reward old friends. Louis made a friend at Valence of a boy of his own age, François Mésangère-Clérac, whom he afterwards gave an important position at the Dutch Court.

It was on June 16, 1791, that Napoleon and Louis arrived at Valence. On the 21st the King and Royal Family, attempting to leave France, were stopped at Varennes, and taken back as prisoners to Paris. Napoleon, immediately on arrival at Valence, had joined the local Société des Amis de la Constitution, to which a number of the officers of the 4th Regiment belonged. As soon as the news of the King's attempted

flight had reached Valence, this club, together with twenty-two other Sociétés des Amis de la Constitution held a *réunion*, at which Napoleon was present. They all swore fealty to the nation and the law, omitting the King. On July 6 Napoleon wrote out and signed the new oath required, promising to defend the country and the Constitution, and to obey the orders issued by the National Assembly. On the 14th he repeated this oath at a great public meeting, together with the civic and military authorities of the town. Then in the evening he toasted, at a banquet, Naudin, Lombard, and others who were organizing a revolutionary society at Auxonne.

Refusal to take the new oath, which substituted the National Assembly for the King, caused a large emigration of officers, who had from childhood been taught to regard their uniform as the King's uniform. Over thirty officers of the 4th Regiment emigrated at once and others followed later. Very few of those who took the oath gave their hearts to it; but the artillery contained many who had no independent means, and could not afford to give up their career. An extraordinarily early promotion was sure for all who remained. Napoleon, who had served with the colours for little over two years as Second Lieutenant, and whose commission was not yet six years old, significantly observed in a letter to Naudin that there were two vacant places of Captain already in the regiment. In the same letter, dated "Valence, July 27," he wrote: "This regiment is very sure: soldiers sergeants, and half the officers." The whole army was in favour of the Revolution, with the exception of the aristocratic officers, and there were few of the high nobility in the artillery. The soldiers were in favour of it because it promised promotion out of the ranks, which hitherto had been impossible. The artillery and engineer officers were mostly of the

petty and poor nobility, whose families did not appear to be threatened, and who saw magnificent prospects of promotion. Probably few of them were as ardent for the cause as Napoleon, for they had been reared in belief in the monarchy as beyond discussion, which was far from being the case in Corsica. It was thus inevitable that Napoleon should stand practically alone in the ardour of his republican convictions, and that all the non-commissioned officers and men should be with him. It was a time of great mental and emotional excitement. Napoleon wrote to Naudin: "To sleep with one's head full of the great public events and one's heart moved on behalf of people whom one esteems, and from whom one parts company with sincere regret, that would be a voluptuous enjoyment that only hardened epicureans would be able to compass. . . . The southern blood which flows in my veins moves with the swiftness of the Rhone. Please excuse me if you find it difficult to read my scribble."

Napoleon applied for his autumn leave as usual, and it would at once have been granted, in spite of the scarcity of officers, if there had not been a general expectation of the outbreak of war. The request was refused by his Colonel. But Napoleon wanted to assist Joseph in his candidature for the Legislative Assembly at the approaching elections, and he hoped for a superior grade in one of the battalions of Corsican Volunteers that were being formed. He therefore went straight to his former patron, Du Teil, now Inspector-General of the Artillery of the Department, walking all the way to his country estate of Pommier. Du Teil's daughter Alexandrine, who was then twelve years of age, wrote a letter to a friend in 1863, when she was eighty-four, in which she said that Napoleon remained several days at Pommier, sleeping in "the green room"; that the whole time he was there he talked with Du Teil on military subjects,

large maps being spread before them ; and that when Napoleon had gone, Du Teil said to her : " That is a man of great ability, who will be heard of."* This remark, first reported in writing seventy-two years after it was made, unlike most of the similar prophecies published long after the event, is not inherently improbable. Such things have been said often enough of young men who have ultimately done nothing, or very little. At that time, when all the customary boundaries to advancement had been suddenly knocked down, there would be few households outside the nobility which did not contain a youthful candidate for startling promotion of some kind. Indeed, it is a matter of surprise that we should have so little of this kind of prognostication to show from Napoleon's friends.

Du Teil gave Napoleon the required leave, and he started at once with Louis for Corsica, in September, 1791.

Napoleon's writings at Auxonne and Valence, during a period of seven months, are arranged below in chronological order :

1. On Love and Solitude. Original. P. 1, in Biagi's reproduction.

2. *Duvernét (Abbé)*: Histoire de la Sorbonne. Pp. 8½.

3. *Coxe (William)*: Voyage en Suisse. Pp. 17½.

4. *Duclos*: Mémoires secrètes sur les Règnes de Louis XIV et XV. Pp. 1½.

5. *Dulaure*: Histoire critique de la Noblesse. Pp. 3½.

6. *Le Noble (Eustache)*: L'Esprit de Gerson. Pp. 1½.

7. *Machiavel (Nicolas)*: Histoire de Florence. Pp. 4.

8. Definitions, expressions, names, taken from various books. Pp. 9.

9. *Voltaire*: Essai sur les mœurs depuis Charlemagne jusqu' à nos Jours. Pp. 6.

* "Une Famille Militaire au XVIII Siècle," by Baron Joseph du Teil, 1896.

10. République ou Monarchie. Original. P. 1.
11. Dialogue sur l'Amour. Original. Pp. 7½.
12. *Rousseau, J. J.*: Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes. Pp. 2½.
13. Brouillons et Notes. Pp. 3½.
14. Discours sur la question: Quelles vérités et quels sentiments importe-t-il le plus d'inculquer aux hommes pour leur bonheur? Original. Pp. 39½.

This gives a total of 106½ pages, done in 210 days, or half a page a day; but there was another notebook on the Sorbonne, the definitions, etc., show that other books were read, and the two pages on "L'Esprit de Gerson" are a summary of the whole book. Even after allowance for this extra labour, it would appear that his own work was rather less than during his previous stay at Auxonne; but he now had Louis to teach besides. Probably the time given to these two occupations was just the same, the same hours of the day, that he had previously devoted to his own work—not more than two hours a day.

These writings are of three kinds:

1. Notes taken from the books he was reading, on the Sorbonne, Switzerland, France, the nobility, Florence, Voltaire's general history, and a number of definitions and expressions; these amount to 50 pages.

2. Miscellaneous original matter: a summary of a whole book ("L'Esprit de Gerson") in 1½ pages, a page on politics, a page on love, and a dialogue on love, 7½ pages—11 pages in all.

3. Comments on Rousseau (2½ pages), and various notes (3½ pages), all written in preparation for an essay on happiness (39½ pages), which he sent in for a prize offered by the Academy of Lyons, making 45½ pages devoted to the subject.

He is nearly twenty-two years of age, three years older than when last taking notes at Auxonne, and

those three years—1789, 1790, 1791—have been of an extraordinary kind. Has he matured under their exciting experience? His notes dwell longest on Coxe's "Voyage en Suisse," and a comparison of them with the text will furnish an answer.

Coxe is a traveller who describes the scenery and topography of the country, the condition and the customs of the inhabitants, and gives the history and the political constitution of the various cantons. There are few cruelties or trivial stories in Coxe, so there is nothing left for Napoleon but figures, names, and politics.

His figure mania persists. For instance: "Yverdun. Il-y-a 500 pas de la ville des eaux estimés," a remark on the lowest guide-book level. Napoleon delights in that kind of thing. If Coxe had said the waters were near the town, Napoleon would have made no note.

He has all his former inaccuracy. Here are some examples:

Napoleon.	Coxe.
huit candidates	5
en 1555	1531
en 1270	1273
soixante membres	50
six departements	3
deux montagnes	3 (with description)
X ^e siècle	XVI ^e
un syndic	4
120 membres	102

He makes other mistakes. He notes that a certain Richard made a watch in a year after he first began to study the mechanism of an English sample, whereas Coxe says he spent a year in making his instruments, and another six months over the watch. He tells a trivial tale of a doctor who diagnosed illness merely from an examination of the face without asking for any

other information, whereas Coxe expressly states, and it is the whole point of his story, that it was by another purely medical examination that the doctor was guided. He says that "Frederick I." (of Prussia) "in 1707 inherited the principality of Neufchâtel, and his son Frederick II. after him." Coxe says that "Upon the death of Frederick I. it descended to his son Frederick William, who transmitted it with his other dominions to Frederick II." Frederick the Great was not, as Napoleon inaccurately writes, the son, but the grandson, of Frederick I.

Even his political notes are marred by this inexcusable carelessness. He says that at Friburg "the sovereignty is in the hands of a Council of 200 persons. The Secret Council, composed of sixty members, and the Small Council, composed of twenty-four, are invested with the executive power." Coxe devotes a number of pages to the political constitution of Friburg, and especially emphasizes the "most remarkable circumstance" of which "I flatter myself it will not be uninteresting to give a concise account"—namely, the "origin and constitution of the Committee distinguished by the name of the *Secret Chamber*" (italics in Coxe to draw attention to this committee). The Great Council of 200 is composed as follows :

Ex-officio	4
Burghers	112
Small Council	24
The Sixty	60
				<hr/>
				200

The *Secret Chamber* is a powerful committee consisting of the four bannerets chosen by the Great Council, and twenty-four members chosen by the Sixty from among themselves. Napoleon has made the strange and unpardonable mistake, in a serious

political student, of regarding the whole Sixty as a Secret Council, although Coxe is perfectly clear and emphatic, and draws special attention to the matter. Napoleon's inaccuracy creeps even into his notes on political constitutions, the one subject in all his reading that seems to arouse his interest.

His other notes are also in his former manner. He is, with his author Duvernet, hostile to the Sorbonne, noting the discreditable incidents in its history; he picks out of Dulaure's "Noblesse" the cruelties and wrongs perpetrated by the privileged class; from Macchiavelli he takes a few colourless notes on the history of Florence; from Voltaire chiefly figures and names concerning China and the East.

The three years from nineteen to twenty-two have not brought any improvement in his method of note-taking. He is the same man, the detached Corsican islander indifferently surveying the world from outside, writing down figures and names to give himself the illusion that he is a very precise student.

His original writings at this time are of interest. He epitomizes a whole book, in two carefully condensed pages. "L'Esprit de Gerson" was the standard work containing the answer of the Church in France to the Ultramontane doctrines. Napoleon summarizes it as follows:

There are two opposite opinions concerning the quality and the primacy of the Pope as successor of St. Peter.

One is that of the modern Italian canonists of whom Bellarmin has written with most understanding.

The other is that of Gerson and the Sorbonne.

The sectaries of the first opinion contend:—

1. That the Church is a spiritual monarchy, absolute and independent, with the Pope as its Sovereign monarch.

2. That the Pope, as chief of this Church, has alone received the authority of the Keys.

3. That the Bishops have no authority save that which emanates from and is dependent upon him.

4. That the Pope is infallible.

5. That he has a power superior to that of his Councils.

6. That he alone has the right to convoke and to confirm them.

7. That his power is spread by the temporal power of Christian Princes, at least indirectly, according to the interpretation of Bellarmin.

Gerson on the contrary, and with him the whole of the Gallican Church, believes :—

1. That the Church was established by Jesus Christ in a monarchy subordinate to the laws of an aristocratic government.

2. That the Pope is merely the chief minister of the Church of which Jesus Christ is the sole essential head, and that the Keys have been given to the whole Church.

3. That all the Bishops derive their power directly from Jesus Christ, forming between them only one Episcopacy, which they all share equally with the Pope.

4. That the infallibility belongs to the Church properly assembled and not to the Pope.

5. That a Council is above the Pope, when it is ecumenical and legitimate.

6. That the secular Princes have had, and have, the right to convoke the Councils, and that the Councils do not require for their validity the confirmation of the Pope.

7. That the Pope has no authority, direct or indirect, over the temporal power of secular Princes.

A Gregory VII., a Boniface VIII., a Julius II., a Gregory XIV., a Sixtus V., have been led by these maxims to some daring abuses.

Jesus Christ had 75 disciples and 12 apostles. The first are the priests, the second the Bishops.

This is an excellent piece of work.

The First Consul's opinions agreed with what he had read as a young man in "*L'Esprit de Gerson.*" The Concordat was a compromise to which he was assisted

by this earlier, careful study of both sides of the question.

In judging Napoleon's original work two extremes must be carefully avoided. There is the inclination to regard him as a being inspired in all acts and at all times. To throw this off is not as easy as it would seem. There is a subtle gratification to be derived from indulgence in idolatrous practices. At the other end there is the habit of judging an eighteenth-century Corsican by a twentieth-century Northern standard. This difficulty is not entirely avoidable, for one cannot now acquire an eighteenth-century point of view; nor is it possible to change one's nature from North to South; one can only keep constantly in mind the fact that we are dealing with a man of the South, and that the average of education and intelligence has risen very much in 120 years.

He wrote a page or two on love, while travelling from Corsica to Auxonne, and a few months later a longer essay, seven and a half pages, on the same subject, in the form of a dialogue with his friend Desmazis.

SAINT-VALLIER,

8 February, year 91.

Ivy clings to the first tree it encounters, that, in few words is the history of love.

When a man is in a foreign country, with no relations, far from his home, rely on it, he must form some connection, must have some prop or support, a sentiment which takes the place of brother, or father. . . . Love comes to his assistance and offers all its advantages. You say that friendship offers as much. Yes, but it is easier for a stranger to find love in the eyes of one with whom he identifies himself; yes! but his forlorn condition excites imagination and warmth, hence love. What then is love? All seasons are appropriate for it, all nature inspires it: differing from the irritation of animals which has its season; it is found amid the frosts of Iceland, the heats of the

equator, in the marshes of the Iroquois ; in the heart of the groves of Italy, the forests of the Ardennes, under the sign of the Lion or of the Bear. What then is love ? It is the feeling of his weakness by which the isolated, solitary man is soon penetrated, the feeling at once of his impotence and of his immortality : his soul tightens, is strengthened and doubled ; delicious tears of pleasure flow, that is love !

Observe that youngster at the age of 13 : he loves his friend as at twenty his sweetheart. Egoism comes later. At forty, man loves position and fortune ; at sixty himself alone. But do not deceive yourself ; if he weeps it is from vexation ; if he has troubles he becomes afflicted by them, isolation is killing him. The sweet emotions of love, the perfidious darts of Cupid are, it is said, poisoned, but there is pleasure in this pain ; there is no wish to be cured ; because, having once experienced the sensations, the intoxication, of love, man fears the horrible solitude of the heart, the absence of feeling. The trials of mature age are cured by dissipation, would you cure the pains of love ? Oh, melancholy doctor, you will need courage, you are about to destroy the innocent. If you are a man of feeling you will find the earth opening before you.

Napoleon has just left his home, relations and friends, and is feeling homesick. Though he has Louis with him, a sense of solitude and isolation is upon him, and he yearns for the society of a sweetheart. The thing has happened before to a youth in such a situation. But in spite of the warmth of his feelings Napoleon pretends that friendship offers, to a man who is not among strangers, as much as love. We are thus prepared to find him, when among his brother officers and in the company of his ally Desmazis, preferring friendship to love. He goes much further, and now denounces the love which he wanted so badly when he was homesick and forlorn, as a curse to society.

Desmazis. How, Sir, you ask what is love ? What ! Are you not made like other men ?

Bonaparte. I am not asking you for a definition of

love. I have been in love and remember enough about it to have no use for metaphysical definitions which only confuse matters. I do more than merely deny its existence. I say love is hurtful to society, and to the happiness of the individual, in fact I consider it does infinite harm, and that it would be a good act if a protecting divinity would rid us of it and deliver the world.

D. What! Love hurtful to Society, love which vivifies all nature, the source of all production, of all happiness. No love,—why, Sir, you might as well put an end to existence itself!

B. You are getting heated. You are in a passion. Recognize, I beg of you, your friend. Do not look upon me so indignantly but answer me, why is it that since you have been under the domination of this passion I never see you at our customary social meetings? What has come to your habits? Why do you neglect your relations, and your friends? You give all your time to a monotonous and solitary promenade until the moment arrives when you can see Adelaide.

D. Eh, Sir, what are your occupations, your societies, to me? What is the good of an undigested science? What have I to do with what happened a thousand years ago? What influence can I exert upon the movements of the stars? How can I be interested in the minute details of the puerile discussions of men? I have occupied myself with such things no doubt. What had I better to do? I had to do something to escape from the boredom that threatened me; but, believe me, I felt even in my study the emptiness of my heart. Certainly my mind was occupied, but not my heart. Why, I was merely vegetating all the time that I was not in love. Now, on the contrary, when the dawn arouses me from slumber I no longer ask myself, "Why does the sun shine for me to-day?" No. The first streak of light shows me my dear Adelaide in her morning gown. I see her, she is thinking of me, she smiles upon me. Yesterday evening she squeezed my hand: she sighed, our eyes met; how well they expressed our feelings! I gaze at a portrait which delights my soul. I put it away a hundred times and take it up again. That promenade,

Sir, which you call monotonous. No! No! the vast surface of the globe does not contain its variety. First I recall what she has said to me; then I re-read the note she wrote to me; then I think of my answer, and wonder how I can ever express the whole extent of my love. I rewrite it a hundred times. My imagination is aroused; I see my hopes soon crowned; I regret sometimes that I have not an immense fortune to consecrate to her. I wish I had a crown to give her, here and now. Imagine the delight it would be to tender it to her parents for her, the joy that it would give her. Whatever approaches her person is sacred to me. Another time I am thinking of the preparation for the marriage ceremony which will soon unite us, and of the presents I have to make her. My heart dilates as I think of some gift which may please her, and prove my love. Do you not see the domain in which we shall pass our days, the sombre groves, the smiling meadows, the delightful gardens? Nothing concerns me now except the joy of being always by her side. And soon she is to give me pledges of her love. But you are laughing! Really, I detest you.

B. I am laughing at the great occupations in which you are absorbed and still more at the warmth of your manner in telling me of them. What is this strange malady that has seized you? I feel that the power of reason, which I am going to bring to your assistance, will have no effect, and that in your state of delirium you will merely shut your ears to its voice; that you despise it. But remember that you have never had *sang-froid*, and that it has always been the influence of my friendship that has recalled you to your duties. Remember that this influence has always been worthily used. It seems I must recall the obligations you owe me, and the reality of my warm sentiments towards you, of which you are well aware, for I myself shall not escape your invectives in the paroxysms of your delirium. For your condition is like that of a man who sees nothing but the phantom he is following, unconscious of the disease that has produced it, and of the health he has lost. I shall not therefore discuss the question whether your pleasures are, or are not, worthy of a man. I am going to suppose that that sex, king of the world by its strength, industry, intelligence, and other natural

faculties, finds its greatest happiness in languishing in the chains of a soft passion and subjected to the orders of a being weaker both in understanding and in body. I am going to suppose, as you have declared, that the thought of your Adelaide, of her appearance and conversation, may recompense you for the loss of your customary social pleasures: but is it not the fact that you are always hoping for the end of this condition of affairs and that your insatiable imagination dwells upon what the virtuous Adelaide cannot give you? My coldness and tranquillity are not, I can see, suited to depict properly the heavy burden that weighs down a lover at the slightest check that may come. If Adelaide were to absent herself for a fortnight, what would become of you? If another managed to please this person whom you suppose to belong to yourself, what torments! Suppose that an alarmed mother chooses to object to the too frequent visits that make a wicked world talk or, in short, Sir, that any one of the hundred other things that may try a lover comes your way. Then, often enough, your nights are without sleep, your food untasted. There is no place on earth where you can escape from your terrible distress. Your blood boils, you walk with great strides, you have a wild and haggard look. My poor chevalier, is that your idea of happiness? I have no doubt that though to-day in the ecstasy produced by a squeeze of the hand you may be in a condition of supreme felicity, I have no doubt, I say, that to-morrow when in a contrary humour you may regard such a weakness as shameful.

But, chevalier, this is your position. If it behoved you to defend your country from attack what would you do? If it was really necessary! But of what use would you be? Would the fate of a people be confided to a child who is always in tears, who is alarmed, or elated, by the slightest movement of another person? Would a State secret be confided to one who has no longer a will of his own?

D. Merely big words void of sense! What are to me your State, and its secrets? Really you are past comprehension to-day. You have never before argued so pitifully.

B. Ah! chevalier, what are to you the State, your

fellow-citizens, society! There we see the fruit of a relaxed condition given up to voluptuous pleasures. No strength, or virtue, is now in your path. Your ambition was to do good and now even that good is to you a matter of indifference. What then can be this depraved sentiment that has taken the place of your love for virtue? You now wish only to live unknown, in the shade of your poplars. What a profound philosopher! Ah! chevalier, how I detest this passion which has produced so great a metamorphosis. You do not realize that you are becoming an egoist to whom everything is indifferent, the opinion of men, the esteem of your friends, the love of your parents and relations. All is in captivity to the tyrant, strong over your weakness. A glance, a pressure of the hand, a kiss, chevalier, and what then matters to you the troubles of your country, or the bad opinion of your friends; a body touch . . . but I do not wish to annoy you. I grant that love has its incomparable pleasures, and trials even greater perhaps, but let that pass, let us consider only the influence it has upon the state of society. It is the fact, chevalier, that we are born in order to be happy, that is the supreme law which nature herself has implanted in our consciousness. That, it is true, is the main principle which has been given us as a rule of conduct. Each one, born the judge of what should suit himself, has therefore the right to dispose of his own body and his own affections, but that condition of independence is really opposed to the condition of servitude in which society has placed us.

This change of condition has drawn with it a change of spirit, and has substituted for the call of sentiment that of prejudice. This is the basis of all our social institutions. Man has been taken at birth and converted into an altered creature. Do you believe that, without this change, such numbers of men would allow themselves to be degraded by a few great nobles and that their sumptuous palaces would be respected by those who are in need of bread? Force is the law of animals: conviction that of men. It was found convenient, for repelling the attacks of the strongest beasts, and so as to be free from the necessity of fighting at every moment, it was found convenient, I

say, to have laws of proprietorship so that each one should be assured, in the name of all, of the ownership of his field.

This convention existed only among a small number of men. It was therefore necessary to have magistrates, both to repel the attacks of neighbouring peoples, and to enforce the accepted convention.

These magistrates felt the pleasure of being in command, but the most alert among the people opposed them. These were gained over and so became associated with the aims of the ambitious men. The people were subjugated. You see how rapidly inequality introduces itself: you see the ruling class formed out of the governed class. Religion came to console the unfortunates who found themselves despoiled of all their possessions. She came to enchain them for ever. It was no longer by the call of conscience that man was to conduct himself. No! It was feared lest a sentiment to stifle which every effort was made might regain the upper hand.

So there had to be a God. This God ordered the world. All acts were done by His will: He had issued written laws . . . and the empire of the priests commenced, an empire which will probably never end.

Man then must be subjected, a sad truth! But that the state of society should be legitimate, that is something which cannot be gainsaid. The silence of men on that point is a tacit approval which nothing can contradict. You are twenty years old, Sir: choose: either renounce your rank and fortune and leave a society which you detest, or taking your place among its citizens, submit to its laws. You are enjoying the advantages of the contract. Will you be faithless to the other conditions? As an honest man your choice cannot be doubted. You must then adhere to the State which procures for you so much well-being and while contriving to make worthy use of the advantages it has given you, you must make the people above whom you are placed happy, and the society which has given you a distinguished position prosperous. To do that, my dear chevalier, it is necessary that you should be always master of yourself and of your occupations and not impeded by the appearance of things. To do that, you must, guided always by the torch of reason,

be able to judge equitably the rights of the men to whom you are so much indebted. To do that, you must, ready to undertake any service for the State, be a soldier, a man of affairs, even a courtier if the interests of people and nation require it. Ah! how sweet will be your reward! Defy then the malign vapours of calumny and of jealousy! Boldly defy time itself! Your decrepit limbs may not be more than an imperfect presentment of what they have been and yet they will earn the respect of all those who may approach you. One will be relating, in his cottage, what assistance you have given him. Another, speaking of the conspiracies of the wicked, will say: "If he had not come to my help I should have perished in torture like a criminal." Chevalier, cease to restrict that lofty soul and that spirit formerly so proud, to so narrow a sphere. Thou at the knees of a woman! Rather make the defeated wicked fall at thy knees! Thou despise the troubles of men! Inspired by honourable feelings, conquer them rather! Esteemed by thy peers, respected and loved by thy vassals, death when it comes will take thee away amid the tears of those who are around thee, having spent a happy life, an oracle to thy friends and a father to thy vassals.

D. I do not understand you. How, Sir, could my love prevent me from following the course you have mentioned? What idea then have you formed of Adelaide?

Adelaide, if the execution of duty requires that one should succour the unfortunate, if to be virtuous one must love one's country, mankind, and society, who more virtuous than she? Do you suppose that I should be capable of doing good with the coldness of a philosopher? The wishes of Adelaide being my motives, to give her pleasure my reward. . . . No, Sir, you have never been in love.

B. I am sorry for your mistake. What, chevalier, you believe that love is the path of virtue? It makes you stick at every step. Be honest. Since this fatal passion has troubled your repose, have you cared for any pleasure but that of love? You will then do good or ill according to the vicissitudes of your passion. But, what am I saying? You and passion are one.

So long as passion lasts you will be guided by it alone, and since you agree that the duty of a rich man consists in doing good, in saving from penury the unfortunates who suffer from it, that it is the duty of a man of birth to use the credit of his name in order to destroy the intrigues of the wicked, that the duty of a citizen consists in defending his country and forwarding her prosperity, will you not then admit that it is the duty of a good son to acknowledge his obligation to his father for a good education, to his mother. . . . No ! chevalier, I should have to be silent if it was incumbent upon me to bring forward evidence of that nature. . . .

It is interesting to observe that the few remarks Napoleon gives to Desmazes are by no means without point. Napoleon had the habit, as invaluable as it is rare, of listening to the arguments opposed to him until he was able to reproduce them, instead of shutting his ears to all views differing from his own, which is the customary manner of mankind. To get right round to the back of your subject and see it with your enemy's eyes until you are able to appreciate his contentions, and then return to your own point of view, is the only sure way of understanding a subject. The habit of doing this is one of the secrets of the great.

In this case, however, Napoleon is discussing a matter which is as yet beyond his powers. He asserts that love makes a man indifferent to the welfare of the State ; that under its influence he is subjected to a being inferior to himself, and neglects his duties towards his fellow-citizens. In less than five years he was to prove in his own person the fallacy of such a contention. No man was ever more in love than he was with Josephine when he was writing those passionate letters to her, and at the same time leading the army of Italy to victory in the most consummate of all his campaigns.

For him, as for the vast majority of mankind, love was an inspiration, an incentive to effort. Napoleon had not yet found that out, for two reasons: because he was a misogynist, and because he was more interested in theories than in facts.

His attitude towards women was uncivilized and backward even for an eighteenth-century Corsican. He was jealous of the essentially feminine capacities, for the same reason that he sneered at the good manners of his elder brother, because they exposed his own deficiencies. He thought, or wanted to think, that love meant the subjection of superior man to inferior woman, and was of opinion that woman should be merely man's plaything and the mother of his children. His position relatively to Joseph made him aggressive and rude. These qualities made him "not happy with women," and so he came to dislike them. The flattery of women in the end somewhat soothed his injured vanity, but in effect his opinions did not change.

He belonged to that class whom he was afterwards never tired of denouncing with ridicule—the ideologues. His views on love are abstract vapourings—theorizing in the manner of Rousseau, philosophizing about principles and imaginary conditions—entirely ignoring the elementary simple facts at all men's disposal. That is the characteristic ideologue—a term used by the First Consul and Emperor as symbolical of all that is impracticable and visionary. Joseph, as we have noted,* admitted that Napoleon's Corsican friends used to call him "an inhabitant of an ideal world." No doubt it was the violence of his own conversion that made him so persistent a denouncer of persons still in his former unregenerate condition. And yet, though the First Consul was no ideologue, was the Emperor entirely free from that disease? Did he

* *Supra*, p. 144.

not come to see visions, to mistake fancies, desires, unproved theories, for solid, tested facts?

Napoleon was a dreamer before his active career began, and he became a dreamer again when the struggle to survive—with its urgent demand for a courageous grasp of stern realities—had been successfully conducted. He was a man of extravagant imagination who required the tonic of an immediate, pressing need to come to earth. Then he was great, a genius, and then only. Before the fight began, and when its severity was passed, he allowed himself the indulgence of wild imaginings, roaming in every direction according to the whim of the moment. As Republican General, as First Consul, and during the early years of the Empire, he retained control over his idealistic, passionate nature; before, and after, he was an ideologue.

Napoleon also wrote the following remarks:

NOTES UPON THE DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND
FOUNDATION OF THE INEQUALITY AMONG
MEN, BY J. J. ROUSSEAU.

It is in the consciousness of his moral liberty that man shows the spirituality of his soul.

Self-preservation is almost his only concern. His most active faculties must be those whose main purpose is attack and defence.

The only good things known to him in the entire universe are food, a female, and repose. The only misfortunes he fears are pain and hunger. *I do not believe that.*

His imagination depicts nothing to him: his heart asks nothing of him. . . . He has neither foresight nor curiosity. . . . The spectacle of nature has become indifferent to him by reason of its familiarity. . . . His mind which nothing can excite is given up to the single question of bare existence, without thought of the future.

On the other hand in the primitive state, without

house, or hut, or property of any kind, each one took up his lodging by chance and often for one night only : males and females united fortuitously according to chance meeting, to opportunity and desire. . . . They separated with equal ease ; the mother suckled the children at first from her own need, then habit having made them dear to her, she nourished them afterwards for their own sake, and since there was hardly any possible means of finding each other when once lost to view, they soon came to the situation of not being able to recognize each other. . . . *I do not believe a word of this.*

Let us assume that wandering in the forests, without industry, without speech, without home, without war and without connections, without any need for the society of his fellows as without desire to hurt them, perhaps even without the power of recognizing any individual among them, the savage man, with few passions . . . *I do not believe a word of that.*

My Reflections upon the Natural State.

I think that man has never been a wanderer, isolated, without connections, without need of his fellows. I believe on the contrary that having emerged from infancy and arrived at the age of adolescence, man felt the need of his fellows, that he became united to a woman, and selected a cavern which had to be the centre of his excursions, his refuge in a tempest and during the night, his magazine of provisions. This union was strengthened by custom, and by the tie of children : but it could be broken at will. I think that in their excursions two savages having met, at their second interview showed recognition and friendship and had the desire of having dwelling-places near each other. I think that they approached for that purpose and that thus a colony was naturally formed. . . . I think this colony lived happily because it had abundant food, protection from the seasons, with necessaries of good quality, that it lived happily because it had the enjoyment of sentiment and of natural religion. I think that the world for a great number of centuries was divided in this way into colonies, separated and hostile,

and of scarce numbers. After these centuries, the colonies multiplied, and had to open relations with each other. From that time the earth could not produce enough for them without cultivation, property and social relations, and then governments came into existence. Exchanges were made, then came wealth, and taste. The imagination then emerged from the cavern in which it had long been enclosed. Self-love, impetuous domination, pride, arose, and there were men of ambition with their pale tint who seized upon the direction of affairs, and young rascals of florid hue who kissed women and ran after courtesans.

My point is not to expound the series of changes through which man has passed before coming to the state of society, but only to show that he could never have lived wandering, without home, without connections, without any other desire save that of the male and female uniting furtively according to opportunity, chance meeting, impulse. Why should we assume that man in a state of nature must have eaten? Because there is no example of a man who has existed in any other way. I think that man had in a state of nature his ability to feel and to reason. He must have used these faculties, for there is no example of men having existed without using these faculties. . . . To feel is the need of the heart, as to eat is that of the body. To feel is to be attached to a person, to love. Thence appreciation, veneration, respect. . . . If it had been otherwise, if it was true to say that in man feeling and reason are not inherent in the individual, but are only the products of society, there could then be no natural feeling or natural reason; no need for virtue: no happiness in virtue. It would not be the citizen of Geneva who would tell us that.

These observations, with the three and a half pages of rough notes that followed them, were written out as preparation for the essay on happiness which Napoleon sent in for the prize offered by the Academy of Lyons. There were sixteen competitors for the prize, which was not awarded till a new competition had taken place two years later, when a certain Daunou

obtained it for a corrected version of the essay he sent in on this occasion.

The reporter said of Napoleon's effort: "It will not long hold the attention of the commissioners. It is perhaps the work of a man of sentiment, but it is too badly arranged, too disconnected, too rambling, and too badly expressed to fix the attention." One of them added: "It is a very pronounced dream."

This verdict is amply justified. Napoleon's essay on happiness is, as usual with him, wandering, lengthy, obscure. In spite of some passages of force and dramatic fervour, it is on the whole tedious reading; and when the task is over there remains an uncertainty as to the answer the author is giving to the question propounded. There is the characteristic abstract reasoning, with an air of arithmetical precision, and very little that is practical and immediate.

The sense would appear to be in the following passages of the essay, which does not deserve full translation:

"We must live in a manner that conforms to our organization, or there is no happiness.

"Our animal organization has its indispensable needs: to eat, to sleep, to procreate. . . . Food, shelter, clothing, a woman, are therefore an absolute necessity for happiness.

"Our intellectual organization has appetites not less imperious, and whose satisfaction is far more precious. It is in their complete development that real happiness is to be found. To feel and to reason, there is the distinctive feature of man; these are his titles to the supremacy he has acquired, which he keeps, and will keep for ever. We must, then, eat, sleep, procreate, feel, reason, to live as men, therefore to be happy."

Then he proceeds to consider political institutions, beginning with the remark that "Man has from the

mere fact of being born and retains rights to such a share in the fruits of the earth as is necessary for his existence," which introduces a long and tedious excursion in which he discusses the origins of society, with digressions to Paoli, Sparta, Cato, the murder of Cæsar, etc. After about thirty pages of declamation he says :

"What is political liberty? It is to obey no law but that of the constitution.

"What is animal liberty? It is to obey no law but that of the animal constitution.

"What is moral liberty? It is to obey no law but that of the moral constitution."

Then he observes that "absolute repose and excessive fatigue" are "equally unnatural, equally destructive of the constitution, and thus of animal liberty."

As for moral liberty, its principal enemies are two—firstly, bad laws and tyranny; secondly, "ambition, desire for wealth, love, or any other passion which, having obtained control over a man, deals a death-blow to repose, at least for a time, to happiness. . . ."

He writes at some length of "ambition, with its pale tint, its wandering eyes, its precipitate proceedings, its irregular movements, its sardonic laughter. . . . Ambition, that immoderate desire to satisfy pride or an intemperate nature, which is never satisfied, which leads Alexander from Thebes to Persia, from the Granicus to the Issus, from the Issus to the Arbela, from there to India; ambition which makes him conquer and ravage the world without being ever satisfied; he believes himself a son of Jupiter and wishes to make others think so," etc.

Napoleon's conclusion is that "happiness is incompatible with a violent passion, for the latter is destructive of the animal economy, of feeling and of natural reason. . . ." "Live in conformity with nature; feel

and reason in accordance with natural feeling and natural reason and you will be happy."

He gave long preparation to this essay, which had occupied his thoughts for many months; he had talked to Joseph a good deal about it. The result is interesting when the self-indulgent, passionate, ambitious career of the man who wrote it is remembered; but otherwise it is not impressive—diffuse, involved, abstract, declamatory—a "very pronounced dream."

(8) *Corsica (September, 1791, to May, 1792).*

When Napoleon and Louis arrived in Corsica, the elections of six deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and of other officials, were in progress at Corte. Joseph was there, and hoped to be elected. To keep himself in the foreground he had made a speech eulogizing Mirabeau on receiving news of his death; and he had exhibited his knowledge of French, and his industry, by publishing a copy in Italian and French of the new Constitution, for the use of the electors. But Paoli dominated the elections, and the fact that Joseph's name was not even proposed is significant of his feelings towards the Bonapartes. Joseph's youth told against him; it was no recommendation to be below the legal limit of age.

Among the successful protégés of Paoli were Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo and Mario Peraldi. Peraldi was already an enemy of the Bonapartes. Pozzo di Borgo had been an intimate friend and ally; open hostilities between the two families had not yet commenced, but the former cordiality could no longer be maintained. Joseph obtained election as one of the thirty-six administrators of the island and one of the eight directors—positions of considerable importance to be held by so young a man.



JOSEPH.

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On October 15, 1791, Archdeacon Lucciano Bonaparte, great-uncle of Napoleon, who had always lived in the Bonaparte house, and had long lain there bed-ridden, died. The death-bed scene, like that of Carlo, has been reported. When Fesch wished to speak of religion, the Archdeacon asked him to desist, saying he had only a few minutes to live, and desired to give them to his family. Napoleon told Antommarchi, and also Las Cases, that the Archdeacon had declared that while Joseph was the eldest, Napoleon was the chief. In Corsica, where the eldest son has an indestructible precedence, such a remark would be impossible. Joseph, in his Memoirs, corrects the statement. The Archdeacon said: "Letizia, cease weeping. I die content, since I see you surrounded by your children. My existence is no longer necessary for Carlo's children. Joseph is now at the head of the administration of the country, so he must be competent to manage the family. Thou, Napoleon, wilt be a man of importance (*omono*)."

This was doubtless, in substance, what the Archdeacon said. There was a reference to Joseph as the head of the family, and to Napoleon as destined to become a man of note and distinction. It is curious that the Emperor at St. Helena, while exaggerating the Archdeacon's reference to himself, did not repeat the interesting word *omono*, which we may be confident was used, on Joseph's testimony. Napoleon must have heard the Archdeacon use that expression, but it made no lasting impression upon him; he supposed it referred to him merely as a man of promise.

The Archdeacon had been a saving man and left some money. The Bonapartes were now in easy circumstances.

Joseph's official position compelled him to reside at Corte. Paoli is suspected of having planned Joseph's career with the object of taking him away from Ajaccio,

where he had considerable influence. In his absence Napoleon became the manager of the family affairs, and he had the handling of the Archdeacon's estate. He was thus acting head, and the Archdeacon's dying words no doubt increased his self-importance and his influence in the family. He became domineering. Lucien in his *Memoirs* says they did not venture to dispute with him, as he was enraged at the slightest observation, the smallest symptom of disagreement. Even Joseph did not dare to answer him. The masterful disposition and the hot temper were both being developed by the excitements of the times. Napoleon had been in the French caldron and was still steaming. In this condition, with the prestige of his Continental standing and knowledge upon him, conscious of his superiority in the small circle at Ajaccio, he was too hot to touch.

At the request of Napoleon, General Rossi, then acting for the Commander-in-Chief in Corsica, wrote to the Minister of War for authority to nominate him Adjutant of one of the battalions of Corsican Volunteers. The answer sanctioning the proposed appointment was received on January 14, 1792, but early in March Napoleon was informed by Rossi that by recent decrees of December 28, 1791, and February 3, 1792, which had only just been promulgated in Corsica, he must join his regiment unless he became Lieutenant-Colonel of Corsican Volunteers. The election to these posts was to take place on April 1. There was to be a First Lieutenant-Colonel and a Second Lieutenant-Colonel to each battalion.

Napoleon accordingly became a candidate. His most important rivals were M. Pozzo di Borgo (brother of Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, the Deputy), J. Peraldi (brother of the other Deputy), Peretti (a man of considerable influence and personal friend of Paoli), and Quenza (also a person of note and protégé of Paoli).

Quenza persuaded Peretti (his brother-in-law) to retire in his favour. Napoleon could not amalgamate with the Pozzo di Borgo or the Peraldi interest. He managed to get himself accepted as an ally by the Peretti-Quenza party on condition that Quenza should, in case of their election, be Lieutenant-Colonel-in-Chief, and Napoleon Second Lieutenant-Colonel.

Napoleon was thus, for the first time in his life, a candidate seeking the suffrages of the electors. He acquired a practical experience of the most educating and convincing kind. Of the four candidates, three were known to be regarded personally with favour by Paoli; but the great man's opinion of the Bonapartes, of Napoleon in particular, was suspected to be rather unfavourable. Napoleon made it one of his chief objects to induce the electors to believe that he had received Paoli's blessing, that the *babbo* would be glad to see him elected. He did not venture to say so explicitly, but took care that it should be inferred from hints and suggestions. Paoli did not interfere openly in elections. He stood aloof, like the King in a constitutional monarchy. By maintaining this attitude of superiority he obtained a power which he could, when he chose, secretly use with decisive effect. It was thus open to each candidate to claim his private preference.

Pozzo and Peraldi got letters from their brothers, the Deputies, promising rewards to those who voted for them. To this Napoleon, the inspirer of the Quenza-Bonaparte tactics, replied by defying his opponents to produce the letters—a bold move which does not seem to have been countered.

Peraldi was rich, and his strength being in Ajaccio itself, he used his money in the usual way to strengthen his local influence. Napoleon's reply to this was to allocate beforehand a number of the posts of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Volunteers to

the most influential persons, on condition of obtaining their support. He also spent, much to Letizia's annoyance, the money left by the Archdeacon—indeed, it may be questioned whether, without this backing, he would have ventured on the candidature. The Bonaparte house and table were open to all. Declaring that he did not believe in doing things by halves, Napoleon gave board and lodging to as many of his supporters (most of them from the country) as could get into the house. Some of them had to sleep on mattresses on the landings.

Peraldi, for his part, made fun of the little man, with his boundless ambition and his small reputation, and managed, with his contemptuous airs, to goad Napoleon to fury. He sent Peraldi a challenge, which the latter promptly accepted; but the affair was not carried further.

Napoleon kept announcing that his success was certain; but he felt far from confident, and appears to have been in an unhealthy condition of anxiety and melancholy, alternating with great excitement and outbursts of violent passion, which forced even his mother to silence. As there was a danger of his falling between two stools—being cashiered from the French Army without obtaining the Corsican appointment—he endeavoured to make sure his retreat to France in case of failure here. He applied to Rossi for a certificate excusing his absence from his regiment, and Rossi wrote that, considering the difficulty of getting officers with a knowledge of Italian, he had appointed Napoleon Adjutant, but on receipt of the new decrees he had told him to join his regiment. The delay in his doing so was due to the delay in receiving news of the decrees, and the absence of an opportunity for making a sea voyage.

This certificate was dated Bastia, March 31, 1792, too late to reach Napoleon before the day of the

election. His position was precarious: the Archdeacon's money gone, enemies made, Paoli more than cool towards him, the French career perhaps lost, and no Corsican career as yet arranged. At this crisis he remembered what he had seen done in similar difficulties by the forward party in France. He decided to resort to the Jacobin methods, to illegality and violence, which had been so triumphant in France. He had already urged Joseph to this course when his election had been disputed. The quotation he had then made from Montesquieu in favour of fraud and force—in the cause of liberty—was now his own sanction.

His Jacobin friend Saliceti had obtained a commission from the Directory to proceed to Ajaccio to inquire into the religious disturbances there, and had taken upon himself to order the four companies of Volunteers that had already been formed to proceed to Ajaccio. Their welcome arrival gave courage to Napoleon.

The three delegates to preside over the election—Quenza, Grimaldi, and Murati—arrived in Ajaccio on March 30. In theory they were impartial scrutineers. Quenza was a brother of Napoleon's ally; he lodged with Ramolino, Napoleon's near relation. Grimaldi showed his hand by staying with Fesch, Napoleon's uncle. To make sure of Murati the Peraldi faction waylaid him outside the town, and carried him off to the house of Peraldi himself. Thereupon the friends of Napoleon forcibly burst into the house of Peraldi, and, protesting that a delegate ought not to accept the hospitality of one of the candidates, they dragged out Murati; and then, the unfortunate man requiring rest somewhere for the night, they offered him room in the Bonaparte house. The three delegates were now all in safe custody with Ramolino, Fesch, and Bonaparte.

On April 1, the day of the election, the town was full of the soldiers of the battalion, who would not

have been Volunteers if they had not also been of the revolutionary party, and came from the country districts where the Bonapartes had influence. It was clear on which side the force lay. The election was to be decided in the Church of San Francesco. The delegates had issued an order that no person carrying arms would be admitted, but the effect was merely that the dagger or pistol which most of them carried had to be concealed.

Before the voting had commenced Mathieu Pozzo di Borgo, the candidate, mounted the tribune, and protested warmly against the illegality and violence perpetrated by his opponents. His remarks being received with protests and hisses, he raised his voice to drown opposition, at which the Bonapartists—the term was already being used—seized him, dragged him from the tribune, and violently ejected him from the building. No effective opposition being possible, the meeting then proceeded to elect Quenza and Napoleon for the desired posts.

Quenza was without military education, and had other duties as one of the administrators of the island. Napoleon was thus the actual Commander of the battalion. He was, apart from personal qualities, by his training alone, the fittest man in Corsica for such a post. He was alone among Corsicans in having received the best French military education, while of the French officers very few had his knowledge of Corsican Italian, the only language the Volunteers understood. His salary was four francs a day, but the post had been obtained at a heavy cost, apart from the actual money expenditure. On hearing the story Paoli observed that an illegal election of that kind would provoke protests on all sides. And it was not a small matter for the Bonapartes to have vendettas with the powerful families of Pozzo di Borgo and Peraldi.

Mario Peraldi, the Deputy, was another acquaintance of the Bonapartes who from friendly cordiality had been turned into a vindictive enemy. It was the manner and bearing of Napoleon that converted friends into enemies. Joseph, though he may have left a suspicion of ulterior motives, was conciliatory in demeanour; while Napoleon, though sometimes charming, was too often self-assertive, and obviously an ambitious schemer. Peraldi more than once warned C. A. Pozzo di Borgo against the designs of the Bonaparte brothers; he said they were without scruples—men who would sacrifice their dearest friends to serve their own interests, who wrote letters to important persons for the sake of exhibiting themselves as persons of influence, who contributed to a paper published by Buonarotti in order to abuse their opponents and obtain a reputation for patriotism.

The habit of thrusting themselves in front of the great men of the day was characteristic, not only of Joseph and Napoleon, but of the entire family. Even Louis, when he came across a passage in a work by Bernadin de St. Pierre which he did not altogether understand, wrote—while still a boy—straight to the famous author. As Masson has observed, this self-confidence—derived partly from Carlo, and also from the superiority of their education over that of their Ajaccio friends—was subjected to a tremendous strain when they found themselves amongst the rulers of the world, and it proved amply sufficient to carry them through. They showed no surprise or hesitation; took their places as Kings and Queens, as if such promotion was their right and had long been overdue.

Peraldi wrote from Paris: "As long as I was at Ajaccio the Bonapartes dared not raise their heads; I was always opposed to the explosion of their ambition; I was always able to expose their subterranean methods; I have often saved them from popular

hostility; I have seen them many times on their knees before me when they were candidates. The greatest triumph for a virtuous man is to forget the calumnies of a man who abases himself, and that is what I did at the last election, but I shall always bitterly regret it." (This refers to the support Joseph obtained from Peraldi for his election as one of the administrators.) Napoleon, said Peraldi, in order to become Lieutenant-Colonel, had been guilty of dishonourable conduct, and outraged the rights of friendship. "Poor Quenza! there he is, enveloped in the schemes of the Bonapartes, and these new Agamemnons will use him as the passive instrument for obtaining their desires."

In Corsica, more even than elsewhere, violence produces violence. Ajaccio was still simmering with the excitement of the election when a dispute between a sailor and a Volunteer set the whole town in a blaze. It was full of combustible material. There was the crisis among the priests. Some of them, Fesch among the number, had taken the oath required by the Assembly; others had refused. The decrees for the breaking up of the convents had been published in Corsica, and the monks had been ejected. The sailors of Ajaccio were for the continuance of the old order; the Volunteers of the outlying districts supported the revolutionary proceedings and the juring priests. Ajaccio adhered to the Pozzo and Peraldi influence, to the non-juring priests, to the counter-revolutionaries. The Volunteers termed the Ajaccians *cittadini*—that is, feeble and soft people, accustomed to foreign domination; the Ajaccians retaliated by stigmatizing the Volunteers as *paesani*—vulgar rustics. Owing to the Genoese, and then French, settlements in the coast towns, there was a historic antipathy between the sturdy Corsican spirit of independence in the interior and the readiness of the coast towns to welcome one

conqueror after another. And now the election of Napoleon, whose supporters came from the country districts, and the tyrannical acts by which it had been compassed, encouraged the Volunteers quartered in or about the town to extra rudeness towards the *cittadini*; they treated the town like conquered territory.

Besides the two antagonists, town and country, there was a third element in the 42nd French Regiment, under Colonel Maillard, which had possession of the citadel.

The fight between the original couple of brawlers spread on all sides. The sailors, artisans, and other townsmen went about crying: *Addosso alle paesani! Addosso alle berette! Addosso alle spallette!* ("Down with the country people, the juring priests, the Volunteers!") Napoleon with a group of officers was attacked, and they had difficulty in escaping to a neighbouring house, leaving one of their party, a young Lieutenant, dead in the street. Napoleon and Quenza then went to Maillard, asking for a guard of regular troops, or for ammunition, or admission of the Volunteers into the citadel. Maillard refused. Then some of the Volunteers gained access to one of the towers of the citadel, and from that point kept up a severe fire down the Rue Fontanaccia, thus dominating the main entrance of the cathedral. Abbé Peraldi, nephew of the Deputy, was killed there.

The Volunteers now formed entrenchments at the posts they occupied, doubtless with the connivance of Napoleon; they sallied out into the streets and took possession of well-placed houses; they formed guards over the public fountains, thereby producing a water famine; and numbers of supporters came in from the country, who cut off the food-supplies of the town. The Municipality called upon Maillard to intervene: the town was in a state of siege, the citizens without food or water. Maillard marched his soldiers into the

streets, and brought out cannon, with the intention of battering down the entrenched posts of the Volunteers. The reply of the Volunteers, signed by Quenza, Napoleon, and the other officers, was that they had the positive orders of Paoli to remain where they were—a deliberate falsehood—and that if within one hour the cannon were not taken back into the citadel they would be captured by force. This reply was doubtless the work of Napoleon, and extremely characteristic it is, being deceitful, unscrupulous, and determined. Maillard gave in, withdrew the cannon, pending the arrival of the Commissioners, who had already been sent by the Directory to settle the dispute. The Volunteers remained in possession of the tower they had entered, but destroyed their entrenchments, and abandoned the houses they had occupied, and the food and water supplies were no longer cut off. Peace reigned. The firing had lasted four days—from April 8 to 12, 1792.

The Commissioners were Arrighi and Colonna Cesari, brother-in-law of Quenza, who could be relied on to soften matters for the Lieutenant-Colonels. The Directory of the Department, under the influence of Joseph and of the country districts, was also prepared to let them down gently.

Arrived in Ajaccio, the Commissioners were inundated with reports from the Municipality, the Directory of the district of Ajaccio, the Judges, the Procureur Syndic, the Justice of the Peace, the Vicar-General Fesch, the Colonels of the Volunteers. This last was written by Napoleon, and was the most long-winded and verbose of them all. Napoleon put all the blame on the citizens of his native town: he described them as "brigands" and "*anthropophages*," while the country folk were the "friends of the Constitution," the true "patriots." From childhood he had followed Paoli in dislike of the Genoese settlements on the coast at Ajaccio and Bastia. He had been reared in a town

which was originally a city of Genoese tyrants; his own family he regarded as Florentine. This town actually welcomed the French conquerors, received the French officials with degrading deference, and accepted the French troops with equanimity. He himself was sent as child hostage to France. His hatred of France and of the insolent French officials, with their shameful vices and their pretentious manners, was thus extended to the venal town which accepted their presence. Paoli's influence, though considerable in the old Genoese settlements, was derived principally from the inland districts. The Bonapartes were in the same position, and it was one of the factors that made them patriotic and Paolist. Though they lived, as the family of a lawyer would have to do, in the town, their supporters were at Bocognano, Bastelica, and other country estates, where the inhabitants were intrepid and frugal, hostile to foreign oppressors, and typical patriotic Corsicans.

Napoleon's election as Lieutenant-Colonel of Corsican Volunteers, and the resultant riots in Ajaccio, show us a man who will stick at nothing in the way of fraud or of bloodshed to attain his end. He was quite prepared, for a puny object, a mere question of personal prestige, to start his Volunteers charging down upon a regiment of regulars supported by cannon; to make the town a scene of massacre. We see a man who, utterly unscrupulous and of an iron determination, is also a hater of towns and townsfolk. The Napoleon of history was never at ease in Paris, never felt comfortable and on good terms with the Parisians. He shot them down at Vendémiaire, and hoped the incident would never be recalled; he was utterly unnerved, almost fainting with anxiety, when his supporters carried him through the *coup d'état* of Brumaire. The campaign of 1814 was a useless display of brilliance, because he did not feel sure of his position

as defender of Paris against the foreign invaders. He would not fortify Paris, prepare it to defend itself, from want of confidence in its loyalty. He spent the last few moments of his power, which he should have devoted to Wellington and Blücher, in discussing the feelings of Paris towards him. He was always a countryman, suspicious of towns.

The first decree of the Commissioners was that citizens and Volunteers alike should lay down their weapons of all kinds. Then they ordered the two Colonels to remove their battalion from the town, and take it in the first place to Corte, pending final re-arrangements.

Napoleon accordingly started for Corte. On the way he turned aside to Monticello to have speech with Paoli. The latter had already written to Cesari, the brother-in-law of his friend Quenza, whom he could not censure: "When the government is in the hands of inexperienced young men" (Joseph, for example) "it is not surprising that inexperienced boys" (Napoleon) "should get appointed to the command of National Guards." When the two met, there was talk of Napoleon's resigning his connection with his present battalion, in order to take up a new exclusive command of the companies of Volunteers that were being raised in the interior of the island. Paoli would not give a definite promise, and he also temporized when asked to take Lucien as secretary.

This was a fateful interview for Napoleon. When he turned away from Paoli he gave up for ever his hero-worship, his youthful enthusiasm for a noble human ideal. These feelings were already on the wane; they were now entirely superseded by the personal ambitions which the tremendous cataclysms of the time were causing to sprout around on every side.

He returned to Ajaccio. Joseph wrote to him from

Corte on May 14: "I do not know where you are. I am writing to Ajaccio. The General" (Paoli) "arrived here yesterday evening, ill-disposed towards me; I saw him this morning; we had an explanation, and the trouble is over.

"He considers it is no use thinking of the proposal he made to you. The companies to be raised should be separate, and not form a single corps under one head. It seems to me it is urgent you should go to France. By the next post I will send you the papers about the plantation and the letter for Biron. . . .

"Lucien must not hope the General will take him. He spoke quite plainly. He recognizes his abilities, but will not amalgamate with us. That is the bottom of the affair. He fears the outcries of jealousy, which are already too numerous. . . .

"The manifesto of the municipality is very long and very prolix and very violent against the National Guards. If it is the first to be printed, it will make a dangerous impression upon those who may have the patience to read it through. I think the manifesto of the battalion should be as short as this is long.

"I regret that in the letter which the two Lieutenant-Colonels wrote to the municipal officers to have the guns withdrawn, you said that General Paoli had ordered you to guard your posts. If this letter were made public it would be prejudicial to General Paoli, and then if he explained the facts, what would be your appearance?"

Joseph had done his best to get Napoleon out of his scrape, and had made his own peace with Paoli. At the same time he pointed out that Napoleon had put himself in the wrong with Paoli, and with the public, by his unjustifiable assertion that he had Paoli's authority. Joseph also endeavoured to impress upon Napoleon the virtue of conciseness in narration, Napoleon's account of the riot at Ajaccio was, as

Joseph knew, even more than that of the Municipality, "very long and very prolix and very violent." Joseph sought to impress upon his younger brother that if it had been shorter, and more moderate, it would have been more effective.

It was, indeed, time Napoleon made for Paris. His career in Corsica had been unfortunate, owing to his unscrupulous violence. In Paris he might be able to put a better complexion upon his behaviour during the Ajaccio tumults; he might possibly get some money for the mulberry plantation; above all, he hoped to be reinstated in his regiment. His name had already been struck off the lists; but war had been declared against the Emperor on April 20, and officers might be wanted. Making the best speed possible, he reached Paris on May 28, 1792.

(9) *Paris (May 28, 1792, to September, 1792).*

Napoleon wrote from Paris to Joseph on May 29, 1792.*

I arrived in Paris yesterday. For the time I am in the same hotel as Pozzo di Borgo, Leonetti and Peraldi, Rue Royale, Hôtel des Patriotes Hollandais. I shall change to-morrow as it is too expensive. I have just spoken to Pozzo di Borgo; we were a little constrained, though friendly.

Paris is in the most violent convulsions. It is inundated with strangers and the roughs are very numerous. The town has been kept lighted the last three nights. The national guard at the Tuileries to guard the King, has been doubled. The household troops are said to be unsatisfactory and are to be disbanded.

News from the frontier is always the same. Probably there will be resort to a defensive war.

Desertion among the officers is excessive; the position is critical in many ways. . . .

* Most of the letters translated in this chapter were published originally by Masson in "Napoléon Inconnu," from the "Archives Levie-Ramolino."

I am told that Pozzo di Borgo is on very good terms with the Minister of War.

I have not yet seen Marianna. I shall go to-morrow.

I have not seen Peraldi who is in the country.

Keep on good terms with General Paoli. He can do everything; and is everything. He will be everything in the future which nobody in the world can foresee.

I shall go to-day for the first time to the Assembly.

It has not the same reputation as the Constituent, nor deserves it.

Give news of me to the family. Write soon. I embrace you.

The important points for Napoleon were that it was essential to be in good relations with Paoli, whether for a French or a Corsican career; that Pozzo di Borgo was on good terms with the War Minister—hence Napoleon had endeavoured to make their meeting as friendly as past events would allow; and, finally, most important of all, that in a time of war the officers were emigrating *en masse*. The artillery was losing two-thirds of its officers; consequently there was a strong probability that he would be reinstated.

On June 14 he wrote:

This country is being torn to pieces by the wildest and most frantic people; it is difficult to follow the threads of all the different parties; I do not know how it will end, but matters are taking a very revolutionary turn.

Your letter to Arena [one of the Corsican Deputies] is too curt and you should learn to write in a different manner. I am on good terms with him; he is a zealous democrat. Do not allow yourself to be done; you should get into the next Legislature or you are but a fool.

The last remark shows what Napoleon thought of Joseph's correct methods of electioneering, so different from his own. Joseph had failed at Orezza, while he,

with his combination of fraud and force, had succeeded. On the other hand, Joseph might have replied that he remained in a good position, while Napoleon had unseated himself by his own violence.

Napoleon's criticism of Joseph's literary style as being too curt corresponds to Joseph's previous complaint of Napoleon's excessive verbiage.

On June 18 Napoleon wrote to Joseph :

There are three parties in France. One party desires the Constitution as it stands, thinking it a good one. The other considers the Constitution bad, but wishing for liberty adopts its principles ; it desires a change, but would prefer that the change should be arranged by means of the Constitution, that is to say, by the Court of Revision which will be established in a few years from now. These two parties are united, and for the moment have the same object, the maintenance of the law, of tranquillity, of all constituted authorities.

These two parties are in favour of war against the foreigner ; so we may regard them as one. The second party desires the Constitution, but would prefer a Senate in lieu of the King. This party calls itself republican ; it is the party of the Jacobins. They hope to take advantage of the war with the Queen's brother to carry out this great revolution. The third party thinks the Constitution absurd, and would have a despot. Even amongst these there are many who would like two Chambers or a moderate system, but this third class thinks that they will get nothing without the help of the armies of foreign enemies. . . .

I saw Marianna yesterday ; she is well. She begged me to get her out if any change should be made in the school.

We must ascertain if Lucien might remain with the General. It is more than ever probable that all this will end in our independence. Act with that idea.

On June 20, 1792, the Jacobins organized an armed procession, which passed from the Place du Carrousel into the courtyard of the Tuileries, and so into the palace itself, where the King and Royal Family were

grossly insulted, and might have been killed but for their dignified bearing and the tardy interference of Pétion, the Mayor of Paris. Napoleon, with his Brienne schoolfellow Bourrienne, watched the proceedings from the terrace near the river. He was disgusted. His revolutionary ardour slackened, and began to make way for his perception of the vital necessity of controlling the mob ; his instincts of order revolted at the sight of the King, the representative of the nation, being terrorized by the criminals of Paris.

Of these events he wrote to Joseph :

Friday, 22 June, 1792.

M. de la Fayette has written to the Assembly against the Jacobins. The letter, which many regard as a forgery, is very powerful. M. de la Fayette, a large part of the officers of the army, all honest people, the ministry, the department of Paris, are on one side ; the majority of the Assembly, the Jacobins, and the populace are on the other. The Jacobins do not mince their words against La Fayette whom they stigmatize an assassin, a scoundrel, a wretch. The Jacobins are idiots, with no common sense. The day before yesterday, seven to eight thousand men armed with pikes, hatchets, swords, guns, skewers, sharpened stakes, went to the Assembly to present a petition. From there they went on to the King.

The garden of the Tuileries was shut and defended by 15,000 national guards. They threw down the gates, entered the palace, pointed the cannon against the King's apartment, threw down four doors, presented the King with two cockades, the white and the tricolour. They gave him the choice. Choose, they said, between reigning here or at Coblenz. The King behaved well. He took the red cap. The Queen and Prince Royal did the same. The mob was given wine to drink to the King. They remained four hours in the Palace. This incident has furnished ample matter for the aristocratic declarations of the Feuillants. But it is not the less true, all the same, that all this is unconstitutional and a very dangerous example. It is

very difficult to see what will become of the Empire if events of this outrageous kind continue.

I hope that you are at Ajaccio unless you have already returned. You might have let me know the condition of affairs. Buonarotti is a powerful aid to your project. I am sending you a page from the "Cabinet des Modes." It ought to have been for Paoletta.

I am awaiting your reply about Marianna. I am more undecided than ever. I have been a month at Paris and the papers with regard to the plantation have not arrived. I knew how it would be.

The army of Luckner has made some progress, but it is only a trifle. The capture of Menin and Courtray is mighty little. I have read the absurd letter of Massaria. It is much to our interest to propitiate Arena; make that clear to Fesch and to Lucien.

Cataneo of Calvi is here. Oh! misery of human folly! He is become half crazy, gambles all day, loses often, has sold his clothes and has nothing but a threadbare blue coat. It is pitiable to see him. He has not been to see his daughter for three years. The little one thinks he is in Corsica. This news is for you alone; for, in the present condition of things, I can see one truth only, that we must be on good terms with those who are prepared to be, and have been, our friends.

Peraldi has declared war against me; no quarter. It is lucky for him that he is inviolable, I would have taught him manners, but he is a bigger fool than ever. They think little of him here, where he is well known.

You people of the Department have been rather rude with Arena. If he turns his back upon you, he will make things difficult for you and you would get but feeble support from the others, and besides he has great influence and more ability than the others and really belongs to the dominant clique.

I have written you quantities of letters. No doubt you have received them. I have had exactly five letters from you. Continue to address them to Pietri or to Leonetti.

I wrote to you from Ajaccio about the 26 muskets I had at the house. If you could get them to Pietri who

is at Cervione we could save them and at the present time they might be of great use.

The guillotine was already at work in Paris; the carts were making their daily journey. But Napoleon's threats against Peraldi were mere bravado; if the quarrel had got to that point, Napoleon would have fallen an easy victim to the Peraldi-Paoli influence. The times were so dangerous that he was most anxious to conciliate all who were not open enemies. He was no longer influenced by political partisanship. He had had enlightening experiences in Corsica and in France. He was able to look first at France, then at Corsica, in each case from the outside, with the cool scrutiny of a spectator. It was this standpoint, above everything else, that by freeing his mind of the passions and prejudices which obscure the free working of the intellect amongst the generality of mankind, gave him the power of looking straight, regardless of distracting elements, directly on to his object. That is the secret of that rare quality, common sense, so named because it is just ordinary sense, which any man could easily attain if he were only free from the prevalent diseases of passion and prejudice. So few are in that fortunate position that common sense is only another word for genius.

Louis, aged thirteen and a half, wrote to Joseph, who was at Corte, on May 24, 1792: "My dear brother, I send you a letter I found in Lucien's desk. He has written a sanguinary letter against the deputy, who wrote a letter to his supporters. He wishes to send his letter to the General. That might well turn against the welfare of the family. In spite of our urgent entreaties he persists in his intention. . . . You trouble too much about my going to Corte. You know that would not vex me, for you know my character. You have only to say the word, and I remain. You have

only to say it in a contrary sense, and I would go. In short, you should not be ignorant that after Napolione you are the one whom I esteem and cherish most."

The Bonapartes, like others of their time and country, would not hesitate to extract letters from each other's desks, or to open letters addressed to other people. Louis was on special terms, as pupil to brotherly teacher, towards Napoleon; but he was more especially obedient to the eldest of the family.

Lucien at this time was seventeen. Napoleon wrote to him:

"I have read your proclamation; it is worthless. There are too many words, not enough ideas. You aim at pathos. That is not the way to speak to the people. They have more sense and tact than you think. Your prose will do more harm than good."

Napoleon, it will be remembered, had already been himself criticized for his excessive verbiage; he also had often aimed at pathos, though irony had been his favourite device. He was being drastically educated by the terrors of the time.

He wrote again:

PARIS,
3 July, 1792.

I send you the project of the committee for public education; nothing has yet been decided and in this time of combustion the Assembly cannot consider it.

Read it with attention, my dear Lucien, and profit by it; it is not a chef d'œuvre, but still it is good.

The step taken by La Fayette* is considered by sensible men to have been necessary, but very dangerous for the public liberty. In time of revolution an example becomes a law, and it is a very dangerous example that this General has just given. The people, that is to say the lowest class, are irritated and no doubt there will be a conflict.

* La Fayette left his army, and on June 28 appeared at the bar of the Assembly and tried to stop the growing anarchy.

The shock may be of a nature to hasten the ruin of the Constitution.

Those who are at the head of affairs are poor men ; it must be admitted, when one sees all that at close quarters, that the people are little worth the trouble one takes to obtain their favour. You know the history of Ajaccio ; that of Paris is exactly the same ; perhaps men here are even smaller, worse, greater calumniators, and more censorious.*

One has to see that from close quarters to perceive that enthusiasm is mere enthusiasm and that the French are an ancient people who are out of control.

Every man seeks his own interests and hopes to arrive by means of horrors, of calumnies ; intrigue is as base now as ever. All that destroys ambition. One is sorry for those who have the misfortune to be playing a part, especially when they might pass by ; to live in tranquillity, to enjoy the affections of family and home, that, my dear Lucien, if one has four to five thousand livres [\pounds 160 to \pounds 200] a year, is the position to have when one is from 25 to 40 years of age, when the imagination is calmed down and no longer torments.

I embrace you and recommend you to moderate yourself in everything ; in everything, you understand, if you wish to live happily.

Lucien meantime had written a remarkable letter to Joseph :

UCCIANI,
24 June, 4 of Liberty.

The letter of Napoleone gave me much pleasure for Marianna. "She is," he says, "an aristocrat and I dissimulated with these ladies." That is what I do not approve. I consider that one ought to place oneself above the circumstances of the moment and take up a decided position if one wishes to be somebody and to make a name : no men in history are more detested than those who go with the wind ; I tell you in the expansion of my confidence, I have always discerned in Napoleon an ambition not entirely

* Napoleon's dislike of towns, especially of Ajaccio and Paris, is evident.

egotistical but which overcomes his desire for the public good; I am convinced that in a free state he would be a dangerous man. He seems to me to have a strong inclination to be a tyrant, and I believe he would be one if he were King, and that his name would be for posterity, and for the sensitive patriot, a name of horror.

I see, and not for the first time, that in case of a Revolution, Napoleone would endeavour to ride on the billows, and I think that for his personal interest he would be capable of becoming a turn-coat. Perhaps I am mistaken; remember it is to you I am speaking; I will myself make my meaning clear to him; for I have already too formed a mind to be able to follow any other impulse than my own in public affairs; you cannot imagine how deeply my nature is enthusiastic; I feel in myself the courage to be a tyrannicide, and if wicked men tried to drag us once more in chains, I would die dagger in hand and not like an imbecile with these comedy priests at my pillow. And in this solitude, always thinking—for what can I do?—I shut myself up in myself and develope my character in a very pronounced manner . . . and my ideas agitate me to such an extent that I must write about them; I can do nothing else; I am busy now with an idea; I have begun a song about Brutus, just a song after the manner of Young's nights or of short poems such as "The Last Judgment" or "The Death of Anne." I write with astonishing speed; my pen flies and then I scratch it all out. I correct little; I do not like the rules that bound genius and do not observe any. Young is my model, he penetrates my soul in a thousand ways. I do not expect to do anything good yet, but hope to come to it by plodding along.

That is my situation; if you will permit me, I will also announce to you my opinion of yourself in all sincerity.

This is the earliest authentic contemporary portrait of Napoleon, and revelation of Lucien. The career of these two men followed the road indicated. Napoleon sacrificed his principles in order to float to power on the advancing wave, and used his position to make

himself a tyrant. Lucien adhered, in the main, to his opinions, and when the Emperor tried to induce him, by the offer of a kingdom, to put away his wife, Lucien rejected the proposal with scorn. Nothing availed—no entreaties from his relations, no threats, no rewards, however stupendous, for a man conscious of the ability to carry out great schemes and itching to show what he could do—nothing could turn him from his determination. He would not, like Napoleon, “dissimulate with these ladies.”

Was Lucien, barely seventeen, the only one to understand the character of Napoleon? It would seem so. It was doubtless plain to all that Napoleon was ambitious; but, though not universal, that is quite a common condition at the age of twenty-three, requiring only opportunity for its exhibition. In the unprecedented condition of public affairs an open display of ambition must have been too usual to attract notice. But Lucien speaks seriously of a definite aim at royalty. Even that may not have been unique in those days. But there were very few lads of seventeen capable of seeing through an elder brother, and describing himself, with the acumen Lucien exhibited.

On July 10, 1792, Napoleon was reinstated in his regiment. Peraldi had done his best to prevent it. He had denounced Napoleon's conduct in the riot at Ajaccio. “The law,” he declared, “will strike the guilty; so much the worse for Quenza, who has allowed himself to be implicated in the criminal projects of the Bonapartes.” Pozzo di Borgo had at first described Napoleon as a tiger, a “Jourdan coupe-têtes,” but he afterwards submitted to coldly neutral relations, having come to the conclusion that it would be preferable that Napoleon should be submerged in the French army rather than reappear as a disturbing element in Corsica.

On July 8, two days before Napoleon's reinstatement,

the Minister of War wrote to Maillard his decision with regard to the Ajaccio riot. He said :

"Quenza and Bonaparte supported the disorders and excesses of the troops they commanded ; the conduct of both was infinitely reprehensible, and if their misdeeds had been purely military they would be sent at once before a court-martial. But civilians were also implicated in the Ajaccio affair, which was especially a question of public safety ; it should be reserved for the ordinary judges and referred to the Minister of Justice and not to the Minister of War."

In spite of this very severe censure, Napoleon was reinstated, given his back pay, and promoted to Captain, as if he had never been cashiered. Officers were emigrating in such numbers that rapid advancement was certain for all who supported the Revolution. Of the fifty-five young men who went up for examination with Napoleon in 1785, only six now remained. He was a Captain dating from February 6, 1792.

He wrote to Joseph :

Tuesday, 7 August.

The day after to-morrow the question of the dethronement of the King will be considered. Everything points to violent events ; many people are leaving Paris. It has been decreed that monks and nuns must abandon their houses. The goods of the congregations are confiscated, etc, etc.

The matter of the battalion of Ajaccio to which I have paid no attention because it interests me little in a time of combustion like this, has been sent from the War Office to the Minister of Justice because it is not considered to contain any military offence. That is what I wanted. So that affair is finished.

I have seen a letter from Mario Peraldi to Peretti, captain of grenadiers, on Leonetti's table. Tell Quenza, so that if it is an intrigue, Quenza may watch it.

I think I shall resign myself to leave shortly and abandon the battalion. So, whatever happens, I shall be established in France.

Adopt an attitude to enable you to be a deputy in

the next legislature; otherwise you will always have but a poor position in Corsica.

I have been much occupied with astronomy during my stay here. It is a fine diversion and a superb science. With my mathematical knowledge it requires little study to acquire this science. It is another great acquisition. If I had considered only the interest of the family and my own inclination I would have gone to Corsica, but you are all agreed that I should go to my regiment. So I will go. My work is finished, corrected, copied, but this is not the time for printing it.* Besides I have no longer the petty ambition to be an author. Adieu. Compliments to Massaria and all our friends. Tell Paolo Batista that it is possible I may send in my resignation from the battalion. Also inform Tanuso Tavera so that they may concur.

My health is better. Tell Lucien that I will write to him incessantly.

The last sentence probably indicates that Napoleon had seen Lucien's letter to Joseph. The effect of reading this letter would be to embolden Napoleon to adhere to the half-formed ideas referred to, and grasp them intentionally, with a definite purpose. Hitherto he may scarcely have been aware of his own tendencies. When they were dragged into the light, and exposed to himself as well as to others, he would be pushed forward, forced to go hurriedly on in the direction indicated.

He witnessed the attack on the Tuileries of August 10, and the massacre of the Swiss. He said to Las Cases at St. Helena: "At the sound of the alarm-bell, and on the news that the Tuileries was being attacked, I ran to the Carrousel, to Fauvelet, brother of Bourrienne, who had a furniture shop there. He had been my comrade at the Military School at Brienne. From that house I could at my ease observe all the events of that day. Before I had reached the Carrousel I had met, in the Rue des Petits-Champs,

* This may refer to a revised copy of the essay on Happiness.

a group of hideous men, with a head on the top of a pike. Seeing me passably dressed and with the appearance of a gentleman, they came towards me to make me cry *Vive la Nation!* which I did without difficulty as may well be imagined.

"The Castle was attacked by the vilest of mobs. The King undoubtedly had for his defence as large a force as the Convention afterwards had on the 13 Vendémiaire, and the enemies of the latter were far more disciplined and redoubtable. The greater part of the National Guard was for the King; one must do it that justice.

"The Palace carried, and the King in the care of the Assembly, I ventured to enter the Tuileries Garden. Never again, in any of my battlefields, did I get such an impression as that given me by the masses of the corpses of the Swiss; perhaps it was the narrow space that exaggerated the numbers, or the effect may have been due to its being my first experience of that kind. I saw well-dressed women indulge in acts of the utmost indecency towards the corpses. I visited all the neighbouring cafés; everywhere passions were violent, rage was in all hearts; it was visible in every face, although these were very far from being the common people; and it was evident that these places were occupied every day by the same clients, for, though there was nothing peculiar in my dress, perhaps because my expression was more calm, it was plain to me that I excited hostile and defiant looks as a stranger, and therefore suspected."

On the same day Napoleon wrote to Joseph a letter which has been lost. In his Memoirs Joseph said that the chief points in the letter were: "If Louis XVI. had shown himself on horseback, the victory would have been his; that was how it appeared to me from the demeanour of the various groups at the outset. After the victory of the Marseillais I saw one who was

about to kill one of the guards. I said to him : ' Oh ! man from the South, let us spare this unfortunate.'— ' Art thou from the South ?'—' Yes.' ' Well, let us spare him.' "

It was not till August 30 that Napoleon at last actually received his brevet of Captain. With that in his hand he obtained the same day an audience of M. Monge, Minister of Marine, and presented him a written request for the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel of Marine Artillery, in the following terms :

Sir, the qualifications one must have when asking for employment are of two kinds; the conditions required by the law and personal qualities. The necessary qualification for the post of Lieut.-Colonel of Marine Artillery is by the decree of the 23 August, a captaincy in the artillery. M. Bonaparte is captain in the 4th regiment of artillery. The qualities which might militate in his favour are : ordinary abilities, knowledge of the theory and practise of his profession, enjoying the esteem of the chiefs of the corps who have often employed him in extraordinary labours and in the management of experiments, which of all kinds of work requires most capacity and judgement. His civic status is established by the different administrative bodies who have given him their testimony. Finally his rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of the second battalion of volunteers, which gives him the grade of Lieut.-Colonel in the army, makes him anticipate no other advantage, in passing into the Marine Artillery, than that of returning to occupations which he enjoys. So he hopes for the good favour of M. Monge.

BUONAPARTE.

On August 16 the St. Cyr Institution was suppressed by decree, and it was hardly possible for Elisa to remain in Paris, or to travel to Corsica without escort. Napoleon felt that, received everywhere with black looks owing to his decent appearance, Paris was no longer a safe place for himself. He could not go to his regiment leaving Elisa unprotected. He saw

that he would have to escort her, and he tried therefore to obtain a post which would locate him on the south coast, near Corsica, and at the same time keep him employed in the artillery; but his application failed.

On September, 1792, passing through crowds who kept shouting "Vive la Nation!" Napoleon went to St. Cyr, and obtained permission to take away Elisa. Then he applied to the Directory of the district for travelling money for Elisa—1 franc a league, 352 francs for the 352 leagues from Versailles to Ajaccio, which was given him on the spot. He was unable to get away before the massacres of the prisoners, September 2 to 5, and during their progress exit was barred. He often spoke afterwards of these massacres, but never did he so much as hint that he witnessed them, though it is probable that he went to see what was going on.

He left Paris with Elisa on September 9, and was detained some time at Marseilles by bad weather. While there at the hotel, Elisa's hat, which had large feathers, attracted unfavourable attention, and cries of "Death to the aristocrats!" were raised. Napoleon shouted back, "No more aristocrats than you are!" took Elisa's hat from her head, and threw it into the crowd, amid clamorous applause.

It was not till the middle of October, 1792, that a favourable wind landed them at Ajaccio.

(10) *Corsica (October, 1792, to June 11, 1793).*

For the fifth time Napoleon returned to Corsica from France. The whole family was now in the Bonaparte house. Their ages were: Letizia, forty-two; Joseph (much away at Corte), twenty-four and a half; Napoleon, twenty-three; Lucien, seventeen and a half; Elisa, fifteen and a half; Louis, fourteen;

Pauline, twelve ; Caroline, ten and a half ; Jerome, eight.

Before Napoleon reached Corsica the elections to the National Convention had already taken place at Corte. Paoli was dangerously ill at the time, and in his absence three of his candidates were defeated. He was on September 15 elected President of the Electoral Assembly by a unanimous vote of the 396 electors ; but Saliceti, elected Vice-President with 251 votes, had to take his place. Then the six Deputies were elected—Saliceti, Chiappe, Casabianca, Andrei, Bozio, Moltedo. Joseph had been candidate for one of these positions, but of 398 votes he obtained only 64. Saliceti behaved with skill towards Paoli. Though a Jacobin, he succeeded in allaying the wary old man's suspicions. Saliceti had been one of the four Deputies to the National Assembly, had played an important part in obtaining the decree which made Corsica an integral part of France, and was a man of great astuteness. He bought votes wholesale. The electors were driving hard bargains, demanding gold and refusing assignats. Saliceti, Moltedo, and Chiappe had money, and spent it freely. Joseph's case was hopeless : Paoli was against him, and he had no money. Napoleon had hoped to arrive in Corsica in time to assist Joseph, but his presence would not have affected the result. He brought a certain prestige, having been at headquarters in Paris, acquainted with some of the men known to the Corsicans, and a witness of the astounding recent events. He had a decided, self-confident air, and a French uniform ; but Joseph was more liked and better known.

The violent methods employed by Napoleon at the election of Colonels of Volunteers at Ajaccio could not have been repeated with success among the influential representative electors of Corsica, and Napoleon had no longer the Archdeacon's money. The Bonapartes

were now reaping the results of Napoleon's discreditable tactics.

Paoli recovered quickly from his fever, and soon showed his power. At the elections in December, 1792, when every public post was open to competition, his nominees were everywhere triumphant. Saliceti had been unmasked and was well beaten. Joseph went back to the Bonaparte house at Ajaccio without any official position, though he had been one of the powerful Directory. Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo was elected by Paoli's influence to the important post of Procureur Général Syndic. As he explained afterwards, *egli capo, io mano* ("Paoli was the head, I was the hand"). These three Corsicans—Paoli, Pozzo, Saliceti—were men of exceptional powers, a very remarkable trio to be produced by a small island. They help to account for Napoleon.

On his arrival Napoleon joined the six companies of his Volunteers which were at Corte, three companies being with Quenza at Bonifacio. He found them in a state of disorder: their pay was long in arrear, many had deserted, the remainder were insubordinate. Napoleon wrote to Quenza on October 27, 1792, asking for arrears of pay for himself as well as his men, and observed:

"The General is very displeased with the Volunteer battalions in general, and ours in particular. We must not exhibit the true state of affairs; the best policy is quite the contrary. We must punish officers and soldiers who resist discipline, but not accuse them publicly, except in the last extremity."

The interviews Napoleon had with Paoli at this time made it quite plain that he had nothing to hope for in that quarter. Indeed, Paoli went so far as to encourage Napoleon's desperate talk about taking service with the English in India. As Napoleon remarked to Lady Malcolm at St. Helena, the difficulty of the strange

language was insuperable; otherwise he was just in the mood for such an adventure. He spoke of it in the family circle. Lucien records in his *Memoirs* that Napoleon remarked that an officer's pay in India was good; a capable artillery officer was rare anywhere, and especially in India; at the worst he might be able to organize the native artillery and direct it against the English; though he was a Captain at the age of twenty-two, that was merely due to the emigration of superior officers; at Paris all promotions were obtained by women, and he was not happy with them.

It is noteworthy that when Napoleon found his career in Corsica apparently compromised by the coldness of Paoli, he should have thought of the East, and not given his regiment in France any consideration. Serious fighting appeared imminent, with Prussian and Austrian invaders on the frontiers, and, trained officers being hard to find, his promotion would have been rapid. There is something more here than distrust of his influence with women. He had seen the ugliness of a Paris mob on June 20 and August 10, and probably had also witnessed the atrocious September massacres. After his experience in Paris, when it seemed that at any moment he might be dragged to the lantern because he looked like a gentleman, and again in Marseilles, when a feather in Elisa's bonnet brought them both very near to death, he was afraid of France. Corsica was a much safer place, and even India was less hopeless. It is probable that he had already begun to change his political principles, and was no longer, after what he had seen in France, an ardent Jacobin.

His unwillingness to return to France in 1792-93 seems to show that he was then already disillusioned, that he agreed with Paoli in reprobating the Jacobin excesses, that he considered France no country for an educated man. Moreover, he had always disliked

being under French orders, whether at Brienne, Paris, Valence, or Auxonne, whether at school or in the army. The present disorderly condition of affairs in the French Army, with civilian Commissioners, "representatives of the people," wielding despotic powers, would disgust any professional soldier.

Napoleon had not yet begun to look upon France as his stage. Throughout his childhood, up to the age of fourteen, he had always expected to join the French Navy, with headquarters at Toulon, taking frequent holidays in Corsica. He was twenty-three years of age, an officer of nearly seven years' standing, and he had contrived to spend more than half of that time away from his regiment in his native land. He regarded his French uniform merely as a means of impressing his fellow-countrymen, and hoped even now, in spite of Paoli, to make himself a position in Corsica. The obstinacy of his character, the vendetta spirit of the Corsican, which declines to accept defeat, kept him rooted to Corsica. His Colonel had given him leave, and he intended to use that leave in forcing a way for himself in Corsica, with or without Paoli, and never for a moment contemplated a plunge into the French maelstrom—rather, if necessary, the East.

Then came the news that a descent upon the neighbouring island of Sardinia was in preparation, in which he could take part. It was supposed that the Sardinians were anxious for "freedom," and wished to depose their King and abolish their nobility. An expedition consisting of 4,000 Volunteers from Marseilles, with the four battalions of Corsican Volunteers, and the three French regiments of the line in garrison in Corsica, was to sail under the command of Rear-Admiral Truguet, for an attack upon Cagliari, while a feint would be made at the same time against the Maddalena Islands, which command the Sardinian passage of the Straits of Bonifacio.

Early in December the sailors of Truguet's fleet disembarked at Ajaccio. They at once began to terrorize the inhabitants. On December 18 they actually seized two Corsican Volunteers, and for a trifling offence hanged them, cut the corpses in pieces, and paraded the fragments on pikes about the streets. The Corsican Volunteers rushed to arms, and would have murdered all the French sailors in the town if their commanders had not succeeded in inducing them to return to their quarters; then they were marched out of Ajaccio to neighbouring villages. It was obvious that they could not be placed on board the ships to fraternize with the sailors. When the Marseillais arrived they behaved like the sailors, murdering one of the Volunteers. They were the scum of the South. There could be no co-operation between them and the Corsicans, and a new arrangement had to be made. The Corsicans, Napoleon and his regiment among them, with a French corvette, were sent to attack the Maddalena Islands, while the Marseillais and the line troops assailed Cagliari.

Both assaults ended in the most ignominious failure.

On February 15, 1793, the Marseillais, landed before Cagliari, were seized with panic, threw away their weapons and other encumbrances, and raced back to the ships. They were quite useless for fighting purposes, and Truguet had to take them back to France.

On February 22 the Corsicans, under the command of Colonna Cesari, nephew of Paoli, and former Deputy to the National Assembly, were landed on the island of Santo Stefano, one of the Maddalena group. Next day they captured a tower on Santo Stefano, and Napoleon had a battery constructed containing a mortar and several cannon, pointing against the fort on the Maddalena island itself. On the 24th he opened fire, with some success. It was then intended to land troops on that island and

capture the battered forts. But the French sailors on the corvette were, like the Marseillais, mere rabble, who were terrified at the sound of the guns. A Sardinian shot had reached the corvette, and the sailors thereupon, indifferent to the commands and entreaties of their officers, took the ship out of range. But they could still see the smoke of the firing that was going on and hear the noise. They decided to depart altogether. With the greatest difficulty Colonna Cesari and the ship's officers succeeded in delaying the departure of the corvette until the Volunteers had reached their boats. The Sardinians had some armed galleys, which could not face the twenty-two guns and culverins of the corvette, but, in its absence, would have cut off the communications of the landed force. The troops, once in their boats, hurried after the corvette as fast as possible. Arrived safely at Bonifacio, scenes of mutual recrimination occurred.

It has been recorded of Napoleon at Bonifacio that he was neat in dress and particular about his appearance. He washed himself every morning with a wet sponge, and he had a dressing-case ornamented with silver and marked with his crest. His clean and well-groomed person made him an object of suspicion to the French sailors, who were as cowardly as the Marseillais, and as handy with the rope. A number of them made a sudden rush at Napoleon with cries of "To the lantern with the aristocrat!" but he was rescued by one of his Corsican Volunteers, who stabbed one of them, and the rest promptly fled. No wonder Napoleon kept away from the land where such creatures were in power.

The failure of the attacks upon the Sardinian coast was due solely to the utter cowardice of the Marseillais and French sailors, who were a mere rabble of criminals. When they returned to Provence they loudly blamed the Corsican Volunteers and their commander Cesari,

and declared that Paoli had done his utmost to make success impossible.

Napoleon, while still at Bonifacio, drew up a memoir describing the importance of the Maddalena forts as giving command of the Straits of Bonifacio, and made out a detailed scheme for a renewed attempt. In this he wrote: "It is necessary to be absolute mistress of the sea. I do not say only that we must be the stronger—that would not be enough. With one corvette we would not be afraid of the whole Sardinian Navy, but, at the same time, we would not be able to stop the communication between the islands and the Continent; not chase, much less capture, the galley ships." Then he explains that, besides the corvette, a brig and two gunboats are necessary to keep the galleys from issuing out. The corvette could not chase them owing to their lighter draught.

Napoleon also prepared plans for the defence of the Gulf of Ajaccio, and the Gulf of San Fiorenzo on the north-west of Corsica. Commissioners from the Convention were expected, and Napoleon may have made out these projects to present to them, in the hope of obtaining advancement or employment.

On January 9 Saliceti wrote him a very intimate letter, in which he said the December elections were a counter-revolution, and hinted plainly that Paoli's conduct was unsatisfactory and would have to be inquired into. Saliceti, alone of the Corsican Deputies, voted for the execution of the King, which took place on January 21, 1793, and led to war with England. It was now recalled that Paoli had lived for twenty years in London with a pension from the British Government, and that he had always spoken of England and the English in terms of warm and generous praise. Saliceti, Barthélemy Arena, Volney, and others, all of them from motives of revenge for the coldness or hostility of Paoli towards them during the

elections, made it their business to denounce him as in the pay of England, a traitor, only waiting for an opportunity to give Corsica to the enemy. On January 17 the Convention was induced by the discontented Corsican element in Paris—all the Paolists being in active employment in Corsica—to place the 23rd, or Corsican, Division, of which Paoli was the Commander, under General Biron, Commander-in-Chief of the army of Italy. This was followed, on February 3, by an order from the Minister of War to Paoli to join his Commander at Nice. Vendettas now took the form of contests for the services of the guillotine. Paoli recognized the head-hunters, and excused himself on the score of age and ill-health.

The Commissioners on the coasts of Provence now joined in the gruesome game. They sent Paoli a request for his presence at Toulon to discuss the situation, observing that they were far too busy to afford the time to travel to Corsica to consult him. Paoli made the same reply to them.

On February 5 the Convention sent three Commissioners to Corsica with unlimited powers—Saliceti, Lacombe - Saint Michel, and Delcher, all regicides. They left Paris on the 12th, and reached Toulon on March 2. News of the failure of the Sardinian expedition had arrived, and the whole of Provence was furious with Paoli and his Corsicans, who were regarded as responsible for the disaster. On March 13 the portrait of Paoli, hanging in a position of honour on the walls of the patriotic club of Marseilles, was pulled down and burned amidst general applause. Contrary winds kept the Commissioners long waiting at Toulon. At length they reached San Fiorenzo on April 5, and Bastia next day. From Bastia the Commissioners sent Paoli a pressing invitation to join them, and give them the benefit of his advice; but Paoli was not so simple—his health prevented him



PASQUALE PAOLI.

After a drawing by George Dance in the British Museum.

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from mounting a horse. Saliceti, with singular courage, himself went to see him at Corte on April 13. He urged Paoli to go to Bastia to assist the Commissioners, with many flattering remarks, which Paoli returned in full, expressing a sanguine hope that his health would soon enable him to make the journey. Saliceti was back at Bastia on April 16, having gained nothing, but the Commissioners hoped to induce Paoli to take a wrong step of some kind. In the meanwhile it was their cue to exhibit complete confidence in the Corsican idol.

On the next day, April 17, there arrived the startling news that the Convention had ordered the arrest of Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo. On hearing it, the Corsicans swarmed to Corte to protect their hero. Civil war was in prospect, with heavy odds on the side of Paoli, his Jacobin opponents having little influence. The Commissioners held Calvi, San Fiorenzo, and Bastia; but Ajaccio was held for Paoli by the 4th Battalion of Volunteers, and Bonifacio in the same interest by Quenza with some companies of Napoleon's regiment. The interior of the island was entirely Paolist.

Napoleon hastened to try and make his position safe, or it would go hard with the family. He wrote to the Convention a defence of Paoli. No sooner was this done than the astounding news came that it was a violent speech against Paoli, delivered by the young Lucien at Toulon, which had induced the Convention to order the arrest of the great Corsican. Lucien was just eighteen. He had gone to Toulon as secretary to Semonville, French Ambassador to Turkey. His youthful ardour and desire to express his violent revolutionary doctrines had impelled him to make a speech in the local patriotic club, in which he accused Paoli of being a tyrant, and demanded his death by the guillotine (*Livrez sa tête au glaive de la loi*); for Paoli had refused to take Lucien as secretary!

Motives of private revenge were now the customary lever of men's actions throughout revolutionary France. The wounded vanity of a boy of eighteen might be used to put to death one of the greatest men of the age, who had dared decline to employ him.

Lucien's speech was at once printed by the club and sent to Paris, and it was read in the Convention on April 2. The news of the defection of Dumouriez had just arrived, and the Convention was prepared to believe, as Marat, Barère, Cambon, and others asserted, that Paoli was another traitor, preparing to hand over Corsica to the enemy. Hence its order for his arrest.

Lucien wrote home in exultation that he had dealt a fatal blow to the enemies of the family. His letter was intercepted, and published with an Italian translation by Pozzo di Borgo, who had copies distributed about the island. At the head he wrote: "The original is being kept to consign to perpetual infamy the name of its author"; and he added in a note at the end that the Bonapartes had been educated and bought by Marbeuf, and were now the chief supporters of the conspiracy against the people.

The Bonapartes were now forced into the French party, and their careers would have to be in France unless the French could at once reconquer Corsica from Paoli. This was their only hope if they were to remain in their native land; and so, while Joseph was at Bastia conferring with his friend Saliceti, Napoleon at Ajaccio made several attempts to get control of the citadel. In the name of the Commissioners he offered Colonna Leca, the commander of the Corsican Volunteers in the citadel, the command of Ajaccio, with the rank of General, if he would give up the citadel to the partisans of the Convention. He proposed that the guns of a warship which had been wrecked at the entrance of the harbour should be placed in the citadel, hoping to get his partisans in

while the drawbridge was down. But the Paolists were stanch. On May 5 Paoli said in a letter : " Napoleon Bonaparte, Abbatucci, and, I think, Meuron, and some of their friends, have been recently trying to turn the National Guard out of the citadel, as if a fortress was safer for the Republic in the custody of French troops of the line than with Corsican Volunteers."

Being unable to do anything at Ajaccio, Napoleon determined to join Joseph and the Commissioners at Bastia. He left on May 3, accompanied by a peasant ; but the partisans of Mario Peraldi seized him at Bocognano. He managed to escape, with the assistance of his Bocognano friends, and got back to Ajaccio. There he found shelter in the house of his cousin Levie, former Mayor of Ajaccio. Levie collected and armed a number of supporters, who slept on mattresses in the passage of the house. While preparations were being made for Napoleon's escape by sea, gendarmes appeared, and their chief was admitted alone into the house by Levie, who shut the door behind him. The gendarme was ill at ease, perceiving the mattresses, evidence of the presence of armed men, and fearing he had walked into a trap, and would be murdered. Levie politely asked what was his business. The officer replied that he had been ordered to search for Napoleon Bonaparte, who was reported to be concealed in the house. Levie said that, to a man in his position, who had been Mayor of the town, such an inquiry was offensive, but that he was welcome to examine the house and see what it contained. The gendarme had no wish to go any further, and, observing that Levie's word was enough, was glad to escape. Then Napoleon was hurried to a boat in the harbour, and left the same night ; he landed at Macinaggio, whence he found his way on horseback, not without difficulty, to Bastia.

The Emperor remembered several of those who had assisted him in his perilous journey. He left in his will 10,000 francs each to three Bocognano peasants who had between them practically saved his life, and he left 100,000 francs to Levie.

At Bastia Napoleon, on May 11, propounded to the Commissioners a plan for the capture of Ajaccio, telling them that, with the exception of the Peraldi faction, the city was loyal to France. One very urgent reason for his desiring an expedition to Ajaccio was the dangerous position of Letizia and the younger children. He hoped, at least, to be able to get them away in safety.

The Commissioners decided upon the venture. On May 23 an expedition set sail from San Fiorenzo with 400 regular troops on board, accompanied by the Commissioners, and by Joseph and Napoleon. On the evening of the same day Letizia received news from Costa of Bastelica (to whom the Emperor left 100,000 francs in his will) that a considerable force of Paolists had arrived in the outskirts of Ajaccio. She escaped at once with her children to the Milelli country house. That night the Bonaparte house at Ajaccio was sacked by the Paolists. On the 25th Letizia and her children contrived, scrambling over rocks and through *maquis*, to reach the Capitello tower on the further side of the bay. There, on May 29, the Commissioners' expedition having at last arrived, Napoleon found them, and he sent them in a boat to Girolata, whence they were able to reach Calvi by land, where they were welcomed by the Giubega family.

The Commissioners found, when the ships arrived in the Bay of Ajaccio, that the town and district were for Paoli; and as they could achieve nothing without land assistance, they were obliged to return to Bastia. Joseph and Napoleon joined the family at Calvi.

On May 29 a general Council of representatives from all parts of the island, which had been sitting at

Corte, passed without opposition the following resolution :

"Considering that the brothers Bonaparte have seconded all the efforts and supported the impostures of Arena, and have joined the Commissioners of the Convention, who despair of subjecting us to their tyrannical faction and threaten to sell us to Genoa :

"Considering, moreover, that it would be unworthy of the dignity of the Corsican people to occupy itself with the families of Arena and Bonaparte, the Council abandons them to their own remorse and to public opinion, which has already condemned them to perpetual execration and infamy."

The Bonapartes might have remained at Calvi, perhaps, but they were quite destitute, and could not expect to be permanently welcomed as guests. Napoleon, in any case, would return to France to join his regiment; and Joseph hoped that his friend Saliceti might obtain for him some post in the public service. They could not be worse off in France. On June 11 they embarked: Letizia, Joseph, Napoleon, Elisa, Louis, Pauline, Caroline, Jerome, and Fesch. Lucien, the final cause of their expatriation, was already at Toulon, where the family arrived on June 13, 1793.

CHAPTER V

EARLY FRENCH CAREER

I. LE SOUPER DE BEAUCAIRE.

LETIZIA and her children, after a few days in Toulon, found cheaper lodgings at La Valette, a village in the suburbs. Napoleon went to Nice, where a detachment of his regiment was quartered. There he found Jean du Teil, brother of his former patron, General in command of the artillery of the army of Italy. Promotion had been rapid: during his absence Napoleon had risen to Capitaine-Commandant. Du Teil occupied him in inspecting the batteries of the coast and in collecting artillery material.

The tenacity with which Napoleon had clung to Corsica to the last moment was now equalled by the swiftness, and the thoroughness, of the change henceforth in his attitude towards France. Even before the flight from Corsica he had already, in the hope of covering over the unfortunate defence of Paoli which he had sent to Paris, prepared a memorandum in the opposite sense, denouncing Paoli, the former patriot, as a traitor, while the Corsicans who had been bravely struggling for freedom were now rebels. To prove his orthodoxy and zeal, and his complete renunciation of the feelings which had always inspired him from childhood up to his then age of nearly twenty-four, he now worked out a plan for the re-conquest of Corsica by the same French whom he had always so violently

hated as foreign oppressors of a free nation. A new orientation had to be adopted, and he made it without hesitation, and in as radical and thorough a manner as he could contrive, that there should be no doubt of his "patriotism" (French). The Corsican traitors and rebels were to be subdued, and the islands once more given over to French conquerors.

His new memorandum was shown to the provisional Council at Paris by Joseph, who had travelled there with Saliceti for that express purpose. The Convention approved the scheme, and sent Saliceti, who took Joseph with him, to detach 4,000 men from the army of Italy for a descent upon Corsica. They were stopped on their way at Lyons, which had revolted, and it being then plainly impossible to consider an expedition against Corsica until the rebel towns in France had been subdued, they were ordered to join the Republican army under Carteaux, which they ultimately found at Marseilles.

After the execution of Louis XVI. on January 21, 1793, matters had been going badly for the Republic. France was at war with England, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Piedmont and Sardinia, and Spain. On March 18 the French General, Dumouriez, was defeated at Neerwinden, and the Netherlands had to be evacuated. Then Dumouriez went over to the Austrians, who advanced into the North of France. The terrible outbreak began in La Vendée, which was followed by defections from the Convention of large areas of France, and great cities, such as Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles. The Sardinian expedition failed; Corsica was lost; the Prussians captured Mainz; the Piedmontese passed the Alps; the Spaniards came over the Pyrenees. The Conventional Government was surrounded by foreign enemies who were triumphing in every direction, and a half of France itself was in rebellion. The Republic seemed doomed, and

a restoration under Louis XVII. appeared to be imminent.

But the situation was by no means desperate. The various rebel towns and districts failed to combine, waited to be attacked, and were overcome one after the other. The foreign enemies were even more divided. Allies in name, they were intensely jealous and suspicious of each other, and acted quite independently. There was little danger to the Republic in their separate forces and their irresolute, spasmodic movements.

The Convention, however, was incapable of making the most of its advantages, with interior lines, and soldiers all of one nationality, owing to the diseased emotions of its leaders, who could not tolerate the idea of power in the hands of an individual. Already in the early days of the Revolution it had been clear to all competent observers, and had been openly prophesied by Burke, by the Empress Catherine of Russia, by Mirabeau, and many others, that the end would be a military dictatorship. But a revolutionary Government is so thick with the venom of jealousy and hatred that it will not accept the Man until these passions have worn themselves out. Napoleon had the fortune to be too young to be a candidate for the post before it had been decided to fill it. Dumouriez, who was well fitted, at the head of a moderate Government, to defend France against internal and foreign enemies, came to maturity too soon.

But while the Convention could not tolerate a Generalissimo, it hit upon an expedient which gave the French armies a single source of inspiration. On July 10, 1793, the great Comité de Salut Public had been formed. On August 10 a decree was issued, by which all officers of noble birth were to be expelled from the army. As this necessitated a complete re-officering of the army, the Comité wisely added to

their numbers two officers, Carnot and Prieur (d'Or), both of the Engineers, who joined as special military members. Prieur was to superintend the supply of war material, Carnot to manage the personnel, and make the plans of campaign. From this time the Convention troops had the enormous—in fact, decisive—advantage of a single, powerful, controlling authority. That Carnot, the man chosen, should prove a genius was a piece of undeserved, even unnecessary, good fortune.

In the old royal army it had been essential for every officer to prove his nobility. The order that all nobles should be cashiered permanently drove out of the army most of the King's officers, and seriously interfered with the careers of the few who had adopted the Revolution. The future Marshals, Davout, Berthier, Grouchy, and others of less fame, had to retire for the time. Napoleon was spared as a Corsican refugee, an amply certified patriot; and he was befriended by Saliceti, who had been appointed one of the all-powerful representatives of the people with the army of Carteaux. Saliceti stood by his Corsican friends. He appointed Joseph Commissioner with the army, with a salary of £240, with lodging and expenses, and got for Lucien the post of superintendent of stores at the little town of St. Maximin. The three eldest brothers were now all receiving pay, and were able to send some of it to their mother, who also received her share of the £24,000 which Saliceti had induced the Convention to grant for distribution among the Corsican refugees.

Napoleon intended to make his position more than safe, and even to bid for promotion in the Jacobin ranks, by the use of his pen. One evening he was at the little village of Beaucaire with his supply column of artillery, and over supper at the inn an animated discussion of the situation of public affairs

took place between himself and the other guests. Thence he obtained the idea of advocating the Jacobin cause by means of a written dialogue between a soldier (himself) and citizens of Marseilles, Nîmes, and Montpellier, to which he gave the title "Le Souper de Beaucaire," and the date of the real discussion, July 29, 1793.

THE SUPPER AT BEAUCAIRE.

I happened to be at Beaucaire on the last day of the fair; chance gave me for companions at supper two merchants of Marseilles, an inhabitant of Nîmes, and a manufacturer of Montpellier.

After some moments employed in making each other's acquaintance it was realized that I had come from Avignon and that I was a soldier. The thoughts of my companions which had been all the week fixed upon the course of the trading which increases wealth, were now directed to the outcome of the immediate happenings upon which depends its conservation; they wished to know my opinion to compare it with their own so as to correct any mistake and to learn something of the probabilities of the future which would be different for each one of us; the Marseillais in particular seemed less truculent; the evacuation of Avignon had taught them to be doubtful of all; they had now only the greatest anxiety as to their own fate; soon with growing confidence we had become talkative and we began a discussion somewhat on the following lines.

The Nimois. Is the army under Carteaux strong? It is said that its losses in the attack were heavy, but if it is true that it was repulsed why did the Marseillais evacuate Avignon?

The Soldier. The army had a strength of 4,000 men when it attacked Avignon; now it has 6,000 and in four days it will have reached 10,000 men. It lost five men killed and four wounded; it was not repulsed as it made no formal attack, it skirmished around the works, endeavoured to burst open the gates by means of petards; fired some cannon shots to test the mettle of the garrison; was then obliged to retire to camp to prepare the attack for the following night.

The Marseillais were 3,600 men; they had a

superiority in the number and the calibre of their guns, and yet they were forced to repass the Durance. That astonishes you very much : but the reason is that only seasoned troops can withstand the uncertainties of a siege.

We were masters of the Rhone, of Villeneuve, and of the country. We could cut all their communications. They were compelled to evacuate the town.

The cavalry pursued them in their retreat, they lost many prisoners and two guns.

The Marseillais. That is not the story that has been told us ; I will not dispute your version as you were present : but you will admit that this will lead to nothing.

Our army is at Aix ; three good Generals have come to replace the others ; new battalions are being raised at Marseilles, we have a new train of artillery, with several pieces of 24 ; in a few days we shall be in a position to retake Avignon or at least we shall remain masters of the Durance.

The Soldier. You are told this in order to entice you into the abyss which grows deeper every minute and which will perhaps engulf the most beautiful town in France, which has of all patriots deserved the most ; but you were also told that you would march through France, that you would give the word to the Republic, and your first steps have been checked ; you were told that Avignon could offer a long resistance to 20,000 men, and one single column of the army, without any siege artillery, in twenty-four hours was master of it ; you were told that the Midi had risen and you have found yourselves standing alone ; you were told that the cavalry of Nîmes would crush the Allobroges, when the latter had already reached Saint Esprit and Villeneuve ; you were told that 4,000 Lyonnais were marching to succour you and the Lyonnais were bargaining for a settlement. Admit that you have been deceived, observe the incapacity of your leaders, and distrust their calculations.

The most dangerous adviser is self-love ; you are by nature quick, you are being led to ruin by the same influence which has ruined so many peoples, by your vanity ; you have wealth and a considerable population ; you exaggerate them ; you have rendered signal

services to liberty, you remember them without stopping to notice that the spirit of the Republic was with you then, while, on the contrary, it abandons you to-day.

Your army, you say, is at Aix with a large train of artillery and good Generals; well, in spite of its efforts I assure you it will be beaten.

You have 3,600 men; a good half have dispersed; Marseilles and some refugees of the department may furnish, at the very most, 4,000 men; you will thus have 5,000 to 6,000 men without cohesion, or unity, or experience.

You say you have good Generals, I know nothing of them and am not therefore in a position to deny their ability, but they will be absorbed in matters of detail and will obtain little assistance from their subordinates; they will not be able to do anything to sustain the reputation they have acquired, for they would want two months for any passable organization of their army, and in four days Carteaux will be beyond the Durance, and with what soldiers!

With the excellent light troop of the Allobroges, the old regiment of Burgundy, a good regiment of cavalry, the brave battalion of the Côte d'Or which has a hundred times seen victory before it in the fight, and six or seven other corps, all of the old militia, encouraged by their successes on the frontier and against your army.

You have pieces of 24 and 18 and you fancy yourselves impregnable; you adopt the common opinion, but men of the profession will tell you, and a fatal experience will prove it to you, that good pieces of 4 and 8 have as much effect in field warfare and are preferable in many conditions; you have newly raised gunners and your adversaries have the artillery-men of the line who are in their art the best in Europe.

What will your army do if it concentrates at Aix? It would be lost; it is an axiom of the military art that he who rests in his entrenchments is defeated; experience and theory are in accord on this point and the walls of Aix are not equal to the worst field entrenchments, especially when one notes their extent, and the houses which surround them at the range of a pistol shot. Be assured that the side you think the

strongest is the weakest; besides how could you provision your town in such a short time with all that is necessary?

Will your army march to meet its enemies? But it is inferior in numbers, its artillery is less suitable for field work; its ranks would be broken, and then there would be defeat beyond recovery, for the cavalry would prevent any rallying. Wait till you have war in Marseilles itself; a considerable party there is in favour of the Republic; a great effort will be made, a junction will be effected and that town, the centre of the commerce of the Levant, the emporium of the centre of Europe, is ruined. . . . Remember the recent case of Lisle, and the barbarous laws of war!!

But what madness has suddenly taken possession of your people? What fatal blindness is leading them to ruin? How can they hope to resist the whole Republic? If they were to force this army to retire upon Avignon can there be any doubt that in a short time new combatants would come to replace the others? Will the Republic which gives the law to Europe accept it from Marseilles?

With the support of Bordeaux, Lyons, Montpellier, Nimes, Grenoble, the Jura, the Eure, Calvados, you undertook a revolution, you had a probability of success, your instigators may have had evil motives, but you had an imposing mass of forces; on the other hand, now that Lyons, Nimes, Montpellier, Bordeaux, the Jura, the Eure, Grenoble, Caen have accepted the Constitution, now that Avignon, Tarascon, Arles have given in, admit that there is folly in your obstinacy; you are being influenced by people who having lost their fortunes are dragging you down in their ruin.

Your army will be made up of all the affluent of your people, the wealthy of your town, for the *sans-culottes* would be too ready to turn against you. You are going to place in danger the élite of your young men, who are accustomed to control the balance of the Mediterranean and to enrich your town by their economies and their speculations, against old soldiers who have a hundred times drawn the blood of the rabid aristocrat or the ferocious Prussian.

Leave it to the poor countries to fight to their last gasp; the inhabitant of the Vivarais, the Cevennes,

Corsica, has no fear for the issue of a fight ; if he wins he has accomplished his aim ; if he loses, he has the same position for making peace as before.

But you !! Lose a battle, and the fruit of a thousand years of toil, struggles, economies, good fortune, becomes the prey of the soldier.*

The Marseillais. You travel fast, and you terrify me ; I agree with you that the situation is critical ; perhaps it is true that we are not sufficiently aware of the position in which we are ; but you must admit that we still have immense powers of resistance.

You have convinced me that we cannot resist at Aix ; your remark on the absence of subsistence for a prolonged siege is perhaps unanswerable ; but do you think that the whole of Provence could for long watch with indifference the blockade of Aix ? Provence would rise spontaneously and your army beset on all sides would be lucky to be able to repass the Durance.

The Soldier. How little you understand human nature, and the spirit of the time ! In all regions where there are two parties from the moment that you are besieged in every part of the country the sectaries will be overcome ; the example of Tarascon, Orgon, Arles, should convince you of this ; twenty dragoons were enough to re-establish the former officials and drive off the others.

Henceforth no considerable movement in your favour is possible in your department ; that might have been when your enemy was on the other side of the Durance and when you were not yet broken up ; at Toulon opinions are very much divided and the sectaries have not there the same superiority as at Marseilles, and are therefore obliged to remain in the town to keep down their adversaries. . . . As for the department of the Basses Alpes you know that it is practically unanimous for the Constitution.

The Marseillais. We shall attack Carteaux in our mountains where his cavalry will be useless.

The Soldier. As if an army which protects a town controls the point of attack. Besides it is a mistake to suppose that these mountains are of a kind to

* See *supra*, p. 176.

nullify the power of cavalry ; your hills are only sufficiently steep to make the service of the artillery more difficult and thus give a great advantage to your enemies. For it is in rough country that by the quickness of his movement, the precision of his aim and the just estimate of distances, the good artilleryman obtains the advantage.

The Marseillais. You think then that we have no resources ? Is it possible that it should be the fate of this town which resisted the Romans, and preserved some of its laws under the despots who followed them, to fall a prey to a few brigands ? What ! The Allobroges, heavy with the spoil of Lisle, will give the law to Marseilles ? What ! Dubois-Crancé and Albitte will encounter no opposition ! These men, tainted with blood, whom the misfortunes of events have placed at the helm, will be absolute masters ! What a sad prospect you lay bare. Our estates under different pretexts will be invaded ; we shall become the constant victims of a soldiery whom the hopes of pillage tend to unite under the same ensigns. Our best citizens will be imprisoned and perish as criminals. The Club will raise once more its monstrous head and execute its infernal projects ! Nothing could be worse than an idea so horrible ; it were better to give oneself the chance of victory than to be a hopeless victim.

The Soldier. That is what civil war brings : tearing to pieces, hatred, killing, without knowing anything of each other. . . . The Allobroges—whom do you think they are ? Africans, inhabitants of Siberia ? Oh ! not at all, they are your compatriots, they are of Provence, of Dauphiné, of Savoy ; they are supposed to be barbarians because their name is strange. If your Phalanx were to be called the Phocæan phalanx all sorts of fables would be believed of it. You have, it is true, recalled to me one example, that of Lisle : I do not justify what was done, but I can explain it.

The people of Lisle killed the emissary who was sent to them ; they resisted when there was no hope of success, the town was taken by assault ; the soldiers forced an entrance in the midst of firing and amongst their dead, it was no longer possible to restrain them ; their anger did the rest.

These soldiers whom you call brigands are our best troops and our most disciplined battalions, their reputation is above calumny.

Dubois-Crancé and Albitte, constant in friendship for the people, have never deviated from the right path. . . . They are criminals in the eyes of the wicked. But Condorcet, Brissot, Barbaroux, also were called criminals so long as they were pure; it is the appanage of the good to be of ill fame among the wicked. It seems to you that they no longer retain any moderation towards you; and on the contrary they are treating you like straying children. . . . Do you suppose that if they had wished otherwise Marseilles could have withdrawn the merchandise it had at Beaucaire? They could have sequestered it till the end of the war. They had no wish to do so, and thanks to them you may, without anxiety, return to your homes.

You call Carteaux an assassin: well! know that this General is most solicitous about order and discipline, witness his conduct at Saint-Esprit and at Avignon: not a pin was taken away. He imprisoned a sergeant who had ventured to arrest a Marseillais of your army who had remained in a house, because that was to violate the asylum of a citizen without an express order. Certain inhabitants of Avignon who had ventured to designate a certain house as that of aristocrats were punished. A soldier accused of theft was brought to trial. . . . Your army, on the other hand, has killed, assassinated, more than 30 persons, has violated the asylum of families, has filled prisons with citizens on the vague pretext that they were brigands.

Do not be afraid of the army; it esteems Marseilles because it knows that no town has made such sacrifices for the public cause. You have sent 18,000 men to defend the frontier and you have not always been inclined to bargain. Throw off the yoke of the small number of aristocrats by whom you are led, return to saner principles and you will have no better friend than the soldier.

The Marseillais. Ah! your soldiers have indeed degenerated from those of the army of 1789; that army would not take up arms against the nation;

yours should imitate so good an example and not turn its arms against the citizens.

The Soldier. With such ideas la Vendée would by now have planted the white flag upon the walls of a re-erected Bastille and the party of Jalès would dominate at Marseilles.

The Marseillais. La Vendée wishes a King; la Vendée wishes a counter-revolution to be declared. The war in la Vendée as from the party of Jalès, is a war of fanaticism, of despotism, ours, on the contrary, is that of the true republicans, supporters of law and order, enemies of anarchy and of criminals. Do we not carry the tricolour? And why should we wish to be slaves?

The Soldier. I am well aware that the people of Marseilles are very different from those of la Vendée in the matter of counter-revolution. The people of la Vendée are robust and healthy; those of Marseilles are feeble and ill, they require sugar with which to coat the pill; to establish amongst them the new doctrines it is necessary to deceive them. But after four years of revolutions, after so much hatching of plots and conspiracies, the entire range of human perversity has developed in different directions; men have perfected their natural powers of judgment; so true is this that in spite of the coalition and the great number of the departments, of the ability of the chiefs, and the union of all the enemies of the Revolution, the people everywhere have been aroused at the very time it was thought they had been lulled to sleep.

You have, you say, the tricolour flag?

Paoli also raised it in Corsica to give himself time to deceive the people, to crush the true friends of liberty, so as to be able to draw his compatriots into ambitious and criminal projects. He raised the tricolour flag; and he fired against the ships of the Republic; and he drove our troops out of the fortresses; and he disarmed those who were in them; and he got together a mob to drive out those of his enemies who were still in the island; and he pillaged the magazines selling at a low price all that was in them so as to have money for sustaining his revolt; and he ravaged and confiscated the possessions of well-to-do families because they were attached to the unity of the

Republic; and he denounced as enemies of their country all those who remained with our armies; he had already caused the expedition against Sardinia to miscarry. And yet he had the impudence to call himself the friend of France and a good republican; and yet he deceived the Convention which recalled its decree of dismissal.

He managed so well that when he was unmasked by his own letters found at Calvi the time had gone by; the fleets of the enemy intercepted all communications.

We must no longer rely on words, but examine actions, and you must admit that when yours are realized it is easy to show that you are counter-revolutionary.

What has been the effect upon the Republic of the movement you have made? You have led it near to ruin; you have retarded the operations of our armies. I do not know whether you are in the pay of the Spaniard or Austrian but certainly they could not wish for a more happy diversion. What more could you have done? Your success is the desire of all recognized aristocrats. You have placed at the head of your sections and of your armies avowed aristocrats, a former Colonel, Latourette, a former Colonel of Engineers, Soumise, who abandoned their corps in time of war so as not to have to fight for the liberty of the people. Your battalions are full of such persons and your cause would not be theirs if it was that of the Republic.

The Marseillais. But Brissot, Barbaroux, Condorcet, Vergniaux, Guadet, etc., are they also aristocrats? Who founded the Republic? Who overthrew the tyrant, who indeed were they who upheld their country at the dangerous period of the last campaign?

The Soldier. I do not stop to enquire whether these men who have deserved well of the nation on so many occasions have conspired against her; it is enough for me to know that the Mountain having, both from public spirit and from party spirit, sent them to prison, having even, if you will, calumniated them, the only chance of the Brissotins was a civil war which should enable them to give the law to their enemies. It is therefore for them that your fighting was of use.

If they had deserved their early reputation they would have thrown down their arms in face of the Constitution, they would have sacrificed their own interest for that of the public welfare; but it is easier to quote Decius than to imitate him. They have now been guilty of the greatest of all crimes. They have, by their conduct, justified their arrest. . . . The blood they have caused to flow has effaced the real services they have rendered.

The Manufacturer of Montpellier. You have been regarding the question from the point of view which is most favourable to these gentlemen; for it seems to have been proved that the Brissotins were really culpable. But culpable or not we are no longer in an age when men engage in war on behalf of individuals.

England poured out torrents of blood for the houses of Lancaster and York; France for Lorraine and Bourbon. Are we to be still in such barbarous times?

The Nimois. Besides we abandoned the Marseillais as soon as we perceived that they wanted the counter-revolution and were fighting for quarrels of a particularist nature. The mask fell from them at the time when they declined to publish the Constitution. We have thereupon forgiven the Mountain some irregularities. We have forgotten Rabaud and his Jeremiads, to look only upon the growing Republic, surrounded by the most monstrous of coalitions which threatens to stifle it in its cradle, to look only upon the joy of the aristocrats and upon Europe to be conquered.

The Marseillais. You have abandoned us in a cowardly manner after having excited us with your ephemeral deputations.

The Nimois. We acted in good faith while you had the fox in hiding under your arm; we desired the Republic, and had to accept a republican constitution. You disapproved of the Mountain, and the 31 May, you ought also to accept the Constitution, so as to bring their mission to a termination.

The Marseillais. We also desire the Republic; but we want our Constitution to be formed by representatives with freedom to operate; we desire liberty, but we want it to be given us by representatives whom

we esteem. We do not wish our Constitution to protect pillage and anarchy. Our first conditions are: no clubs, less frequent primary assemblies, respect for property.

The Manufacturer of Montpellier. It is evident to all who can think that a part of Marseilles is counter-revolutionary. They pretend to desire the Republic but that is a curtain which has become every day more transparent; you were being accustomed gradually to be able to see at last the counter-revolution quite bare. Already the veil which covered it was nothing but gauze; your people were good, but in time the entire mass would have been converted but for the spirit which watches over the Revolution. Our troops have deserved well of the country for having taken up arms against you with so much energy; they were not called upon to imitate the army of 1789 because you are not the nation. The centre of all unity is the Convention; that is the real Sovereign, especially when the people are divided.

You have overthrown all laws, all conventions. By what right did you dismiss the Departmental Council? Was it Marseilles that formed it? By what right did the battalion of your town march through the districts? By what right did your national guards venture to enter Avignon? That town and district had the chief constituted body since the department was dissolved. By what right did you venture to violate the territory of the Drome? And what makes you think that department has not the right to requisition the public force to defend it? You have thus defied all rights, you have established anarchy, and since you venture to justify your operations by the right of force you are brigands, anarchists.

You have established a popular tribunal; Marseilles alone has nominated it; that is contrary to all the laws. It can only be a tribunal of blood since it is the tribunal of a faction. You have subjected by force the whole of your department to this tribunal. By what right? Do you usurp then this authority for which you unjustly reproach Paris? Your Committee of the Sections has recognized some affiliations; there then is a coalition similar to that of the clubs, against which you cry out. Your Committee has exercised acts of

administration over the communes of the Var ; there then is the territorial division that you disavow.

You have, at Avignon, imprisoned without warrant, without writ, without the formal accusation of the administrative body. You have violated the asylum of families, set aside the liberty of the individual ; you have, in cold blood, carried out assassinations in public places ; you have re-enacted the scenes whose horror you exaggerate which troubled the Revolution at its commencement ; without enquiry, without process of law, without ascertaining the identity of the victims, merely upon the information of their enemies, you have seized them, torn them from their children, dragged them along the streets and put them to death by strokes of the sword. As many as thirty have been counted whom you have condemned to be sacrificed in this manner. You have dragged the statue of Liberty in the mud ; you have publicly executed it ; it has been subjected to outrages of all kinds by frenzied youths ; you have lacerated it with sabre cuts, you cannot deny it, it was done in open-day, more than 200 of your people assisted at this criminal profanation ; the procession traversed several streets, arrived at the place de l'Horloge, passed through the rue de l'Epicierie, etc. I close my remarks and stop the flow of my indignation. Is this then the way in which you desire the Republic ? You have retarded the march of our armies by stopping the convoys ; how can you deny the evidence of so many facts and how can you save yourself from being named the enemies of your country ?

The Soldier. It is proved to the hilt that the Marseillais have injured the operations of our armies and desired to destroy liberty, but that is not the question we are considering. The thing is to learn what it is they hope for and what course is left for them to adopt.

The Marseillais. We have less resources than I thought, but they have a great strength who are determined to give their lives and we are so determined rather than bear again the yoke of the men of blood who now govern the State. You know that a drowning man catches at straws ; so rather than submit to have our throats cut we . . . Yes, we have all taken part in this new revolution, we would all be the victims of

vengeance. Two months ago there was a conspiracy to butcher 4,000 of our best citizens, guess what excesses would now be committed. . . . We shall be reminded of that monster who was one of the leaders of the club; he had a citizen hanged from the lantern, pillaged his house and violated his wife after having compelled her to drink a glass of the blood of her husband.

The Soldier. How horrible! But is that true? I mistrust it, for you know we do not believe in violation nowadays. . . .

The Marseillais. Yes! Rather than submit to people of that kind we would bring ourselves to the last extremity, we would give ourselves to the enemy; we would call in the Spaniards. There is no people whose character is less compatible with ours, nor any more hateful. You may judge by the sacrifice we should be making, the wickedness of the men whom we fear.

The Soldier. You would give yourselves to the Spaniards!! . . . We will not give you the time.

The Marseillais. Their approach is signalled every day to our ports.

The Nimois. To perceive whether the Federals or the Mountain are for the Republic that threat is enough for me. The Mountain was at one time the weakest. There was a general commotion. Did it, however, ever speak of calling in the enemy? Do you not realize that this is a fight to the death between the patriots and the despots of Europe? If then you hope for help from them it can only be because your leaders have good reasons for being welcomed by them. But I have still too good an opinion of your people to believe that you will carry the day in Marseilles for the execution of so dastardly a project.

The Soldier. Do you think you would do much harm to the Republic and that your threat is very terrifying? Let us evaluate it.

The Spaniards have no debarkation troops, their ships cannot enter your ports. If you call in the Spaniards that may enable your leaders to escape with a part of their fortune. But the indignation would be general throughout the Republic, you would have 60,000 men under arms in a week. The Spaniards

might take away from Marseilles as much as they could carry and there would still remain enough to enrich the conquerors.

The Manufacturer of Montpellier. If you were capable of such baseness we should not leave one stone on another in your superb city. We should have to act so that a month from now a traveller passing by your ruins would suppose you had been destroyed a hundred years.

The Soldier. Listen to me, Marseillais, throw off the yoke of the small number of criminals who are leading you to the counter-revolution, re-establish your constituted authorities, accept the Constitution, give the representatives their liberty that they may go to Paris to intercede for you. You have been led astray; it is not the first time that the people have been so led by a small number of conspirators and intriguers. It has always been the credulity and ignorance of the multitude which has been the cause of most of the civil wars.

The Marseillais. Eh! Sir, who will put things right? Will it be the refugees who reach us from every quarter of the department? They are forced to the most desperate course. Will it be those who govern us? Are they not in the same position? Will it be the people? One part of them does not understand its position, is blind, fanatical; the other part is disarmed, suspected, humiliated, I see then with profound grief misfortunes without remedy.

The Soldier. Now at last you are reasonable. Why should not a similar revolution be operated upon a great number of your citizens who are deceived and honest men? Then Albitte who can only wish to spare French blood will send you some loyal and capable men; an agreement will be reached and the army without waiting a single instant will march to the walls of Perpignan there to make the Spaniard, puffed up by some small success, dance the carmagnole.

And Marseilles will always be the centre of gravity of liberty. Only a few pages will have to be torn out of her history.

This happy prognostication put us all in good humour again. The Marseillais gave us with a good

will some bottles of champagne which entirely dissipated our anxiety and solicitude. We went to bed at two in the morning, promising to meet at déjeuner next day when the Marseillais would have more doubts to propound and I would have many interesting truths to teach him.

It was the custom of Napoleon to exaggerate the numbers and valour of the army with which he was associated ; he was an habitual bluffer ; but he can seldom have reached such absurd bragging as when he praised Albitte, Carteaux, and the conventional mob of ragamuffins in these extravagant terms.

The Marseillais is allowed to speak so eloquently that some commentators have supposed that Napoleon was keeping open a way of escape, in case of the Girondins coming again to power. But he had gone too far towards the Mountain to hope for recovery in such an event. Napoleon's great strength was precisely his invaluable habit of regarding with scrupulous care, and expressing in the strongest manner, the point of view against which he was arguing. In his youth, when at his best, he was one of those rare persons who are able to do this with a conscientious ardour that looks very like honest enthusiasm.

In other respects this forcible, and in some places dramatic, pamphlet is of a different nature to anything that Napoleon had previously written. There is no discussion of political principles, no advancement of any theories, none of the abstract reasoning which had hitherto been so marked in his literary work. There is a complete change in his outlook. He insists now merely that the Mountain must be right because it has the upper hand, that the Brissotins are to be condemned because they do not carry with them the majority. The central authority must be supported because opposition to it will fail. He does not discuss, or care, what its principles may be, or what may be

its influence upon the welfare of the country. To oppose it is to create civil war, and wrong because it is doomed to failure. No doubt if the Brissotins, or the Marseillais, had been able to show that they were sure to overthrow the Mountain, he would have supported them. At all times, but most especially when the enemy is at the gate, every citizen should support the party in power.

Napoleon has been driven from his home ; he is an exile amongst a people he has always disliked ; he has to make his way amongst them ; so, regardless of principle, or right, or justice, or the welfare of the country, he urges everybody to keep on what is for the time the stronger side. This was the period he was thinking of when, as First Consul, he remarked to Thibaudeau : "There was a time when every man who had a soul to save was bound to be a Jacobin." There may have been some loss of self-respect, but—one must live.

The pamphlet was ordered to be printed at the public expense, and the orthodoxy of the writer was thus at last firmly established.


Napoleon was now a French patriot, and Paoli a Corsican rebel.

2. TOULON.

When news came that on August 28 British and Spanish fleets, with troops on board, had been welcomed into the great naval arsenal of Toulon, Carteaux was ordered at once to march against the rebellious town, and Saliceti and Joseph went with him. Dommartin, who had entered the artillery at the same examination as Napoleon, when he was thirty-sixth and Napoleon forty-second, was in command of the artillery. On September 7, in a skirmish of outposts, he was wounded, and had to be carried to Marseilles. Saliceti appointed Napoleon to take his place. He justified his action by writing to Paris :

"Dommartin being wounded, we were left without any artillery leader; fortune favoured us wonderfully; we stopped citizen Bonaparte, a captain, and a trained officer, who was on his way to the Army of Italy, and ordered him to replace Dommartin." Napoleon thus obtained, at the age of twenty-four, his first chance of seeing real warfare.

The city and docks of Toulon lay in the north-east corner of a bay whose waters spread thence for some distance westwards. The nearest land approach was therefore on the east and north. On the south-east, at the edge of a promontory covering the entrance of the harbour, was a small coast battery, the Grosse Tour. This promontory was strongly protected in its rear by Fort St. Louis, by batteries on Cap Brun, and by a very strong fortress, La Malue, which, with Forts St. Catherine and Artigues, made the whole east defence very powerful. On the north was a considerable eminence, Mont Faron, which was well defended by a range of forts, from Fort Faron on the east to Forts Pomets and St. André on the north-west. Due west of Toulon was Fort Malbousquet, not a very strong place. The west arm of the bay had no land fortifications, perhaps because Toulon was out of range of an enemy's fire from that direction, perhaps because it was not supposed that Toulon would ever be attacked except from the side of Italy, the east. On the south-west was a promontory, Le Caire, with two coast batteries on its edge, Eguillette and Balaguier. These, with the Grosse Tour on the east, commanded the entrance to the harbour; but they had not, like the Grosse Tour, any fort behind them to prevent attack from the land side on their rear. Further south was a peninsula jutting out into the sea, called the Cap Cépet, or the Croix des Signaux; its narrow neck, connecting it with the mainland, was adequately defended. Ships could pass Cap Cépet while remain-



ing outside the range of its guns. A sortie across the neck from this promontory would take an invading army in the right flank. Otherwise the position was of little importance.

An army coming from the west would endeavour to fasten upon Le Caire, and attack Eguillette and Balaguier from their rear. Once in control of these points it could make the inner harbour unsafe for ships; and as Toulon relied for its defence mainly upon the British and Spanish ships, it would not be able to hold out for long after their departure. Evidently the first thing to do was to reach the Caire promontory.

To prepare for this expected attack Admiral Hood had placed gunboats and floating batteries in the west arm of the bay, to impede the approach of the enemy; had occupied the village of La Seyne; and had provided Le Caire with near floating protection, both in the inner harbour on its north and in the outer harbour on its south.

Carteaux, the Commander of the investing army, had been a soldier in the ranks for a number of years, and had then taken to painting, chiefly battle scenes and military portraits. He had painted an equestrian portrait of Louis XVI. On the outbreak of the Revolution he became a Lieutenant of gendarmes, and rose to be Commander of the army which so easily captured Avignon and Marseilles. He was a man of courage, but a *sans-culotte* General, who, in the fashion of the hour, despised military education. His weapon, he said, was the cold steel. Napoleon, one of the few trained artillery officers remaining to France, and therefore an officer of rare acquirements for a siege, treated Carteaux with contempt, and was supported in that insubordinate attitude by the all-powerful representatives of the people, Gasparin, an old infantry officer, and Saliceti.

The force Carteaux brought with him was very small and had few guns. He remained with it on the west of Toulon, while a division from the east under Lapoype covered Toulon on that side. Napoleon had nothing to do with that division, which had its own artillery commander, Captain Sugney, a former comrade in the 4th Regiment.

The sequence of events will be gathered from the following correspondence. On September 7 Saliceti wrote: "We wrote yesterday to the Comité de Salut Public that we should be this evening masters of the heights, and that we hoped soon to be in sight of Toulon, and in a position to punish that rebellious city, and to burn the enemy's fleet." The heights here referred to were those which first met the army from the west after emerging from the defile of Ollioules, and before arriving on the shore of the bay.

On the 10th Saliceti wrote to the Comité: "Our position before Toulon is the same as that taken up on the evening of the 7th. Before making any further advance it was necessary to concert measures with the left division, and await the arrival of our siege material.

"General Lapoype and our colleague Escudier came here yesterday to confer with Carteaux and ourselves" (Saliceti and Gasparin). "The two Generals are in accord in their plans, which will soon be carried out. On the east Fort Faron will be attacked, while on our side we will force Fort Pomets, which will make us masters of the water of Toulon; and we will prepare upon the shore forges and gridirons to burn the English fleet, or at least compel it to retreat." The enclosing attack here referred to was made on September 18, the water-supply for the mills cut off, and the land investment completed.

On September 13 Saliceti wrote to the Comité: "We are placed where we can count the sails in the port and in the harbour. We are only waiting for the

large guns which are coming in every day from Marseilles to take up a position whence we can reach the ships with red-hot shot, and we shall then see if we are not masters of Toulon, without the 40,000 men and the three months for their concentration that Kellermann talked of."* They had advanced beyond the heights above Ollioules, and were close to the shore of the west bay.

On the 15th Carteaux wrote to the Minister of War: "I expect to attack on Tuesday, the 17th inst., the English fleet, and burn their ships." This refers to the battery which Napoleon had planned to open against the ships in the west arm of the harbour, as is shown by the letter of Saliceti to the Comité of September 26: "In the night of Tuesday to Wednesday" (September 17 to 18) "Captain Buonaparte established his battery (*La Montagne*) at La Guarène, below the Poudrières."

On the 20th Saliceti wrote: "In our last of the 15th we announced to you that we expected to begin on Tuesday (17th) to attack with vigour and batter the ships of the fleet with red-hot shot. In spite of the activity and the number of the workmen we have employed in the construction of the battery, we could not get it ready before Wednesday morning (18th), and even on that day an accident which occurred to the bellows obliged us to fire with cold shot. You will see by the letter of yesterday (19th) from citizen Buonaparte, Captain of artillery, who had been destined for the army of Nice, whom the disablement of Dommartin compelled us to keep here as Commander, the situation yesterday and the dispositions for to-day. No doubt you will think it of interest to read it to the National Convention."

The "dispositions" of Napoleon were the laying of

* The siege lasted more than three months, and the invaders were 35,000 at the end.

another battery near the first. Saliceti wrote to the Comité, "In the night of Thursday to Friday (September 19 to 20) he" (Napoleon) "established a new battery at Bregaillon (*Sansculottes*), just under the chapel, on the shore, to clear away altogether the ships from this part of the harbour." The fire from La Montagne on September 18 and 19, and from the two batteries, La Montagne and Les Sansculottes, on September 20 and 21, overpowered the defence in the west arm of the bay. On September 20 Hood, the English Admiral, wrote in his journal: "The floating battery No. 1 hauled off, having received much damage"; and on the 21st he wrote: "Floating battery No. 3 sunk by the enemy's shot in the northwest arm." It now became evident that the floating defence could not maintain its position in the west of the bay, and that Carteaux, Saliceti, and Napoleon had achieved their object referred to in Saliceti's letter of September 13, and Carteaux's of the 15th, where the words "ships" and "fleets" do not mean the main fleet, which was beyond reach of these batteries, but the vessels in the west of the bay.

Hood and Gravina (the Spanish Admiral) decided to take prompt action. On that very evening, September 21, they landed a force, under Lord Mulgrave, which took possession of the wooded heights of Le Caire, and had erected a serviceable defence there before next morning. Carteaux sent troops to drive them off next day, but the intruders, assisted by the fire of gunboats from the outer harbour, which Napoleon's batteries could not touch, beat them back. More men were landed the same evening, and the construction of a redoubt commenced, to be known as Fort Mulgrave, which grew into a work of considerable strength. It was subsequently supported by three smaller redoubts, the whole forming a strong protection to Eguillette and Balaguier from land

attack. The garrison had stolen a march on the invaders.

Saliceti and Napoleon declared that this misfortune was entirely due to the incompetence of Carteaux. On that question the contemporary correspondence furnishes the best evidence.

On September 25 Saliceti wrote to a friend: "We are all the time exchanging shots with the ships; we have established batteries on the seashore; they disturb the fleet, and we should have forced it to quit the harbour if the General" (Carteaux) "had been willing to carry out the plan which we submitted to him, which was also that of the Comité de Salut Public.

"It being impossible to conduct a regular siege with the forces at our disposal, the only thing we could do was to seize the summits, with the object of fulminating against the fleet, and if we had succeeded in driving it away, Toulon would have offered but feeble resistance.

"Whether from slowness or the feebleness of the General, this move, which would have saved the Mediterranean, was neglected. The enemy seized the two important positions which dominated the harbour; he established batteries, and it will be very difficult to drive him away, as he has had time to erect fortifications."

On the 26th he wrote to the Comité: "All was going according to our wishes; there was nothing to prevent our passage by La Seyne to occupy the heights above the points of Vallons, and there establish a battery whence we could thunder on the whole bay, without even taking at once the forts of Eguillette and Balaguier. Why have we not done it? Because the General who we thought had understood and adopted our plan had no confidence in it, although the plan you sent us from Paris was exactly the same; because those who surround him are even more ignorant and

conceited than he is ; because neither he nor they have any understanding either of the men under their orders, or of the military weapons, or of their effects ; because the army, having experienced no resistance elsewhere, is quite discouraged by that offered by Toulon.

"But if our General has not understood the only practicable plan for attack on Toulon, the English have seen the danger, and on Saturday evening (21st) disembarked troops and took possession of the heights, and have placed floating batteries in the outer harbour in support. There was still time that evening to dislodge them ; it was a position that should have been rushed and captured at any cost. That was not realized either by the General or the Colonel who commanded the expedition" (Delaborde). "Only a small force was sent, which fell back at once when the English resisted. Next day they had formed batteries with pieces of twenty-four. . . . We consider therefore our plan has failed, and the Toulon attack has become a long business, which can only succeed by numbers and in course of time."

On September 30 Saliceti wrote : "Carteaux, who did wonderfully well in a campaign from Orange to Marseilles, is incapable of mastering the operations of a besieging army, and has no Engineer officer with him. Buonaparte, the only Captain of artillery who is able to plan these operations, has already too much work in directing all the artillery. Busy yourself in sending us at once an Engineer capable of overcoming a place of the first importance, and also capable, if it be possible, of making the General understand his plan."

In accordance with this request, Carnot sent Major Marescot, an Engineer officer, to superintend the work which the representatives thought was too much for Napoleon ; but he did not arrive until November 24.

On October 6 Carteaux wrote to the Minister complaining of the "blackest treason which makes my

burden insupportable, . . . and what must the Comité de Salut Public think of me when it is asked to believe that it is because their plan was rejected that the English were not driven out?"

On October 7 Napoleon opened fire with his third battery, which he had now constructed far to the east of the first two, to attack Fort Mulgrave. On the 9th it was carried by a sortie of the defenders, and, though recaptured, it was found necessary to protect it from a possible flank attack by a battery covering the narrow path from Cap Cépét to the mainland. On October 12 this battery, Faubrégas, was in position, and protected the flank. Then the approach upon Mulgrave was continued, two strong batteries being erected.

On October 20 Carteaux wrote: "I do not deserve to be subjected to all the bickering and the base jealousy which is shown me," and complained that "the artillery was not at his disposal, and the Commander Buonaparte always went against him."

Besides an Engineer, the representatives now asked for an artillery officer of high rank to take over the command of the artillery. Napoleon supported the request. On October 25 he wrote to the Comité: "The first thing I propose is to send to the army to command the artillery a General of artillery who could, by his rank alone, impose consideration, and make an impression upon the ignoramuses of the staff, with whom one has always to be capitulating or dogmatizing to get over their prejudices, and put into execution what every enlightened officer of the corps knows that both theory and experience have shown to be axioms. . . . As soon as we are masters of the Eguillette and Cap Cépét we will establish batteries there which will compel the enemy to evacuate the two harbours, and we will direct our attack upon the redoubt and that face of Toulon which is nearest to the arsenal, which is also the weakest."

On November 14 he wrote to the Comité: "The plan of attack for the town of Toulon which I presented to the Generals and to the representatives of the people is, I think, the only practicable one. If it had been followed from the beginning with a little more warmth we should probably now be in Toulon. . . . To become masters of the harbour we must be masters of the point of Eguillette. . . . At that time" (after his first batteries opened fire) "the enemy, perceiving the insufficiency of his naval artillery, risked everything for everything, and landed at Eguillette. They should have been crushed while in the act. Fate, or our remissness, enabled them to succeed. A few days afterwards they had there pieces of twenty-four, a covered road, and palisades. Some days later they received considerable reinforcements from Naples and Spain. I perceived that the Toulon opportunity had been lost, and that we had to resign ourselves to a regular siege."

This is all the material evidence. Two questions arise: 1. Whose fault was it that the English attack on Le Caire of September 21 was not forestalled? 2. Whose fault was it that the English were allowed to make good their hold?

Saliceti, writing *after* September 21, said that the Comité had sent from Paris a plan which Carteaux had the temerity to ignore. There is no indication of this in the letters he wrote *before* September 21. While writing to the Comité he does not mention having received any plan from them, which would be very extraordinary if he really had received one. He makes no suggestion of disagreement with Carteaux, but refers with satisfaction to the measures that were being adopted, identifying himself with them. On September 20, the day before the disaster, he writes of Napoleon's batteries, and encloses Napoleon's letter describing his dispositions for that day. What they

were we can judge from the fact that on September 20 and 21 Napoleon was hard at work firing on the floating defence in the west arm of the harbour. It is incredible that Saliceti would have written in this manner if, as he alleged after the event, Carteaux had already received from the Comité a recommendation, or order, for the immediate occupation of Le Caire, and had defied the Comité and the guillotine in spite of Saliceti's entreaties. The contemptuous way in which Carteaux wrote on October 6 about that story of Saliceti's is in itself convincing. Carnot on November 4 sent a plan, which began with the observation that "the army of the West will direct itself towards the batteries of Eguillette and Balaguier." No doubt the plan referred to by Saliceti was a communication containing just such general terms as this, calling attention to the importance of Le Caire.

As to that, of course, there could be no two opinions. Dugommier, who succeeded Carteaux, wrote: "Nobody who knows Toulon and its defences can fail to see that its weak side is that from which we can approach the combined fleets, and direct upon them bombs and hot shot. All who have any knowledge of ships know that they cannot withstand that.

"The position which best gives us this advantage is, without doubt, the promontory of Eguillette" (Le Caire). "The others are protected by La Malue and the surrounding fortifications. Masters of Eguillette, we will give the enemy imperative orders to evacuate the port and the harbour."

The importance of Le Caire was obvious to all, but no immediate descent upon the place was expected. Saliceti's letters show that the first object of the invaders—of Carteaux, Napoleon, and himself—was to get batteries established on the shore of the west harbour, "to clear away altogether the ships from this part of the harbour." These batteries were placed


there with that object by Napoleon himself. The drawing by Granet was made on the spot during the siege. It shows the guns of Napoleon's battery, Les Sansculottes, pointing down the harbour on the sails visible in that direction, ignoring the heights of Le Caire on the right.

The expression used by Napoleon, that the English "risked everything for everything and landed at Eguillette," shows that he looked upon that enterprise as a dangerous one, which was not to be anticipated. After the English were established, he erected his next battery far to the east, bearing directly upon their position. It is quite plain that he, as well as the others, had been taken by surprise, that they were all equally to blame.

Napoleon ascribed the failure to drive off the English after they had landed to "fate or our remissness," Saliceti to "slowness or the feebleness of our General." Both complained of the ignorance and conceit of the staff.

Those were dangerous times. The guillotine was suspended over them all, and might fall even upon Corsican refugee patriots, if it became known that the English had stolen a march upon them. So they hastily put the blame upon Carteaux.

Now, his army at that time was only about half the size of that of the enemy behind their fortifications; it was very deficient in arms and equipment; its personnel was deplorable; and it had no stomach for fighting. As Saliceti admitted, these men had not expected resistance, and were disheartened by it. Hood and Gravina, having once got possession of Le Caire, would have strained every nerve to defend that decisive point. If Carteaux had launched the whole of his small force against the intruders, and been defeated, as was quite likely, he would have been guillotined. When in December the Republican army



BATTERIE DES SANS-CULOTTES, LAID BY NAPOLEON, TOULON, 1793.

From the contemporary drawing by Granet.

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had become a formidable force of 35,000 men, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery, Dugommier, when leading them to the assault, made no secret of his fear that defeat would bring his head to the scaffold. Carteaux, with his unreliable little force, would have run far greater risk. One cannot but sympathize with the unfortunate man, who was not lacking in zeal or in personal courage, and, largely owing to the complaints of Saliceti and Napoleon, was ultimately imprisoned in the Conciergerie from January to August, 1794, daily expecting his summons, when the fall of Robespierre saved him.

The siege now resolved itself into a protracted artillery duel, with the Conventionals steadily gaining by the constant stream of guns and men sent to them from all parts of France. Hood had expectations of considerable reinforcements, but they did not arrive; while Carnot, his real opponent, was bringing the besiegers to a strength which could not long be resisted. On October 9 Lyons fell, and the investing army, of far superior quality to that of Carteaux, was sent at once to Toulon.

On November 6 Dugommier, the new Commander-in-Chief, arrived; and on the same day General du Teil took over from Napoleon the command of the artillery. On the 24th came the Engineer, Marescot.

Next day a Council of War was held. There were five possible objects of attack—La Malgue, Faron, Malbousquet, Caire, Cap Cépet. Carnot's plan of November 4 was read out, recommending a simultaneous attack on La Malgue, Faron, Caire, and Cap Cépet. The Council decided that a number of new batteries should be placed, and after a vigorous bombardment the army of the West should make a determined attack on Fort Mulgrave (Caire), and a diversion against Malbousquet; while the army of the East would coincide with a diversion against Cap Brun and La

Malgue, and a real assault on Faron. The whole of the Toulon position, some fifteen miles in length, with an available defence of some 10,000 men, was to be attacked simultaneously by the entire besieging army of 35,000 gross, of whom Dugommier said he could reckon on 25,000 actual combatants. Cap Cépet, which Napoleon had unwisely suggested as a desirable point to attack in his letter of October 25, and Carnot, following him, had recommended in his plan of November 4, was the only point ignored. Cap Cépet would follow the lot of Le Caire, and in the meantime might safely be neglected.*

When a number of new batteries had been erected, the attack began.

Early in the morning of December 18, after a very destructive artillery fire, Fort Mulgrave and the redoubts which supported it on Le Caire were all carried by assault; and the Faron position was also captured by the army of the East. Either of these successes would alone have sufficed. From Le Caire the besiegers could force the fleet to run; from Faron they commanded the town itself.

Toulon had fallen. The British and Spanish fleets sailed away, and on December 19 the Republicans entered in triumph.

When Napoleon was brought into the siege of Toulon by Saliceti the affairs of the Bonaparte family were at a desperately low ebb. Saliceti placed him, only a Captain, in command of the artillery of the west division, a post which he could not have obtained, even from so powerful a man as Saliceti, if there had been any artillery officer above the rank of Captain to be spared from elsewhere.

He conducted himself with ability and energy. He helped to repel a sortie from Malbousquet on

* If it was genius to see the importance of Le Caire, what was it to place a mistaken value upon Cap Cépet?

November 30. Dugommier reported: "Among those who most distinguished themselves and gave me most assistance in rallying and leading the troops were the citizens Bonaparte, commander of artillery; Arèna and Cervoni, Adjutants." Saliceti wrote: "General Mouret, Garnier, and Bonaparte conducted themselves in a distinguished manner on this occasion." Napoleon, Arèna, and Cervoni were Corsicans. The islanders were living up to the character of their nation as good fighters.

In his report of the siege, December 28, 1793, Dugommier said that, in preparation for the final attack, "the fire from all our batteries, directed by the greatest talent, announced his fate to the enemy." This has been claimed as applying to Napoleon; but most of the batteries had been erected under the supervision of Du Teil, and *he* was the director of the artillery fire. He cannot be excluded from the praise, which referred to the whole artillery staff, which consisted of Du Teil, Napoleon, Muiron (comrade of Napoleon in the 4th Regiment, and already a Captain, at the age of nineteen: Napoleon was not Captain till the age of twenty-three), and three men promoted from the ranks—Dintroz, Talier, and Junot (the future Duc d'Abrantes). Besides these, Du Teil brought with him two aides-de-camp, the brothers Noirot.

The manner in which the rôle of Du Teil at Toulon has been suppressed is a good example of the method of manufacture of the Napoleonic legend. On November 17 Saliceti wrote to the Comité: "The gunners, who ought to have been the first, have not yet arrived. At the request of General Du Teil, I have sent an extra courier to Grenoble to hasten their departure." Years afterwards, when it might be supposed that Napoleon's military reputation could be safely left to take care of itself, this extract was printed with the first initial only, followed by dots, "D.," and the inference

was drawn that it referred to Dugommier, that Du Teil was never at Toulon, and that Napoleon was throughout in chief command of the artillery—a deliberate fraud.

A similar deception was practised when Napoleon's correspondence was being published. Of nine reports as to the batteries which are to be found in the war archives, seven are signed by Napoleon as "commandant en second de l'artillerie," and six of these are countersigned by Du Teil; two are signed by Napoleon alone as "commandant de l'artillerie." In order to create a false impression as to Napoleon's position, and suppress the name of Du Teil, it was one of these two that was published.

Again, the phrase used by Dugommier when praising Napoleon, "commandant d'artillerie," has always been printed "commandant l'artillerie." Napoleon was a commander of artillery in the fighting that day; he was not the commander of the artillery before Toulon, as the perversion is intended to convey. That position was held by General Du Teil.

Finally, Napoleon himself, in September, 1815, when on his way to St. Helena, said that Du Teil "understood nothing of artillery," and "when he arrived before Toulon was very glad to be relieved of functions which he was incapable of fulfilling, and which under the circumstances were very hazardous." Yet as First Consul he had already ordered it to be officially put on record that Du Teil "had served with distinction in the army, and had earned the right to be recognized by the nation." Dugommier, in his report of the siege, described Du Teil as a "precious officer, whose distinguished services at the Siege of Toulon deserve the recognition of the nation," and "carried out his duties to perfection as Commander-in-Chief of the Artillery, and showed in all his dispositions much intelligence and military talents."

But the Napoleonic legend is insatiable, and cannot spare any little shreds of glory for Napoleon's early patrons.

It was in a very different spirit that Du Teil wrote of Napoleon in his letter to the Minister of War, December 19, 1793: "I cannot find expressions to depict the merit of Bonaparte: much science, as much intelligence, and too much courage—that is a feeble sketch of the virtues of this rare officer. It rests with you, sir, to consecrate them to the glory of the Republic."*

Du Teil was one of the ablest writers of the day on artillery tactics, from whom Napoleon learned many a useful lesson. In return for this instruction and this generous praise, which were of great value to him at the time, and came from the brother of a man who had also done much for him, Napoleon and his supporters did their best to take from Du Teil the merit that was his due.

When the siege was over, the representatives, on December 21, 1793, "satisfied with the zeal and intelligence of which citizen Bonaparte, chef de bataillon, of the second regiment of artillery, has given proof in contributing to the fall of that rebellious city, have rewarded him by making him General of Brigade."

This early promotion was not, for a trained officer, very extraordinary at that time. Hoche rose from the ranks to be Commander-in-Chief at the age of twenty-four. Dommartin, Napoleon's comrade in the 4th Regiment, whose place he took at Toulon, and whose captaincy was of the same date as Napoleon's, was Brigadier-General when Napoleon was still only a Captain. Any trained officer who was not cashiered for his nobility, and had the luck to see some fighting, was bound to make a rapid advance; and if he had the patronage of one of the repre-

* The original of this letter is in the handwriting of Noiroi, A.D.C. to Du Teil, and is not signed.

sentatives of the people, his promotion would be by leaps.

According to the Napoleonic legend, it was Napoleon alone who saw the importance of Le Caire, and who by his fiery harangues induced the Republicans to attack that point, thus determining the fate of Toulon. The truth is that everybody knew of the value of Le Caire, and that while the eagle eye of genius was looking in another direction, the plain Englishman and the medieval Spaniard—strange that at the very outset of his career Napoleon should be thwarted by that combination—quietly pounced upon the decisive point. Then Carteaux would not risk his force of shaky infantry in a serious attempt to recapture the post, and the Corsicans quickly turned the blame on him, so that he went about declaring that his one fear was, not failure before Toulon, but the black treachery which would consign him to the guillotine. In the end Toulon was not captured until the invaders had bombarded all its defences with a very powerful artillery, and had launched upon the garrison an attacking force two and a half times the number of the defenders.

Napoleon does not, as is so often claimed, leap into history at Toulon. His presence did not accelerate the fall of the place by a single day. Any energetic artillery officer in his place would have had an equal influence upon the fortunes of the siege. But although there was no scope for the exhibition of his great abilities, some of the characteristic marks of the Napoleon of history are plainly visible. He is already ascribing great power to "fate," and he is a persistent boaster, making free use of the first person singular. He writes: "I propose," "the plan I have proposed," etc. He has already a supreme self-confidence and vast contempt

for the rest of mankind. Here probably is the origin of the self-advertisement and the brazen falsehoods that he worked into the Napoleonic legend. He was so conceited, so absorbed in his own views, that he really imagined he was the only man who saw the importance of Le Caire, although the defenders were doing their utmost to protect it by floating batteries; and even when the English, "risking everything for everything," had seized the post, he supposed they would readily abandon it if pressed, from lack of *his* intelligence and *his* spirit.

That was, broadly, the attitude of the Emperor towards his fellow-beings.

3. THERMIDOR.

After the fall of Toulon, Napoleon, Brigadier-General, became Commander of the Artillery of the Army of Italy. He was at first ordered to inspect and reorganize the coast defences, and was thus able to visit Letizia and the children, who were now at Marseilles. His pay was £500 a year, with lodging and rations, and he was thus able to place Letizia, with the assistance she received from Joseph, in a position of comfort.

Dumerbion, an old infantry officer, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy. He had accepted the post unwillingly, to prove his "civisme," and allowed himself to be completely under the orders of the representatives—Saliceti, Ricord, and Robespierre, junior. Napoleon, already sure of Saliceti and on good terms with Ricord, studiously cultivated the friendship of the younger Robespierre, and succeeded in gaining his complete confidence. Augustin Robespierre wrote to his brother, April 5, 1794: "I add to the patriots I have already named citizen Buonaparte, General in command of the artillery, of a transcendent merit. He is a Corsican; he can offer only the

guarantee of a man of that nation who has resisted the blandishments of Paoli, and whose estates have been ravaged by that traitor."

The Paolists who had damaged the Bonaparte properties in Ajaccio and neighbourhood had conferred the most vital services upon the family. With that "guarantee," as genuine Corsican refugees, their lives were fairly secure; they obtained powerful patronage, and Napoleon could speak his opinion freely in the councils of war which were held from time to time. He felt safe in doing so, and all felt safe in seconding him. Dumerbion, trembling before the representatives, eagerly supported their spokesman in every proposal he made. It might mean death to oppose him. Hoche himself had just been arrested, and expected at any moment to be led to the scaffold. Every prominent soldier, and especially every commander, was in hourly dread of the guillotine. Du Teil, Napoleon's old chief, suffered in January, 1794, without any cause. Failure before the enemy meant death on the scaffold; success was only a trifle less dangerous.

Amid the trembling throng, none daring to move, each one suspicious of his neighbour, a man who, like Napoleon, had the only good credentials procurable, found the path gaping before him, and easily stepped along it in solitary grandeur. His plans for the campaign were adopted *nem. con.* Fortunately for Dumerbion and the army of Italy, they were good plans, for they would have been accepted as quickly if they had been bad.

The object of the army of Italy was, supported on its left by the army of the Alps, to conquer Piedmont from the Sardinians and Lombardy from the Austrians. To do this the French had first to cross the Alps, and then, getting between the Sardinians and the Austrians—who made no pretence of joining their forces or

concerting together in any way—to defeat one after the other. How to do this had long been discussed, and many plans had been proposed. It was, to a large extent, a topographical problem, and Napoleon was peculiarly fitted, by his early and sustained taste for geography, and his familiarity with movements among the mountains in Corsica, to solve it.

On April 2, 1794, Saliceti and Robespierre, junior, issued the plan which Napoleon had made, and on April 5 the advance began, the expedition being under the orders of Massena. Napoleon followed one of the detachments, accompanied by the representatives. It is not necessary to follow matters in detail. Massena seemed not to have entirely understood the scheme, and received from the representatives a letter of reproaches inspired by Napoleon. On April 20 Massena wrote to Dumerbion that, the troops having got into the position intended, he “would send him the plan of attack which it was said had been definitely decided upon,” which shows that the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the commander of the troops in touch with the enemy were ciphers, waiting for orders from the representatives—that is, from Napoleon. Massena was a man of rare military genius, quite competent to carry out the operations himself; but life was dear, and it was wise to obey the orders of the representatives.

Napoleon was in a position which can seldom have ever before been enjoyed by a young officer. He was able to act as commander *sub rosa*, without the fear of serious consequences in case of failure—unless, indeed, the representatives themselves should fall into disgrace. It was an extraordinary and most unusual opportunity for acquiring experience in the supreme direction of operations.

Napoleon’s plan having at last been received by Massena, the attack was made on April 27, with com-

plete success; the Sardinians were driven back, and Saorgo occupied. The French were in a position to debouch into the Plain of Piedmont.

Napoleon now proposed that the army of the Alps should co-operate. Albitte and Laporte, the representatives with that army, agreed, and on June 8 they were able to report the capture of an important position. Napoleon then, on June 20, forwarded to the army of the Alps a plan for further advance.

But at this point his plans came under the influence of the great struggle in Paris. Carnot did not desire a war of conquest for the Republic. On May 26, 1794, he wrote to the army of the Pyrenees, reproving any further advance, saying: "France has renounced the idea of making conquests beyond those which are necessary for her own liberty." A few days later he wrote, with regard to the campaign in the north: "We could if we wished plant the tree of liberty upon the banks of the Rhine, and reunite to France the territory of ancient Gaul; but however seductive, it will perhaps be found wiser to abandon the idea, for France would only weaken herself and prepare for an endless war by an aggrandizement of that nature."

Now, Robespierre desired an offensive warfare in all directions, in order that France might stand amongst the Powers of the world like a town in a state of siege—in perpetual danger. When Carnot sent orders to the armies of the Alps and of Italy to abandon the offensive, he was defying the Dictator. To support his brother, on June 20 Augustin Robespierre left the army of Italy and made for Paris, taking with him Napoleon's plan for a further advance of the two armies. He also received from Napoleon a "*Note sur la position politique de nos armées de Piémont et d'Espagne*," which has been justly acclaimed a masterpiece—the earliest Napoleon's evidence we have of great ability. This note Augustin Robespierre presented to the

Comité de Salut Public on July 19. The opinions therein expressed were, in the main, in accordance with those of the Robespierres. The discussion which ensued in the Comité enlarged the gap already opened between Carnot and Robespierre. At first Carnot had to give way, and the advance into Piedmont was ordered; but the revolt in the Convention then occurred, and gave Carnot and Prieur the support which brought about the fall of Robespierre. This decisive event was announced to the Sardinians in the Plain of Piedmont by the sudden retirement of the French, who had been on the previous day evidently preparing an attack. "We cannot understand," wrote a Piedmontese officer, "the strange manœuvre of the French: why are they so precipitately returning over the Col de Tende? Is it a panic? In any case, though we have done nothing to provoke it, it saves us."

While the armies were waiting for the result of the mission of Augustin Robespierre to Paris, Ricord gave Napoleon orders to go to Genoa, ostensibly to ascertain the attitude of Genoa towards France, and to counteract the influence of the Austrian Generals who had just arrived there for the same purpose. But the secret written note given to Napoleon showed that he went as a spy, to "examine the fortresses of Savona and of Genoa and the neighbouring country," and "to find out all that is possible about the artillery and the other military preparations." Napoleon accordingly left Nice on July 11, and, after spending five days in Genoa, was back in Nice on the 27th. No report from him as to the result of his mission has been discovered.

The news of the fall of Robespierre arrived on August 5. Saliceti had been so closely in accord with his fellow-representative, Robespierre, junior, that he was greatly alarmed, and started at once for Barcelonnette to ally himself, if possible, with the representatives with the army of the Alps, Albitte and Laporte. Ricord,

the third representative with the Army of Italy, did not go with Saliceti—perhaps because he realized he was too contaminated, perhaps because he was not on good terms with Albitte and Laporte, perhaps because he was paralyzed with fear. Saliceti on his way was attacked by brigands, and had a very narrow escape from assassination. He declared that they had been set upon him by Ricord. Though Saliceti brought a Robespierrist infection, Albitte and Laporte could not throw him off. The three joined together to denounce Ricord and Napoleon. They accused Ricord and Robespierre, junior, of intending to betray the army to the enemy, pointing to the secret mission of Napoleon to Genoa, and said: "Buonaparte was their man, their plan-maker, whom we had to obey." The instinct of self-preservation was too strong for Saliceti, who was sending his friend Napoleon, as he supposed, to the scaffold. For Albitte and Laporte it was only ordinary prudence to dissociate themselves in the customary manner from the plan-maker of the Robespierres; but they had also a grudge against Napoleon, whose schemes for the coalition of the armies of the Alps and Italy threatened their positions, as a double set of representatives would then not be required.

Ricord was sent under arrest to Paris. Napoleon, arrested by Dumerbion on August 9, was imprisoned at Antibes. After examining his papers, Saliceti and Albitte released him. They wrote to the Comité: "We found the order of Ricord, of which we send you a copy, by which that representative sent General Buonaparte to Genoa; and we are convinced of the value of the talents of that soldier, who, we cannot deny it, has become very necessary in an army which he understands better than anybody, and in which men of this kind are very difficult to find.

"Consequently we have set him at liberty, without,

however, being reinstated; to obtain from him all the directions of which we have need, and to prove to us, by his devotion to the public welfare and the exercise of his knowledge, that he can recover our confidence, and return to an employment which, after all, he is very capable of exercising successfully, and in which the present critical position of the army of Italy may oblige us to place him provisionally, until we have received the orders that you may give on the subject."

The reasons alleged by Albitte and Saliceti for the release of Napoleon—that he was an officer who could ill be spared—however weighty in ordinary times, would have been of no significance during the Terror. But the fall of Robespierre, it was now seen, had, most unexpectedly to all the leading men, ended the Terror. It had revealed the fact that the whole of France, from the richest to the poorest, had always been opposed to the Terror. At last the pace had become too hot even for the small group, a branch of the criminal class, who had set it; there was too much underhand and indiscriminate murder; not even the most hardened scoundrel could sleep comfortably in his bed. France hailed the death of Robespierre as the end of the hideous nightmare. None of the actors in the ghastly tragedy had expected this, though many of them had hoped for it. The delight of the whole country, the general determination that the gruesome game should be ended, made it impossible for Collot, Billaud, and the rest, to go on. They struggled hard, but public indignation swept them away. Fouquier Tinville, the Public Prosecutor, was arrested; the Revolutionary Tribunal, the great engine of destruction, was reorganized; and the powers of the representatives on mission were curtailed. News of these great changes reached the army of Italy while Napoleon was in prison. The real cause of his release was the dis-

covery that the Terror was over. Joseph, a bosom friend of Saliceti, in his *Memoirs* says that "the representatives wished to save themselves from the suspicion of having been friends of Robespierre, junior, with whom Napoleon was known to have been intimate; and Napoleon was set at liberty when it was known how affairs were going on in Paris."

Letizia and her children were, in the spring of this year, at Château Sallé, near Antibes. Lucien in his *Memoirs* says that Joseph, Napoleon, and he himself all went to pay her a visit; and that Napoleon told them that Augustin Robespierre had offered him the post held at the time by Hanriot, commander at Paris, which he had not accepted, remarking to his brothers, "*Qu'irai-je faire dans cette galère ?*" The incident is not improbable. It shows that Napoleon had gone very far in his advocacy of the Robespierre doctrines; it helps to explain Augustin's recommendation of Napoleon to his brother, and the remark that he was of "transcendent merit"—a phrase that the writer would scarcely have used to denote military capacity, even if he had been able to recognize it, but which meant that Napoleon was "their man."

Lucien had been making himself snug at St. Maximin, changing his name to Brutus, and inducing the inhabitants of that village to call it Marathon. In the spring of 1794 the depot at "Marathon" was abolished, and Brutus Bonaparte's occupation, with its small emoluments, was gone. He declined to join the army, and was simply destitute, unable to pay for his board and lodging at the inn of M. Boyer, where he lived. To make sure of the bare necessities of life, and perhaps also to strengthen his chances of life, he married Catherine, the innkeeper's daughter. Being only 19, he had not reached the necessary age for marriage, so he altered his birth certificate to make it appear he was born May 21, 1768, seven years before

the real date. Catherine was two years older than himself, but he pretended he was five years her senior. He described himself as Brutus Bonaparte, of Marathon, formerly St. Maximin, a "Corsican patriot refugee." Catherine could not write her name. She made him an excellent wife, whom he loved dearly, and who was liked by all the family. •

At Marseilles there was a rich family of silk manufacturers, who lived in hourly dread of death owing to their wealth. The father, François Clary, died January 20, 1794. One of the brothers committed suicide, out of sheer terror of the machine. Joseph made their acquaintance : he was in an official position, a war commissary ; his manners were distinguished and his person was handsome ; above all, he was a Corsican refugee and a friend of Saliceti, the representative. He promised the family his protection, and they gave him Julie Clary, with £6,000, in return. The marriage was solemnized at a village near Marseilles on August 1, after the fall of Robespierre, but before that event was known. A few days later, the Terror being over, Joseph might not have been able to do so well for himself.

The trying circumstances into which they found themselves so suddenly plunged drew from each of the three brothers an exposure of character. They were all, from their origin as well as by inclination, of the dominant faction. They all made the most of the fact that they were Corsican refugees, whose property had been destroyed by the traitor Paoli.

Joseph, like an eldest son, was amiable and conciliatory ; his instinct to act as protector of the young and weak led to his assuming sheltering airs towards the Clary family ; and it was fitting, almost essential, that the eldest of the Bonapartes, who had been a man of importance in his native land, should be well off, to support his dignity, and to enable him to carry

out his duties towards his widowed mother and her children.

As was only proper, it was to Joseph, with his wife's money, that the family now looked for assistance.

Napoleon, because he was the second son, was adventurous and aggressive. He was prepared to take risks, though the intense keenness of his desire to emerge kept him within certain bounds. He would speak his mind freely on military questions; he would identify himself closely with the dominant faction in a manner that would be dangerous if any change occurred. He would chance that for the sake of the immediate prominence he obtained. But he would not venture to Paris. That would have been foolhardy. He watched closely people like Saliceti—"one of those men," he said afterwards, "who always succeed." But Napoleon had not Saliceti's credentials as regicide and representative of the people, and fell into a situation of peril from which he was lucky to escape.

Lucien's position was more complicated. His elder brothers made him rebellious, his younger sisters conceited and vain; and each of these qualities reacted upon the other: the greater his vanity, the greater his defiance; the stronger his emulation, the more extravagant his conceit. He was thus always in extremes, with little ballast, and became one of the most violent of the Jacobins. His marriage was in the nature of a defiance to the world in general and his own family in particular. Economic reasons had their influence; but he was also glad to show of what he was capable, as though he had been dared to do it. He could not endure the mere suspicion that he was influenced by anybody, that he was not complete master of his own actions: hence his obstinate defiance of his brother the Emperor.

4. VENDÉMIAIRE.

When Napoleon stepped out of his prison at Antibes he was entering a new world, and he had to orientate himself in accordance with the change that had taken place. He was in disgrace, and applied himself to his military duties with doubled zeal; good work would now bring promotion, and it need not be done by stealth, for there was no longer any danger in success.

On August 13 Carnot sent the representatives peremptory orders to refrain from all offensive operations. "We do not doubt," he observed, "that the new conspiracy which has just been exposed, extended one of its most dangerous branches towards the countries where Robespierre exercised so perfidious and so powerful an influence. The project which Robespierre, junior, came to extract from us, so to speak, by means of the tyranny of his brother, the project of entering Piedmont . . . appears to have been the fruit of the intrigue of these conspirators."

This was Napoleon's plan. Carnot said that it was too late in the season to commence it; that the army of Italy should prepare itself to set out very early in the next year, so as to achieve the invasion of Piedmont with one swoop, and to avoid being stopped by the snows of winter while in the middle of the operations. His real reason was that he was opposed to a war of conquest for the Republic because he feared that would mean perpetual war, with financial ruin, the postponement of social reforms, and a return of the Terror.

But just at this time the enemy made a forward movement. Massena retired. Then the representatives, pretending that they were conforming to Carnot's instructions to hold their positions, ordered a counter-attack to regain the lost ground. This was

the work of Saliceti, inspired by Napoleon, whose name now appeared for the first time in the enemy's correspondence. On September 3, 1794, the Archduke Ferdinand wrote to Colli, the Sardinian General: "It is true that General Bonaparte, but lately dragged in chains to Paris, has returned with the supreme command. He is a Corsican, hardy and enterprising, who would certainly be prepared to risk some attack."

A remark of that kind, made before Napoleon was famous, is worth more than all the laborious treatises of the ablest men writing after the event. It was generally assumed; it was the ordinary expectation of all persons, of the French and of their opponents, that a Corsican would be hardy and enterprising and prone to attack. These Corsican characteristics formed the most important elements in the military success of the conqueror of Europe.

The plan proposed by Napoleon was carried out with perfect success. The French pressed between the Sardinians at Ceva and the Austrians at Caire and Carcare, and drove the latter back towards their depots. On September 23 Dumerbion, writing to the Comité, said: "It is to the talents of the General of artillery (Buonaparté) that I owe the able combinations which have produced our success."

Before following the Austrians it was necessary to deal with the Sardinians, who were on the flank and rear of the French, and expected to be at once attacked. One of them wrote: "The French aim is Ceva: they are amusing the Austrians in the direction of Caire by an insignificant force in order to bring their strength against Ceva." That was the obvious thing to do. It was what Napoleon did in 1796, and what he proposed now. But in a council of war Albitte, the representative, unwilling to compromise himself with Carnot, declined to give his assent, and no advance was made.

Saliceti and Albitte now left the army of Italy, their places being taken by Ritter and Turreau. Napoleon found that he could put himself right with Turreau by making love to his wife, and acted accordingly. It was at this time that he committed an act far worse than the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, which throws a sinister light on his character, does indeed show of what he was capable, and how indifferent he was to the lives of common men. At the request of Mme. Turreau, who wanted to see some men killed, he placed her in a good position for observation, and ordered an advance of outposts, who were resisted by the enemy, and the affair had not ended until several men had been killed on either side—a gladiatorial exhibition got up by Napoleon merely to please his mistress.

Under the inspiration of Napoleon, Ritter and Turreau wrote to Paris for authority to resume the offensive; but Carnot ordered a general retirement, in order to prepare an expedition against Corsica. Napoleon thereupon, writing to Multedo on September 23, said: "It seems that the enemy can do nothing more for a long time against Savona. All that remains for us is to deliver Corsica from the tyranny of the English." This was a sudden change of opinion on his part with regard to the army of Italy; he was following the current.

He and Joseph were occupied for the next six months in gathering stores and making the necessary arrangements for the Corsican expedition. When the troops were at last on board the transports at Toulon, the French fleet left that port to do battle with the British ships, whose base was Leghorn. On March 13, 1795, off Capo Corso, the northern point of Corsica, the French Navy was completely defeated by Admiral Hotham; it crept back to Toulon, and the expedition had to be abandoned. Saliceti had been one of its warmest advocates, and Napoleon also was quite pre-

pared to land on the island, as he did afterwards in Egypt, trusting to fortune for the keeping open of communications.

His Corsican enterprises were always unfortunate for Napoleon. While he was engaged in the expedition to conquer his native land from his former idol, Paoli, and subject it once more to the French domination which he had so strongly denounced in his youth, a complete reorganization of the French Army had been in progress. Over 800 officers were dismissed. Napoleon was retained, with the note against his name: "Has a real understanding of his business." But during his absence a new commander of the artillery with the army of Italy had been appointed, and he was now ordered to command the artillery of the army of La Vendée.

Napoleon was unwilling to leave the South, where his relations were, and the army of Italy with which he was so well acquainted, and did not hurry to take up his new post. He lingered on the coast, visiting his family in Marseilles, and embarked upon a serious flirtation with Désirée Clary, Joseph's sister-in-law, the future Queen of Sweden.

When he arrived in Paris, May 28, he found that his patrons Saliceti and Ricord had been proscribed, and his friends Barras, Fréron, and Turreau had lost influence. Aubry, the new Minister of War, was a reactionary, and marked his disapproval of the former protégé of Robespierre by removing him from the arm of which he had special knowledge, and, on June 12, 1795, reducing him to the command of a brigade of infantry in the army of the West, in La Vendée.

Napoleon at that time thought it a degradation to command any troops but the artillery. He learned better as he grew older; indeed, his first batch of Marshals contained not a single artillery officer. But

at present he wanted to remain with the artillery, and excused himself from going to La Vendée on the ground of ill-health. With the sudden changes that were occurring in Paris there was always a chance that he might get something better, or be sent back to the army of Italy. Schérer, now in command of that army, reported that Napoleon had too much ambition and too much intrigue—troublesome qualities, which superior officials regard with strong disapproval in their subordinates. Napoleon had tried to upset Carnot's defensive policy, and was naturally out of favour.

The Bonapartes were not flourishing at this time. Letizia was again in very poor circumstances; Joseph had lost his appointment and was living on the Clary money; Napoleon was unemployed and liable to be dismissed the army, for if his plea of ill-health was genuine he would have to retire, and if it was a mere excuse he might be cashiered for not going to his post; and now Lucien was in trouble.

After Thermidor, Lucien found himself so unpopular at St. Maximin that he had been obliged to leave, and was lucky to get a small billet in connection with the supplies of the army of Italy, at Saint Chamans, near Cette. There he was ultimately found by a man whose family he had caused to be imprisoned at St. Maximin; he was denounced as a Robespierriest, and imprisoned at Aix-en-Provence. Already once there had been a massacre of the prisoners at Aix by the Thermidorians, styling themselves "Companies of Jehu," who went about murdering Terrorists.

Lucien wrote feverish letters in all directions—to his mother, to Napoleon, to the Corsican, Chiappe, at that time representative with the army of Italy; and their combined efforts obtained for him a release after a detention of sixteen days.

On August 12 Napoleon wrote, in the deepest

dejection, to Joseph a letter that recalls his youthful thoughts of suicide at Valence :*

"I find myself constantly in that condition of mind in which one finds oneself on the eve of a battle, convinced by sentiment that when death is found as a means of ending everything it is folly to be anxious. Everything leads me to brave death and destiny, and if that goes on, my friend, I shall end it by no longer turning away when a carriage passes. I am sometimes astonished at myself, but that is the abyss to which I have been brought by the moral spectacle of this country and my familiarity with danger. . . . For my part I am but little attached to life, and regard it without great solicitude."

Aubry was now succeeded in the Ministry of War by Doulcet Pontécoulant, who was more friendly to Napoleon, and on August 20 appointed him to the committee for making plans of campaign. Exceptional as were his abilities for work of that kind, Napoleon longed for a life of action. The new Minister of War would give up his post on September 1. On August 30, the Sultan of Turkey having asked for French officers to reorganize his army, Napoleon applied for the post of organizer, as General of artillery, and the Minister supported his application.

On the next day, September 1, 1795, Napoleon's demand to be re-employed as General of artillery in the French Army was definitely rejected. On September 15 his name was struck off the active list, in consequence of his refusal to repair to the post assigned him with the army of the West; and on the same day the military mission to Turkey was sanctioned, with Napoleon in command, and nine officers under him. Before the final orders could be issued, the various bureaux had to send in their reports as to the several officers.

* See *supra*, p. 130.

In the meantime he remained in Paris, hoping that something better would turn up. His career seemed to be ruined, for the mission of drill-sergeant in Turkey meant merely a long period of complete obscurity. Was this to be the end?

The Convention on September 23 proclaimed a new Constitution, which lessened the power of the primary assemblies of the sections, and it nominated two-thirds of its own members to the new Corps Législatif, thus preventing these primaries from exercising the vote. The sections were easily roused to action. They had 30,000 National Guards, and they prepared to use force. The Convention had 4,000 regulars and 1,500 armed "patriots," and confided the command to Barras, who had been so successful at Thermidor. On that occasion he had not required to fire a shot. It would obviously be very different now. Neither side had any artillery. The cannoneers had terrorized Paris for so long, having been the chief Jacobin instrument throughout the Revolution, that Carnot had at last been obliged to send them outside Paris. There were forty guns belonging to the National Guard at Les Sablons, under a negligible escort. The sections sent a column of National Guards to fetch them; with artillery and numbers, they would easily triumph over the small force under Barras. At this crisis somebody (it is not really known who did it) ordered Murat, already well known as a dashing cavalry officer, to seize the guns for the Convention. Murat started without an instant's delay, and galloped with 300 horse through the night, reached the guns only a few minutes before the sectional infantry had arrived, and carried them off at two in the morning, bringing them to the Tuileries by six. When, in the course of the day, the section troops attacked, they were easily dispersed by a few discharges of grape-shot.

Napoleon was on this day, with several other officers, under the orders of Barras, as one of his professional advisers. He had a special importance from the fact that artillery was to decide the day, and the guns were naturally placed in accordance with his suggestions.

There were other artillery officers available, and Napoleon had been dismissed the army, and was supposed to have given up his French career for service in Turkey. How came he to be employed? Because he was an ambitious man, in a desperate position, and a Corsican.

Seeing that, as he wrote to Joseph, "we are on the eve of great events," he did not hurry his departure for Turkey, but lingered in Paris to see what chance might bring. When the coming conflict was impending, he pushed himself forward, went to Barras, whose acquaintance he had made at Toulon, and volunteered his services; pointed to the power of artillery in the streets of Paris, and offered to place it where it would be most effective. As a Corsican, he had none of the scruples felt by many French officers, who hesitated to shed the blood of their fellow-countrymen. Menou, who had been in command, declared that he had been replaced "for having been unwilling to cause the blood of his fellow-citizens to flow." Squeamishness of that kind is not characteristic of the Corsican, and in any case the people before him were not Napoleon's compatriots. An exile from his home, he was forced into the position of the *condottiere* who was prepared to act with vigour and earn the rewards of his employers. The desperate position of his fortunes at the time made him determined to strike with relentless severity.

The persistent reluctance of the party of law and order to fire upon the "people" is one of the striking facts of the French Revolution. More than once its course might have been stayed, or at least diverted,

by the free use of powder and ball in the streets of Paris. The extraordinary softness of the ruling classes towards malefactors masquerading in the name of the "people" was due at first to a mild contempt, and then to an overpowering, paralyzing fear. But over a year had now elapsed since the true Terror had ended, and men were beginning to recover from their timidity. It wanted only some signal success to reassure the better class that the worst of the danger was over—that, in fact, public opinion would now support the man who should dare to put down a riot by a "massacre."

Barras at first thought it prudent to give all the credit, or blame, for the bloodshed to the Corsican. In his report to the Convention he minimized his own participation in the affair, and pointed to Napoleon as the real perpetrator of the deed; but, finding that opinion had changed as to the heinousness of such actions, he was soon boasting of the achievement.

One is struck by the peculiar good-fortune which brought matters to a head just at the moment when Napoleon was on the spot, in the right position, and animated with the proper spirit. He had refused to take up his infantry command, and was very properly dismissed the army, and was just about to leave France, perhaps for ever, when the only possible kind of fortunate circumstance actually came his way. Nothing but just that—street fighting in Paris which could be dominated by artillery—could have saved him. If Waterloo was, as the St. Helena captive declared, "a fatality," what was Vendémiaire?

Immediately after Vendémiaire Napoleon was restored to the army with the rank of General of Division, and by the end of the month was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Interior, a post vacated for him by Barras. He spent the winter of 1795-96 in Paris, and set himself to the task of wringing

from the Directors the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy. To that end he continued making plans for that army, and followed its fortunes with the closest attention. The officials in Paris were all made to feel his "ambition and intrigue," and his incessant, fatiguing importunity, like that of his father before him.

He now met for the first time the future Empress Josephine. She was the daughter of Tascher de la Pagerie, a French official in the Island of Martinique. Born and reared in the West Indies, she came to France as a young girl, and married a young noble, Comte Alexandre de Beauharnais, whose good manners and breeding had on several occasions earned him the honour of dancing with the Queen at the Court balls at Versailles. Beauharnais espoused the cause of the Revolution, was President at one time of the National Assembly, and then took the command of the army of the Rhine; but in 1794 he and his wife were imprisoned, owing to their aristocratic connections. On July 25, 1794, he was guillotined, and Josephine had already been warned to prepare to follow him, when, three days later, came the fall of Robespierre.

An old negress had prophesied—the tale is amply corroborated—that the young creole would become a Queen, and she had endeavoured in prison to cheer herself and her companions by repeating the story.

The exact relations that existed, after Thermidor, between Josephine, Barras, and Napoleon will never be accurately known. Josephine was befriended by Barras, and Napoleon fell genuinely in love with her. At the same time the Directors were being so persistently pestered by the intriguing Corsican, with his caustic comments, his eternal plans of campaign, his uncomfortable confidence and self-assertion, that they were anxious to see the last of him. Barras accordingly

handed over Josephine to Napoleon, who was also given the Italian command.

Napoleon was in ecstasies. He knew what could be done with the army of Italy, and that his military fortune was made ; and he was delighted with Josephine and her distinguished, charming manners. He said of her at St. Helena : " Josephine was grace personified. Everything she did was with a grace and delicacy peculiar to herself. I never saw her act inelegantly the whole time we lived together." The young Corsican loved her for her grace and her aristocratic associations. He would say to her : " Let us talk of the old Court ; let us take a tour to Versailles."

After a brief honeymoon, Napoleon left his wife for the Italian campaign. He wrote her quantities of the most ardent letters. He could always find time for a long epistle, full of the warmest, most passionate expressions. As he said himself in a note to Carnot, he was madly in love with her. She was not beautiful, but she was well bred ; that was, for the coarse Corsican, the chief attraction. Moreover, she was no *ingénue*, no sentimental girl, but an accomplished and experienced woman of the world.

Carlo di Bonaparte had been a man of elegant manners, who had been received more than once by Louis XVI. ; but the family lost him early, and the mother, Letizia, though a beautiful woman, was a semi-educated provincial, who spoke French, and even Italian, with a Corsican accent, and had too decided a manner. The Bonapartes, with the exception of Joseph, who had his father's graces, were all of them painfully conscious of their provincialism and insularity. When Caroline was at school with Hortense de Beauharnais, the daughter of Alexandre and Josephine, she was eternally being exhorted to imitate her, and was exasperated accordingly. The Bonapartes detested Josephine because of her fine manners, her French grace and

tact ; and Napoleon loved her for these very qualities, for, as her husband, he was being introduced to the best French tone, and was taking a place in the most polished society of the Continent. Napoleon was always a bear, and knew it. It was his consciousness of the roughness of his manners that drew from him the caustic remark that his elder brother would be "in every country the ornament of society," and that made him so passionate an adorer of the graceful Josephine.

His desire to please her was a strong tonic that made him a transformed being, exalted to efforts of the most strenuous nature. The honeymoon was of just the right duration. It left him in transports. Thus Josephine counted for much in the Italian campaign ; her influence was felt by friend and foe, for her champion was inspired to efforts which the senile Generals opposed to him could not by any woman's smiles be galvanized into imitating.

CHAPTER VI

THE ARMY OF ITALY

NAPOLÉON was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy on March 2, 1796; he married Josephine on March 9; he left her and Paris on March 11; obtained at Marseilles his mother's written consent to the marriage, which was the first thing in his mind; and finally, with no undue haste, arrived at Nice, the headquarters of his army, on March 27.

The problem before him was one with which he was so familiar that he was able, without boasting, to announce to his soldiers, in his first proclamation, that he was about to lead them into Italy.

A forward movement was prescribed for him by the condition of his troops, the men dying of epidemics induced by want and privation. The easiest mountain pass, with the best road, for entry into the plains of Piedmont and Lombardy, where he could get food for his troops, was that of Altaire, leading from Savona to Carcaire. West of Carcaire lay the Sardinian troops, some 20,000 strong, under an Austrian commander, General Colli; their line of communication led north-west, to Turin. East of Carcaire were the Austrians, some 31,000 strong, under Beaulieu; their line of communications led north-east, to Alessandria and Milan. Napoleon had an army of 35,000 soldiers, who were so far superior in quality to their opponents—that is, in zeal and energy, in *moral*—that they would have been able to give a good account of themselves,

even if opposed to the united forces of the enemy, some 51,000 altogether. But there was no co-operation between the Sardinians and Austrians. They did not require to be separated, as they had never been joined. The obvious thing to do was to cross the Alps by the good road of Altaire, which led to a position between the two enemy forces, then to drive the Austrians north-east and the Sardinians north-west. That this could easily be done was known to everybody—to Napoleon first of all, because he had already worked out the scheme for the campaign of 1794, when all went exactly according to expectation. The Austrians were driven back, and the Sardinians were preparing to repel the anticipated attack, when one of the representatives, Albitte, delayed the move, and Carnot finally forbade it. That obstruction was now removed, and no improvement having occurred in the relations between Sardinians and Austrians, there was nothing to prevent the repetition of the French advance of 1794, and its continuance beyond the point formerly reached. The ultimate arrival in the plains of Lombardy was a foregone conclusion.

Colli had been three years upon the scene of operations, had witnessed the former French invasion, and knew that it would be repeated in the same way by the man who had made the original plan. He proposed to Beaulieu a sensible scheme of preparation and reply to the expected attack; but Beaulieu, who had only just arrived, imposed upon Colli, his junior, his own hastily-prepared scheme. Beaulieu was aged seventy-one, Colli fifty-five, Napoleon twenty-six and a half. Beaulieu despised Napoleon for his youth, and Colli for his three years of inaction. He imagined that in one glance he could appraise the strategic position better than his youthful opponent, who had thought of little else for two years; had made plan after plan in elaborate detail; was not only familiar

with the geography of the district, but was also personally acquainted with its minute topography; and had studied the numerous previous campaigns in this war-worn country, some of them singularly apposite to the present case. He has, indeed, been accused of copying the dispositions of the Marquis de Maillebois in the campaign of 1744. However that may be, suffice it that Napoleon had made himself thorough master of the situation in all its bearings. In the words of Thiers, he had it all "in his pocket."

When Napoleon arrived at Nice, the situation had already greatly improved since 1794. Acting upon the plans worked out by Napoleon in Paris, the French, under Schérer and Massena, had in the late autumn of 1795 marched against the enemy, defeated him in a considerable battle at Loano, and established themselves in an advanced position, facilitating further progress. Schérer had declined to follow up his success, alleging, as excuse for inaction, the scarcity of supplies and the smallness of his force. He was fifty years of age, and wished to retire on his reputation. He tendered his resignation more than once, and in terms which made it clear that the offer was sincere. He knew that Napoleon desired the appointment, and he openly suggested that a more enterprising man should be given his chance. When, finally, Napoleon did obtain the command, Schérer, with a loyalty of which Napoleon would have been incapable, made every preparation for the forward move which he knew would be ordered, and waited for Napoleon's arrival, in order to give him every assistance and all the information he might require.

Just before Napoleon's arrival Saliceti had ordered Cervoni (another Corsican) to advance with a small force to Voltri and Genoa, with the object of forcing a loan from the Genoese. Napoleon found himself

obliged to send a detachment to support Cervoni. Saliceti's action, coupled with the well-known intention of the new commander to begin an offensive movement, brought out the Austrians from their winter quarters, and thus prevented Napoleon from effecting his intended surprise; but it also diverted Beaulieu's attention from the real point of attack. He concluded that Napoleon's principal aim was Genoa, and moved some of his troops in that direction, leaving the path by way of Carcaire insufficiently defended. Thus Napoleon had little difficulty in pushing back the Austrians from that neighbourhood, at Montenotte, and then further, beyond Dego, north-east. Then, in accordance with the programme, he turned against the Sardinians, and after some stiffish combats at Cossèria and Mondovì, drove them back north-west, and forced them to the armistice of Cherasco. After that he followed up the Austrians, outflanked them at Piacenza, drove them off eastwards at Lodi, and entered Milan.

Seven weeks after his arrival at Nice, five weeks after the first skirmish at Montenotte, Napoleon had risen from a barricade reputation in Paris to a European celebrity. In France he had already acquired something of that semi-divine halo which was to be with him throughout life and with his name after death.

It is curious that the only prognostication of all this should be derived from enemy sources. The Archduke Ferdinand, as we have noted, had already said that Napoleon, being a Corsican, was hardy and enterprising and likely to attack; and just before the campaign Colli's Chief of the Staff, Costa de Beaupaire, wrote: "General Buonaparte, a creature of Barras, is not known for any stirring achievement; but he is regarded as a profound theorist and a man of genius."

Whence did the enemy derive this information? Probably it came from Paris. In the army of Italy Napoleon was at first rather laughed at; but in Paris they knew him better; his plan-making had evidently made a deep impression; somebody must have already declared he was a genius. Carnot said afterwards, in 1799, that it was he who had proposed Napoleon for the Italian command, and that Barras, while consenting, had not wished to identify himself with the appointment until he saw how it would turn out. If Napoleon had failed, Barras would have denounced Carnot as a traitor for proposing a young and inexperienced man, who was also an intriguer. Perhaps, after all, it was Napoleon's underground intriguing which, combined with his incessant criticisms and proposals, made them all glad to get rid of him. In any case, it is certainly remarkable that the only just estimate of Napoleon, the only apposite reference to his abilities before they had been exhibited to the world, should have come from the enemy.

Napoleon's Chief of the Staff, Berthier, afterwards so famous, on May 6 wrote to Paris: "I am very pleased with General Bonaparte: he has talent." Evidently he supposed that his patronizing approval would reassure them in Paris. In return, Napoleon wrote of Berthier to the Directory: "It is impossible to join together more activity, zeal, courage, and understanding. I have, as is only just, passed over to him the half of the flattering remarks you have given me in your letters." Saliceti wrote to the Directory of Berthier: "It is to his indefatigable zeal, his activity, his energy, his truly rare military talents, that in a large measure our success is due."

The influence of Berthier upon the fortunes of Napoleon was second only to that of Saliceti. When the fidelity of Berthier had passed almost into a proverb, the Emperor could afford to speak of him

as a mere instrument, a poor fool, a gander whom he had made half an eagle. Napoleon owed Berthier, as well as Saliceti, more than he cared to acknowledge. In the Waterloo campaign Napoleon's orders, with no Berthier at his side to explain them, were obscure and misunderstood, with fatal results.

Speaking to Las Cases at St. Helena, Napoleon said: "Vendémiaire, and even Montenotte, did not lead me to regard myself a man out of the ordinary. It was only after Lodi that the idea came to me that I might, after all, indeed become a decisive actor on the political stage. Then arose the first gleam of high ambition."

This remark recalls the observation of the young Lucien, who saw that Napoleon, in the early ferment of the Revolution, had indulged in unbounded hopes. As Napoleon expressed it to Montholon at St. Helena, he had expectations which were in the nature of a "fantastic dream." These feelings had subsided for a time, suppressed by the misfortunes of the next years; but they were merely latent, and one is not inclined to admit that there was no eruption before Lodi. His ambition, no doubt, grew with every success. It was already potent and observed before Vendémiaire.

Montenotte, though a necessary operation, was not a serious battle. Lodi, as Napoleon remarked on the evening of the combat to the local Bishop, "*Non fu gran cosa*" (was not much of an affair). Yet when the Emperor Francis wanted to prove that his son-in-law was of the noblest birth, Napoleon replied that his patent of nobility dated from Montenotte; and he told Las Cases that his title of "*Le Petit Caporal*" was given him by his soldiers after Lodi, for the marvels he had achieved on that day. Here again we have the Napoleonic legend. Most people have heard of Montenotte; everybody knows the fable about the

bridge of Lodi. Napoleon himself created the prevalent misconceptions concerning these combats. No doubt they were to him events of importance. Montenotte was his first personal success. Lodi was a dramatic episode. Napoleon had been hoping for just such an event—a victory over the Austrians in open ground, and under conditions which, with a little exaggeration, might be used to excite enthusiasm and wonder. He gave orders to a young painter to illustrate the “astonishing passage of the bridge of Lodi.” Then began the incessant self-advertisement by paintings, engravings, newspapers, coinage, which henceforth never stopped. It was the first edition of that Napoleonic iconography which carried the features and exploits of Napoleon and his soldiers to the utmost ends of the earth.

The creation of the Napoleonic legend thus early in connection with such combats as those of Montenotte and Lodi was a remarkable achievement, though Napoleon had some natural advantages in his appearance, his name, and his nationality.

He measured 5 feet $5\frac{3}{4}$ inches, and was very thin, with small hands and feet. His hands were always in a clean and cared-for condition; they were his one vanity. He had a sickly, pale olive complexion. His lank chestnut hair he allowed, following a not unusual custom in the Republican army, to grow so long that it reached his shoulders. It was this frail appearance, so unwarlike, so far removed from the soldier type, that earned him the title of “*Petit Caporal*,” and aided him in assuming the character of an abnormal being. An English visitor to Elba said it was his fatness that made him look short; in these days it was his thinness. Hoche and Marceau were Commanders-in-Chief at an earlier age, but Napoleon's youthfulness has come to be regarded as something very extraordinary, which was far from being the case in the Republican

army. When he appeared before English spectators in 1815 his face was still remarkably free from wrinkles; twenty years earlier it had a childlike aspect, with little dimples in chin and cheeks. The features were regular and distinguished; the nose straight and of good length; the cheek-bones somewhat prominent; the forehead large and well-shaped; the lips were thin and sensitive, projecting a little in the profile; the eyes were grey, or grey-blue: they had a fixed, searching look, which was the outstanding feature of the whole physiognomy; the teeth were white and well-shaped, and never required the dentist. Napoleon's gestures were short and energetic; he would rise or sit down with sudden brusqueness; spoke, walking up and down, in a voice metallic, dry, and trenchant, with a noticeable Corsican accent. Mme. de Rémusat, an unfriendly critic, while admitting his "bewitching smile" (much noticed by his contemporaries), said of his speech: "Spoken by him, Italian loses all its grace and sweetness. Whatever language he speaks, it always sounds like a foreign tongue."

Napoleon at this time seemed to be shorter and younger and more delicate than he was; his appearance helped him to fill the part of the freak of Nature.

His name could scarcely have been bettered. It showed, in the first place, that he was not of French origin. At that time the French had seen so many typically French failures that a foreign name was an attraction. When one goes through a list of French officers—Berthier, La Harpe, Augereau, Massena, Sérurier (his Chief of Staff and four Generals of Brigade)—Bonaparte is quite distinct, at once arrests the attention. To the commander of an army about to invade Italy the name of Bonaparte—Italian, dignified, and promising good things—was singularly appropriate.

He found later that even his Christian name was most helpful to the founder of a new dynasty, suggesting power, dignity, mystery.

His Corsican origin, constantly in evidence, owing to his accent, helped the legend. It was out of the common; and the Corsicans had a widespread reputation for being persons of rare qualities, amongst whom a prodigy might easily be found.

These advantages he made the most of. France was excited by the succession of victories, assumed to be great battles, reported from the army of Italy, which for the three previous years had done nothing; and now that a diminutive, precocious child, a long-haired, thin, frail, yellow Corsican, with the singular and agreeable name of Bonaparte, was in command, had in a few weeks imposed peace on the Sardinians, driven off the Austrians, and taken possession of Lombardy. The hero was already regarded as a being more Divine than human.

The Directors were uneasy at the prestige of the new chief. They had been warned as early as March 6, before Napoleon had left Paris, of the danger of giving the command of the army of Italy to Corsicans who "have their fortunes still to make." They now saw their mistake. While still ignorant of the Lodi drama, and the advantage Napoleon was going to derive from his management of the *réclame*, the Directors wrote to him proposing that the command in Italy should be divided between Kellermann and himself, Kellermann continuing the northern campaign, while Napoleon marched to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples.

Napoleon received the letter after Lodi, and, knowing that it had been written before that event, he was able to offer a stiff opposition. He replied: "If you impose on me fetters of all kinds; if you compel me to refer all my plans to the Commissioners of the Government; if you are going to alter my moves, take away troops,

or send me more, do not expect any more successes. It is essential that you should have perfect confidence in your General. Every man has his own way of making war. General Kellermann has more experience and would do it better than I, but together we should do it very badly." To Carnot personally he wrote: "One bad General is better than two good ones."

His complaints were abundantly justified, and they go far to explain the failures of preceding commanders and the successes of Napoleon. Up to that date no General had been allowed to carry out his own plans. Napoleon acted with such promptitude that the orders from Paris always arrived too late, and Saliceti, the local Commissioner, was still his friend. He was thus the first Republican General who was not hampered by the instructions of the people in Paris, or the interference of the civilian representative with the army. To the end of his career Napoleon was the only commander in Europe (except Wellington, after his reputation had been made) who was able to do what he thought best. The Directors had attempted to interfere with him after Cherasco, but before their instructions had reached him he had achieved the culminating and dramatic success of Lodi, which enabled him to resist their strangulating pressure; and when news of Lodi arrived in Paris, the enthusiasm of the French was so great, and the young General was already so much of a popular hero, that the Directors did not dare oppose him. Like Frankenstein, they had made their monster, and could now only try to soften his bearing towards them.

And if one bad General is better than two good ones, what chance had Beaulieu and Colli, in command of troops of different nationalities, of varying aims, and mutually hostile, against their single opponent, with his united and enthusiastic people? What chance,

indeed, had the detached Kingdoms and Principalities of Europe, with their numerous unconnected commanders, each one under the control of his own distant officials, against *any* independent General?

At Milan, on the evening of the tremendous acclamations he received on the day of his formal entry, Napoleon said to Marmont: "Well, what do you think they are saying of us in Paris? Are they satisfied?" Marmont enlarged enthusiastically on the greatness and rapidity of their triumphs, which could not fail to rouse France to a high pitch of delight. "They have not seen anything yet," said Napoleon. "Fortune has not smiled on me in this way that I should disdain her favours. She is a woman, and the more she does for me the more I shall expect. In our day nothing really great has been attempted; it is for me to give the example." His ambition after Lodi and Milan was concrete and specific for the near future, and with an unbounded horizon. He was to be the first man in France at least, perhaps in the whole world. But he dissimulated with rare ability, always in his letters to the Directors adopting an attitude of great respect to them, and of equal hostility to the *émigrés* and other malcontents.

The Directors sent Clarke to watch over him, and Clarke reported that he was quite convinced Napoleon was an ardent Republican, entirely free from all personal ambition, who thought of nothing but his duty to France and the Republic. Clarke was completely deceived—a great achievement, for it was known that all the leading soldiers of the day were beginning to raise their heads. Even Hoche, the purest patriot of them all, had given offence by the assumption of regal airs. When a sycophant significantly observed to Hoche that the throne was empty, Hoche gave no immediate sign; but in such a position of temptation no man could be impervious to personal considerations, and Hoche

began to coquet with the idea of his own aggrandisement. For Napoleon from this time forward cynically selfish aims were the guiding motives of all his acts. From the date of the entry into Milan, May 15, 1796, to the day of his death, May 5, 1821—just a quarter of a century—the welfare of France, and of mankind, was of no concern to him unless it coincided with his own.

CHAPTER VII

LUCK

THE marvellous career of Napoleon, with its early period of sensational conquest and its later period of astounding defeat, is too well known to need further relation. Sustained at first by the self-confidence of youth, then by the extraordinary extent of his success, throughout his life he believed himself to be under the special protection of the goddess Fortune. He was for ever talking of his star and of fulfilling his destiny. He believed in fate. He said in 1812: "I feel myself impelled towards a goal with which I am unacquainted. When I shall have reached it, when I shall be no longer needed for it, an atom will suffice to throw me down, but until that moment all human efforts will be powerless against me." On his death-bed at St. Helena he said: "All that is to happen is written down; our hour is marked; we cannot prolong it a minute longer than fate has predestined."

The other great Corsican, Paoli, as will be remembered, had the same feeling. This common Corsican superstition was fortified in Napoleon by his sojourn in the East; by the semi-miraculous nature of his career, which seemed to mark him out as a being under special protection; by his self-confidence, which made him always certain of victory (which many have felt in youth); and, above all, by his intimate acquaintance with "the fortune of war." In 1796, when writing to the Directors a report on

the qualities of his chief subordinates, he observed of certain officers, whom he credited with excellent abilities, that they were "unlucky."

It is fatal for a soldier to be "unlucky," more especially in his first venture as a commander. If he is defeated then, whatever the extenuating circumstances may have been, he is seldom given the opportunity to recover his position. Napoleon himself would never have been heard of if in 1796 he had experienced the opposition of 1815; if Wellington and Blücher and their eager troops had taken the place of Beaulieu and Colli and their lukewarm soldiers.

A military genius, except he be a monarch, cannot prove his worth unless in his first important command he is in favourable circumstances. If he is unlucky then, the sponge goes through his name. It is to be presumed, therefore, that this has frequently occurred, that a great many men of genius, who might have equalled the most famous, have been pushed back at the outset and never again given the necessary opportunity. Unless war is prolonged, reputation and merit may not have time to become connected. Compared with other contests of skill, such as chess, golf, cricket, billiards, where searching and unequivocal trials are frequently repeated, war is a haphazard business. The competing Captains are few, and the tests are neither numerous nor exact.

Military luck, besides the mere escape from bullets, includes also such fortunate incidents as the charge of the younger Kellermann at Marengo, which had not been prearranged or anticipated. Of such occurrences Napoleon enjoyed his share, but he also experienced misfortunes of that sort, and the total balance may not have been uneven.

His real good-fortune was of another character. It gave him a command when he was unknown; it provided circumstances connected with that command



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NAPOLÉON I.

From a copy by Horatio Gibbs, after the original by Delaroche.

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which assisted him to display his ability; and it continued to offer similar favourable opportunities in subsequent campaigns.

Napoleon obtained the command of the army of Italy in 1796, because, owing to the very fortunate events of Vendémiaire, he found himself in a position to demand what he wanted with persistent importunity; and because, owing to his previous connection with the army of Italy, he was exceptionally well acquainted with the conditions in that theatre of war. He must also have made a personal impression on Carnot and other men of influence in Paris; but the command must be considered decidedly lucky, for he had no military reputation at the time. The Directors were taking a risk, and Barras at least had already prepared, while assuming all the credit if the appointment turned out well, to throw the blame on Carnot if it turned out ill.

Napoleon's rivals up to the date of Marengo, June 14, 1800, were, at various times, Kellermann, Desaix, Davout, Marceau, Joubert, Moreau, Bernadotte, Jourdan, Pichegru, Kléber, Augereau, Lefebvre, Massena, Hoche, Lannes. After Marengo, at latest, the competition was at an end. The prize had been awarded.

Of these fifteen, only three — Kellermann, Desaix, and Davout—had received an education at all comparable to that of Napoleon. They alone, like Napoleon, were reared as officers and gentlemen, and even over them Napoleon had an advantage, for he went into the artillery, which at that time was the best in Europe. It is a fact of great significance that of all the soldiers who rose to fame before the Empire it was the Emperor himself who had received the best military education.

Of the men whose education was next below his, Kellermann had been too long in the old Royal Army

to be able to adapt himself to the new conditions of warfare, and at sixty-four was too old for great personal triumphs.

Davout was educated, like Napoleon, at a military school. A year younger than Napoleon, he reached the rank of General of Brigade before him, in July, 1793, at the age of twenty-three; but two months later he was cashiered, owing to his noble birth, while Napoleon was getting his opportunity at Toulon. Restored to active service after the fall of Robespierre, Davout's career was again interrupted by his being taken prisoner in 1795.

Desaix, a year older than Napoleon, went through a military school, and obtained a commission in an infantry regiment at the age of fifteen. At twenty-six he was General of Division. He was killed at Marengo. Neither he, nor Kellermann, nor Davout, had Napoleon's familiarity with French and Italian, a rare and very useful accomplishment for a French campaign in Italy. This was one of the qualifications which helped Napoleon to obtain the appointment.

Five of the men on our list had fair or good civilian education, but no military training for the commissioned ranks. Of these, Marceau, born in the same year as Napoleon, was the son of a registrar of the court at Chartres. He enlisted, and rose to be Commander of the Northern Army of the West at the age of twenty-four, but was suspected of aristocratic tendencies, and deprived of the command. He was killed in a skirmish, September, 1796.

Joubert, also born in Napoleon's year, was killed in battle in 1799, just when he was being approached to take over the government of France. If Joubert had triumphed at Novi, it is probable that Napoleon, on his return from Egypt, would have found the vacant seat already occupied.

Moreau was eight years older than Napoleon. The

son of a lawyer, he followed the same profession. When the Revolution broke out, he became commander of a battalion of volunteers, and soon rose to be Commander-in-Chief. He was a General of great ability, and his reputation made him for long a serious rival to Napoleon. But he hesitated to seize the vacant position, partly from genuine Republican convictions, partly, perhaps, from disinclination.

Bernadotte, five years older than Napoleon, was the son of a lawyer. He enlisted, and was for some years in the non-commissioned ranks, until the Revolution enabled him to rise. He nearly obtained the command of the army of Italy, in place of Napoleon, but was passed over in favour of the trained officer. He was ambitious, but too democratic for the post of Dictator.

Jourdan, seven years older than Napoleon, was the son of a doctor. He enlisted, and went to the war in America. The Revolution raised him to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the North in 1793. He gained the brilliant victory of Fleurus, but was defeated by the Archduke Charles at Stockach in 1799, just at the time when he required an untarnished military reputation.

The seven remaining soldiers on our list all sprang from the plebs, and had little education of any kind.

Pichegru, the son of a peasant, obtained the position of pupil-teacher of mathematics at Brienne, and, enlisting, rose to be Commander of the Army of the Rhine in 1793; but his loyalty to the Republic was early suspected. In the end he was a traitor.

Kléber, the son of a working mason, became an architect, but enlisted, and then obtained a commission in an Austrian regiment, returning to France when the Revolution broke out. Napoleon left him in command in Egypt, where he was assassinated. It is reported that Napoleon, on hearing the news, observed: "One rival the less."

Augereau, Lefebvre, and Lannes, were great battle-fighters, but unsuited, from their lowly origin and want of manners, for the supreme civilian position.

Massena, who could never read or write with comfortable ease, was a cabin-boy at sea for a number of years. At Loano he anticipated, before Napoleon had ever commanded an army, the characteristic manœuvre for which the Corsican was to become so famous. He had a genius for war, but was self-indulgent, and not fitted to stand at the head of a civil administration.

Hoche, the greatest of Napoleon's rivals, began life as a groom. He rose from that lowly position to be Commander of the Army of the Moselle, at the early age of twenty-four; but he was too great for Robespierre, and spent the last months of the Terror in prison, daily expecting his summons. Being released after Thermidor, he pacified La Vendée, and acquired a semi-divine reputation very similar to that of Napoleon, and with more justification, for it is much harder to explain Hoche than Napoleon. He died in 1797, aged twenty-nine.

If in the spring of 1796 the army of Italy had been given to almost any one of these men, it would have been led successfully into Milan, and its General would have stood very high in the public estimation. How much further he might have gone would have depended partly on his military capacity, but much more on his ambition and his civilian adaptability. Napoleon was superior to them all in the wish to dominate, in sleepless and unquenchable personal ambition. The greatest triumphs can only be manufactured in that hot furnace. Napoleon was also, owing to his long Corsican furloughs and his superior education, as Sièyes said, "the most civilian of the soldiers." Take away from Napoleon his thirst of power, and give it, together with his good civilian and

military education, to almost any one of the competitors we have named, and we should get a head of the Government, military and civil, whose name was not Bonaparte.

The extent of Napoleon's luck over these fifteen competitors will be perceived when we note that if Hoche, Marceau, Joubert, had lived ; if Kléber and Desaix had remained in France and lived ; if Davout had not been a prisoner for two of the critical years ; if Kellermann had been a younger man ; if Bernadotte, Moreau, Jourdan, had received Napoleon's military education ; if Massena, Lannes, Kléber, Augereau, Lefebvre, had had any education at all (Hoche and Pichegru were able to do without it) ; or if Napoleon had stayed in Egypt a little longer—in almost any one of these events Napoleon would probably have found the place occupied when at last he arrived in Paris. The supremacy of his military genius was not yet admitted, and it was only the extraordinary combination of (1) a superior education over all rivals, (2) other gifts of singular personal good-fortune, and (3) an ardent ambition, that made him master of France.

Of the prominent Generals who opposed him at various times, Beaulieu, Wurmser, Alvinzi, Melas, Brunswick, Hohenlohe, Kutusoff, Blücher, Bennigsen, were all over sixty years of age when they met Napoleon for the first time. Mack was fifty-two, Barclay fifty-one, and Bagration forty-seven. Napoleon at Waterloo, the end of his career, was only forty-five, still younger than the youngest of the above list. Wellington was three and a half months older than Napoleon ; Schwarzenburg and the Archduke Charles were two years younger.

Of the sexagenarians, Blücher alone made any stand against Napoleon. Each of the three youngest men had his successes against him. The Archduke Charles

defeated him at Aspern-Essling, Wellington at Waterloo at the first encounter, and Schwarzenburg, though no rival in ability, did succeed in slipping past him to Paris in 1814.

In the wars of the period, with their innovations, it was a grave disadvantage for a commander to be over fifty years of age if his opponent was much below that age, and fatal to be over sixty. In the former case victory for the younger man was very probable; in the latter it was certain. Youth being so tremendous a factor, it is worthy of note that Napoleon had the oldest, and therefore least competent, men against him in the early and most successful part of his career; that it was only when his own age began to approach that of his opponents that he began to be less easily triumphant; and that of the three men he fought who were not older than himself, one, the Archduke Charles, was very nearly, another, the Duke of Wellington, quite, his equal. Napoleon's youth was of itself alone almost a decisive factor. We are not entitled to assume that if he had been born ten or twenty years earlier he would have shown the same ability.

Another immense advantage that Napoleon enjoyed was his freedom. Wellington observed that after his own earlier successes officers and men would do for him "what, perhaps, no one else could make them do." He "had several of the advantages possessed by Bonaparte in regard to his freedom of action and power of risking, without being constantly called to account. Bonaparte was quite free from all inquiry, and he himself was, in fact, very much so." Until 1815 Napoleon never once met an independent General who was able to do what he thought best—and then he was utterly routed.

In 1796 he said: "One bad General is better than two good ones." Napoleon never had to share his command, while against him there were nearly always

two commanders. They had to study each other's plans and wishes, and also obey their monarchs, their Aulic Councils, and other distant controllers. When Wellington had obtained the supreme command in Spain, his task was simplified by the jealousies of the various Marshals, who were at variance with each other, and also under the control of Napoleon in Paris. The advantage that Napoleon, and in a lesser degree Wellington, derived from this freedom of action may alone of itself have sufficed to account for the successes of these Generals. In such conditions, if Napoleon's dictum is remembered, they might have been bad Generals and still won.

The unwillingness of the Continental Powers to give their Generals a free hand naturally kept alive a spirit of jealousy, created a feeling of uncertainty and hesitation among them, and encouraged that dispersion of their forces into separate groups in different parts of the theatre which gave Napoleon the wonderful opportunities which he was so well qualified to take advantage of.

And what of the machine that the Revolution gave him? At first the Republican volunteers were almost worthless: they had no discipline; they contained a large criminal element; many had gone into the army to escape the guillotine, and were not prepared to face death in any form. These were the men whom Dumouriez, Kellermann, Jourdan, Pichegru, Hoche, led with chequered success. But they were improving every day; and the danger which threatened France when almost all Europe was swarming down upon her brought the most patriotic citizens to her aid. It was part of Napoleon's good-fortune that by the time he obtained a command the French soldiers had gradually become the best on the Continent in education, intelligence, patriotic ardour, and general zeal and willingness.

The officers were selected from all ranks of society, according to personal merit; and, imperfect as this system must be, it was far superior to the selection by old age, from one small social stratum, which was still the haphazard plan in other armies. The French officers, from commanders to subalterns, were all young, while their opponents, in the higher ranks at least, were all old.* There could be no comparison between the two sets. One was efficient, the other was not.

The Republican army was also far less dependent than any army of the time on its magazines. Partly from the poverty of the Republic, partly owing to the wholesale frauds of the war commissaries, the French soldiers had been obliged to learn to do without what others thought necessary. In the old Royal Army, in which soldiers enlisted for pay, such privation would have caused wholesale desertions to the enemy, and it was thus impossible for the army to march without the accompaniment of full magazines. But the revolutionary soldier was a patriot, not a mercenary; he would put up with privation for the sake of his country and its cause. The Republican army was able to abandon the impedimenta which still hampered all other armies, and became far swifter and freer in movement than any army it had to meet. Napoleon contrived to make it appear that he was the originator of a system which he approved and supported, but found already in existence.

Lastly, the French had developed a system of tactical operations superior to that of the other Continental nations. History shows that the side which has

* Even at Waterloo Napoleon's army of veterans contained no General as old as fifty, or with less than twenty years of war service. The three eldest were Grouchy and d'Erlon, forty-nine; Napoleon, forty-five ("The Life of Wellington," by Sir Herbert Maxwell, vol. i, p. 401).

the best method of fighting is nearly always victorious.* Frederick the Great owed much of his success to the line system of advancing to attack, which gave an abundant fire; and drilled his troops to a perfection of discipline then unknown, which gave mobility. The enemy, when the trained Prussians appeared on the field, were afraid to move from the position they had taken, and were then passive recipients of the Prussian blow, delivered by oblique attack on the flank, so as to bring the maximum force upon one point.

Then came the French system, adopted in the early years of Louis XVI. The French used battalion columns, with a double company front, covered by clouds of skirmishers. Having shaken the enemy's line with the fire of artillery, the battalion masses would advance in columns, preceded by their skirmishers. If the enemy stood (by no means always the case), the French would deploy into line for musketry fire, and follow that up with a bayonet charge. These tactics gave great mobility. The skirmishers would often work right round the enemy's rear.

This method was far superior to the previous best—the Prussian. Napoleon was taught it as a cadet, found it in use when he took command—experience having already shown its value—and derived much of his battle success from it.

Napoleon was peculiarly fortunate in obtaining this superior French Army as soon as it was ready, and not before. He obtained his first command just when the troops were at their best, and the forward policy had been decided upon in Paris. Earlier his weapon would have been of inferior quality, and he would not have been permitted to make a decisive move. Later some other General might already have become the popular hero.

* "A History of Tactics," by Captain H. M. Johnstone, R.E., 1906.

Moreover, it was precisely the Italian command that gave the best opportunities. The task before him of forcing a passage over the mountains into Italy was, owing to geographical facts, of necessity a separated and isolated business. The Paris people could not follow his movements in the mountains, nor reach him with orders, as easily and as promptly as they wished. He was in a small and secluded theatre, where it was very difficult to keep control over him. On the Rhine there were two armies, with two Generals, in a large open space, and within easy reach of Paris. Neither of these Generals had any initiative worth mentioning. Plans of campaign were sent them from Paris. The army of Italy furnished by far the easiest route, the shortest cut, to Power. Napoleon's association with that army arose from its being the nearest to Corsica.

Luck gave Napoleon an extraordinary chance at Vendémiaire ; a command when he was unknown and untried ; a decisive advantage in education over French rivals, in youth over Continental opponents ; an army superior in activity, spirit, and tactics to the foreign armies, just at the moment when such superiority had been acquired ; a freedom and independence which no French rival or Continental opponent ever had before Waterloo. Small wonder, indeed, that he believed himself to be under the special eye of Providence, that he came to suppose that under no possible circumstances would his "Star" ever desert him. Only the dullest brain could have remained unaffected by so extraordinary a combination of fortuitous circumstances.



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NAPOLEON, MARCH 8, 1812.

By Girodet Troison.

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CHAPTER VIII

GENIUS

THOUGH he owed his great opportunity to fortune more than merit, and his superb French weapon to fortune alone, Napoleon proved his genius by the manner and the extent of his victories. Ordinary ability in his position might have gained some triumphs, but there was more than the fortune of war in his tremendous achievements.

He was a hard worker. He once said, "I am always working," which means that his work was seldom out of his mind. Some great men have been able to throw off their work completely in intervals of thorough relaxation, but Napoleon does not appear to have been one of these. His power of sustained work impressed those who were associated with him; he would tire them out one after another. He boasted at St. Helena that, whereas he had known what it was to reach the limit of his physical strength, he had never come to the end of his mental endurance, and recalled how he had been able to keep three or four secretaries employed at one time. These abilities were exceptional, but by no means extraordinary or marvellous. There is an immense sustaining power in unquestioned authority. It is much less fatiguing to prepare and publish a command than to follow its terms and carry it out implicitly. In the one case a natural outlet is given to an ordinary mental process; in the other a distinct effort has to be made to follow the working of another

mind, and a feeling of anxiety as to the correct interpretation remains throughout. So long as the bodily functions are unimpaired by physical lassitude, the mind, if serene and confident, feels no fatigue. And a Director is always more interested in the business in hand than any subordinate can be. Confident of his own ability, the study of interesting problems and the issuing of orders form an agreeable, stimulating, and satisfying mental exercise, while those under him have not the same interest nor any similar prospect of reward for success, and are harassed by continual uncertainty as to the adequacy of their task performance.

He was a writer. We have seen that as a youth he spent much of his time in taking notes of the books he was reading, or in writing an essay, or a history; that when political questions arose it was he who took the trouble to write out a new organization for a regimental "calotte," or an attack on a Buttafoco, or a report on an Ajaccio disturbance, or an imaginary political conversation at Beaucaire.

He liked to put things on paper, partly in order to express his ideas in the best way, for he rewrote when he was dissatisfied with his first presentation of a subject; also in order to narrow down the issues to a definite basis, which could be pondered over, and to prevent the wandering of an untethered imagination.

It was his habit to work out plans of military operations in elaborate detail, and to forward them to persons of importance. For the Italian campaign he compiled plan after plan, until he was thorough master of the whole subject in all its bearings.

The writings of his youth were marked by violence of expression and tedious length. Both qualities sprang from his energy. This was really the chief fact about Napoleon, that he was the embodiment of

energy. "Energy is more important in warfare than mere sharpness of intellect" (Yorck v. Wartenburg, "Napoleon as a General"). Attack and swiftness of movement, both so characteristic of Napoleon, are products of energy.

Jomini, the great critic, himself a participator in most of Napoleon's campaigns, said: "The most important qualities for the leader of an army will ever be great character or moral courage, which allows mighty resolves to be formed, and then coolness or physical courage, which triumphs over all dangers. Actual military science only comes in the third place, but it will be a very strong auxiliary." Napoleon said much the same thing: "A soldier should have as much character as intelligence; those men who have much intelligence without the character are of all the least fitted for war." By character is meant moral courage, determination: for instance, readiness to put matters to the touch—an uncommon quality, for, as Napoleon observed, few Generals are eager to fight battles. These qualities of energy and pluck are features of youth, which was always on the side of Napoleon. They formed so large a part of his merit during his period of success, and decayed in him so steadily with advancing years, that there must always remain a grave doubt whether youth was not the chief factor in the triumphs of Napoleon; whether if his career as a General had commenced at the age of Cæsar or Cromwell, he would have ever been more than a capable soldier.

In his day war, as Jomini said, was "not a science, but a passionate drama." A somewhat similar idea was thus expressed by Bülow: "Genius is more a product of the will than of the light of intellect." There is more science in war now. At that time a commander could survey the whole field of battle and make his presence felt everywhere, by friend and by

foe ; his personal influence counted for a great deal. His obstinate determination would be quickly transmitted to his troops, and felt also by the enemy. A battle tended to become a contest between the moral influence of the opposing Generals. At Arcola, for instance, Napoleon brought back his troops for a third assault after two days of repulse ; then Alvinzi gave way, more from moral weariness than owing to any decided defeat in the fighting. Waterloo was a struggle between the confidence and dogged obstinacy of Wellington passed on to his soldiers, and the daring aggressiveness of Napoleon acting on his fine army. Waves of mesmeric influence emanated from the persons of these two great men, and fought out the question of supremacy in the battlefield before them.

This personal influence over his soldiers Napoleon took great pains to emphasize. By his harangues and proclamations he inspired them with his own spirit. The most famous of these was his first, on reaching his army at Nice in 1796 : " Soldiers ! you are naked, half starved. The Government owes you much and can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage you show in the midst of these rocks are admirable ; but they obtain for you no glory ; no splendour is reflected upon you. I intend to lead you to the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great towns, will be in your power ; you will get there honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage and constancy ?" On his arrival at Milan : " Soldiers ! you have descended like a torrent from the summit of the Apennines ; you have overwhelmed and dispersed all that opposed your progress. . . . Yes, soldiers ! you have indeed done much ; but much still remains to be done. . . . Then you will return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say of each of you in passing : ' He was a soldier in the army of Italy. ' " In Egypt, just before the battle of the

Pyramids he said to his army: "Remember that from the summit of these Pyramids forty centuries look down upon you."

Napoleon kept most of his officers at a distance, while surrounding himself with a small coterie of personal adherents, whom he advanced and rewarded for their loyalty. With his soldiers he was always on the best of terms. His Corsican rearing prevented any arrogance or haughtiness on his part towards them. A French officer of good birth would have had difficulty in establishing the relations of confidence and personal devotion which did so much for Napoleon.

Wellington was not loved by privates or by officers. We may deplore this in the man, but it would be a mistake to regard it as a failure in the General, for no troops could have fought better than those under his command. He got the last ounce out of them, and Napoleon never did more. It is immaterial whether victory is gained by love or by fear.

There were some similarities in the careers of these great soldiers. Wellington was born in Ireland, a small island lying about the same distance as Corsica from the larger country; he belonged, like Napoleon, to the foreign conquering race on his island, and had little of the local blood in his veins; he was born in the same year as Napoleon; his birthday, like that of Napoleon, has been disputed (with greater reason); his education, like Napoleon's, was outside his native land—at Belgium, at Angers in France, at Eton (attention has already been drawn to the immense stimulus this may give); he thus had, like Napoleon, the command of two languages. He lost his father in boyhood, at the age of twelve, while Napoleon lost his also in boyhood, at fifteen. The widowed mother was in each case left in poor circumstances with a large family. Wellington had four brothers and three sisters, which is precisely what Napoleon had. Wellington changed

his name from Wesley to Wellesley; Napoleon also changed his, from Buonaparte to Bonaparte. Wellington was a Lieutenant-Colonel at the age of twenty-four, before he had seen any fighting; Napoleon was a Lieutenant-Colonel (of volunteers) at the age of twenty-two and a half, under the same conditions. Wellington obtained his Lieutenant-Colonelcy by influence and money, Napoleon by the same means. They became Lieutenant-Colonels of regulars within one day of each other. Wellington in the early years was much absent from military discipline, and so was Napoleon. Wellington as a young officer set apart "some hours every day" (as he told Sir J. S. Kennedy) for private study, and so did Napoleon. Their early military steps were not very dissimilar :

		Wellington.			Napoleon.
Lieutenant	...	December 25, 1787	...		September 1, 1785
Captain	...	June 30, 1791	...		February 6, 1792
Lieutenant-Colonel		September 30, 1793	...		Corsican volunteers, April 1, 1792 ; French regulars, Sep- tember 29, 1793
First fighting	...	Holland, September 15, 1794			Toulon, September 16, 1793

Strangely, it may seem, both of them showed a marked taste for topography and for figures. Both gave much attention to exploration of ground and to map study; both had the gift of numbers. Wellington told the Rev. R. Gleig that his special talent was rapid and correct calculation, while Napoleon was a mathematician and seemed to think in figures. Utterly different as was their military genius, they both gained some of their early successes by the same means—by concentration in a central position between two adversaries—Wellington in the Peninsula of Spain, Napoleon in the Peninsula of Italy. Finally, it is interesting to observe that both as mature men seemed to those

about them to bear a singular physical resemblance to Julius Cæsar. Europe had to wait until these Continental-trained islanders met to decide her fate.*

Napoleon was, as he said himself at St. Helena, the boldest commander ever known. He would never attack with an inferior force if he could help it, and very seldom allowed himself to be obliged to run such a risk; but he would expose his own flank or rear, or would suddenly change his line of communications, in a way that staggered the orthodox. It was this very boldness that brought him down, so that he was heard to say after Waterloo: "The Duke of Wellington is fully equal to myself in the management of an army, with the advantage of possessing more prudence."

At the conclusion of the first Italian campaign Napoleon observed: "There are in Europe many good Generals, but they see too many things at once; as for me, I only see one thing—namely, the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves." Attack on the enemy's army had not always been the only thought of a General. In the time of Frederick the Great war was "like a game of chess, a series of methodical manœuvres by which an adversary sought to occupy the territory of his opponent, and thus compel him to make peace." But "as armies increased in size the necessity for quickly terminating the struggle, owing

* These similarities cannot all be mere coincidences; some of them must surely be the environmental factors which created genius. If these two had been changed at birth, should we have had an Irish-born Emperor of the French and a Corsican victor at Waterloo? Would environment or ancestry have gained the day in the formation of their characters? Some day we shall be able to answer such questions. At present, except where a Galton comes forward with a private endowment, there is no money for such inquiries. The influences of environment and inheritance in the case of racehorses are studied with great care; it has been found to pay. In the fulness of time human beings will have their turn.

to its costliness, became more and more evident. It is true that Marlborough showed in the Blenheim campaign that a far greater effect could be obtained from the ruin of the enemy's army than from the occupation of his country. But this principle was first elaborated and perfected by Napoleon, and in his time we no longer see war a succession of sieges, the object of which was to dominate certain tracts of country or to command roads; his object was always to destroy the field armies of his foes, and thus render them incapable of opposing his will."*

Napoleon fought to kill. In this he reflected his Corsican origin, the sanguinary, unaccommodating nature of his fellow-countrymen, and the ferocious spirit of the Revolution. In childhood and in early manhood he was in an atmosphere of deliberate, prepared, intentional murder, where defeat meant not merely loss or disgrace, but death. He carried that principle, stimulated by his desire to dominate, and by a longing for an admitted personal triumph, into war. The monarchical armies of that day, officered by aristocrats who thought much of ceremony and honour, and soldiers all hired out for pay, had developed a war of positions in which there was as little killing as possible. With a revolutionary army, on the other hand, the first object was to kill. Wellington made the significant remark that the British soldier was not a murderer. The French Republican soldier emphatically was; and it was one of the greatest merits of Napoleon as commander of these troops that he did not make war in kid gloves. Owing to his Corsican rearing, he was thoroughly in accord with the characteristic revolutionary spirit, and eminently adapted for the command of the new armies.

Moreau, in conversation with Napoleon in 1799,

* "Modern Strategy," by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. James, 1903.

remarked that it was always the greater numbers that won. To which Napoleon replied: "You are right. When, with inferior forces, I had a large army before me, I concentrated mine rapidly, and fell like lightning upon one of the enemy's wings and routed it. Then I took advantage of the confusion which this manœuvre never failed to produce in the opposing army to attack it on another point, but always with my whole force. Thus I beat it in detail, and the victory which was the result was always, as you see, the triumph of the larger over the lesser."

The carrying out of this principle was one of the secrets of Napoleon's strategy. For its execution, concentration: celerity: and superior troops are necessary. On the first point, the mass theory, Napoleon expressed himself as early as 1794 in a note on the position of the armies of Piedmont, in Spain. "Campaigns," he said, "are like a siege: we should concentrate the fire against a single point; the breach once made, equilibrium is destroyed; everything else is unimportant." General du Teil, his superior at Toulon, had advocated "concentration of fire on the weak points of the enemy" in his well-known little book on the new artillery, which Napoleon must have seen, and it may be safely assumed that Du Teil instructed him in this sense at Toulon. Concentration was pressed upon him by his artillery training, by his teacher Du Teil, and by his first experience of actual fighting, at Toulon.

Swiftness of movement was, as already noted, for the first time made possible by the new revolutionary system which Napoleon found already established—of living on the country and reducing impedimenta to the lowest possible limits.

The superior troops were given him by the Revolution.

A relative said of Napoleon in his childhood: "He

will get on—he is such a consummate liar.” This Corsican compliment was abundantly deserved. Napoleon was at his best in the art of strategy, the essence of which is surprise or deceit. The object of each General is to divine what are his opponent’s intentions, and to conceal his own. In this Napoleon was supreme. He outwitted every one of his opponents as to the direction of his attack, and in the early part of his career was seldom deceived himself. At Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, and on many other occasions of less celebrity, the blow he delivered was totally unexpected. The element of surprise was essential to his warfare. What little chance he may have had in 1815 consisted in his sudden appearance in the midst of his unprepared enemies. His favourite manœuvre was to attack the enemy in the rear, on his line of communications. Great triumphs resulted at Arcola, Marengo, Ulm, Jena, Friedland, Landshut, and lesser successes were obtained on many occasions. Of twenty-seven such characteristic attacks upon the enemy’s rear which have been counted, eight gave great results, eighteen produced minor advantages, and only one failed ; but that one, the attempt to draw off Blücher and Schwarzenburg from Paris in 1814, was fatal.*

The main Napoleonic features in war were, then, concentration ; swiftness ; attack with a superior force ; attack first upon one inferior enemy and then upon the other ; attack upon communications ; the utmost mystification as to the intended moves.

He was led to this, partly at any rate, by—

1. His artillery training. Wellington said of him that he gained most of his victories by the use of artillery.

2. The teaching of General Jean du Teil (the

* “La Guerre Napoléonienne,” by Lieutenant-Colonel Camon, 1907.

Chevalier), his superior officer at Toulon, and author of "L'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle" Of this work Colin* says: "Good sense, perception clearness, absolutely distinguished Chevalier du Teil from the other military writers of the day. What he wrote is in exact agreement with the kind of warfare that was to be made from 1792 to 1815, and the few essential principles which he brings to light are precisely those which will form the essence of the Napoleonic method: to have the numerical superiority, to concentrate your efforts, to attack the enemy in flank or in rear, to surprise him both by the assured secrecy of your preparations and by your rapidity of execution." There is the very spirit of war as it was conceived of by Napoleon's teacher Du Teil, and carried out by the pupil.

3. The example of Toulon, with its successful concentration of attack upon Eguillette, and resultant position on the line of the enemy's retreat.

4. The war in the mountains in 1794 and 1795, where frontal attacks had to be abandoned for flank and turning movements.

5. The poverty of France, which made it necessary that the armies should live on the country, thus producing a reduction of the impedimenta which gave great mobility.

6. The divisions of the enemy, which encouraged, almost dictated, a swift attack first upon one and then on the other. Napoleon was prevented from making the mistake of dividing his own forces by his inferiority in numbers to his enemies when combined and superiority to each when separate.

7. The Battle of Loano, November, 1795, had shown the value of the manœuvre that Napoleon four years later spoke of to Moreau. Massena attacked the Austrian flank and centre, much as Rodney, Howe, and Nelson did at sea—by breaking the line, and falling

* "L'Éducation Militaire de Napoléon," 1901, p. 99.

with an overwhelming force upon one wing. As Alison observes: "Such a plan will never be adopted but by the party by whom superiority in combat is felt; it will never be successful but where such a superiority exists"—as it did in the French revolutionary army.

Napoleon was presented by Fortune with exceptional opportunities for learning these lessons before he had to try his own powers in command. Throughout his successful career he remained an exponent of the principles which were thus early thrust upon his notice.

But at the early age of forty, in the prime of life, the genius of Napoleon had already begun to fade. He had less energy, allowed himself to be influenced by his own physical inclinations, or by an inclement season. So entirely had his standpoint changed from youth to middle age, that at St. Helena we find him excusing his failures in Russia and Flanders by talk of the weather.

He was still able to work out a plan of campaign for deceiving his adversary and effecting a surprise, but his old fault of careless execution was growing. He had always lacked patience, watchful care, and, as he himself admitted, prudence. During the advance to Moscow, during the retreat at Leipzig, at Waterloo, and even much earlier at Acre, he wasted the lives of his troops by precipitate, headstrong attack, without the necessary precautions and preparations, and failed to make proper provision for retreat. The desire to gain victory at the decisive point had degenerated into a mere massing of force, and launching it in a certain direction, regardless of obstacles and without thought of repulse. He now carried concentration to a fatal extreme.

At St. Helena he admitted this error. He said: "As armies increased in size, we took to columns

of too large a size, induced by the desire of having the greatest possible masses disposable under one's hand. Instead of being in columns of single battalions on a double-company front, we often were in columns of twelve battalions on a battalion front, which is an enormous difference. It was above all at Albuera, at Moskowa, and at Waterloo that we incurred this reproach."

It was not only the growing size of armies that caused the degeneration of the admirable revolutionary tactics; nor was it the inferior quality of the later conscripts that induced this mistake, for even the Guards advanced in enormous depth. The French had often found that the mere density of the approaching mass sufficed to disperse the enemy, and they increased it till it was unwieldy and of little fighting value just at the time when their opponents were beginning to stand up against it. Those who held their ground against a division column had their reward, for they could from a long line pour an extensive converging fire on the solid mass, which could reply but feebly from a portion only of its outer surface. While the men in the interior were non-combatants, those on the exposed faces were being shot down.

The English system beat the French over and over again in the Peninsula. In spite of what his Marshals told him, and regardless of the obvious merits of the case, which were easy to perceive, and had to be admitted when too late, Napoleon persisted in sending deep columns of infantry against the English line of muskets, and when the columns recoiled he merely repeated the error. He went on to the last using the system he had been taught as a boy, which had succeeded on many a battlefield in Europe. He exaggerated it until it had lost all virtue, and then applied it against the best troops in Europe, whose

method of reply had proved sufficient on many occasions.*

He made the most elaborate and minute preparations for the supply of the huge army he proposed to employ in the Russian campaign of 1812. He had already in 1809, with an army of 200,000 men, found himself in a perilous position owing to commissariat difficulties. He had seen his Marshals obliged to give way in Spain owing to the deliberate devastation of the country by the inhabitants. Yet, in spite of all his study of the subject, he failed to foresee that his troops would melt away during the advance into Russia. He had come to imagine that events would always go according to his wishes, so he assumed that his preparations were adequate, and that food would be found.

He also now fell into traps set by his opponents. In 1813 he was out-manceuvred by the Allies. His judgment of men became at fault. He was confident that Alexander would make peace in 1812; did not believe the Allies would persevere in 1813 and 1814; imagined that one battle gained would dissolve the coalition; was quite sure Blücher would not support Wellington in 1815.

Military critics, from the two great contemporaries, Jomini and Clausewitz, to the modern Yorck v. Wartenburg, point to numerous examples of grave blunders in the later campaigns,† some of them recalling the very mistakes for which he had despised his sexagenarian and septuagenarian opponents in the early days. He had become irresolute; liable to lay

* Wellington was consistently successful against French troops by keeping his line protected as long as possible from the enemy's artillery, and by sending out skirmishers superior in numbers to the French.

† "It was only the most glaring military errors that caused his final crushing defeat at Leipzig" (Yorck v. Wartenburg, *op. cit.*, ii. 356).

emphasis on non-essentials, to think too much of appearances ; was often too late in his moves. There was less character and determination. He allowed himself to be put off his best line of retreat from Moscow by the mere appearance of an opposition which would never have been maintained.

If this deterioration was due to increasing age, if he was too old for war at forty, his opponents, who had always been much older, must have been totally incapacitated by the same cause, and there could never have been any credit or glory in beating them. No physical decay was visible ; he could still pass many hours in the saddle every day ; and he himself boasted at St. Helena that he had never known mental fatigue.

He admitted at St. Helena that in 1815 (and no doubt in 1813 also) he had lost some of his former confidence. But here again, if we are to excuse his defeats by the natural dejection following on the disasters of 1812, we must make even greater allowance for his opponents, who had far more cause to be dispirited by their early failures, by the prestige of Napoleon, and the successes of the French arms.

After Tilsit, and especially after the Austrian marriage, Napoleon was suffering from conceit and pride ; the pressure of his crown stopped the free working of his brain. Ten years of power, from the age of thirty to forty, had changed him from a strenuous, hard worker, who studied the situation with great care, to a self-willed despot, who expected everything to go as he wished because he wished it, and imagined himself a being apart from mankind, endowed with supernatural powers. While appearing to consider only actual conditions, he lived in a world of hallucinations. This result was to be expected from the Auxonne notes, in which he is seen making the facts of history follow his desire. He had not been, like Johnson, conscious of his intention "not to let the Whig dogs

have it." He did not realize his weakness ; thought he was a relentless pursuer of truth, when he was merely seeking the gratification of his prejudices. The disease was to be fatal to him. He said of himself that "he was of all men the greatest slave of a pitiless master—of the calculation of events and the consideration of the real meaning of facts."* Bourrienne, who left him as early as 1802, said : "Although he was the most matter-of-fact man probably that ever existed, yet I have never known anyone who allowed himself more easily to be carried away by the charms of imagination. In many circumstances wishing and believing were for him one and the same thing." A matter-of-fact man, with whom wishing and believing are often the same thing, is just the ordinary person who accepts facts only when he feels so inclined. Except during the period of struggling, after he had been driven from his native land and was an exile seeking his fortune, Napoleon was not the slave of any facts contrary to his wishes, and that means that his imagination and passions were for the greater part of his life the dominant motive of his actions. Mathematicians sometimes combine a disconcerting, brusque plainness of statement with the most fantastic ideas as to actual conditions. Their simple arithmetic is an austerity which seems to permit in the higher mathematics any orgies of imaginative self-indulgence. From the sober prose of two and two make four they wander to realms of phantasy tricked out in hypothesis and symbols, and run a grave risk of regarding probabilities, possibilities, imagined states under certain assumed conditions, as immediate realities.

Napoleon endeavoured to make it appear that he was primarily interested in questions of government and internal policy, and regarded foreign war as an unpleasant interruption to his work in France. His

* Correspondence to King of Würtemberg, September 30, 1806.

pose was that of the civilian longing for peace, but forced to war by the enemies of his country, and he declared that the *Code Napoléon* would be remembered when his victories were forgotten.

His task in France was to bring order out of a chaos so terrible and extraordinary that it is not easy now to realize it.

He came just at the right time, obtaining advantages such as none of the preceding Governments—whether of Louis XVI., of the Committee of National Safety, of the Directors—had enjoyed. Passions had cooled. A non-partisan and national policy was now for the first time possible, and the greatest difficulty in the way of reform—the existence of vested interests and of deep prejudices—had already been overcome. He had an opportunity such as, perhaps, no man in history has ever had. Every institution had been overturned and, to make matters still easier, countless experiments had been tried. In all this he had taken no part, and was committed to no principles or parties. Being a Corsican, he could observe affairs in a really impartial, detached spirit, and, coming fresh upon the scene, he had no past declarations and associations to inconvenience him.

But the most important matter, after all, was the iron will. Napoleon was able to make himself obeyed. After so much change, so much bickering and quarrelling, France was prepared to welcome any system that promised to be final. The country longed for a master. Napoleon was in every fibre of his being a despot, and the man for the position.

Many of the institutions that he founded have endured to this day. He established the code of laws that bears his name, presiding at the discussions and making remarks which greatly impressed Thibaudeau and others who were present; but his own contributions to the code were few, and by no means of special

merit. He supplied the driving power. That is his title to fame, and a very real one it is.

He arranged a concordat with the Church, reinstating the Catholic religion. His remark that he might have established the Protestant religion if he had so desired exhibits in its fullest degree the intense longing of France for a settlement of disputes, and the extraordinary power that the dictator found in his hands, unexampled in the history of civilized States.

He centralized local government, giving great power to the Prefects, and doing away with the electoral machinery of the Jacobins. He declared a general amnesty to *émigrés*. He inaugurated the Legion of Honour. He established the Bank of France. He reorganized education, in a dragooning spirit, hostile to mental independence, so that "French thought, which had been the most ardently speculative in Europe, speedily became vapid and mechanical."*

"In some respects," says Dr. Rose, "the new laws and customs associated with Napoleon may be described as making for progress. Their establishment gave to the Revolution that solidity which it had previously lacked"; but "the very spirit and life of that great movement were benumbed by the personality and actions of Napoleon. . . . The consolidation of revolutionary France was effected by a process nearly akin to petrification."

Of the Continental system Dr. Rose says:† "Any other unit among earth's millions would have been convinced of the futility of the whole enterprise." His aim was "to conquer the sea by the land," by closing Europe to British goods. It was his old mistaken idea, derived from his reading at Auxonne. He thought that commercial England would sue for peace if her trade was hurt, while agricultural Europe could do

* "The Life of Napoleon I.," by Dr. J. H. Rose, vol. i., p. 257.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 233.

without trade. The commercial effects of his Continental system were that England obtained the monopoly of non-European trade and fattened upon it, while Europe was cut off from all overseas trade except what was smuggled in from England, and that prices in Europe were consequently very much higher than in England. It is difficult to understand how a man of Napoleon's genius for war could have so failed to understand the simplest commercial matters. There was a singular inability on his part to throw off the ideas of his youth, however patent may have been the error. He was quite incapable of learning on such a subject, and went on with his Continental system long after it was obvious that it had failed. English goods could not be kept out of France itself, still less from other parts of the Continent; if they could have been, France and the Continent would have suffered as much as, or more than, England. Napoleon seems to have imagined that the whole profit in an exchange goes to the seller of goods for money.

Napoleon's genius was military. Of his civil reforms the most to be said is that they "may, on the whole, be described as making for progress." His brother Joseph, with far inferior powers and opportunities, achieved something very similar in Naples. To write well on a *tabula rasa*, a smooth surface, should not be very difficult. The occasions for attempting it occur so seldom that the results obtained seem more wonderful than they are.

CHAPTER IX

THE LUCK OF GENIUS

GENIUS, like every other quality, is the product of inheritance modified by environment.

The body is less sensitive to environmental influence than the mind, and the range of its experiences is comparatively small, while the mind responds instantly and vividly to an infinite succession of ever-varying stimuli. The body always shows marks of its ancestry, but the mind, in spite of its close association with the body, often exhibits no trace of inherited faculties. Twins could be so reared from childhood that physically there should be a strong resemblance and mentally a complete divergence. Even as it is, brought up as a rule in closest intimacy, bodily resemblance remains far more marked than mental.

Growth is accompanied by an incessant adaptation to environment. Certain influences appear with frequency, and produce, by repeated impression, a mental experience and a mental tendency or bias, which, if uncorrected by a hostile influence, develop into a formed feature in the character; and then the character, though still sensitive, is able to retaliate upon and influence environment, and change its incidence. The first results are produced by the action of environment upon inheritance; thus an acquired character is made; and then these factors act and react upon each other, the acquired character ever growing more and more independent of the other two.

The effect of environment cannot always be foreseen. Apparently evil influences sometimes produce good results. Quarrelling or drunken parents as a rule produce similarly afflicted children; but it happens sometimes that the child is gradually inoculated, so as to be able to throw off such influences—first in the home, and then under any similar extraneous trials. Carefully regulated inoculation against specific and prevalent mental diseases should give valuable results. When we see men reared in a fetid atmosphere develop into giants—a workhouse child becoming a Stanley—it is probable that early inoculation has given immunity in subsequent life, while others, more sheltered in childhood, are upset by the unaccustomed poison.

As yet only the very first steps have been taken in the study of mental growth and mental heredity. We know that a grown genius had at birth the capacity of making such growth, but we do not know whether such birthday gift is rare or common, nor do we know how many adult persons in a community have a developed genius. Perhaps, as each human being is unique, every man must have in some direction an ability superior to that of all other men. Hence every man must be a genius, and the difference between Napoleon and Nemo must be that Napoleon's genius was of use, while that of Nemo was either valueless or inappropriate. The modern golfer, who was described as having a "genius for seeing short holes" when laying out a course, would have been out of place and unnoticed a hundred years ago.

For the healthy growth of the mind the two great deflectors, prejudice and prose, must be got rid of. Hostility to certain aspects of a question, hostility gradually acquired and long since ingrained, and the restless and unsatisfied vanity which creates a disturbing anxiety for public appreciation—these are the influences which clog men's brains. The rare

occasions when they are absent from one cause or another are the lucid intervals of mankind. A man in that state, merely unprejudiced and unaffected, is sane; his judgment being unimpaired, he sees clearly and correctly. This condition is so rare and its effect so startling that it appears like a God-given inspiration.

Genius is sanity, though it may be found in a madman; it is merely looking straight. The average man, when such a being can be found, is a genius; he is the furthest possible from the extremes. He is always exactly right, hitting the bull's-eye at every shot.

Napoleon at his best—for even the greatest men miss the target altogether sometimes—was such a man. He developed into a genius because at one time or other of his growth, probably in early childhood, he acquired the habit of placing himself in a good position for absorbing impressions, incessantly adjusting himself to his experiences. Sometimes the reaction was sluggish, sometimes it was overdone; but, whatever may have been the vicissitudes, it was on the whole more sympathetic than with most men. Sometimes, when the pressure was of a malignant nature, a hostile reaction occurred, which ended in repulse of the evil, and left a salted condition, an enhanced power of resistance to a second attack. This may be how genius grows and survives.

Perhaps, after all, the lifelong habit of sympathetic acceptance of good influences and prompt rejection of bad is due to the fortunately helpful character of the influences themselves, or to the fortunate manner of their presentation—in other words, to luck, that is, environment.

Poeta nascitur *et* fit—Genius must be not only born, but made. A short summary of what has been advanced concerning Napoleon's environment during the growing years will help to explain the process of manufacture in his case.

Napoleon is said to have been delicate during the first two years of his life, and of a sweet and gentle disposition; then, as he became more hardy and vigorous, he developed an intractable temper. Something must have occurred to produce this change. A third child, a girl, came when Napoleon was two, and diverted his mother's attention from him. Perhaps there was also a change of nurse; the teething may just then have concluded or become more troublesome, or there may have been other disturbances of health. Whatever the cause, he was from this time forward of an irritable temperament. All the Bonapartes had tempers; even Joseph was capable of a violent explosion; but Napoleon gave freer vent to his feelings than the rest.

Though not much below the general average of height, Napoleon at 5 feet 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches was the shortest of the Bonapartes. Allowing for the sex difference, he was not up to the standard of his mother, and much below that of his decidedly tall father; he was, for a Bonaparte, markedly short. Some of the fatigue of body growth is felt by the mind, and the less such growth the less such disturbance. Napoleon probably experienced in childhood much less of the sensation—often unconscious—of tiredness than did his taller brothers. Shortness and activity are often found together.

Another effect of shortness is the growth of a desire for self-assertion, caused by unsatisfied vanity. A spirit of jealous rivalry, of conceit and aggression, is formed in small men, while the taller men are more self-complacent. The activity and the desire for personal triumphs, which are characteristic of the short, are essential for a career such as that of Napoleon.

Napoleon, like his mother, bolted his food, and remained only a very short time at table. Prudent men, when invited to dine at the Imperial table, would

take their necessary sustenance before arrival, knowing that there would be no time to make a reasonable meal before the Emperor would rise and put an end to the banquet. But, unlike his mother, who declared she always left the table before her appetite was completely satisfied, Napoleon ate greedily of the most savoury meat dishes, and gave full vent to the desire of the moment. Wine he took sparingly, and always diluted with the same quantity of water, a habit inculcated at the Military College. Though he suffered from occasional bilious attacks, he was not conscious of any chronic stomach disturbance; but it is probable that his organism was kept on the stretch by the efforts that had to be made to deal with the indigestible material presented. That such a physical condition would react on the character may be safely assumed. It would tend to produce outbreaks of violent nervous irritation. Napoleon's other irregularities of habit may have helped to give him his short stature, his concentrated, irritable energy, and his periods of slackness.

Although of Ligurian blood, being reared in Corsica Napoleon acquired from his environment the Corsican qualities so valuable for a soldier—audacity, obstinacy, guile. The Corsicans, as Rousseau and Boswell agreed, have the stuff in them; they have character, which is the most important of all qualities in a commander of troops. Napoleon acquired the Corsican form of insular tenacity—that instinct for ruse and audacity which the continual rivalry of families always produces in an isolated community—during the first nine years of his life, and strengthened it by visits to the island at the age of seventeen and upwards.

During the Corsican childhood his position was that of the second son. He was the youngest for two years, and then became for a short time the middle of three, but the third was a girl; then he was the second of four until the death of the little girl. From that time

he was emphatically the second—near the eldest, and far from the third. The effect was to make him aggressive and ambitious. He was incessantly striving to keep up with or surpass the eldest; and every success was a triumph, while each failure had its excuse. He thus acquired self-confidence from his contests with Joseph, while escaping discomfiture and depression from any similar approach of the distant Lucien upon his own position.

The influence of a mother is enormous. Mentally and morally, as Napoleon himself said, the child is the product of the example and teaching of his mother. That Letizia's influence was good is proved by the successes of her children, and also by their admiration and respect for her, an unfailing and decisive testimony of the mother's ability. She had a strong, determined character. Probably she had many tussles with Napoleon. She was able to impose her will upon him, if necessary, by a corporal correction which Napoleon has told us was an experience to remember. She was devoted and unselfish, and did not spare herself any toil for her children. She was "tender and severe," and would put up with nothing that she thought unworthy. As a mother it is plain that she was of exceptional merit; but mothering is a subject which has still to be studied. Very little is known of the details of Letizia's influence upon her children. Their defects of temper, their self-indulgence, callousness, pride, may have been her work. She taught them respect for her and self-confidence—two essentials. Her severe and classic beauty was probably itself an inspiration to them all.

The beauty of the mother, the handsome figure, accomplishments, and public distinctions of the father, gave the family a valuable self-respect and an honourable pride. Probably there was in the home atmosphere a sense of the worthiness and merit of the

family, and a feeling that it was the duty of each member to improve the family status, with a conviction that success was assured. There was probably also an intellectual ferment; for the father was a man of culture and intellect, and the French conquest, the opening of France as a career, the political discussions of the time, in which Corsica so often figured, must have been frequent subjects of debate. The father was anticlerical, and, as Napoleon said, would have been an ardent supporter of the Revolution. The new ideas were, we may be sure, discussed with energy in the Bonaparte house, with a father who set the example of expressing personal views, and encouraged the children to be unorthodox, to venture to differ from the generality. For mental growth it is of immense importance to hear and take part in frequent arguments, thus acquiring a confidence in one's own opinions, tempered by respect for the views of others. The father was ambitious, discontented, an intriguer; he kept up an interminable lawsuit against the Jesuits concerning an alleged inheritance. He created a feeling in the family that the Bonapartes were people of greater importance than was recognized, a highly stimulating sentiment for children. Carlo's connection with Paoli, the great Corsican hero, in his patriotic fight for freedom—a recent event—must have made a deep impression upon the children, especially upon the child who was destined for an adventurous career.

The date of Napoleon's birth was for that and other reasons advantageous. If he had been born a few years earlier he would have been educated in Corsica, and would have become provincial and undesirably insular; he would have missed the very important change of scene in the most impressionable years. One of the few facts which appear to have been established with regard to genius is that it has a

marked tendency to appear among those who in youth have experienced entirely distinct sets of conditions, by a change of domicile from one country to another. Early transplanting, as all gardeners know, makes for a sturdy growth. The capacity for movement is indeed what distinguishes plants from stones, animals from plants, men from animals, civilization from barbarism. To spend childhood in one country, boyhood in another, early manhood in first one and then the other, as Napoleon did, is highly stimulating and broadening. All the Bonapartes received part of their education in France. Excluding Jerome, who never had to fend for himself, the relative ability of the brothers may almost be stated in terms of the duration and frequency of their visits to France. Louis had least of these advantages, Napoleon most.

If he had been born much later the education in France would no longer have been a novelty among Corsican boys, and would have lost some of its beneficial excitement and importance. The Bonapartes felt themselves exceptional children, moving in the great world. The date of Napoleon's birth being contemporaneous with the French conquest, it was still a recent event when he went, as a sort of hostage, into the camp of the conquerors. He was the first Corsican to be educated at the expense of the French King, and the first to obtain a commission in the French Army from the Military College, Paris. He was thus from the outset, at the commencement of his school-days, marked out from other Corsicans. He and Joseph and Lucien had all to contend with the jeering of the triumphant French boys, a hard trial, which stiffened the Corsican nature. Their ignorance of French forced them to a solitude which strengthened and formed the character. All three developed abilities much above the average, while their younger brothers, who had no such educating trials, remained ordinary Bonapartes.

Of the three eldest, Napoleon's experiences were the most hardening and the most stimulating.

The great position in the world taken by Paoli, and the democratic institutions of their country, tended to give the Bonapartes an insular pride and self-confidence, and an intolerance of the French aristocratic hauteur and assumption of superiority. The natural aggressiveness of a second son was increased by these factors. It was to be expected that he would hate the French, and be inspired with a determination to get the better of them.

The importance of each day of growth being greater than that of the next following day, Napoleon's first nine years in Corsica would not be wiped out by the next seven and a half in France. While in France his domicile, with the intention of returning, was in Corsica, and it was not till he was a grown man that he found himself compelled, most reluctantly, to adopt the character of a Frenchman. Till then he had hoped either for a purely Corsican life, or for a military career in France broken in upon by frequent and lengthy holidays in Corsica. He was to be, like some of the foremost heroes in the history of his country, a Corsican in the employ of France. Even as it was, the first nine years of Corsican childhood made him once for all a Corsican, and he never became anything else. He was all his life semi-European, a stranger and intruder; hence the readiness with which he looked to the East for an alternative career. He was able to regard French affairs from a detached, unbiassed point of view, and had thus an immense advantage over the prejudiced and impassioned Frenchmen themselves. The real secret of much of his success in France and in Europe was his native impartiality.

The poverty of his father made it necessary that Napoleon, when the naval career had been abandoned for the army, should enter one of the scientific corps,

in which wealth and influence were not all-important—the engineers or artillery. To pass the required standard he had to work. His journey from Corsica and the natural curiosity of an islander with regard to the Continent gave him a taste for geography; his want of French made all studies difficult, except mathematics, to which he devoted most of his attention, especially as it was the most important subject for the examination. His geography and mathematics, thus forced upon him in youth, are clearly visible throughout his military career.

At Auxonne he was in one of the best military schools in the world. He was now a confirmed worker, and, being poor, with no opportunity for distraction in the dull little town, he spent much of his spare time in writing and note-taking, thus keeping up habits of mental activity and curiosity which are too often dropped after the period of examinations is passed.

Returning to his home after a long absence, his father being dead, Joseph a very young head of the family, Napoleon, with his French uniform, his French speech and Continental acquirements, was a person of domestic importance and of local celebrity. Ajaccio was interested in the young officer, and the Bonaparte influence expanded. The two eldest boys were urged to worthy conduct by the responsibility that fell upon them towards their widowed mother and the fatherless children, and the consciousness that the Bonaparte fortunes were in their hands. The removal of the father in such circumstances acted as a potent stimulus upon Joseph and Napoleon.

These long absences from the military routine were of great value in retaining mental elasticity. Freedom and discipline are both essential, in due proportion, for healthy growth. It was one of Napoleon's great advantages that in a time of wild ideas he had to

submit to military discipline, while the undue stiffness and loss of pliability which generally supervene were kept off by prolonged spells of civil life. He returned to his regiment freshened by the long and happy holiday in his genial, beautiful country, and then continued his reading and note-taking, and also tried original writings.

Then followed the excitements of the French Revolution, which was fashioning men of power out of the most unlikely material. Every ardent young man was burning to distinguish himself. Napoleon's journeys during this period of phenomenal disturbance—from Corsica to France and back again, into and out of the whirlpool—gave him experiences of immense value: they taught him to look at events from a detached, extraneous point of view, to withdraw the gaze when it was becoming stony, and return again with fresh eyes. To give breadth of vision, power of impersonal, dispassionate observation, coupled with comprehension derived from a varied experience, no education could have been more valuable. Even in time of perfect calm a gradually enhanced intelligence would result. In a period of unexampled excitement the discipline must have been most powerful.

Napoleon, like his brothers and all Corsicans who were not under the influence of the clergy, was inevitably a supporter of the Revolution in its early stages. When he found himself stranded in France in the height of the Terror, though his opinions may have been loosened by what he saw, he could not afford to consider anything but his personal safety and fortune. Robespierre junior was the most influential man he came across, and to him he was able to give full adherence. When the Terror was over, the army without trained officers, and he himself under a cloud, the question of political principles was thrust aside altogether, and personal considerations alone guided

him. An exile from his home, he was now a desperate adventurer, determined to rise at any cost. He kept pushing himself forward, writing out and submitting unauthorized plans of campaign, until his industry had its reward and he obtained his great opportunity. Then the inspiring influence of Josephine brought out the utmost of his power, and his genius was in full blast.

These were the factors that helped to make him a genius. But how came he to be Emperor of the French? What were the circumstances that provided the opportunity of exhibiting his genius? In the fewest words they were: Date of birth, which made him the right age when he took the Italian command; exile from Corsica and safe position in France as a Corsican patriot; French Revolution and emigration of officers; consequent promotion, and possession of rare military training; chronic state of war; patronage of Saliceti, his fellow-countryman; opportunity at Toulon, owing to wounding of artillery officer Dommartin; connection with the army of Italy, owing to Corsican birth; experience in making plans of campaign for that army, and opportunity for observing the results without risk to his reputation; plan-making in Paris (earned by previous experience); introduction to influential persons in Paris; extraordinary opportunity at Vendémiaire, helped by Corsican origin and by desperate personal position; knowledge of the situation of the army of Italy, acquaintance with the Italian language, Italian name—all leading to the Italian command; independence of the commander of the army of Italy (unlike rival commanders on the Rhine); date of appointment coinciding with general adoption of forward policy; inferior education of French rivals; social position of "petty gentility," which helped him with the soldiers; youth of French officers; superior spirit and ability of French officers

and men ; superior tactics of French army ; mobility of French troops ; senility of opposing Generals ; their need of freedom from central authorities ; their separated armies ; jealousies of the various European States, and their inability to combine ; and, finally, the Corsican and gentle birth—not plebeian, nor noble, nor French—which made him acceptable as ruler of France.

The great stage on which he stood, the importance to mankind of his actions, the submissive obedience with which his orders were received, the success and the dominance of the man, have made it difficult to form a sane and just estimate of his powers. One of the ablest and most conscientious of modern Napoleonists, a great admirer of the “superhuman” hero, has said :*

“Never had mortal man so grand an opportunity of ruling over a chaotic continent ; never had any great leader antagonists so feeble as the rulers who opposed his rush to supremacy. At the dawn of the nineteenth century the old monarchies were effete. Insanity reigned in four dynasties, and weak or time-serving counsels swayed the remainder. For several years their counsellors and generals were little better. Napoleon never came face to face with thoroughly able, well-equipped, and stubborn opponents until the year 1812.”

If, as we believe, the above remarks contain the essential truths, it only remains to add that from the time when the European Dictator first met a capable enemy to his abdication was a period of less than two years. The first serious opposition brought him down, in that short space of time, from the highest summits of power to a life of vegetation upon an obscure little island.

His peculiar combination of military genius, civilian disinterestedness, and domineering will, were exactly

* “The Life of Napoleon,” by Dr. J. H. Rose, vol. ii., p. 573.

what France wanted. These qualities happened to be singularly appropriate to the time and place, and he had the remarkable fortune to be given the opportunity to display them on a great stage.

Of the factors which went to furnish his extraordinarily apposite endowment, perhaps the chief of all was his position in age and sex in the Bonaparte nursery, especially in relation to Joseph. That gave him the first essential—the desire to succeed and to dominate.

And what caused his fall was the same quality in excess, developed into overweening conceit and pride.



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
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